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PREFACE 
 
Since the late 1980s, agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) has been under considerable adjustment pressure due to changing 
political, economic and institutional environments. These changes have been linked 
to the transition process, as well as the ongoing integration into the European Union 
and the world market. Reduced subsidies, increased environmental and food quality 
demands, as well as structural changes in the supply, processing and food retailing 
sector call for major structural adjustments and the improvement of farmers’ 
managerial abilities. Though such changes always carry significant threats to farms, 
they also offer new opportunities for the farms' entrepreneurial engagement. 
Upcoming changes in the agricultural environment and their possible 
consequences for farm structures across Europe are thus still timely subjects.  
The objective of the IAMO Forum 2006 is to contribute to the success of 
agriculture in the CEECs, as well as their neighboring countries, in today’s 
increasingly competitive environment. Concrete questions the conference focuses 
on are: What are the most suitable farm organizations, cooperative arrangements 
and contractual forms? How to improve efficiency and productivity? Where do 
market niches lie and what are the new product demands?  
This book contains 33 invited and selected contributions. These papers will be 
presented at the IAMO Forum 2006 in order to offer a platform for scientists, 
practitioners and policy-makers to discuss challenges and potential strategies at 
the farm, value chain, rural society and policy levels in order to cope with the 
upcoming challenges.  
IAMO Forum 2006, as well as this book, would not have been possible without 
the engagement of many people and institutions. We thank the authors of the 
submitted abstracts and papers, as well as the referees, for their evaluation of the 
abstracts from which the papers were selected. In particular, we would like to 
express our thanks to OLIVER JUNGKLAUS, GABRIELE MEWES, KLAUS REINSBERG 
and ANGELA SCHOLZ, who significantly contributed to the organization of the 
Forum. Furthermore, our thanks goes to SILKE  SCHARF  for her work on the 
layout and editing support of this book, and to JIM CURTISS, JAMIE BULLOCH, 
and DÓNALL Ó MEARÁIN for their English proof-reading. As experience from 
previous years documents, the course of the IAMO Forum continues to profit Jarmila Curtiss, Alfons Balmann, Kirsti Dautzenberg, Kathrin Happe 
 
VIII 
from the support and engagement of the IAMO administration, which we 
gratefully acknowledge. Last but not least, we are very grateful to the Robert 
Bosch Foundation, the Federal Ministry of Nutrition, Agriculture and Consumer 
Protection (BMELV), the German Research Foundation (DFG), the Haniel 
Foundation and the Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and 
Eastern Europe (IAMO) for their respective financial support.  
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INSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
  Agriculture in the Face of Changing Markets, Institutions and Policies: Challenges and Strategies 
JARMILA CURTISS, ALFONS BALMANN, KIRSTI DAUTZENBERG, KATHRIN HAPPE (eds., 2006) 
Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Central and Eastern Europe, Vol. 33, Halle (Saale), IAMO, pp. 3-29. 
THE SUCCESS OF GRADUALISM:  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM CHINA’S AGRICULTURAL REFORM 
 
JIKUN HUANG
*, JOHAN F. M. SWINNEN
 **, SCOTT ROZELLE
*** 
1  INTRODUCTION 
At its most basic level the Big Bang versus Gradualism debate can be 
characterized by two questions. Should reforming nations lead with radical 
market liberalization policies? Or, should institutions that offer strong 
incentives to those involved with economic activity be fostered and be allowed 
to evolve before central planning is dismantled and markets are unleashed?  
While the debate has raged for more than 10 years, there has been little 
progress in understanding exactly what has accounted for the success of 
countries that adopted gradualism and why most countries that began their 
reforms with market liberalization have not enjoyed rapid growth. Most 
explanations of the success of gradualism relative to Big Bang reform have 
discussed which nations have grown faster: Countries like those in East Asia 
that adopted gradual reform policies, or those in Europe that began with radical 
liberalization policies (ROLAND and VERDIER, 1999). According to most any 
performance criteria, East Asian gradualism is the clear winner (MACOURS and 
SWINNEN, 2000). In response, researchers that still believe in the necessity of 
Big Bang reforms argue that the comparison of East Asia and Europe is not 
valid because of structural differences in the economies (SACHS  and WOO, 
1994).  
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Despite great interest among academics and policymakers, progress in settling 
the debate has stalled, almost certainly because few researchers have been able 
to empirically isolate the factors that have contributed to the performance of 
the different transitional economies. So, in a sense, the goal of this paper is to 
respond to this lack of evidence; our paper seeks to empirically substantiate 
that the sequencing of policies in transitional economies matters. While our 
study is limited to the case of China’s agricultural sector and its reforms, we 
argue that our findings offer support for explaining why gradualism works. We 
also draw heavily on comparison to other transitional countries in East Asia 
and Europe to illustrate China’s strategy. 
To meet our goal, we pursue three objectives. First, we briefly delineate the 
record of China during the reforms. In order to put this record into a 
comparative perspective, we compare China’s achievements to various other 
transition countries. Second, we examine the policy changes that China has 
made to achieve such an outstanding result. Although there are many factors 
that have affected growth in production and productivity, we focus three: 
Changes in price policy, property rights shifts and market liberalization reform 
measures. Finally, we offer estimates of the magnitudes of returns to these 
three policy changes. 
2 THE RISE AND FALL OF PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY IN 
CHINA 
Remarkable differences can be observed when examining the performance of 
agriculture between China and other transition countries during the first decade 
of reform (ROZELLE  and SWINNEN, 2003).
1 From the start of the reforms, 
output increases rapidly in China (Table  1). In China output increases by 
60 percent. While output in other Asian transition countries, such as Vietnam, 
also rises sharply (e.g., it increases by nearly 40 percent), outside of East Asia 
agricultural output trends follow a different set of contours. Production falls 
steeply in the first years of transition in almost all CEE and CIS countries.  
Productivity trends tell a somewhat different story of how transition affects 
agricultural performance. While productivity trends evolve similarly to output 
in certain countries, strongly diverging patterns emerge in others.
2 In China, 
                                                 
1  The material in this section is from ROZELLE and SWINNEN, 2003. 
2  We examine three sets of productivity indicators: Labor productivity (output per unit of 
labor use), yields (output per unit of land), and TFP. While the most comprehensive 
indicator of productivity is TFP, comparative and reliable estimates of TFP are scarce, 
because of data and methodological problems. For some transition countries TFP measures 
and the data needed to calculate TFP measures are simply not available. For those 
countries in which TFP series are available, in some cases, comparisons have to be done 
carefully because of differences in methodologies, time frames, and sampling and 
commodity coverage. Information for the partial productivity measures is more readily The success of gradualism: Empirical evidence from China’s agricultural reform  5
for the entire reform period, trends in agricultural labor productivity (ALP), 
measured as output per farm worker, parallel those of output (Table 2). The 
output per labor unit rises rapidly in China. Like China, ALP of farm 
households in Vietnam rises steadily albeit less so than the case of China. The 
path of ALP for Russia also mirror those of the nation’s output, falling between 
35 and 50 percent between 1990 and 1999. Agricultural labor productivity trends 
for several CEE countries, however, differ from those of output. The dramatic 
reduction in the use of agricultural labor drives the rise of ALP in the Central 
European countries. It also is partly behind the rise in China. In Vietnam and 
Russia, however, the transition of labor out of agricultural does not happen and 
so ALP does not improve. 
The performance of yields parallel those of ALP (Table 3). In China yields 
increase rapidly from the beginning of transition, rising by 12 percent annually 
during the first 5 years after reform. Between 5 and 10 years after reform, 
yields continue to rise, although the rate of rise slows. These rises were also 
experienced in Vietnam (PINGALI and XUAN, 1992). In contrast, average yields 
fall during the first few years after reform for all CEE and Russia. 
Interestingly, as in the case of labor productivity, after the initial post-
transition years, the paths of yields differ strongly between CEE and Russia.  
Although it is possible that partial and more complete measures of productivity 
move in opposite directions, most of the evidence from the literature shows 
that, in fact, total factor productivity (TFP) trends move largely in the same 
direction as the partial measures (Table 4). Several series of TFP estimates 
have been produced for China’s agriculture (MCMILLAN, WHALLEY and ZHU, 
1989; FAN, 1991; LIN, 1992; WEN, 1993; HUANG and ROZELLE, 1996; FAN, 
1997; JIN et al., 2002 – see rows 1 to 5 for Jin et al’s estimates). The studies 
uniformly demonstrate that in the first years after reform (1978 to 1984), 
comprehensive measures of productivity (either constructed TFP indices or 
their regression-based equivalents) rose by 5 to 10 percent per year. Although 
WEN (1993) worries that TFP quit growing in the post-reform period (1985 to 
1989), FAN (1997) and JIN et al. (2002) demonstrate that during the 1990s, TFP 
continues to rise at a rate of around 2 percent per year. These trends are much 
like those for Vietnam. Between 1980 and 1985, PINGALI and XUAN (1992) 
demonstrate that the productivity of agriculture (in this case rice, which makes 
up a large part of the nation’s agricultural output) rises by 2 to 3  percent 
annually (rows 6 to 11).
3 Estimates of TFP changes in CEE and the CIS 
countries also show that measures of TFP generally move in a manner 
consistent with the partial ones (Table 4). 
                                                                                                                                                       
available, and so we start by examining indicators of partial productivity and complement 
the analysis with a review of estimates of TFPs from the literature. 
3  Although no one has analyzed the rise in productivity between years 5 and 10 after the 
reforms, BENJAMIN and BRANDT (2001) estimate that between 1992 and 1997, TFP for 
rice and total crop output generally continues to rise in Vietnam (though in the case of 
total crop output, TFP growth differs between the south – positive, and the north – negative). Jikun Huang, Johan F. M. Swinnen, Scott Rozelle  6 
In summary, according to almost all indicators of development of agriculture, 
China performs the best. Although use of different criteria also paints different 
pictures of success in some countries, China performs the best or nearly the 
best in terms of all indicators for all time periods. It is perhaps because of this 
reason that the economy as a whole and the rural economy specifically has 
grown so rapidly and poverty has fallen so sharply. In the rest of the paper, we 
shall narrow the focus to China and examine three sets of the policies that were 
instrumental in generating these changes. There have been others – for 
example, agricultural R&D and trade policy. For reasons of space limitations, 
we ignore these in this paper.  
3 DETERMINANTS OF CHINA’S SUCCESS: PRICE REFORM, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS CHANGES AND MARKET LIBERALIZATION 
Unlike in the transitional economies in Europe, leaders in China did not move 
to dismantle the planned economy in the initial stages of reform in favor of 
liberalized markets. Policymakers only began to shift their focus to market 
liberalization in 1985, after decollectivization was complete. Even then, 
liberalization was start and stop (SICULAR, 1995). For example, in the case of 
fertilizer, YE and ROZELLE (1994) show that after an early attempt at market 
liberalization in 1986 and 1987, perceived instability in the rural economy in 
1988 led to sharp retrenchments. Agricultural officials only took controls back 
off fertilizer marketing and began encouraging private trade in the early 1990s. 
LIN, CAI and LI (1996) offer a detailed analysis of reform policy. They argue 
that leaders were mainly afraid of the disruption that would occur if the 
institutions through which leaders controlled the main goods in the food 
economy (such as grain, fertilizer, and meat products) were eliminated without 
the institutions in place that work to support more efficient market exchange.  
ROZELLE (1996) shows that the sequencing of agricultural reform policies 
followed the gradualism strategy of China’s more general, economy-wide 
reforms that MCMILLAN and NAUGHTON (1992) describe. In the initial stages 
of reform, leaders consciously restricted the promotion of market-based 
economic activity, allowing at most the exchange of minor products (e.g., 
minor fruits and vegetables) in a sharply circumscribed regions. Not until 
1985, after the completion of HRS, did policy makers begin to encourage 
market activity for more important commodities (e.g., grain), although initially 
market activity only occurred within the framework of China’s renowned two 
tier price system (SICULAR, 1988). Leaders did not commit themselves to more 
complete market liberalization until the early 1990s, more than a decade after 
the initiation of HRS. From this description, it is clear that China’s reforms fall 
into 2 distinct stages: The incentive reforms that dominate the period from 
1978 to 1984; and a period of gradual market liberalization that begins in 1985 The success of gradualism: Empirical evidence from China’s agricultural reform  7
and extends through the 1990s. In the rest of this section we look in more 
detail at three of the main parts of China’s reform strategy. 
4 PRICE POLICY CHANGES  
The administration of prices by the Socialist planning apparatus is one of the 
most distinguishing characteristics of pre-transition countries. While in some 
countries leaders allowed subsets of goods to be traded out of the plan, for 
most high priority commodities – which almost always included food and 
fiber-planning ministries in most nations allocated goods and services mostly 
on the basis of quantity-based plans. Prices mostly served accounting 
functions. This was the case of China, as the rest of the transition world. 
In pre-reform era, China used administrative prices to impose a heavy tax on 
agriculture (LARDY, 1983; SICULAR, 1988a; GREEN and VOKES, 1998). Policy 
makers required farmers to deliver their output at artificially low prices. 
Although in the 1970s a policy of paying a slightly higher price for marketed 
output that exceeded the basic quota, most of these prices were purposely held 
artificially in comparison to inputs, capital equipment purchaes and other 
consumer goods that were bought from factories and wholesalers in the urban 
economy. In part of offset the high input prices, subsidized inputs were 
provided, although only producers could only buy limited quanitites.  
Although early in the reforms China’s leaders had no concrete plan to 
liberalize markets, they did take steps to change the incentives faced by 
producers that were embodied in the prices that producers received for their 
marketed surplus. Hence, perhaps one of the least appreciated moves of the 
early reformers was their bold decision to administratively increase the price of 
farm goods that were to be received by farmers (LARDY, 1983; SICULAR, 
1988b). Between 1978 and 1983, in a number of separate actions, planners in 
China increased the above quota price, the payment farmers received for 
voluntary sales beyond the mandatory deliveries, by 41 percent for grain and 
by around 50 percent for cash crops (SICULAR, 1988b). According to the State 
Statistical Bureau’s data, the relative price of grain to fertilizer rose by more 
than 60 percent during the first 3 years after reform. During the early reform 
years, the rise in above-quota price represented a higher output price at the 
margin to farmers, since until 1984, state-run procurement stations regularly 
purchased all grain sold by farmers at the above-quota price as long as they 
had already fulfilled their mandatory marketing delivery quota which was 
purchased at a state-set quota price, which for the case of rice, for example, 
was 50 percent below the above-quota price (SICULAR, 1995).
4  
                                                 
4  Although the statistical bureau did report a "market" price at that time (which actually 
was about the same level as the above quota price), such a small amount of grain (and 
less of fiber and oil seeds) was sold on markets, since rules still tightly controlled the Jikun Huang, Johan F. M. Swinnen, Scott Rozelle  8 
The important contribution of China’s pricing policy is the timing and breadth 
of the policy change. The first major price rise occurred in 1979, almost at the 
same time when reformers were deciding to decollectivize. However, given the 
leadership’s decision to gradually implement the Household Responsibility 
System (HRS – discussed below), beginning first in the poorest areas of China, 
the price increases immediately affected all farmers, both those in areas that 
had been decollectivized and those that had not. By 1981, the time of the 
second major price increase, according to LIN (1992), less than half of China’s 
farmers had been allowed to dismantle their communes. Hence, as long as 
there was some, albeit weak, link between the output price and production, the 
plan-based price rise would have led to increases in China’s farm output. 
During the entire pre- and post-reform period, input prices – especially that of 
fertilizer – were still mostly controlled by the state’s monopoly agricultural 
inputs supply corporation in China (STONE, 1988). Although in short supply, the 
governments in both countries controlled the price of fertilizer and other inputs 
(such as pesticides, diesel fuel, and electricity) as well as their distribution 
(SOLINGER, 1984). Communes received low-priced fertilizer from the state, but 
almost all of it was inframarginal. In other words, the government-supplied, 
subsidized fertilizer was not sufficient to meet the needs of most farmers. 
Producers in both the pre- and post-reform periods typically purchased additional 
fertilizer from the state at a higher price (YE and ROZELLE, 1994). Hence, unlike 
other transition and developing countries, at the margin, farmers in China were 
not able to purchase fertilizer prices at highly subsidized rates. In fact, according 
to HUANG and CHEN (1999), during the 1980s the real price of China’s fertilizer 
was above the international price. Although China’s leader administratively 
raised the price of fertilizer somewhat under rising foreign exchange and 
budgetary pressures in the mid-1980s, the rise was not large enough to eliminate 
the positive incentives created by higher output prices (WORLD BANK, 1997).
5 
5 PROPERTY RIGHTS REFORM 
Although there were many differences among countries in the organization of 
their agricultural sectors prior to reform, in most cases farm production units 
shared several key characteristics (LARDY, 1983; PINGALI and XUAN, 1992; 
LERMAN, CSAKI and FEDER, 2002). Prohibiting private farming, Socialist ideals 
favored large, corporate organizations. In some nations state-owned farms 
dominated the landscape. Those that worked the land on state farms typically 
were paid a wage, drew a pension, and performed work assignments handed 
down by managers. Farms were theoretically organized on the same principals 
                                                                                                                                                       
distance of shipment and the goods that could be bought and sold, that most farmers did 
not consider the market price as their opportunity cost. 
5  To the extent that access to fertilizer improves during the reform (STONE, 1988), the shadow 
prices of fertilizer would also have fallen, which would also encourage higher output. The success of gradualism: Empirical evidence from China’s agricultural reform  9
as factory enterprises and farmers became workers. The state made 
investments, set planting plans, purchased inputs through planning channels 
and remitted profits up through the ministerial system. In other countries, 
farms were run as collectives. Like state farms in most respects, the main 
difference was that instead of drawing a wage, collective members earned 
work points that entitled them to a share of the harvest that was left over after 
deductions were made for input purchases, taxes, quota deliveries, and 
investment retentions. 
Whatever the exact organizational form, wage- and point-earning farm 
workers typically faced few incentives to work hard since their compensation 
was at most only loosely tied to either their effort or the farm’s profitability. 
Unlike industrial factories, however, monitoring farm workers was difficult. 
Logistics often compounded the problems. Planning necessities (e.g., arranging 
for the procurement of inputs and disposal of output) meant that farms in most 
countries were quite large. The large scale of farms meant that managers were 
often charged with trying to direct work of many individuals that on a day-to-
day basis were physically spread out over a spatially-dispersed area. In almost 
all studies of pre-reform agriculture, farms were found to be inefficient 
(BRADA  and  KING, 1993; BROOKS, 1983; MEADE, 2000; LIN, 1992; 
PUTTERMAN, 1992). 
Searching for ways to make their economies more productive, reformers had 
several options for eliminating inefficiencies. First, they could try to provide 
better incentives to elicit more effort. Second, leaders could try to reduce the 
operational size of the farming unit to improve information about on-farm 
production needs. Finally, they could try to facilitate the reduction or better 
allocation of inputs, including labor, that were being wasted. All countries, 
albeit with differing degrees of emphasis, tried to tap these sources of 
productivity gains.  
In the search for ways to improve the performance of agriculture, reformers in 
most countries decided to make fundamental changes in property rights. 
Consisting of control rights (that is, who gets to decide on what to plant and 
what inputs to use) and income rights (that is, who gets the residual income 
generated by the productive activity), the final form and mix of property rights 
differed greatly across different countries. In some cases reformers only 
granted partial property rights to farmers. For example, reformers sometimes 
provided income rights, but few control rights. In other cases leaders provided 
nearly full control rights with only partial income rights. Ownership changes 
(that is, who received alienation rights to land and other farm assets) were 
often considered separately from questions of farm restructuring; likewise, 
restructuring sometimes occurred independently of changes in rights. 
China’s reformers, more than anything, have followed a strategy based on 
providing incentives through property rights reforms, even though the shift to 
private ownership is today far from complete. The reforms in China started with Jikun Huang, Johan F. M. Swinnen, Scott Rozelle  10 
the Household Responsibility System (HRS), a policy of radical decollec-
tivization that allowed farmers to keep the residual output of their farms after 
paying their agricultural taxes and completing their mandatory delivery quotas. 
Farmers also began to exercise control over much of the production process 
(although in the initial years, the local state shared some control rights and in 
some place still do today). In this way the first reforms in the agricultural 
sector reshuffled property rights in an attempt to increase work incentives and 
exploit the specific knowledge of individuals about the production process 
(PERKINS, 1994). 
In executing the property rights reforms, leaders also fundamentally restructured 
farms in China. Within a few years, for example, reformers completely broke up 
the larger collective farms into household farms. In China today there are more 
than 200 million farms, the legacy of an HRS policy that gave the primary 
responsibilities for farming to the individual household.  
The collective did not disappear, however. A companion set of reforms in the 
mid-1980s transformed communes into townships, the lowest level of China’s 
formal government hierarchy. Brigade leadership committees (a sub-commune 
level of organization) were turned into village committees, which became the 
government’s representative in China’s villages (OI, 1999). Villages and the 
small groups below them (formerly production teams) retained legal 
ownership rights over land and are the entities that were charged with 
contracting land to the farmers and setting rules for land management. 
6 LIBERALIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS 
In addition to property rights reform and transforming incentives, the other 
major task of reformers is to create more efficient institutions of exchange. 
Markets – whether classic competitive ones or some workable substitute – 
increase efficiency by facilitating transactions among agents to allow 
specialization and trade and by providing information through a pricing 
mechanism to producers and consumers about the relative scarcity of 
resources. But markets, in order to function efficiently, require supporting 
institutions to ensure competition, define and enforce property rights and 
contracts, ensure access to credit and finance and provide information 
(MCMILLAN, 1997; WORLD BANK, 2002). These institutions were either absent 
in the Communist countries or, if they existed, were inappropriate for a market 
system. For example, in most countries central planning agencies directed 
production and other economic transactions and their directives served to 
enforce contracts involving exchanges among various agents in the chain. 
Market liberalization requires the elimination of central planning, but to do so 
successively requires the process to be executed in a way that will allow 
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the necessary market-supporting institutions are emerging. In this section we 
show how China’s leaders gradually liberalized markets. We focus, in 
particular, on three issues: The process of market liberalization; the enforcement 
of exchange contracts; and how well reformers or some alternative institutions 
were able to guarantee access to input and output markets during transition. 
In contrast to the CEE and the CIS countries in which took a Big Bang approach 
to reform, leaders in China did not dismantle the planned economy in the initial 
stages of reform in favor of liberalized markets (ROZELLE, 1996). SICULAR 
(1988a; 1988b; 1995), PERKINS (1994) and LIN (1992) all discuss how China's 
leadership had little intention of letting the market play anything but a minor 
supplemental guidance role in the early reforms period in the early 1980s. In 
fact, the major changes to agricultural commerce in the early 1980s almost 
exclusively centered on increasing the purchase prices of crops (SICULAR, 1988b; 
WATSON, 1994). The decision to raise prices, however, should not be considered 
as a move to liberalize markets since planners in the Ministry of Commerce 
made the changes administratively and the price changes mostly were executed 
by the national network of grain procurement stations acting under direction of 
the State Grain Bureau. 
An examination of policies and the extent of marketing activity in the early 
1980s illustrate the limited extent of changes in the marketing environment of 
China's food economy before 1985. It is true that reformers did allow farmers 
increased discretion to produce and market crops in 10 planning categories, 
such as vegetables, fruits, and coarse grains. Moreover, by 1984, the state only 
claimed control over 12 commodities, including rice, wheat, maize, soybeans, 
peanuts, rapeseed, and several other cash crops (SICULAR, 1988b). However, 
while this may seem to represent a significant move towards liberalization,  the 
crops that remained almost entirely under the planning authority of the 
government still accounted for more than 95 percent of sown area in 1984. 
Hence, by state policy and practice, the output and marketing of almost all 
sown area was still directly influenced by China's planners. 
Reforms proceeded with equal caution when reducing restrictions on free 
market trade. The decision to permit the reestablishment of free markets came 
in 1979, but only initially allowed farmers to trade vegetables and a limited 
number of other crops and livestock products within the boundaries of their 
own county. Reformers did gradually reduce restrictions on the distance over 
which trade could occur from 1980 to 1984, but as  SICULAR (1988b) and 
SKINNER (1985) point out, the predominant marketing venue during the early 
1980s was mainly local rural periodic markets. Farmers also did begin to sell 
their produce in urban settings, but free markets in the cities only began to 
appear in 1982 and 1983. In addition to being small and infrequent, traders 
could not engage in the marketing of China's monopolized commodities that 
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The record of the expansion of rural and urban markets confirms the 
hypothesis that market liberalization had not yet begun by the early 1980s. 
Although agricultural commodity markets were allowed to emerge during the 
1980s, their number and size made them a small player in China's food 
economy. In 1984, the state procurement network still purchased more than 
95 percent of marketed grain and more than 99 percent of the marketed cotton 
(SICULAR, 1995). In all of China's urban areas, there were only 2000 markets in 
1980, a number that rose only to 6000 by 1984 (DEBRAUW et al., 2003). In 
Beijing in the early 1980s, there were only about 50 markets transacting around 
1 million yuan of commerce per market per year. Each market site would have 
had to serve, on average, about 200,000 Beijing residents, each transacting only 
5  yuan of business for the entire year. In other words, it would have been 
impossible for such a weak marketing infrastructure at that time to even come 
close to meeting the food needs of urban consumers.  
After 1985, however, market liberalization began in earnest. Changes to the 
procurement system, further reductions in restrictions to trading of commodities, 
moves to commercialize the state grain trading system, and calls for the 
expansion of market construction in rural and urban areas led to a surge in 
market-oriented activity (SICULAR, 1995). For example, in 1980, there were only 
241,000  private and semi-private trading enterprises registered with the State 
Markets Bureau; by 1990, there were more than 5.2 million (DEBRAUW et al., 003). 
Between 1980 and 1990, the per capita volume of transactions of commerce in 
Beijing urban food markets rose almost 200 times. Private traders handled 
more than 30 percent of China's grain by 1990, and more than half of the rest 
was bought and sold by commercialized state grain trading companies, many 
of which had begun to behave as private traders (ROZELLE et al., 2000).  
China moved equally slow in its liberalization of input markets (STONE, 1988; 
YE and ROZELLE, 1994). During the prereform era, the state distributed all key 
inputs such as chemical fertilizer through the government-controlled network 
of agricultural input supply stations. During a time when many inputs in many 
regions were scarce, local officials were issued coupons that gave communes 
that right to purchase at least part of the inputs they needed. In the initial years 
of reform when decollectivization was occurring, leaders did virtually nothing 
to limit the role of the state in input allocation. Indeed, private sales of nitrogen 
fertilizer were restricted and the state continued to completely control all 
chemical fertilizer distribution.  
Even after the start of liberalization in both output and input markets in 1985, the 
process was still partial and executed in a start and stop manner (SICULAR, 1995). 
For example, in the case of fertilizer, YE and ROZELLE (1994) show that after 
an early attempt at market liberalization in 1986 and 1987, perceived instability 
in the rural economy in 1988 led to sharp retrenchments. Agricultural officials 
only took controls back off fertilizer marketing and began encouraging private 
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afraid of the disruption that would occur if the institutions through which 
leaders controlled the main goods in the food economy (such as fodder, grain, 
and fertilizer) were eliminated without the institutions in place to support more 
efficient market exchange. 
However, it is only after 20 years of market liberalization that the state had 
largely abdicated its responsibilities for grain and inputs trade. By the mid-
1990s, about 50  percent of fertilizer was sold by private traders. In 2000, 
according to a survey of 1200 households in six provinces, fertilizer was 
almost exclusively handled by the private sector. Likewise, despite the failed 
attempts by the government to remonopolize grain trade in the mid-1990s, by 
2001, the state grain bureau commercialized its remaining grain trading 
divisions and tens of thousands of private traders dominate grain trade. For 
example, according to a survey by XIE (2002), in 2001, there were more than 
2000 private rice wholesalers trading in Beijing, more than 3000 in Shanghai, 
and more than 5000 in Guangzhou. Nearly all rice moves through their hands, 
completely bypassing the state. Hence, China’s markets have become more 
integrated, transaction costs have fallen, and there are increasingly fewer 
arbitrage opportunities left unexploited (PARK et al., 2002; HUANG et al., 2003).  
7 THE EFFECTS OF PRICE POLICY, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
MARKET LIBERALIZING REFORMS 
Previous research on the determinants of the success of transition economies 
has identified a number of important factors. We examine three in this section. 
One set of studies examines the effect of changes in incentives associated with 
shifting input and output prices (e.g., SICULAR, 1988a; PINGALI and XUAN, 1992; 
MACOURS  and  SWINNEN, 2002). Another set of studies focuses on the 
importance of reform policy, especially as they affect property rights and farm 
restructuring (e.g., MCMILLAN, 1997; LERMAN, CSAKI and  FEDER, 2002). 
Finally, a third set of studies looks at how transition disrupted exchange relations 
and facilitated or constrained the emergence of markets (e.g., BLANCHARD, 1997; 
DEBRAUW et al., 2003; GOW and SWINNEN, 1998; ROLAND and VERDIER, 1999). 
In addition to these three sets of factors, others surely also affect the 
performance of different transition countries (e.g., initial level of development 
at the time of reform – SACHS  and WOO, 1994; MACOURS  and  SWINNEN, 
2000b; the speed of reform – MCMILLAN  and  NAUGHTON, 1992; political 
economy and regional tensions – ROLAND, 2000; and the management of 
public investments – HUANG and ROZELLE, 1996; CSAKI, 1998; FAN, ZHANG 
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8 EFFECTS OF PRICE POLICY SHIFTS 
Several studies show that price changes had an important influence on the 
performance of the agricultural sector and in part help explain observed trends 
in output. MACOURS and SWINNEN (2002) find a strong positive correlation 
(0.70) between changes in output and changes in relative prices across 15  
countries during the first five years of transition. Specifically, output increases 
only in those countries where terms of trade increased (for example, China, 
Vietnam, Albania).  
Empirical studies on China confirm a strong impact of these price changes on 
output during the first years of transition (LIN, 1992; FAN, 1991; HUANG and 
ROZELLE, 1996; FAN and PARDEY, 1997). LIN (1992) finds that 15 percent of 
output growth during the first six years of reform came from the rise in relative 
prices. HUANG  and ROZELLE’s  (1996) decomposition exercise for rice 
demonstrates that about 10 percent of the output between 1978 and 1984 came 
from the price effects. In contrast, MACOURS and SWINNEN (2000) estimate 
that around 40 to 50  percent of the initial decline in crop output in eight 
Central European and Balkan countries was due to deteriorating terms of trade.  
It is more difficult to measure the effect of price changes on productivity, since 
as in MCMILLAN, WHALEY and ZHU (1989) and JIN et al. (2002), the price 
effects are removed before explaining TFP changes. In LIN (1991) and HUANG 
and  ROZELLE  (1996), however, there is evidence that higher prices are 
associated with higher rates of technology adoption, which has contributed 
positively to the rise in TFP during the reform era. Hence, price changes may 
have an indirect effect on TFP. 
9 EFFECTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS REFORM 
While the speed and nature of rights reform and restructuring has varied greatly 
across the reforming world, in those places that have carried out 
decollectivization, land restitutions, control rights transfers, and farm 
reorganization, a robust positive effect appears on output in some areas and 
productivity has risen in all of the areas that carried out these multi-
dimensioned reforms. In China, the changes in incentives resulting from the 
property rights reforms and farm restructuring triggered strong growth in both 
output and productivity. In the most definitive study on the subject, LIN (1992) 
estimates that China’s HRS accounted for 42 to 46 percent of the total rise in 
output during the early reform period (1978 to 1984). FAN (1991) and HUANG 
and ROZELLE (1996) find that even after accounting for technological change, 
institutional change during the late 1970s and early 1980s contributed about 
30 percent of output growth.  
Empirical researchers also have documented impacts that go beyond output. 
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China also raised total factor productivity, accounting for 90 percent of the rise 
(23 percent) between 1978 and 1984. JIN et al. (2002) show that the reforms 
had a large effect on productivity, contributing greatly to a rise in TFP that 
exceeds 7 percent annually. In addition, a number of researchers have suggested 
that the rises in surplus in the agricultural sector created by HRS triggered a 
number of subsequent growth dynamics, providing labor for rural industry’s 
take-off in the mid-1980s (MCKINNON, 1993), fuelling the nation’s overall 
industrialization drive later in the reforms, and creating demand for the 
products of firms in other parts of the economy (QIAN and XU, 1998).  
Looking inside transition regions, including China, illustrates a link between 
technology, policy and performance. Although gains in productivity have 
come both from rights reforms and organizational restructuring, the relative 
importance of each component differs between countries reflecting technology 
and policy differences (MACOURS and  SWINNEN, 2000; 2002). In countries 
with labor-intensive technologies the shift from large-scale collective farming 
to small-scale individual farming caused dramatic gains in labor efficiency 
with relatively small losses in scale efficiency. In such countries, including 
China as well as other nations, such as, Vietnam, Albania, Armenia, Georgia, 
and Romania, the gains in labor productivity came mostly from the shift to 
household farming. In all these countries the man/land ratio was over 
0.2  persons per hectare and TFP increased strongly during early transition 
(between 4 percent and 9 percent annually) when individual farming grew from 
8 percent of total land use on average to 84 percent on average. In contrast, in 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, countries in which farming was 
more capital intensive (man/land ratio of 0.14 or less), gains in labor 
productivity came primarily from large farms shedding labor with privatization 
of the farms. 
10  EFFECTS OF MARKET LIBERALIZATION  
Few authors have attempted to quantify the gains from market liberalization. 
Part of the problem may be the short period of analyses, the inability of 
standard methodologies to separate efficiency gains of market reform from 
overall gains in the reforming economy, and the breadth of the studies. For 
China, WEN (1993) found total factor productivity (TFP) growth had stopped 
in the post-1985 period, a trend he blames on the failure of the market 
liberalization stage of reform. There are two shortcomings of Wen's 
conclusions. First his analysis ends in 1990, a period that might be too early to 
have allowed the liberalization reforms to take effect. Second, he is only 
examining the net change in TFP and does not account for other factors that 
could be affecting productivity. Holding the effect of technology constant and 
using data through 1995, JIN et al. (2002) find that TFP growth restarts in the 
1990s, a finding that they claim could be linked to increased liberalization of the 
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in efficiency that are associated with market development. FAN (1999) decom-
poses the efficiency gains of Jiangsu provincial rice producers in the late reform 
era and finds that there have been only limited gains in allocative efficiency 
after 1984. Unfortunately, Fan studies only one crop in one province, a fact that 
limits the generalization of his study. 
The only truly systematic attempt at trying to measure the returns to market 
liberalization in China is DEBRAUW et al. (2003). This paper uses a dynamic 
adjustment cost model to develop a framework to estimate the return to market 
liberalization reforms, holding the incentive reforms and other factors constant. 
The authors find that because of the emergence of markets, farmers have 
increased their speed of adjustment to price changes between the early and late 
reform period for both labor and sown area. In the early reform era prior to the 
emergence of markets adjustments labor of producers to shifts in exogenous 
factors (such as prices) took 3 years. After the emergence of markets due to 
liberalization changes, the adjustment of labor to the long-run optimal level 
only took about one and half years. Adjustments in sown area to price and 
other shocks also speeded up (from 6 to 5 years). 
The magnitude of the gains in efficiency from increased responsiveness and 
flexibility in the late reform period, however, is substantially less in percentage 
terms (less than 1 percent per year) than that from the incentive reforms in the 
early reform period (up to 7  percent per year or about 40  percent over the 
whole period). But, although the gains are small, they are still positive and 
China’s gradual market reform policy appears to have avoided the collapse that 
was experience throughout CEE and CIS nations. Hence, relative to the gains 
in the incentive reforms, the gains from market liberalization not only start 
later (by policy choice), they are much smaller. The average annual gain to 
market liberalization over the entire period is 0.73 percent, which means it is 
roughly 10  times smaller than the annual rise in profits from the gains to 
incentive reforms at the end of that period. These findings suggest that 
reforming incentives have much higher returns than reforming markets. This 
conclusion is reinforced when considering the fact that our returns to market 
liberalization may be overstated since in some sense the returns are 
conditioned on the earlier reform of incentives. 
Decomposing the returns to market liberalization, DEBRAUW et al. (2003) see 
that most of the change has come from increased responsiveness. On a year to 
year basis, the returns to producers being more responsive to exogenous 
changes to prices and other factors average more than 0.50 percent per year. 
The gains from responsiveness have also been fairly constant over time, 
ranging from 0.39 to 0.94 percent. Moreover, since producers became more 
responsive between the periods and the level of most of the exogenous 
variables, such as prices and the research and capital stock, rose, the returns to 
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In contrast to the returns from increased responsiveness, the returns to 
increased flexibility are smaller, more variable, and are even negative in some 
years. In part the small gain from increased flexibility is simply because the 
increase in speed of adjustment, especially for sown area, is relatively small. 
The variability of the returns and the appearance of negative values 
demonstrate that increased adjustment speed is not always a virtue, especially 
in an economy like China’s that is experiencing year-to-year fluctuations in 
important factors that affect production, such as the output price. If prices soar 
in one period and then fall in the next, it is easy to see why slower adjustment 
could be beneficial. While there are lost profits in the first year when 
adjustment is slower, the second period adjustment made in an attempt to catch 
up to the rising price in the first year, might be exactly the right allocation (by 
accident) when prices in the second year fall. The more flexible producer is 
able to catch up quicker, but the new flexibility could make him chase the 
prices back down in the second year (versus being correct as in the case of the 
producer that adjusts slower). 
11  CONCLUSIONS 
In our paper we have traced the success of China’s reforms in agriculture. We 
have shown that relative to almost all other transitional economies, China has 
been the most successful. In drawing lessons from the analysis of the 
determinants of success in agricultural reforms, we find that it appears from 
the evidence on the collective transition experiences that any reform strategy in 
order to be successful needs to include some essential ingredients. In other 
words, ultimately successful transition requires a complete package of reforms. 
Perhaps above all, China has shown that the reforms to pricing policy, property 
rights and market liberalization have all been important.  
Comparing the property rights and organizational reform processes across the 
transition world, including China, yields several lessons. First, the lesson 
regarding property rights reforms is nuanced. Good rights and the incentives 
they created certainly contributed to and will continue to affect performance 
positively. Poor ones undoubtedly account, in part, for the poor performance of 
some agricultural systems. This is well illustrated by the difference between 
China and Central Europe on the one hand and Russia, Ukraine, and Central 
Asia on the other hand. Despite its imperfections, China’s reforms allocated 
relatively strong property rights to individual land plots. In Central Europe 
land was either restituted to former owners or distributed to farm workers in 
delineated boundaries and leased to new farms. Although the land reforms in 
these countries were complex and difficult to implement, they ended up with 
stronger and better-defined property rights for the new landowners than in 
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Despite the strong relationship between rights reform and performance, 
another important lesson is that full privatization of land is not needed to 
induce efficiency gains. In many countries, such as China, the introduction of 
private ownership and sale of agricultural land encountered strong social and 
political opposition and kept reformers from providing a complete complement 
of rights to producers. The top leadership in China did not allow private 
ownership of agricultural land. Today in China, farmers still cannot buy or sell 
land. The strong positive effect of rights reform and restructuring on output 
and productivity demonstrates that allocating clear and well-identified land use 
and income rights can by themselves enhance efficiency, investment, and 
growth. Farm restructuring, emerging as the appearance of household farming 
in China, also can be as important as rights reform.  
Finally, we do not suggest that a decade of agricultural transition has created a 
system of full and unencumbered property rights; in fact, many major 
constraints remain. For example, China’s leaders are still struggling to figure out 
a way to provide more secure tenure rights for farmers. Most pervasive, local 
leaders in many regions of the country continue to periodically expropriate 
land, shifting it among farmers for a variety of reasons (BRANDT et al., 2002). 
Although the impact on the investment in land and other long-term farming 
assets is typically found to relatively minor (JACOBY et al., 2002), poor land 
tenure may be undermining rental markets and keeping farm size from 
increasing and precluding farmers from using land as an asset for collateral 
and constraining investment in activities beyond the farm (BENJAMIN  and 
BRANDT, 1999). 
The importance of pricing policy also was shown to be important. However, in 
the early part of China’s reforms this was done administratively. Gradualism in 
China was possible because the government, unlike in many other transitional 
countries, was in control. They chose to give China’s agricultural producers 
improved terms of trade and increase their incentives even though the 
procurement was done mostly through the government’s marketing channels 
and without the aid of markets.  
When the government gradually liberalized markets, nearly 10 years after the 
start of reforms, we then find that the behavior of producers in China has been 
positively affected. Interestingly, the gains from market liberalization have 
been relatively small. Farmers have increased their speed of adjustment 
between the early and late reform period for both labor and sown area. 
According to our estimates of own-price elasticities for labor and fertilizer, 
producers are also becoming more responsive. The magnitude of the gains in 
efficiency from increased responsiveness and flexibility in the late reform 
period, however, is substantially less in percentage terms (less than 1 percent 
per year) than that from the incentive reforms in the early reform period (up to 
7 percent). Given these results, we argue that gradualism has succeeded where 
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In its most simple version, our story is as follows. Although we find that 
market liberalization policies in China’s agriculture have increased producer 
responsiveness and flexibility, the returns to the incentive reforms were much 
larger in terms of their impacts on farm profits, and household income, than 
market liberalization reforms. Since the incentive reforms came first, and 
occurred without the disruption that almost invariably accompanies market 
transition in a reform setting, the large rise in wealth that was generated by the 
incentive reforms almost certainly gave the economy its initial positive boost. 
This boost may have also helped trigger a series of positive downstream 
actions. While speculative, we believe that the initial surge of productivity 
helped raise the ability of households and groups of households to make 
further investment, increase the demand for goods and services across the 
economy, and provide regional and national governments with a larger pool of 
resources from which they were able to draw taxes needed to finance transition 
(or at least created wealth in local areas that provided local leaders with the 
resources that they needed to build local infrastructure and implement policies 
without additional fiscal subsidies from above). According to our estimates, at 
most only a fraction of these resources would have been generated if leaders 
started reforms by liberalizing markets. In fact, it is possible that liberalizing 
markets before agents face the right incentives and have the support of certain 
institutions and infrastructure leads to greater disruption and even smaller (or 
negative) returns that would have limited, not triggered subsequent economic 
activity. Put together, our paper identifies the mechanism of gradualism and 
measures the magnitude of its benefits to China’s agriculture. 
Based on our findings, we would believe that leaders in transitional countries 
should first work hard to increase incentives and build the institutions that 
agents need to operate efficiently before moving to radically free up markets. 
Our results need to be interpreted carefully, however. The case study was 
limited to the agricultural sector. In more complex sectors, reforming 
incentives may not lead to greater efficiency if markets are not already in 
place, given the need for greater coordination. We are also estimating the 
changes in parameters between periods with relatively few observations. It 
would be worth trying to replicate these results in future studies on other 
sectors with larger time series.  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
The financial support from the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, and 
China National Outstanding Youth Science Foundation (79725001) is gratefully 
acknowledged. The authors also acknowledge for the support of National Nature 
Science Foundation of China (70024001) and EC (INCO: ICA4-CT-2001-10085). 
Rozelle is a member of the Giannini Foundation. Authors are in alphabetical 
order and the senior authorship is shared. Jikun Huang, Johan F. M. Swinnen, Scott Rozelle  20 
REFERENCES 
BENJAMIN, D., BRANDT, L. (2001): Agriculture and the distribution of income in Vietnam 
during the reform period, Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 
Canada. 
BLANCHARD, O. (1997): The economics of post-communist transition, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
BRADA, J. C., KING, A. C. (1993): Is private farming more efficient than socialized agriculture, 
Economica, 60 (237), pp. 41-56. 
BRANDT, L., LI, G., ROZELLE, S. (2006): Land rights, farmer investment incentives, and 
agricultural production in China, China Journal, (forthcoming). 
BROOKS, K. (1983): Productivity in Soviet agriculture, in: JOHNSON, D. G., BROOKS, K. 
(eds.): Prospects for Soviet agriculture in the 1980s, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington.  
CSAKI, C. (1998): Agricultural research in transforming Central and Eastern Europe, 
European Review of Agricultural Economics, 25 (3), pp. 289-306. 
DEBRAUW, A., HUANG, J., ROZELLE, S. (2003): Increased flexibility, responsiveness and 
efficiency from market liberalization reforms in China’s agricultural sector, Working 
Paper, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, 
Davis.  
FAN, S. (1999): Technological change, technical and allocative efficiency in Chinese 
agriculture: The case of rice production in China, International Food Policy Research 
Institute, EPTD Discussion Paper. 
FAN, S. (1997): Production and productivity growth in Chinese agriculture: New 
measurement and evidence, Food Policy, 22 (3), pp. 213-228. 
FAN, S. (1991): Effects of technological change and institutional reform on production 
growth in Chinese agriculture, American Journal of Agricultural Economics,  73, 
pp. 266-275. 
FAN, S., PARDEY, P.  G. (1997): Research, productivity, and output growth in Chinese 
agriculture, Journal of Development Economics, 53, pp. 115-137. 
FAN, S., ZHANG, L., ZHANG, X. (2002): Growth and poverty in rural China: The role of 
public investments, EPTD Discussion Paper, International Food Policy Research 
Institute, Washington, DC. 
GOW, H., SWINNEN, J. (2001): Private enforcement capital and contract enforcement in 
transition economies, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83 (3), pp. 686-690. 
GREEN, D. J., VOKES, R. W. A. (1998): Agriculture and the transition to the market in Asia, 
Journal of Comparative Economics. 
HUANG, J., CHEN, C. (1999): Effects of trade liberalization on agriculture in China: 
Commodity and local agricultural studies, United Nations ESCAP CGPRT Centre, 
Bogor, Indonesia. 
HUANG, J., ROZELLE, S. (1996): Technological change: Rediscovering the engine of 
productivity growth in China's rural economy, Journal of Development Economics, 49, 
pp. 337-369. 
HUANG, J., ROZELLE, S., CHANG, M. (2003): The nature of distortions to agricultural 
incentives in China and implications of WTO Accession, World Bank Economic Review. The success of gradualism: Empirical evidence from China’s agricultural reform  21
JACOBY, H., LI, G., ROZELLE, S. (2002): Hazards of expropriation: Tenure insecurity and 
investment in rural China, American Economic Review, 92 (5), pp. 1420-1447. 
JIN, S., HUANG, J., HU, R., ROZELLE, S. (2002): The creation and spread of technology and 
total factor productivity in China’s agriculture, American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 84 (4), pp. 916-930. 
LARDY, N. (1983): Agriculture in China's modern economic development, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
LERMAN, Z., CSAKI, C., FEDER, G. (2002): Land policies and evolving farm structures in 
transition countries, Policy Research Working Paper  2794, The World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
LIN, J.  Y. (1991): Prohibitions of factor market exchanges and technological choice in 
Chinese agriculture, Journal of Development Studies, 27 (4), pp. 1-15. 
LIN, J.  Y. (1992): Rural reforms and agricultural growth in China, American Economic 
Review, 82 (1), pp. 34-51. 
LIN, J.  Y., FANG, C., ZHOU, L. (1996): The China miracle: Development strategy and 
economic reform, Chinese University Press, Hong Kong. 
MACOURS, K., SWINNEN, J. (2000): Causes of output decline in economic transition: The 
case of Central and Eastern European agriculture, Journal of Comparative Economics, 
28 (1), pp. 172-206.  
MACOURS, K., SWINNEN, J. (2002): Patterns of agrarian transition, Economic Development 
and Cultural Change.  
MCKINNON, R. (1993): The order of economic liberalization: Financial control in the 
transition to a market economy, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore. 
MCMILLAN, J. (1997): Markets in transition, in: KREPS, D., WALLIS, K. F. (eds.): Advances 
in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Vol. 2, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, pp. 210-239. 
MCMILLAN, J., NAUGHTON, B. (1992): How to reform a planned economy: Lessons from 
China, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 8, pp. 130-143. 
MCMILLAN, J., WHALLEY, J., ZHU, L. (1989): The impact of China’s economic reforms on 
agricultural productivity growth, Journal of Political Economy, 97(4), pp. 781-807.  
OI, J. (1999): Rural China takes off: Institutional foundations of economic reform, University 
of California Press, Berkeley. 
PARK, A., JIN, H., ROZELLE, S., HUANG, J. (2002): Market emergence and transition: 
Transition costs, arbitrage, and autarky in China’s grain market, American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. 84 (1), pp. 67-82. 
PERKINS, D. (1994): Completing China’s move to the market, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 8.2, pp. 23-46. 
PINGALI, P.  L., XUAN, V.-T. (1992): Vietnam: Decollectivization and rice productivity 
growth, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 40 (4), pp. 697-718. 
PUTTERMAN, L. (1993): Continuity and change in China’s rural development,  Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
QIAN, Y., XU, C. (1998): Innovation and bureaucracy under soft and hard budget 
constraints, Review of Economic Studies, 65 (1), pp. 151-164. 
ROLAND, G. (2000): Transition and economics. Politics, markets, and firms, MIT Press. Jikun Huang, Johan F. M. Swinnen, Scott Rozelle  22 
ROLAND, G., VERDIER, T. (1999): Transition and the output fall, Economics of Transition, 
7(1), pp. 1-28. 
ROZELLE, S. (1996): Gradual reform and institutional development: The keys to success of 
China’s agricultural reforms, in: MCMILLAN, J., NAUGHTON, B. (eds.): Reforming Asian 
Socialism, The Growth of Market Institutions, The University of Michigan Press. 
ROZELLE, S., PARK, A., HUANG, J., JIN, H. (2000): Bureaucrat to entrepreneur: The 
changing role of the state in China’s transitional commodity economy, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 48 (2), pp. 227-252. 
ROZELLE, S., SWINNEN, J. (2003): Agriculture and transition, Working Paper, University of 
California, Davis, CA. 
SACHS, J., WOO, W. T. (1994): Structural factors in the economic reforms of China, Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Economic Policy, 18, pp. 01-145. 
SICULAR, T. (1988a): Plan and market in China’s agricultural commerce, Journal of 
Political Economy, 96 (2), pp. 283-307. 
SICULAR, T. (1988b): Agricultural planning and pricing in the Post-Mao period, China 
Quarterly, 116, pp. 671-703. 
SICULAR, T. (1995): Redefining state, plan, and market: China’s reforms in agricultural 
commerce, China Quarterly, 144, pp. 1020-1046. 
SKINNER, G.  W. (1985): Rural marketing in China: Repression and revival, The China 
Quarterly, 103, pp. 393-413. 
SOLINGER, D. (1984): Chinese business under socialism, University of California Press, 
Berkeley. 
STONE, B. (1988): Developments in agricultural technology, China Quarterly, 116, pp. 767-
822. 
WATSON, A. (1994): China’s agricultural reforms: Experiences and achievements of the 
agricultural sector in the market reform process, Working Paper 94/4, Chinese Economic 
Research Unit, University of Adelaide, Adelaide/Australia. 
WEN, G. (1993): Total factor productivity change in China’s farming sector: 1952-1989, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 42, pp. 1-41. 
WORLD BANK (1997): At China’s table: Food security options, Washington, DC. 
WORLD BANK (2002): Building institutions for markets, World Development Report 2002, 
Washington, DC. 
XIE, Y. (2002): An analysis of China’s grain markets, Unpublished Masters Thesis, Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Beijing/China. 
YE, Q., ROZELLE, S. (1994): Fertilizer demand in China's reforming economy, Canadian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 42 (2), pp. 191-208. The success of gradualism: Empirical evidence from China’s agricultural reform  23
Table 1:    Growth of Gross Agricultural Output (GAO) in transition  
countries (Index equals 100 in first year of reform) 
 
Years after start 
reform with lowest 
GAO 
GAO index in 
year of lowest 
GAO 
GAO index after 
5 years of reform 
GAO index after 
10 years of 
reform 
East Asia         
China 0  100  132  166 
Vietnam 0  100  128  152 
Laos 2  90  109  127 
Myanmar 0 100  127  155 
Mongolia 4 81  84 86 
Central Asia       
Kazakhstan 8  41  53  52 
Kyrgyzstan 5  79  79  110 
Tajikistan 9  48  61 53 
Turkmenistan 6  69  106  99 
Uzbekistan 6  90 98  97 
Caucasus       
Armenia 3  69  82  80 
Azerbaijan 5  55 55  72 
Georgia 10  51  62  51 
European CIS       
Belarus 9  57  61  58 
Moldova 9 42  66  46 
Russia 8  58  64  62 
Ukraine 9  51  69  55 
Baltics       
Estonia 8  41  55  42 
Latvia 9  37  50  38 
Lithuania 9 64  69 65 
Central 
Europe       
Czech 
Republic  5 75  75 77 
Hungary 6  69  70  73 
Poland 5  77  77  85 
Slovakia 10  68  77 68 Jikun Huang, Johan F. M. Swinnen, Scott Rozelle  24 
 
 
Years after start 
reform with lowest 
GAO 
GAO index in 
year of lowest 
GAO 
GAO index after 
5 years of reform 
GAO index after 
10 years of 
reform 
Balkans       
Albania 2  77  100  113 
Bulgaria 7  57  63  62 
Romania 3 75  93  93 
Slovenia 3  65  81  79 
Source: FAO. The success of gradualism: Empirical evidence from China’s agricultural reform  25
Table 2:    Growth of agricultural labor productivity (Output per Farm 
Worker – ALP) in Transition Countries (index equals 100 in 























East Asia          
China  0  100 120 138  4,0  6,0 
Vietnam  0  100 102 111  0,4  3,0 
Myanmar 2  96  115  120  3,0  1,7 
Mongolia  10 57 61 60 -7,8 -0,3 
Average     112  123  2,5  3,6 
Central Asia          
Kazakhstan  6  58 60 71 -8,0  3,7 
Kyrgyzstan  5  59 59 67 -8,2  2,7 
Tajikistan  9  36 46 38 -10,8 -2,7 
Turkmenistan  6  55 87 64 -2,6 -7,7 
Uzbekistan  6  80 88 86 -2,4 -0,7 
Average     68 65 -6,4 -0,9 
Caucasus          
Armenia  7  38 42 38 -11,6 -1,3 
Azerbaijan  9  48 57 62 -8,6  1,7 
Georgia 2  67  85  NA -3,0  NA 
Average     61  NA -7,7  NA 
European CIS          
Belarus  4  69 71 87 -5,8  5,3 
Moldova  8  41 58 41 -8,4 -5,7 
Russia  8  63 64 63 -7,2 -0,3 
Ukraine  8  52 65 52 -7,0 -4,3 
Average     65 61 -7,1 -1,3 
Baltics          
Estonia 3  63  139  118  7,8  -7,0 
Latvia  8  54 63 54 -7,4 -3,0 
Lithuania  5  61 61 67 -7,8  2,0 
Average     88 80 -2,5 -2,7 
Central 
Europe          
Czech Republic  1  97  140  170  8,0  10,0 
Hungary 1  99  164  204  12,8  13,3 
Poland  5  86 86 86 -2,8  0,0 
Slovakia  0  100 110 132  2,0  7,3 
Average     125 148  5,0  7,7 
Balkans          
Albania 2  77  108  109  1,6  0,3 
Bulgaria  9  62 69 63 -6,2 -2,0 
Romania  3  67 79 88 -4,2  3,0 
Slovenia  3  61 85 99 -3,0  4,7 
Average     85 90 -3,0  1,5 
Source: National  statistics,  ILO,  World Bank, Asian Development Bank. 
Note:  
a For Slovenia and Armenia, data are for 7 years after the start of reforms.  
 
 Table 3:  Growth of Index of Agricultural Yields in Transition Countries (index equals 100 in first year of reform) 
   Grains
 a Sugarbeet/Cotton Milk  Average Agric  Av Ag per year 
    5 10  5 10  5  10  5  10  0-5  5-10 
East Asia  China  133  142 207 211  96 113  145,3 155,3  9,1  2,0 
Central Asia  Kazakhstan 
b  41  59 79 55  na na  60,1 57,4 -8,0  -0,6 
 Kyrgyzstan 
b  57  93 79 96  na na  68,0 94,9 -6,4  5,4 
 Tajikistan 
b  66  85 52 51  na na  59,4 68,3 -8,1  1,8 
 Turkmenistan 
b 82  108 79 62  na na  80,7 85,0 -3,9  0,9 
 Uzbekistan 
b  100  148 95 80  na na  97,8  114,0 -0,4  3,2 
  Avg. Cent Asia 
b  69  99 77 69  na na  73,1 84,1 -5,4  2,2 
European CIS Belarus  74  64 66 92  77 70  72,3 75,3 -5,5  0,6 
  Moldova  82  90 na na  51 54  na  na  na  na 
  Russia  63  61 80 79  74 84  72,3 74,7 -5,5  0,5 
  Ukraine  70  56 88 76  77 81  78,3 71,0 -4,3  -1,5 
  Avg.  Eur  CIS  72  68 78 82  70 72  73,3 74,0 -5,3  0,1 
Baltics  Estonia  69  80 103 109  86 112  86,0 100,3  -2,8  2,9 
  Latvia  71  98 88 97  89  116  82,7  103,7 -3,5  4,2 
  Lithuania  61  81 100 100  81  93  80,7  91,3  -3,9  2,1 
  Avg.  Baltics  67  86  97 102  86 107  83,3  98,3  -3,3  3,0 
Central 
Europe  Czech  Republic 87  89 102 131  100 126  96,3 115,3  -0,7  3,8 
  Hungary  72  83  72 101  95 110  79,7  98,0  -4,1  3,7 
  Poland  80  93 86 99  96  108  87,3  100,0 -2,5  2,5 
  Slovakia  89  89  99 117  89 116  92,3 107,3  -1,5  3,0 
  Avg.  CE  82  88  90 112  95 115  89,0 105,0  -2,2  3,2 
Balkans  Albania  85  86 72 76  125  138  94,0  100,0 -1,2  1,2 
  Bulgaria  63  65 57 72  86 90  68,7 75,7 -6,3  1,4 
  Romania  85  93 80 81  137  134  100,7  102,7  0,1  0,4 
  Slovenia  Na  na 97 95  99  112  na  na  na  na 
  Avg.  Balkans  78  81 77 81  112  119  89,0 93,7 -2,2  0,9  
 
Source:   USDA for grains; sugarbeet yields are from FAO for Central Europe, Balkans and China, and from ZMP and FAO for Central 
Asia, Caucasus, and European CIS.; milk yields are from ZMP for Central Europe, Balkans, Central Asia, Caucasus and 
European CIS, and from SSB for China. 
Notes: 
a Grains include wheat, rice (milled weight) and coarse grains.  
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 Table 4:   Annual growth rates of total factor productivity for agriculture  
in various transition countries for selected years (percent) 
    1979-94 1979-84 1984-89 1989-94 
East Asia          
China Rice  3.8  9.1  0.4  2.0 
 Wheat  5.6  12.8  1.2  2.6 
 Maize  6.1  13.5  -1.0  5.6 
 Soybean  4.8  7.7  -1.6  8.1 
 Crops  (Av)  5.1  10.8  -0.2  4.6 
        
    1976-80 1980-85 1993-98   
Vietnam  Rice     3.0  
North Rice  -3.3  5.0  2.1   
South Rice  0.0  3.3  4.3   
Vietnam  Crops     1.0  
North Crops      -0.7   
South  Crops     3.0  
        
Central Asia        
   1992-1997     
Kazakhstan  GAO  -1.0     
Kyrgyzstan  GAO  -0.4     
Tajikistan  GAO  -2.4     
Turkmenistan  GAO  -5.8     
Uzbekistan  GAO  -2.2     
Average Central 
Asia   -3.5     
Caucasus        
Armenia GAO  4.6     
Azerbaijan  GAO  -0.8     
Georgia GAO  6.6     
Average Caucasus    3.5     
Eur CIS        
Belarus  GAO  0.6     
Moldova GAO  0.4     
Russia  GAO  1.4     
Ukraine GAO  0.4     
Average Eur CIS    0.7     
Baltics        
Estonia  GAO  2.8     
Latvia  GAO  -1.2     
Lithuania  GAO  3.6     
Average Baltics    1.7     





   1989-1995   1989-92    1992-95 
Central Eur.          
Czech  Republic  Crops 2.7   1.1   4.3 
Hungary  Crops 1.1   -4.5   6.7 
Poland  Crops  -0.4   -5.1   4.3 
Slovakia  Crops 1.2   -0.6   3.1 
Average Cent. Eur.    1.2    -2.3    4.6 
Balkans         
Albania  Crops 0.0   -9.3   9.2 
Bulgaria  Crops  -1.8   -7.5   3.8 
Romania  Crops 0.5   -7.8   8.7 
Slovenia Crops  –    -3.4    – 
Average Balkans    0.1    -7.0    7.3 
        
Sources: China from JIN et al. (2002); Vietnam from PINGALI  and  XUAN (1992) and 
BENJAMIN and BRANDT (2001); FSU from LERMAN et al. (2003); Central Europe 
and Balkans from MACOURS and SWINNEN (2000).  
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This paper is a stocktaking of land reform and farm restructuring for three 
countries of the Europe and Central Asia region covering three issues pertinent 
to discussions of the effects of land reform: The overall policy environment, 
changes in farm performance and changes in the well-being of the rural 
population. It reaches the following conclusions. First, land reform was probably 
not responsible for the fall in agricultural production and productivity in the 
three countries. Land distribution followed the decline in gross agricultural 
output and deterioration in agricultural yields and labor productivity. Second, 
land reform contributed to raising yields in the three countries under review, 
thus potentially contributing to pro-poor growth. Third, rises in the subjective 
welfare of rural residents stem from a large variety of factors. Land reform can 
contribute to increasing subjective welfare, but can not compensate for the lack 
of non-farm employment opportunities and rural services. 
Keywords: Land reform, farm restructuring, agricultural policy, farm productivity. 
LAND REFORM AND FARM RESTRUCTURING IN MOLDOVA, 
AZERBAIJAN AND KAZAKHSTAN: A STOCKTAKING
1 
Over the past decade the rural sector in nearly all the countries of Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia (the ECA region) has undergone a shift from predominantly 
collective agriculture to more individualized agriculture. Over a ten year period, 
                                                 
*  Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, Viale delle Terme di Caracalla, 00100 Rome, Italy. 
1  This paper is based on a longer study completed for the World Bank (DUDWICK, FOCK and 
SEDIK, 2006). The core task team consisted of Nora Dudwick (World Bank task team 
leader), Karin Fock (World Bank), David Sedik (FAO), and Johan Swinnen (World Bank). 
The study received funding from the Norwegian Trust Fund, the Bank-Netherlands 




between 1990 and 2000, over 145 million hectares of land were transferred to 
private ownership. This transfer is considerably larger than other successful land 
reforms in recent history, including those in Mexico, Brazil, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan (Table 1).  
Table 1:  Land reforms in recent history 
Country or region  Period  Duration (years)  Land transferred 
(million ha) 
Mexico 1917-92  75  100 
Brazil 1964-94  30  11 
Japan 1945-52  7  2 
Korea 1945-50  5    0.5 
Taiwan  
(Rep. of China)  1949-53 4  0.2 
CEE countries
* 1990-2000  10  33 
CIS countries
** 1990-2000  10  116 
Source: DEININGER, 2003. 
Notes: 
* The Central and Eastern European countries, the 8 new EU countries, Bulgaria,  
   Romania and Albania. 
  
** The countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
Though the dimensions of land reform are impressive and the changes many, land 
reform does not yet seem to have lived up to its potential in many countries of the 
Europe and Central Asia region.
2 There are at least two potential long-run benefits 
from distributive land reform and farm restructuring – an improvement in farm 
production efficiency and improved access to land for poor rural inhabitants. Land 
reform can contribute to the efficiency of farm production through establishing 
secure property rights over land. Secure tenure rights can improve the investment 
climate in rural areas, improve access to credit for rural residents with land titles, 
increase demand for land and widen the scope for local tax revenues. These 
changes should foster growth of agricultural production. Land reform can increase 
access to land for poor rural inhabitants if distribution or restitution of land in rural 
areas is widespread. Access to land provides a social safety net in rural areas 
allowing rural residents to ensure their own food security. Furthermore, land 
distribution can provide rural inhabitants with entrepreneurial skills, the 
wherewithal to become commercial farmers. Land reform can therefore contribute 
to poverty alleviation by supporting sustainable pro-poor growth in rural areas.  
In many countries of the region the contrast between these widely acknowledged 
potential benefits of land reform and rural realities could hardly appear wider. 
The past decade and a half has seen the largest fall in agricultural production, yields 
and rural employment on record in many of the countries of the region. Poverty 
                                                 
2  On the promise of land reform see DEININGER (2003). For an overview of land reform in 
the Europe and Central Asia region see LERMAN, CSAKI and FEDER (2004). David Sedik  32
rates in this part of the world rose greatly in 1990s, and for most of the countries 
rural poverty headcounts are higher in rural areas. Furthermore, the deterioration of 
collective and state farms was accompanied by a significant drop in rural public 
services. The contrast between these two pictures in many of the countries of this 
region have led many to question to what extent land reform itself has been 
responsible for these negative developments and why land reform does not appear 
to have fulfilled its promise of pro-poor growth in rural areas. There is therefore a 
great need for a critical review, a stocktaking, of land reform and farm restructuring 
to document what is known about its apparent effects and to understand why land 
reform has not lived up to its potential in many of the countries of this region. 
A stocktaking of land reform and farm restructuring must be realistic as to what it 
can achieve. It cannot offer a comprehensive analysis of the impact of land reform 
policies because of the difficulties of rigorously establishing causation. It is 
difficult to isolate the effects of land reform and farm restructuring from the 
effects of other policy changes and economic trends that took place in this period. 
Particularly in the early 1990s, inherited distortions of the previous system may 
have had more to do with observed economic declines and decline in rural 
services than land reform and farm restructuring, which were introduced rather 
late in these countries. Moreover, the length and divisiveness of the political 
process of introducing land reform and farm restructuring and the implementation 
of complementary reforms also had critical consequences for the economic and 
social results of reforms. Lengthier reforms were more likely to be obstructed by 
lawmakers, local elites or farming interests. Last, agricultural reforms and their 
effects should not be viewed in isolation from the rest of the economy. There 
have been important spillover effects from the rest of the economy that have 
constrained or benefited the performance of agriculture in this period.  
This paper presents such a stocktaking of land reform and farm restructuring for 
three countries of the Europe and Central Asia region that have had particular 
difficulties in land reform, farm restructuring, farm performance or rural poverty – 
Moldova in the European CIS, Azerbaijan in the Transcaucasus and Kazakhstan in 
Central Asia. It covers three issues that are important for any discussion of the 
effects of land reform: The overall agricultural policy environment, changes in the 
economic performance of farms and changes in the well-being of the rural 
population. Much of the information derives from farm and household surveys 
conducted by the World Bank in each of the three countries in 2003. The surveys 
were designed to provide information that would be comparable across countries. 
The household surveys covered from 500 to 700 households in each country, and 
the farm enterprise surveys covered 60 to 200 family and corporate farms. Surveys 
were supplemented by individual and focus group discussions. More information 
on survey methodology, terminology and the limitations of the information derived 




Some tentative conclusions can be derived from the critical comparison of land 
reform in these three CIS countries. First, despite clear difference in strategies of 
land privatization, land reform does not seem to have been responsible for the 
fall in agricultural production and productivity in the three countries. The 
distribution of land for the most part followed the decline in gross agricultural 
output and deterioration in agricultural yields and labor productivity. Second, 
land reform has clearly contributed to raising yields in the three countries under 
review, thus potentially contributing to pro-poor growth. In addition, in the 
country where there was widespread distribution of land (Azerbaijan) land reform 
seems to have both contributed to more robust agricultural growth and has 
effected a more equitable distribution of assets, another potential contribution to 
pro-poor growth. Third, rises in the subjective welfare of rural residents stem 
from a large variety of factors, including rising farm productivity, the supply of 
non-farm income opportunities, the state of rural services and community 
environment. Land reform can contribute to increasing subjective welfare, but can 
not compensate for the lack of non-farm employment opportunities and rural 
services. In order for land reform to properly contribute to bettering life in rural 
areas it must be accompanied by complementary actions and policies to support 
employment in rural areas and improve rural services.  
Box 1:  Agricultural producer terminology 
For the purposes of this study, agricultural producers fall into three categories. The 
first is that of so-called corporate farms. These farms are either descendents of state 
and collective farms or farms formed after their break-up. After 1993 in 
Kazakhstan, 1995 in Azerbaijan and 1993 in Moldova corporate farms became a 
mixture of reformed state and collective farms, joint stock companies, limited 
liability companies, partnerships, closed or open corporations and cooperatives.   
The second category, "individual farms," consists of two sub-categories – family 
and household farms. Family farms (or "peasant farms" ) derive their legal basis 
from special laws enacted, first, in the Soviet period and then after independence 
was declared in each of these countries. These special laws originally designated 
that land for the formation of peasant farms was to be obtained either from lands of 
a municipality reserve fund or from collective farms. Individuals could receive or 
purchase such land for private ownership, were allowed to employ hired labor and 
were obliged to file statistical reports with the State Statistical Committee. After the 
beginning of agrarian reforms in these countries members of corporate farms 
acquired the right to withdraw their land shares in order to form family farms. The 
third category of farms is here referred to as household farms. Before land 
distribution these were the private ancillary plots and collective gardens and 
orchards farmed by the employees of the successors of state and collective farms. 
With the dissolution of corporate farms in Azerbaijan and Moldova household plots 
became private property. Land of dissolved corporate farms was used to form 
private farms or distributed to plot owners.  David Sedik  34
1 LAND REFORM AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Land reform has been of crucial importance to the populations in the countries 
under review, because these countries are still quite rural with half of their 
populations residing in rural areas. Agriculture is quite important in these 
countries, employing from 20 to 50 percent of the labor force and making up 10 
to 20 percent of GDP (Table 2). Despite these similarities, there are sizeable 
differences between these countries coming from three very different regions of the 
CIS – the European CIS (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova), the Transcaucasus 
and Central Asia. Two of the most important differences are the available land 
per rural resident and GDP per capita. In both cases Kazakhstan differs from the 
others. The land to labor ratio in Kazakhstan (the least densely populated 
country in Eurasia) is far higher than in the other two countries. Kazakhstan also 
stands out as the richest country with the lowest poverty headcount.  
Table 2:  Country profiles, 2004 
Indicator Moldova  Azerbaijan  Kazakhstan 
Population     
Population (mln)  4.2  8.3  15.0 
Rural  population  (%)  54 50 44 
Agriculture     
Agriculture in GDP (%)  23  13  7 
Agriculture in labor force  
(latest year, %)  51 40 22 
Agricultural land per rural 
resident (ha, 2003)  1.1 1.1  31.7 
Poverty     
GDP per capita (2000 US$)  398  957  1,822 
Poverty (headcount, 2001)  64.1  33.4  8.5 
Source: WORLD BANK, 2006a; FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UN, 2006; 
WORLD BANK, 2006b. 
Each of the countries considered here pursued a different strategy of land reform. 
Azerbaijan pursued the most rapid and complete land reform with dissolution of 
collective farms and distribution of land to their members (Figure 2). Kazakhstan 
and Moldova pursued more gradual strategies without the elimination of 
corporate farms (Figures 1 and 3). Despite these differences, the fall in both 
GDP and GAO in each country preceded land reform and the recovery of both 
followed further more robust measures in the area of land reform and farm 
restructuring. In Azerbaijan growth in GDP and GAO followed the beginning of 
land distribution directly. In Kazakhstan the recovery of GDP and GAO 
followed the institution of bankruptcy proceedings for and extensive 




after partial land distribution in 1998, and began to recover after GDP began to 
grow in 2000.  
1.1   Land reform strategies 
All three countries privatized Soviet collective and state farms early in the post-
Soviet period, creating any number of privatized corporate farms. After this 
initial privatization each pursued a different land reform strategy. Kazakhstan 
and Moldova underwent "share privatization" in the early 1990s. Under "share 
privatization" members of collectives received notional claims to a share of the 
land and property of the corporate farm, though the corporate farm itself was 
maintained intact. During this period, members of these farms could theoretically 
withdraw from the large farm, though in practice this right was difficult to 
exercise.
3 The Kazakh land reform, the most conservative of the three, maintained 
and restructured privatized corporate farms created by share privatization, while 
allowing the creation of family (peasant) farms, an inheritance of the Gorbachev 
perestroika era. Kazakhstan did not allow private ownership of land until 2003, 
and today family farms (raising vegetables and fruits) predominate in southern 
Kazakhstan while the Northern grain growing area is populated predominantly 
by corporate farms, often vertically integrated with grain trading corporations. 
By 2004 this strategy resulted in 57 percent of land being sown by corporate 
farms. Moldova underwent "share privatization" as in Kazakhstan from 1991 
through 1998. Then in 1998 Moldova pushed through a partial individualization 
of land. All members of corporate farms were allowed to withdraw their land 
shares either to form individual farms or to pool under the management of 
"leaders," often the technical personnel from the dissolved collective farm. As a 
result of this partial individualization, Moldovan land is split nearly evenly 
between individual private farms (53 percent of sown land in 2004) and newly 
recreated corporate farms. In contrast to Kazakhstan and Moldova, the most 
radical land reform of the three took place in Azerbaijan which dissolved nearly 
all corporate farms after 1996 and distributed their land to private individually-
operated farms. In six short years between 1995 and 2001 Azerbaijan distributed 
91 percent of sown land in corporate farms to individual farms. By 2004 97 percent 
of sown land was tilled in individual farms.  
Different land reform strategies have led to large differences between these 
countries in the distribution of landholding. In Moldova and Kazakhstan the portion 
of sown land in individual farms is about half that in Azerbaijan. Differences across 
countries in the portion of livestock in individual farms are considerably less, 
because livestock was always more heavily concentrated in the household sector in 
each country. For instance, in 1991 55 percent of livestock was in the private sector 
in Azerbaijan and 29 percent in Moldova and Kazakhstan. In that same year only 
                                                 
3  During this period members of corporate farms required the approval of the management 
and the local administration in order to withdraw their land share and form a family farm.  David Sedik  36
2 percent of land was in the private sector in Azerbaijan, less than 1 percent in 
Kazakhstan and 9  percent in Moldova. The portion of GAO produced in the 
individual sector in the three countries exceeds the portion of sown land, but is equal 
to or less than the portion of livestock inventories in individual farms (Table 3). 
Table 3:  Structure of farming in Moldova, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, 2004 
Structure of farming  Moldova  Azerbaijan  Kazakhstan 
Sown land in individual farms (%)  53  97  43 
GAO in individual farms (%)  71  98  78 
Livestock inventories in 
individual farms (%)  91 97 90 
Source: Statistical  yearbooks. 
1.2 Agricultural  production 
Farm production in each of the three countries considered here began to fall 
significantly before land reforms and continued to do so well into the years of 
independence (Figures 1, 2 and 3). The differences between countries appear in 
the length and depth of the fall in GDP and GAO and in the robustness of the 
recovery of GAO. Moldova and Kazakhstan saw gradual reforms without 
widespread dissolution of corporate farms. GAO in these countries fell for a long 
time before beginning to recover along with GDP. The bulk of declines in GAO 
and GDP occurred during farm "share privatization" when farm individualization 
was limited. Azerbaijan practiced a more robust land reform with dissolution of 
collective farms and distribution of land. The growth in GAO in Azerbaijan has 
been considerably more robust than in Moldova and Kazakhstan.  
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The stabilization and growth of GAO in these three countries seemed to be 
affected by three factors. First, land distribution seemed to have played a role. 
GAO in these countries began to grow only after the partial land distributions in 
Moldova and Kazakhstan and the more radical distribution in Azerbaijan. 
Second, Kazakhstan and Moldova both restructured and provided debt write-offs 
to corporate farms starting in 1998 in response to the farm "debt crises" there. In 
Kazakhstan bankruptcy proceedings were introduced in the 1998 and buyouts of 
large farms were encouraged by large, vertically integrated grain companies 
(processors). Bankruptcy (or the threat of it) sometimes brought in new 
management and access to capital, and the further concentration of land and 
property shares under management control (GRAY, 2000; ESIRKEPOV and 
BEISEMBAEV, 2001; CSAKI, LERMAN and SOTNIKOV, 2001). A third factor David Sedik  38
contributing to the recovery of GAO is the stabilization and growth of GDP. In 
sum, it is not possible to disentangle the separate effects on GAO of land 
distribution, debt assistance, farm restructuring and GDP growth. However, a 
comparison of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan suggests that perhaps the robustness 
of land reform influenced the robustness of the recovery of GAO independently 
of other factors. In both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan GDP grew quite briskly 
after 1996 and 1998. However, agriculture grew quickly only in Azerbaijan.  
2 THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT OF LAND REFORM 
Land reform took place within specific general and agricultural policy 
environments which shaped growth in GAO in this period. Generally speaking, 
the macro economic environment in Azerbaijan has been better than in Moldova 
and Kazakhstan. Moreover, the agricultural policy environment in Azerbaijan 
improved considerably since 1997 compared to Kazakhstan and Moldova. 
However, rural households in Azerbaijan ranked the enabling environment for 
farming in their country poorly. The overall effects of the agricultural policy 
environment on GAO in these countries, then, are not clear.  
2.1  Macroeconomic policy environment 
The macroeconomic environment had a predominantly negative influence on 
agriculture in these countries through the mid to late 1990s. This is partially 
because depression and stagnation in the general economy had labor spillover 
effect into agriculture. Each of the countries saw an increase in the portion of the 
labor force employed in agriculture through the late 1990s which contributed to 
already falling labor productivity in agriculture (Table 4). It is also difficult to 
expect labor shifts out of agriculture or even agricultural growth without growth 
in other sectors. Perhaps not coincidentally, agricultural production stabilized in 
these countries only after GDP began to grow in 1996 in Azerbaijan, in 1999 in 
Kazakhstan and in 2000 in Moldova.  
Table 4:  Employment in agriculture, 1991-2001 (% of total employment) 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Azerbaijan  32 35 32 32 31 32 29 42 42 41 40 
Kazakhstan  23 24 25 22 22 21 24 22 22  –  – 
Moldova  42 40 43 46  –  43 42 46 49 51 51 
Source: WORLD BANK, 2006b. 
Despite the predominantly negative role of the macroeconomic environment 
through most of the 1990s, there is a clear difference between Azerbaijan and 
Moldova/Kazakhstan in the growth path of agriculture. In Azerbaijan 
agricultural growth has been fully as robust as general economic growth. In fact, 




Azerbaijan. In Kazakhstan and Moldova, in contrast, agricultural growth has 
lagged behind GDP.  
2.2 Agriculture  policy  environment 
A second important influence on agricultural growth and yields has been the 
general policy environment in agriculture. While the status of agricultural 
reforms in these countries is far below those in the EU, there has also been a 
distinct difference between Azerbaijan and the other two countries. In 
Azerbaijan the agricultural policy environment has improved considerably since 
1997, while in the other two countries improvement has been much more 
modest. The change in agricultural reform policies in these countries can be seen 
in the indices compiled by the World Bank on the status of agrarian reforms. 
These indices measure the status of agrarian reforms in the economy in five key 
areas, with each index ranging from 1 (centrally planned economy) to 10 
(market economy) (Table 5). The table shows the simple average of the five 
indices measuring the status of agricultural reforms in the areas of prices and 
markets, land markets, agro-processing and institutions. For a detailed 
explanation of ratings, see CSAKI and KRAY (2005).  
Table 5:  Status of agricultural reforms in Moldova, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and the new EU countries 
  1997 2000 2004 
Moldova  5.8 6.4 6.0 
Azerbaijan 5.0 6.4 6.6 
Kazakhstan  5.8 5.6 6.2 
New EU countries
*  7.8  8.6      9.2
** 
Source: CSAKI and KRAY, 2005.  
Notes: 
* In Eastern and Central Europe; 
** 2003.  
2.3  Enabling environment for farming 
A third influence on agricultural growth and yields has been the enabling 
environment for farming (Table 6). The policy environment may be evaluated 
not only by World Bank experts, but "from below" by rural households 
themselves. The World Bank 2003 surveys asked rural households about their 
own perceptions of the enabling environment for farming by requesting them to 
rate the ease with which a number of activities could be carried out. The results 
seem to indicate that status of the enabling environment in Azerbaijan is worse 
than in either Kazakhstan or Moldova. Azerbaijan ranks last in every category 
except for one. Moldova, by contrast, seems to rank the best of the three 
countries. David Sedik  40
Table 6:  Surveyed households rating of the enabling environment for 
farming 
Ease to  Azerbaijan Kazakhstan  Moldova 
Market agricultural produce  42  53  43 
Purchase land  34  37  46 
Sell land  41  41  50 
Rent in land  39  45  51 
Lease out land  43  45 51 
Access inputs (seeds, 
fertilizer, pesticides)  30  57  54 
Access agricultural 
equipment  31  50  53 
Access satisfactory 
irrigation  37  48  15 
Access satisfactory advisory 
services  47  58  56 
Access a loan for farm 
investments  29  29  41 
Summary average  37  46 46 
Source: DUDWICK, FOCK and SEDIK, 2006. 
Note:        Index between 0 and 100. 0: Very difficult; 100: Very easy. The best rank of three  
  is indicated in bold and the worst in italics.  
3  Economic performance of farms 
While the difficulties of causal arguments about land reform should be 
recognized, this does not mean that it is impossible to evaluate land reforms. 
This can be done through a structured and comparative review of key 
performance indicators of the farm sector before and after reforms and between 
countries. A case can be made that important differences in outcomes over time 
and between countries may be a result of land reform. This line of argument is 
more convincing for immediate effects. It is less reliable in establishing longer 
term effects of land reform. For example, it is possible to demonstrate that the 
distribution of land in Azerbaijan had an immediate impact of increasing the 
average land holding of rural inhabitants by one hectare and caused the 
distribution of landholding to become significantly more equal in rural areas. 
However, it is more difficult to attribute the subsequent growth of crop 
production exclusively to land distribution, because GDP increased and the 
agricultural policy changed at the same time.  
In the following comparisons the growth in crop and livestock yields and labor 
productivity is used as an overall indicator of changes in farm performance. A 




by examination of differences in farm performance between corporate and 
individual farms. As the portion of land and livestock in individual farms grew, 
overall yields grew closer to those in individual farms. Last, corporate farm 
performance over time can be analyzed by comparing official statistics on 
profitability. Each of these measures has limitations, and it may be argued that 
none of these measures is adequate for understanding the extent of farm 
restructuring. For these reasons it is best to be conservative in any interpretations 
of the data.  
3.1  Changes in crop and livestock yields and labor productivity  
Growth in GAO in the three countries has been driven predominantly by 
improvements in yields (output per ha or per inventory animal). Table  7 
illustrates that growth in GAO in Moldova has been caused by increases in both 
area and yields, while Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have falling crop area and 
rising yields. The increase in yields in Azerbaijan and Moldova clearly followed 
the watershed reforms in those countries of 1996 and 1998. Crop and livestock 
yields in Azerbaijan turned around in the years 1996-98. In Moldova crop yields 
began to grow only in 2001. In Kazakhstan crop yields have been highly erratic, 
though the trend since 1998 has been up. Livestock yields, however, have 
continued to fall over the entire period.  
Table 7:  Sown area, crop yields and labor productivity in Moldova, 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, indices (1990=100) 
  1990 1995 1996 1997  1998  1999 2000  2001  2002 
Moldova             
Sown  area  100 102 103 109  109 108 111  114 116 
Crop  yield  100 78 65 80  66 61 59  67 68 
Livestock  yield  100 59 61 66  58 65 61  54 54 
Azerbaijan             
Sown  area  100 83 83 74  63 57 71  79 84 
Crop  yield  100 77 85 80  80 90 93 102  105 
Livestock  yield  100 66 67 67  71 72 72  72 74 
Kazakhstan             
Sown  area  100 82 73 62  53 43 46  48 50 
Crop  yield  100 42 54 65  39  101 77  98 93 
Livestock  yield  100 105 122 128  122 119 113  114 109 
Source:  Calculated from statistical yearbooks. David Sedik  42
 
Box 2:  Crop and livestock meat yield indices 
An index of crop yields (centners per ha) was used to track changes over time in 
the countries of this study. The crop yield index used weights from the latest 
year available (2002) derived from the distribution of cultivated area among 
crops. Current year weights were used because they probably better reflect the 
distribution of land area under market conditions. In order to make the indices 
more comparable, a subset of crops raised in each country was chosen for the 
index. The crops used in the index cover 83, 85 and 95 percent of the area of 
sown and permanent crops in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Moldova in 2002. 
The index leaves out various types of animal feed crops.  
To track livestock meat yield (tons of meat production per inventory animal) 
changes an indicator of the efficiency of meat production was used. For this 
purpose an index of meat production per inventory animal (using end of year 
stock figures) was constructed. This index can be thought of a rough indicator of 
gross return to the grain cost of maintaining capital stock. The numerator is a 
measure of meat production in kilograms, while the denominator is a measure of 
animal inventories in cow terms, weighted according to the relative grain 
consumption of each animal. For instance, if cows and horses receive a weight 
of 1.0, the weight for cattle is 0.6, sheep and goats, 0.1 and poultry receive a 
weight of 0.02. This is not a perfect indicator of efficiency by any means, but it 
has the advantage that it can be calculated for each of the CIS countries. The 
drawbacks of this indicator are evident during periods of large declines in 
inventories of corporate farms, indicating sizeable transfers to individual farms. 
During these periods meat production by corporate farms continues its slow 
decline, but inventories decline rapidly. Thus, it appears that corporate farm 
meat production efficiency jumps.
4 This is because livestock inventories in the 
denominator, measured at the end of the year, reflect the transfer, while meat 
output does not yet. 
Calculations of labor productivity are made notoriously uncertain by the lack of 
dependable underlying labor data. In Moldova, for instance, official figures on 
agricultural labor indicated very little change in the number of employed in 
agriculture (around 700,000), between 1990 and 2002. However, the reported 
number of employed dropped by more than 20  percent in 2003 and another 
10  percent in 2004. The size of change indicates that this fall reflects 
                                                 
4  Another difference between land and livestock distribution in the CIS countries is that 
animals could be exported. In the early 1990s corporate farms appear to have exported 
large quantities of livestock. The evidence for this is to be found in the large reductions in 
livestock inventories that were not transferred to individual farms. If this reduction in 
inventories signified distress slaughter, one would expect a temporary increase in meat 
production. However, there is no evidence of increased meat production in these periods. 
This phenomenon was most pronounced in Kazakhstan, where corporate farms appear to 




employment reclassification rather an actual diminution of employment. Thus, 
the labor productivity figures for Moldova after 2002 should be checked 
thoroughly before drawing conclusions. Labor productivity figures in 
Kazakhstan should also be used with great caution. The fall in labor productivity 
in 2000 is a result of a change in the definition of agricultural labor, so that these 
figures are not comparable with those that precede them (Figure 4).  
Bearing in mind the limitations of such data, it should be said that calculations of 
labor productivity show gradual improvements in performance in Azerbaijan since 
1999 and rapid improvements in Moldova between 2000 and 2002 (Figure 4). In 
Kazakhstan labor productivity continues to fall gradually. In Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan there is no indication of the rise in agricultural labor productivity 
caused by widespread labor shedding in corporate farms that can be found in 
Estonia, the Slovak and Czech Republics and Hungary. Agriculture seems to 
have absorbed rather than shed labor in these countries. In Moldova, however, 
there is improvement in labor productivity after 2000, though the figures for 
2003 and 2004 should not be considered reliable until we have a better 
understanding of the meaning of official figures.  


















































Source: Calculations  from statistical yearbooks. David Sedik  44
3.2  Differences in productivity between corporate and individual farms 
There are two sources for comparison of productivity between corporate and 
individual farms. The first is official statistics, from which indices of yields can 
be derived (Table  8). Table  8 illustrates that yields in individual farms have 
dominated those in corporate farms since Soviet times. If overall yields have 
improved in these countries part of the reason is the movement of production 
from corporate to individual farms. A second set of productivity comparisons is 
derived from survey data. From these data we derived partial productivity 
measures such as productivity of land (value of output per hectare) and labor 
(value of output per average work unit), as well as total factor productivity 
(TFP), for which output is measured in relation to a whole bundle of inputs 
utilized. TFP is calculated as the ratio of the aggregated value of output to the 
aggregated cost of inputs. In theory TFP is the ratio of the aggregated market 
value of outputs to the aggregated market value of inputs. This calculation is 
proxied in Table 9 by using the ratio of sales to costs as reported in the farm’s 
financial statements. The ratio of sales to costs is a TFP proxy that provides an 
accounting measure of productivity equivalent to the profit margin.  
Table 8:  Indices of crop yields for farms by type in Moldova, Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan based on official statistics 
  1990 1995 2002 
Moldova     
Individual  farms  50 42 33 
Corporate  farms  46 35 33 
Azerbaijan     
Individual  farms  54 38 41 
Corporate  farms  27 15 20 
Kazakhstan     
Individual farms  31  9  20 
Corporate farms  13  5  10 
Source:  Calculations from statistical yearbooks. For an explanation of index methodology 
see Box 2. 
Partial productivity measures provide an ambiguous picture of differences in 
productivity between corporate and individual farms. Survey results show that 
land productivity (output per ha) is higher in family farms than in corporate 
farms in Moldova and Azerbaijan, whereas in Kazakhstan the two are 
statistically indistinguishable (Table  9). On labor productivity (output per 
average work unit) the results are more mixed. In Moldova labor productivity 
seems to be higher on corporate farms while in the other two countries labor 
productivity is not statistically different.  
The total factor productivity measure can be used to resolve the ambiguity 




farms are more productive than corporate farms in each of the three countries 
surveyed and the difference is significant at the 20 percent level. It should be 
noted that there is an important limitation on the comparison of survey figures 
for family and corporate farms in Moldova. In the World Bank survey in 
Moldova family farms were concentrated in the smaller size categories, while 
corporate farms were predominantly large. Thus, for this country it is difficult to 
derive firm conclusions from Table  9, because it is not clear whether these 
differences in yields result from differences in scale or organizational form. For 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, however, the TFP comparison should be robust as 
an indicator of differences between farming types.  
Table 9:  Productivity measures for surveyed farms by type in Moldova, 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (2003) 
   TFP  Labor  productivity  Land  productivity 




Moldova       
All farms  200  5.4  10.7  15.0 
Family farms  176  5.9 9.9  10.8 
Corporate farms  24  1.7 16.7  3.3 
Azerbaijan        
All farms  80  2.1  7,032  1,589 
Family farms  65  2.3  7,803  1,762 
Corporate farms  15  1.0  3,692  840 
Kazakhstan        
All farms  200  4.2  767  58 
Family farms  178  4.4  683 60 
Corporate farms  22  2.7  1,446 44 
Source: DUDWICK, FOCK and SEDIK, 2006. 
Note:  
* 1000 LCU; AWU = average work units. TFP = total factor productivity. Indicators  
   that are statistically different at the 20 % or better level are in bold italics.  
3.3  Profitability of corporate farms 
A final indicator of the performance of corporate farms is the portion of these 
farms that are unprofitable (Table 10). Corporate farms in these three countries 
have had difficulties being profitable throughout much of the 1990s, peaking in 
1998 when between 80 and 90 percent were unprofitable. A World Bank study 
on Farm Debt in the CIS (2001) recounted the main reason for mounting farm 
debts as the "lax financial discipline made possible by the persistence of soft 
budget constraints" (CSAKI, LERMAN and SOTNIKOV, 2001). Profitability of 
corporate farms improved after 1998 in each country, though in 2002 nearly half 
of these farms were unprofitable in Kazakhstan. The reasons for the 
improvement in financial performance of corporate farms after 1998 are not David Sedik  46
entirely clear. Certainly the growth of production and debt write-offs in all 
countries played a role.  
Table 10:  Portion of unprofittable corporate farms in Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Moldova, 1990-2002 (percent) 
  1990 1995 1998 2000 2002 
Azerbaijan  7.9 47.0 86.7 52.5  29.0 
Kazakhstan n.a.  78.5  78.5  51.6  48.9 
Moldova n.a. 28.0 91.0 56.0   
Sources:  Statistical yearbooks.  
Note:   N.a. – Not available. 
4  Well-being of rural households 
The overall objective of land reform in all transition countries is not only to 
improve the productivity of the agricultural sector, but to increase the incomes 
and the well-being of their large rural populations which rely on agriculture for a 
substantial part of the family budget. Subjective perceptions of household well-
being and changes in well-being gathered from World Bank household surveys 
in each of the three countries covered in this study were utilized for the 
measurement of the well-being of rural populations. Results of the World Bank 
household surveys related to three topics are reported here: Overall subjective 
well-being, access to rural services and social benefits and changes in 
community life. For each of these topics the current level was reported as well 
as a comparison with past levels.  
Household perception surveys are an important source of information about 
subjective well-being of rural inhabitants, though they are not specifically 
connected with land reform. Rather, they are more a reflection of overall 
perceptions of the status of and changes in conditions in the countryside. 
Information from rural inhabitants decisively illustrates that well-being is only 
partly a function of improvements in productive assets and income afforded by 
land reform. Improvements in non-farm income opportunities, rural services and 
community life all seem to play a part in overall well-being of rural inhabitants. 
Improvements in these areas are quite independent of land reform, but rather 
depend on the overall economic prospects in the country and state budget 
allocations to rural areas. Kazakhstan scores high in both these areas, though it 
has consistently received lower marks on a scale of agrarian reforms and has had 
less impressive results related to production and yields.  




Table 11:  Household perceptions of well-being (2003) 
Current level of well-being 
(%)  Azerbaijan Kazakhstan  Moldova 
High  14.1 30.8  14.4 
Medium  64.6 46.3  50.2 
Low  21.3 22.8  35.4 
Change in perceived level of 
well-being over last three 
years (%) 
    
Improved  17.6 36.2  28.6 
Unchanged  78.5 36.5  48.2 
Deteriorated  3.8 27.3  23.2 
Land allocation was fair  
(% of households)  92 n.a.  53 
Source: DUDWICK, FOCK and SEDIK, 2006. 
Note:   N.a. – Not available. 
Overall perceptions of well-being in Kazakhstan households seem to be higher 
than in either Moldova or Azerbaijan (Table 11). Perhaps more importantly, the 
perception of improvement in welfare over the past three years in Kazakhstan is 
higher as well (though a sizeable portion of Moldovan households also believed 
that their welfare had improved). For Azerbaijan there is an important disparity 
between the excellent sector performance and the mediocre subjective well-
being of rural households. Though it would seem that the clear improvements in 
yields and growth in production would translate into the perception that things 
have improved, this has evidently not been the case on a wide scale in rural 
Azerbaijan. In this respect, the low portion of rural households believing that 
there has been an improvement in their well-being is particularly puzzling. It is 
not evident, however, that the fault lies with land reform. Land reform in 
Azerbaijan was widely viewed as fair.  
One of the keys to understanding why Azerbaijan rural households were so 
dissatisfied is a drastic deterioration in rural services and social benefits. The 
sizeable perceived falls in provision of gas and electricity since Soviet times 
contrasts with the perceived improvements in Kazakhstan and Moldova 
(Table 12; Box 3). The deterioration in rural services provision is supported by 
official statistics that show a severe deterioration in gas supply per inhabitant in 
rural areas beginning in the late 1980s with substantial and growing differences 
in the level of services in urban and rural areas (SEDIK  et al., 2002). The 
disparities in service provision per resident between rural and urban areas in 
Azerbaijan for gas, clean water and plumbing are on the order of ten to one.  
There has also been a greater apparent deterioration in social benefits such as 
rural medical and child care in Azerbaijan compared to the other two 
countries (Table 13). Certainly, more limited access to social benefits is to be David Sedik  48
expected as part of the move toward a more monetized economy. However, 
access to education and health services, two social benefits that are clearly 
within the mandate of the state, have deteriorated significantly as well. In a 
survey conducted in 2002 by Transparency International Moldova, more than 
80 percent of respondents considered the deteriorating quality of the education 
and health care systems to be one of the most severe problems in Moldova 
(DEANE and CATRINESCU, 2004).  
Table 12:  Households’ level of satisfaction with provision of electricity, 
gas, drinking water, telephone  








2) Today  Before
2) Today 
Electricity 84.1  43.7
* 68.1 86.2
* 73.0  79.0
* 
Gas 18.4  3.5
* 65.2 78.5
* 35.7  37.7 
Drinking 
water  68.9 66.7 70.0 72.6  42.5 38.6 
Telephone 25.8  30.2
* 48.2 55.0
* 35.4  50.8
* 
Source:   DUDWICK, FOCK and SEDIK, 2006. 
Notes:  A star behind the value in the "Today" column indicates that the satisfaction levels 
before and today are statistically significant at the 10 % level. 
 
 1) Level of satisfaction is expressed on a scale from 0 to 100 (0 = not available at all;  
   100 = always available in satisfactory quality/reliability). 
 
2) "Before" means before the dismantling of the sovkhoz (state farm) or kolkhoz  
   (collective farm). 
 
Box 3:  Rural services in Shemakha and Khachmaz districts of Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijani villagers in Shemakha district no longer have gas, because after the 
breakup of the state farm, the gas pipes were cut and sold. Likewise, a 
kilometer’s worth of pipes that brought water from the district center was stolen. 
The culprits were said to be known but the police were uninterested. Formerly, 
irrigation water was distributed from a tank to which 4 km of pipes were 
connected – these were also stolen. In Khachmaz district, electric cables were 
stolen, and villagers themselves raised money to replace them and restore 
service.  




Table 13:  Percent of households with access to social benefits before 
dismantling of state and collective farms and today  




















augmentation  35 63 11 34 17 29 
Subsidized 
preschool childcare  12 2 6 2 8 4 




32 30 16  4 13  7 
Heating  fuel  0 15 23 14  6  4 
Medical  care  93 53 55 46 65 46 
Subsidized 
vacations  1 1  22 4  43  19 
Source: DUDWICK, FOCK and SEDIK, 2006. 
Note:  
1) "Before" means before the dismantling of the sovkhoz or kolkhoz farm.  
Another reason why households in Azerbaijan may be more pessimistic about 
their level of well-being is that the level of risk in household income is quite a 
bit higher in Azerbaijan than in any other country surveyed (Table 14). Incomes 
in other surveyed countries are significantly more diversified than in Azerbaijan. 
Fully 64  percent of household income derives from farm production in 
Azerbaijan, but only 11 percent from wage employment and 14 percent from 
pensions. Compare this with Moldova, the other country with labor intensive 
agriculture, where 33  percent of household income derived from wage 
employment, 40  percent from agricultural production and 14  percent from 
pensions.  
Table 14:  Income composition of surveyed households 
Percent in total income (cash and in kind)  AZ  KZ  MD 
Total salary from wage employment  10.6  45.7  32.7 
Value of farm production consumed in the family  27.4  12.9  18.5 
Sales of farm products  36.3  9.2  21.7 
Rent/lease payments received (for land and assets)  0.4  0.3  3.7 
Total revenue from other private non-farm business  2.2  1.5  1.6 
Pensions  14.1 22.9 13.6 
Social  assistance  1.4 2.1 1.0 
Gifts and remittances  0.7 0.6 4.1 
Other  6.9 5.7 3.8 
Source: DUDWICK, FOCK and SEDIK, 2006. David Sedik  50
Kazakh rural household incomes seem to be less risky than incomes in either 
Azerbaijan or Moldova. The key difference between Kazakhstan and the other 
two CIS countries lies in the significantly higher salary income of rural 
households (Table 14). In Kazakhstan nearly half of household income derives 
from salaries received from agricultural enterprises (25  percent) or non-
agricultural enterprises (25 percent). Reported household well-being was highly 
correlated with the portion of salary income in total income. The highest portion 
of households reporting high well-being (50 percent) was reported in Akmola 
oblast whose households had the highest portion of salary income (53 percent). 
The lowest portion of households reporting high well-being was from Almaty 
oblast (10 percent) whose households had the lowest portion of salary income 
(39  percent). Because of the large portion of income from salaries in 
Kazakhstan, sales of farm products as a portion of household income were 
relatively low.  
Table 15:  Households’ perceptions of community life 























among adults  38  28 49 65  41  62 
Alcohol use 
among youth  44  37 43 64  33  62 
Level of crime  29  25  38  57  31  49 
Criminal activity 
among youth  28  25 35 54  30  51 
Domestic 
abuse/violence  28  26 27 39  30  45 
Source: DUDWICK, FOCK and SEDIK, 2006. 
Notes: 
1) Level on a scale from 0 (very low) to 100 (very high).  
2) "Before" means before the dismantling of the collective or state farm.  
Azerbaijan stands out from the other countries in household perceptions of 
community life, which seem to have improved in many ways (Table 15). Rural 
households believe that compared with the level before land reform the levels of 
alcohol abuse, criminal activity and domestic abuse have all fallen. Informal 
interviews indicated that part of this is due to the increased importance of 
religion in Azerbaijan rural social life. But it is also undoubtedly due to the 
period of comparison, the early 1990s. In contrast to other countries, where the 
period preceding land reform might be characterized as "developed socialism", 
in Azerbaijan the early 1990s were years of war, political turmoil and a 
deteriorating socialist economy.  
Moldovan and Kazakh households both believe that community life has deteriorated, 




In Moldova respondents noted the proliferation of bars in villages and concerns 
with increasing alcohol abuse by women and children as young as 12. Children 
of parents who had migrated were likelier to drop out of school. Informal 
interviews found that in the face of a perceived increase in crime, villagers either 
failed to report the crime or took the law into their own hands because they saw 
the police as ineffective.  
5 Conclusions 
This stocktaking has offered a structured and comparative description of much 
of what is known about the effects of land reform and farm restructuring in three 
countries of the Eastern Europe and Central Asian region. It has not offered an 
impact analysis of land reform policies in recognition of the difficulties of 
rigorously establishing causation. However, even assembled facts and comparisons 
suggest a number of conclusions with implications for policy.  
The extensive fall in gross agricultural production in these three countries 
seemed to convince both radical (Azerbaijan) and gradual (Kazakhstan) 
reformers alike that the "changing the sign on the door" variety of farm reform 
("share privatization") was not sufficient for creation of viable farms. The fall in 
agricultural production recorded in the CIS countries in the early 1990s seems to 
have been the result of a breakdown in the collective farm system of the 
previous era compounded by delayed introduction of viable farm governance 
and falling GDP. The fall in agricultural production before land reform contrasts 
with the situation of growth in production and productivity (in nearly all the 
countries surveyed) after land distribution. For most indicators and for most 
countries performance after land reform began was considerably better than 
before. In Azerbaijan, there was positive growth in every indicator after land 
reform began in 1996.  
These two facts – that agricultural production began to deteriorate before land 
reform and that production began to grow only after land reform – seem to 
indicate that land reform is more likely a part of the solution than a part of the 
problem in these countries. In the absence of land reform the deterioration in 
output that characterized the early 1990s may well have continued, because 
much of the root of the problem was a deteriorating collective farm system. The 
choice governments faced in Moldova (1998), Azerbaijan (1996) and 
Kazakhstan (1998) was not one of rural "developed socialism" of the Brezhnev era 
vs. land distribution and farm restructuring. It was one of a deteriorating 
agricultural sector under half-way reforms vs. land distribution and farm 
restructuring. Thus, the counterfactual of no land distribution and farm 
restructuring was continued deterioration. It is not surprising that governments 
chose reform under these circumstances. David Sedik  52
This survey has illustrated that an immediate effect of the transfer of agricultural 
production from corporate to individual farms in the three CIS countries was an 
improvement in sector performance, because yields in individual farms were 
higher than those in corporate farms. But land reform by itself is not sufficient to 
ensure better farm performance. None of the governments of the countries 
covered in this survey have met the challenge of ensuring a truly good and 
sustainable enabling environment for agriculture to ensure that farms will be 
competitive in world markets. In each of the countries a number of 
complementary policies were identified that negatively shaped the enabling 
environment for agriculture. Macroeconomic instability in the early 1990s led to 
a fall in GDP in each of the countries. For most of the 1990s in Moldova and 
Azerbaijan agricultural producer prices were significantly below export prices, 
providing a production disincentive. These price differences seem to be a result 
of government restrictions on trade in agricultural commodities. Falling GDP 
and low producer prices created a poor environment for growth in agricultural 
yields or production. The macroeconomic and enabling environment for 
agriculture in the countries considered here improved by the mid- to late 1990s. 
Inflation rates fell and GDP began to grow. Internal and external agricultural 
prices grew closer. In Moldova the macroeconomic record improved after 2000, 
but the enabling environment for agriculture is still poor. In Azerbaijan the 
macroeconomic environment improved after 1996, though the enabling 
environment for agriculture remains poor. In Kazakhstan the macroeconomic 
environment improved after 1996, but the enabling environment for agriculture 
has improved mostly for large farms.  
In addition to ensuring an enabling environment for private agriculture, an 
important service the government can offer rural inhabitants is assistance in the 
transition from high employment, low wage agriculture to low employment, 
high wage agriculture. Not only will this improve the performance of 
agriculture, but it will raise the well-being of rural inhabitants. This can be done 
through rural development, rural pensions, social support for those shed from 
corporate farms, other social services and by assisting young people in acquiring 
skills for alternative employment. Azerbaijan is a good example of a country 
where land reform, for all its important benefits, requires a great number of 
complementary reform measures in order to improve the livelihoods of rural 
inhabitants. Azerbaijan had the best sector performance of any of the countries 
considered. Yields improved, production increased and rural poverty fell. 
However, households were quite pessimistic (compared to other countries) as to 
changes in their well-being with only 18 percent of them believing that well-
being had improved over the past three years. One key to this disparity is the 
substantial deterioration in rural services in Azerbaijan compared to urban areas. 
Another apparent reason is that fully two thirds of incomes in Azeri households 
derived from farming and only 11 percent from wage employment. This portion 




other countries. This risk aversion may explain why households prefer to 
maintain employment in large farms, instead of becoming commercial farmers 
themselves. It is also why the creation of non-farm employment in rural areas is 
so important.  
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Land markets are active, relatively transparent, and well developed in some 
transition countries while embryonic, informal or opaque in others. In 
general, households and farms in Central Europe have much less difficulties 
in accessing land than in some of the CIS countries. These variations reflect 
the different stages of reforms and economic development, and the regional 
environments these countries operate in. For example, in several new EU 
member states land prices and market activities have grown rapidly with the 
combination of increased demand due to higher subsidies, prices and 
productivity, the inflow of foreign investment, and new land legislation. The 
development is slower in most countries further east. 
The main form of land exchange in transition is through renting of land. 
Buying and selling of land is more difficult than renting everywhere. 
However, the share of land rented in total land used varies enormously: 
From more than 90 % (e.g. Slovakia) to 10 % or less (e.g. Albania).  
Theoretically, sale of land is often considered the superior form compared 
to land rental. The arguments supporting the optimality of land sales are 
that (a) land sales transfer full rights to the new user, (b) they are more 
likely to increase access to credit as owned land can be used for collateral 
purposes, and (c) they provide optimal incentives for investment by 
providing permanent security of rights (BINSWANGER  et al., 1995; 
DEININGER and JIN, 2003; DEININGER and FEDER, 2002). 
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However, these conclusions rely on a number of simplifying assumptions 
which are not always consistent with reality, and especially not with reality 
in transition countries (SWINNEN  and VRANKEN, 2006)
1. In transition 
countries, which are typically characterized by huge uncertainties and 
imperfections in input, product, credit and insurance markets, the actual 
performance of land sales markets may be far from the theoretical ideal 
(DEININGER, 2003). 
Various pieces of empirical evidence confirm that, in transition countries, 
sales of land have been limited, in some cases because government 
regulations prohibit them, but often because many new land owners were 
unwilling to sell their newly acquired assets. Moreover, limited information 
about the sales price and the expected increase in land prices upon 
accession to the European Union resulted in very limited sales in all 
Central and East European Countries. This increased the importance of 
land rental markets in transferring land to more productive users and in 
circumventing the huge fragmentation in land ownership (VRANKEN et al., 
2004). Land rental markets have a huge potential in increasing efficiency 
in the allocation of land.  
In addition to efficiency effects, rental markets may also have positive 
equity impacts as they allow poorer individuals to climb the agricultural 
ladder because less capital is required initially to start up their production 
(ESWARAN and KOTWELL, 1986; DE JANVRY et al., 2001; SADOULET et al., 
2001). 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the status of the development of 
land markets in transition countries, to identify which constraints faced 
by rural households are affecting its development and to analyse the 
implications for efficiency, equity, land prices and the impact of 
agricultural policies.  
The first section of the paper discusses some stylized facts about the 
structure of rural land ownership and use of land by farms and the 
development of land markets in transition countries. The next sections 
analyse the land transaction costs and other constraints faced by farming 
households and the implications of the land market development for 
efficiency and equity. Section  5 identifies patterns of land market 
development. The last section analyses how a combination of imperfect 
competition due to the domination of large corporate farms and transaction 
costs are affecting land prices and the impact of agricultural policies. 
                                                 
1  For a review of the theoretical arguments on land sales and rental markets, see 
SWINNEN and VRANKEN, 2006. Land market developments, imperfections, and effects in transition countries 
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2 KEY FINDINGS ON LAND SALES AND LAND RENTAL MARKETS  
Using data from fifteen surveys implemented between 1997 and 2004 in 
eleven different transition countries by the World Bank and by European 
research institutions
2, SWINNEN and VRANKEN (2006) identified a number 
of stylized facts about the development of land markets in transition 
countries. 
1. Land sales markets are thin and almost everywhere less developed than 
land rental markets.  
On the supply side, many more households and farms are renting out land 
than have sold land. Very little land is sold by rural households or family 
farms in transition countries. Less than 5 % of the rural households and 
family farms, both registered and unregistered, had sold land in all 
countries, and in many cases the share was below 2 %. In countries where 
many households or farms are providing land to others, the vast majority 
is through renting out. In countries where little land is rented out, even 
less is sold. Few rural households have been willing to sell land and if 
they allocated land to others they did it through rental arrangements.  
On the demand side, much more land is transferred trough rental than 
through purchase because the large scale farming organisations are 
renting in the vast majority of the large amount of land they use while 
only small plots are purchased, mainly by some of the registered farms.  
2. There are major differences in how much land is being exchanged, and 
in particular in the importance of land rental markets. 
Figure 1 presents aggregate indicators of the importance of renting as a 
share of total land used, indicates that here are large country differences 
between the role of rental markets in land allocation In for example 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic more than 90 % of the cultivated land 
area is rented. In Bulgaria, Hungary, Moldova and Kazakhstan, between 
50 % and 60 % of the cultivated area is rented. In Azerbaijan, this number 
decreases to 35 % and even to 10 % in Albania. 
3. Corporate farms own very little land and rely almost entirely on rented 
land for cultivation.  
In Hungary, Bulgaria, Moldova, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Azerbaijan, corporate farms own less than 15 % of the land they operate 
and 85 % or more of the land used by them is rented. Corporate farms 
                                                 
2  The World Bank surveys include Azerbaijan 2004; Bulgaria 2004; Moldova 2004; 
Kazakhstan 2004; Romania 1996; Tajikistan 1999; and Poland 2000. Surveys 
implemented by European research institutions, coordinated by the University of 
Leuven, include Albania 1999; Albania 2003; Bulgaria 1997; Bulgaria 2003; 
Czech Republic 1999; Hungary 1997; Romania 1998; Slovakia 1999.  Johan F. M. Swinnen, Pavel Ciaian, Liesbet Vranken  58
rent in from three sources: Members
3, non-members and the state. In 
Azerbaijan, the vast majority of corporate farms are using land that is 
owned by the municipality or the state, while in Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Moldova and Kazakhstan, corporate farms 
are using much land which is owned by their members. 
4. Almost all family farms own some land. Registered family farms rely 
on a mixture of rented land and owned land for cultivation. They got land 
not only through the land reform process but often also through land 
purchases.  
In most countries, more than 85 % of the (registered) family farms own 
land and a significant share purchased land, albeit relatively modest 
amounts. Land purchases by registered family farms were for example 
common in Bulgaria and Moldova where 30 % and 23 % of them had 
purchased land. On the other hand, a large share of registered family 
farms are also renting in (often large amounts of) land and they rent 
almost only from other households. Figure 2 makes it rather obvious that, 
in transition countries, just as in the US and in Western Europe, 
commercial farms see renting and buying of land as complementary and 
this complementarity of renting and buying of land increases by farm size 
(SWINNEN, 2002). 
5. Unregistered family farms mostly own a small amount of land and rely 
almost entirely on this land for their cultivation. Unregistered family 
farms are not active in renting in land, while they are quite likely to rent 
out, mostly to corporate farms and in the second place to family farms. 
Almost all unregistered family farms own land, but only very few 
purchased land, indicating that they mainly operate owned land which 
they got through the land reform process or which they owned already 
prior to the start of the land reforms. 
6. The main cause of the large country differences in the share of rented 
land is the importance of corporate farms. While corporate farms own 
little land, they use a lot of land in some countries, most of it rented. In 
the Czech and Slovak Republic 75 % of the total agricultural land area or 
more is used by corporate farms (see Figure  3).
4 Also in Hungary, 
                                                 
3  Expert interviews indicated that regarding rental payment or contract types, 
members/partners, employees and households which are not related to the CF are 
generally treated in a similar way. 
4  Since the start of transition the importance of family farms in land use increased in 
all countries. However, both the magnitude and the speed of the change differed 
strongly. By 2004, in Albania and Azerbaijan, the vast majority of the land is used 
by family farms. In Albania, this was already the case 5 years after the start of the 
reforms. At the other end of the spectrum we find Slovakia were after more than ten 
years of reforms still only 11 % is used by family farms. In Bulgaria, Kazakhstan Land market developments, imperfections, and effects in transition countries 
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Bulgaria, Kazakhstan or Moldova, corporate farms still use around half of 
all land. In contrast, corporate farms have virtually disappeared in countries 
such as Albania and Azerbaijan, where more than 95 % of the land is used 
by family farms. 
The strong correlation between the share of corporate farms in land use 
and the importance of land renting is demonstrated in Figure 4. There is 
almost a perfect linear relation, as illustrated by the fitted trend line and 
the high R² of more than 90 percent. Therefore, to explain differences in 
the share of rented land, we need to determine why the share of corporate 
farms differs so strongly between countries. 
7. In summary, corporate farms rent most of their land. Larger family 
farms operate on both owned land and rented land. They have typically 
enlarged their farm by both purchasing and renting land. Small family 
farms and subsistence farms operate mostly on owned land, and rent in 
small plots of additional land at most. They are more likely to rent out 
land than to rent in land. 
8. Rental contracts differ in length, formality, type of payment, etc. both 
across countries and across farm types. In general, corporate farms tend 
to have longer contracts, more formal contracts, and are more likely to 
pay in kind and to pay lower prices than family farms. Renting to family 
farms is more likely to be paid in cash, with more informal contracts and 
for shorter contract lengths (Figure 5). 
9. Rental prices for land rented by corporate farms is often much lower 
than that rented by individual farms due to the combination of imperfect 
competition and transaction costs. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
land rents paid by corporate farms are generally much lower: Most vary 
between 50 % and 20 % of the rents paid by family farms (see Table 1). 
In Hungary land rental prices were significantly lower in regions where 
corporate farms dominate (VRANKEN and SWINNEN, 2006).  
10. Corporate farms are more likely to pay in kind, a less transparent 
payment system. A study by IME (2000) also found that in Bulgaria, family 
farms generally paid cash or mixed cash/in-kind, while corporate farms 
were much more likely to pay their rents in kind. These in kind payments 
generally depend on yields, which are difficult to control by the land 
owners, and result in lower effective rent payment, a problem particularly 
prevalent in countries where land is under land share ownership. 
                                                                                                                                            
and Moldova, around half of the land is used by family farms. This change in land 
use occurred faster in Bulgaria compared to Moldova or Kazakhstan, reflecting 
differences in land reform. Also the share of family farms in output increased. 
(Their share in livestock herd increased even more due to the labour intensity of 
animal breeding). Johan F. M. Swinnen, Pavel Ciaian, Liesbet Vranken  60
3 LAND TRANSACTION COSTS AND OTHER CONSTRAINTS 
3.1  Transaction costs  
The efficiency of land markets is measured by their ability to transfer 
land from less productive to more productive users. Transaction costs that 
complicate or impede these transfers decrease efficiency. Several studies 
document that land markets in the transition countries, even the most 
advanced such as in Central Europe, are still characterized by the 
existence of significant transaction costs in the rural land markets, 
constraining access to land for rural households willing to start up or 
enlarge their farm (DALE and BALDWIN, 2000; LERMAN et al., 2004) and 
reinforcing the persistence and dominance of large scale corporate farms. 
First, transaction costs rise when the by new owners of the land want to 
withdrawal and reallocate their land from the corporate farms who are the 
historical users of the land and make impede emergence of individual farms 
(RIZOV et al., 2001; ROZELLE and SWINNEN, 2004). These transaction costs 
include: Bargaining costs, costs of enforcement of withdrawal rights, costs 
related to asymmetric information, to co-ownership and unknown owners, 
unclear boundary definitions, etc (MATHIJS  and  SWINNEN, 1998). The 
difficulty to withdraw land, and hence the magnitude of the transaction 
costs, is highly dependant on the location of the plot. Withdrawal of a plot 
that is located in a consolidated field makes the process more difficult and 
more costly. Furthermore, corporate farm managers typically have more 
information than landowners about the economic situation of the farm and 
about regulations governing local land transactions, putting these new land 
owners even more at a disadvantage.
5  This is especially the case for 
landowners who have not been involved in agriculture, or who are living 
outside the village where their land is located, or for pensioners (SWAIN, 
1999).
6  
Second, other transaction costs follow from co-ownership of land, unclear 
boundary definition, and the problem of unknown owners. In many Central 
and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), land ownership registrations 
were poorly maintained, if at all, and in many areas land consolidation was 
implemented, wiping out old boundaries and relocating natural 
identification points (such as old roads and small rivers). The loss of 
                                                 
5  For example, SWAIN (1999) describes how pensioner-members of co-operatives in 
Slovakia were "forced" to rent the land to the co-operative by being threatened of 
losing their pension. 
6  In Hungary "passive owners" (this include village-based pensioners, landowners 
that are not active in the co-operatives and those living outside of the village where 
their land is located) received around 71 % of agricultural land (SWAIN, 1999).  Land market developments, imperfections, and effects in transition countries 
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information on registration and boundaries produced a large number of 
unknown owners in some transition countries (DALE and BALDWIN, 2000).  
Finally, other costs related to land transfers include notary fees, taxes 
and other administrative charges. For instance, the studies on Poland, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania, estimate these costs between 10 % and 
30 % of the value of the land transaction (OECD, 2000; PROSTERMAN and 
ROLFES, 2000; WORLD BANK, 2001).  
3.2 Co-ownership 
Problems with property rights imperfections may remain after full titling 
and after cadastres and information systems have been introduced. One 
example is the existence of co-ownership of land in e.g. Bulgaria and 
Slovakia.  
Unsettled land inheritance within families during the socialist regime 
caused a strong land ownership fragmentation and a large number of co-
owners per a plot of land. In addition, unsettled land inheritance within 
families during the socialist regime caused a strong land ownership 
fragmentation and a large number of co-owners per a plot of land. For 
example, according to OECD (1997), in 1993 approximately 9.6 million 
plots were registered in Slovakia, which is 0.45 hectares per plot, and each 
plot was owned by on average 12 to 15 people. As Dale and Baldwin put 
it, "a single field of twenty hectares may have hundreds of co-owners". In 
the Czech Republic, there were 4 million ownership papers registered in 
1998 for 13 million parcels, with an average parcel size of 0.4 hectares. In 
Bulgaria, a recent study found that 50 % of the plots were co-owned, 
often by several people (VRANKEN, NOEV and  SWINNEN, 2004). The 
average number of co-owners was more than two (excluding husband and 
wife co-ownership). Some co-owners may be unknown, or may not be in 
the country, or may be scattered all over the country. This raises the costs 
of land withdrawal as land withdrawal from the CF normally requires 
agreement from co-owners. The study indeed finds that co-owned plots of 
land in Bulgaria are more likely to be used by corporate farms (Figure 6). 
This raises the costs of land withdrawal as land withdrawal from the 
corporate farms normally requires agreement from co-owners. 
3.3 Credit  constraints 
Access to capital is an important constraint for many farms in the land 
market, not only for buying land but also for renting land. The accession 
to the EU with increased demand, prices, productivity and subsidies has 
seriously reduced this constrained in the new EU member states and 
stimulated land renting and prices. The financial constraints of farms Johan F. M. Swinnen, Pavel Ciaian, Liesbet Vranken  62
remain important constraints in less developed transition countries, 
including in South and Eastern Europe. 
4 EFFECTS ON EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY
7 
Micro-empirical evidence indicates that the effect of land markets on 
incomes, poverty, and efficiency is conditional and depends in part on the 
players involved in the market.  
Land renting between households has a positive effect on equity and 
efficiency. First, households with more human capital access land through 
a combination of buying and renting land, and rental markets contribute 
to increased returns to labor on family farms. Second, older and less 
educated households rent out land to get additional incomes, and those 
who can rent out their land if they wish, have higher welfare. Third, rental 
markets reduce inequality of access to land by transferring land from 
households with high land endowments to those with low land 
endowments. In contrast, sales markets seem to contribute to inequality of 
land ownership. Fourth, larger family farms combine renting and buying of 
land to enlarge their farm operation (as farms do in the US and EU). 
However, where corporate farms dominate the land rental market these 
effects can be very different. While corporate farms may be efficient 
farming organizations in some regions and for some farming activities, 
transaction costs and regional monopoly power of corporate farms in the 
land market are causing negative equity and efficiency effects in several 
countries (MATHIJS and SWINNEN, 2001; MATHIJS and VRANKEN, 2001; 
SEDIK; 1999). In several countries, corporate farms are using more land 
(than efficient), pay lower rental prices than family farms, are more likely 
to pay rents in kind than family farms (who pay cash), have rental 
contracts of longer duration (locking in land), and often use their political 
powers/relationships to influence policies that shift effective land 
property rights in their favor.  
The problems are more serious (a) where land is owned as shares than 
where households have physical plots; (b) where land is initially allocated 
in the middle of large consolidated plots, (c) where the costs of withdrawal 
is expensive, either because there is considerably uncertainty on the (co-) 
owners of the land or because ownership is highly fragmented through the 
combination of restitution and an egalitarian historical rural land ownership 
structure (eg Bulgaria and Slovakia) or because the registration costs are 
                                                 
7  This section draws on evidence from farm and household surveys in Hungary, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Albania, Romania, Czech Republic, and 
Kazakhstan (SWINNEN and VRANKEN, 2006). Land market developments, imperfections, and effects in transition countries 
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high and/or corporate farms consider the land as quasi-property of the 
farm (eg Ukraine and Russia).  
Government policies may not directly favor corporate farms, but the 
implementation may be biased towards corporate farm interests, because 
of technical requirements related to land exchanges and withdrawal 
procedures, because complex and expensive land registration procedures, 
and because of established relations between farm (managers) and 
officials. In extreme cases, such as Kazakhstan, government policies have 
reallocated land rights from (small) owners to (large) farms. 
5 PATTERNS OF RENTAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
In SWINNEN and VRANKEN (2006), we identify several "patterns" of land 
rental development across transition countries. These "patterns" are extreme 
versions of land rental market development. Several countries may not fit a 
single pattern but have hybrid characteristics. 
Pattern A is that of labor intensive agricultural economies where land was 
distributed in kind to rural households and where small scale family farms 
dominate. Examples of this pattern are Albania, (post 1996) Azerbaijan, 
Kyrgyz Republic and large parts of Romania and southern Kazakhstan. In 
these countries and regions, there is relatively little land renting, all of it 
household to household and mostly informal. Key constraints in the 
rental market are due to constraints in other markets such as the credit and 
input markets, product market (output marketing), and labor market 
constraints – which is partly resolved through migration. 
Pattern B is that of capital intensive agricultural economies where land 
was restituted to former owners and where large scale corporate farms 
dominate. Examples of this pattern are Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and 
large parts of Hungary. In these systems, there is very extensive renting 
of land going on, mostly from households to large scale corporate 
farms, often based on formal contracts. Land rental markets are well 
developed and prices increasing, especially in those countries which have 
acceded to the EU. Constraints in these markets are transaction costs in the 
rental market due to fragmented, unidentified, or joint land ownership. 
Pattern C is that of land intensive agricultural economies where land was 
distributed as shares and where large scale corporate farms dominate. 
Examples of this pattern are pre-2003 North Kazakhstan, parts of Russia, 
and pre-2000 Ukraine. Corporate farms either rent large amounts of 
land from households, often under the form of shares, or rent very 
little as they have been able to acquire ownership of vast areas of land. 
Where corporate farm renting is dominant, constraints are poor Johan F. M. Swinnen, Pavel Ciaian, Liesbet Vranken  64
identification and weak enforcement of ownership rights and major 
problems in accessing output and input markets for smaller farms. In 
several regions, corporate farms, or large agro-holdings, acquired vast 
amounts of land either through bankruptcy proceedings (e.g. vertically 
integrated grain companies in Northern Kazakhstan and agro-holdings in 
Russia), or through government policy which transferred property rights 
from households to farms using the land (in current Kazakhstan). In these 
systems a large share of the land is owned by large corporate farms, and 
very little renting is taking place.  
6 LAND MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND POLICY EFFECTS 
The combination of imperfect competition due to the domination of large 
corporate farms and transaction costs has a strong effect on land prices 
and on the impact of agricultural policies. In this section we draw on 
CIAIAN and SWINNEN (2006) to show this and summarizes some of the 
key insights.  
To model transaction costs, one needs to distinguish between transaction 
costs which are specific to the plot, to the owner, and to the user. 
Transaction costs will depend on the distribution of land among 
households and farms, on individual characteristics of landowners, and on 
the fragmentation of the land. Here we assume that transaction costs per 
unit of land are constant – this considerably simplifies the analysis but 
does not substantially affect the key results discussed here.  
The land decision-making problem of a profit-maximizing individual 
farm (IF) is: 
(1) Max 
I I I I A t r A pf ) ( ) ( + − = ∏  
where   p is output price, A
I is amount of land rented by the IF, f
I(.) is 
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for optimal land use is: 












The optimal level of land rented is where the marginal value product of 
land, represented by the left hand side of (2), equals the IF’s marginal 
cost of land, r + t. The marginal cost is the rental rate an IF has to pay to a 
landowner, and which equals the corporate farm rental rate (r) plus the 
transaction costs per unit of land (t). Condition (2) defines the demand for 
land of the individual farm. Aggregating this over all (potential) IFs 
yields the total demand for land by individual farms, D
I. Total IF demand Land market developments, imperfections, and effects in transition countries 
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for land is represented in Figure 7 by D
I for zero transaction costs (t = 0) and 
Dt1
I and Dt2
I for transaction costs, t1 and t2, respectively, with t2 > t1 > 0. The 




The vertical axis measures the rental price.  
Corporate farms may have important market power. To model this, 
assume that there is one (representative) CF which recognizes that its 
land rental decisions will influence the land rental price. The CF is not a 
monopolist since there is a group of (potential) individual farms who are 
price takers in the rental market. The IFs will rent land up to the point 
where their demand equals their rental price (ie. r+t). The CF will take the 
rental actions of IFs into account: It will adjust its land renting to 
maximize profit subject to the behavior of the IFs.  
In this situation, the objective function of the corporate farm is the 
following:  
(3)   Max 
C C C C C A A r A pf ) ( ) ( − = ∏  
where Π
C are CF profits, A
C is land rented by the CF, r(A
C) is the rental 
rate as a function of A
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M is the optimal land allocation of the CF. The left hand side of 
condition (6) represents the marginal benefits, i.e. the marginal value 
product of land, and the right hand side is the marginal cost of land for 
the CF. The marginal cost of land includes both the rental rate and 
changes in the rental rate when the CF rents in more or less land. The CF 
chooses its land rent where the marginal cost equals the marginal benefits. 
Graphically, this can be represented as in Figure 9. For simplicity, we 
assume for a moment that there are no transaction costs (t = 0). MC
C 
represents the marginal cost function of land renting for the CF.
8 The 
equilibrium land use by the corporate farm is where MC
C equals D
C, ie at 
A
M. The resulting CF rental price is r
M.  
Compared to the competitive market equilibrium (A
*, r
*), the domination of 
the market by the CF leads to a reduction of land use by the CF (A
M < A
*), 
and a corresponding increase of land use by the individual farms. The 
                                                 
8  The shape of the marginal cost function is determined by the elasticity of IF land 
demand. The more inelastic IF land demand, the steeper the MCC. Johan F. M. Swinnen, Pavel Ciaian, Liesbet Vranken  66
land rental price is lower for all farms (r
M < r
*). The surplus gains of the 
CF are area A – C (>0). The IFs also gain, by area EGL. The losses are 
for the landowners who lose rental income equal to area ADEGL. The 
effect on rural households depends to what extent they are employed by 
the CF, or are IFs, or landowner. For rural households who are both 
landowner and individual farmer, the losses in rental income may outweigh 
the gains in farm profits from lower rental prices. Finally, the total 
welfare effects are negative. Social costs due to the market power of the 
CF equals area CD. 
Figure 8 also shows the situation of imperfect competition with transaction 
costs t. In this case, the equilibrium is at (At
M, rt
M). The CF rental price 
falls further to rt
M < r
M < r*: Both the transaction costs and the market 
power of CF push the CF rental price down.  
The combination of imperfect competition and transaction costs results in 
extra benefits for the CF. Relative to the competitive equilibrium without 
transaction costs (A
*, r
*), the surplus gains of the CF equals area ABDE. 
Landowners lose twice as both factors put a downward pressure on rental 
prices. Their combined loss equals area ABDEGHLN. For individual 
farms the two market imperfections have opposite effects. IFs gain from 
lower rental prices and more land with imperfect competition, but lose 
from higher rental prices and less land with transaction costs. The net 
effect depends on the relative size of the transaction costs. With low 
transaction costs, the benefits from CF market power will dominate. With 
high transaction costs (as is the case in Figure  8), the losses due to 
transaction cost will dominate. The net loss for IFs is equal to area FK.
9 





M) implies losses equivalent to – KLN –FGH, 
where KLN represents the total transaction costs incurred and FGH the 
market distortions.  
6.1  Impact of CAP payments 
Since the 1992 MacSharry reform and the Agenda 2000 reforms, the vast 
majority of CAP subsidies are direct payments (DPs). They make up 
around two-thirds of the CAP budget and include both per hectare 
payments for crops and payments per animal for livestock activities.  
Define s as the subsidy (area payment) per unit of land, and assume that 
all land in the analysis qualifies for the subsidies. The objective function 
of the IF then changes to  
(5) 
I I I I A s t r A pf ) ( ) ( − + − = ∏ . 
                                                 
9  If transaction costs are such that MCtC goes through point (A
*, r
*) both effects 
exactly offset each other and the combined impact on IF welfare is zero. Land market developments, imperfections, and effects in transition countries 
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The subsidy s shifts the value marginal product of land curve by s: 










The objective function for the CF changes analogously.  
Result 1:  Area payments benefit only landowners, with and without 
transaction costs and perfect competition in the land market.
 10 
Figure 9 illustrates the result. The IF land demand function with subsidies 
is Ds
I. The subsidy shifts the marginal cost function from MCt
C to MCts
C 




M). The land 
allocation does not change: At
M = Ats
M. Rental prices increase from rt
M to 
rts
M for corporate farms and from rt
M+t to rts
M+t for individual farms. The 
increase equals the subsidy (s = rts
M – rt
M). Subsidies get fully captured by 
land price increases. The surplus of neither CF nor IF is affected. All the 
gains go to landowners, equal to the sum of areas F + G, which equals the 





An important assumption behind these results is that both corporate farms 
and individual farms get the same subsidies per hectare. In reality access 
to CAP subsidies may be complicated for small individual farmers 
because of administrative constraints and problems in satisfying 
additional requirements. If so, some of the individual farms may not get 
access to the payments.  
Result 2: With unequal subsidies, area payments benefit landowners and 
CF, while IF lose on average. 
In this case, a large part of the subsidies still end up with landowners 
through an increase in land rental prices. However, on average, individual 
farmers lose because the land rental price increases more than the subsidies 
they get. Corporate farms gain because the increase in rental prices is 
lower than the subsidies they receive. As subsidies now induce distortions 
in the allocation of land, there are deadweight costs. Obviously, the 
relative sizes of these effects depend on the elasticity of the demand 
curves and on the difference in the subsidies. 
6.2  Impact of decoupled CAP subsidies 
In 2003 the EU decided to decouple CAP subsidies starting from 2005. 
This means, in terms of our model, that subsidies will be given as a fixed 
set of payments per farm, so-called single farm payments (SFP). The SFP 
for a specific farm equals the support the farm received in the previous 
"reference" period. The SFP is an entitlement, but future SFP payments 
                                                 
10 For  proofs:  See CIAIAN and SWINNEN, 2006. Johan F. M. Swinnen, Pavel Ciaian, Liesbet Vranken  68
depend on the farm operating an amount of "eligible hectares" equivalent 
to the size of the entitlement.  
The policy reform has important impacts on the distribution of policy 
rents. The first implication is that policy rents shift from landowners to 
farms with the new CAP support system. 
Result 3:  Decoupled SFP benefit only farms, with and without land 
market imperfections.  
With SFP, the CF and IFs do not receive payments for land that they rent 
above the eligible area. Compared to the area payments, the land allocation 
is the same, but the rental price is lower. Farmers gain all the subsidies.  
However, this result is conditional upon how potential new entrants in 
farming are treated. With support now linked to current farms, new farmers 
(who are potentially more dynamic and productive and therefore a source 
of growth) are excluded from the support system. These problems are 
particularly problematic in the NEMS where major farm restructuring 
continues to take place, and is required for productivity growth. To address 
these concerns, it was decided to create a "reserve" for subsidy entitlements 
to new entrants. It turns out that these reserve entitlements can have an 
important impact on the total distribution of policy rents. 
Result 4: Benefits of SFP will shift to landowners when new entrants are 
eligible for SFP entitlements. 
If new entrants are eligible for SFP, their marginal benefit of cultivating 
land equals the marginal value product of land plus per hectare payments. 
So, new entrants can bid up the price. Reserve entitlements for entrants 
makes the effects of the new CAP system very similar to the effects of the 
old CAP system. Depending on the time-schedule for the reserve for new 
entitlements, this could cause intertemporal effects.  
When the entitlements stop, the effects shift dramatically. In reality, 
farmers and owners will have some expectation on when the reserve runs 
out and this will affect the dynamics of the rental price. 
6.3  EU accession, CAP reform, transaction costs, and productivity  
Accession to the EU will not only affect the benefits which the NEMS 
farms will receive, but also the market imperfections themselves. In 
particular, one should expect transaction costs in the factor markets, 
including the land market, to reduce. Such reduction in transaction costs 
will come from a combination of factors, such as legal and institutional 
requirements for EU accession which improve the legal and institutional 
framework in which land transactions occur. Enhanced productivity of Land market developments, imperfections, and effects in transition countries 
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the farms and subsidies will also stimulate land transactions and thereby 
improve experience, transparency, and understanding of the market.  
Such reductions in transaction costs will stimulate farm restructuring, 
transferring land use from less efficient to more efficient farms. In terms of 
our model, this implies a shift of land use from the corporate farm to 
individual farms.
11 To see this consider Figure 7.
12 The equilibrium in the 
land market with transaction costs equal to t2 is (At2
*, rt2
*). With transaction 
costs reducing to t1, the equilibrium shifts to (At1
*, rt1
*), or when transaction 
costs fall to zero, the equilibrium becomes (A
*, r
*). It is clear that this 
implies that land is moved from less productive use by the corporate farm to 
more productive use by individual farms – the difference in marginal 
productivity at (At2
*, rt2
*) equals t2 – up to the point where the marginal 
productivity in both types of farms is equal. Furthermore, with increased 
marginal productivity of land at the equilibrium, land rents have increased 
with falling transaction costs. These results hold without subsidies. How do 
CAP subsidies affect this efficiency enhancing effect of EU accession?  
Result 5: 
a. Area payments have no effect on productivity enhancing   
restructuring in NEMS. 
b.  Reform to SFP constrains restructuring. 
c.  Making SFP available to new farms will stimulate restructuring, but 
cause a transfer of policy rents from farms to landowners. 
While some restructuring may take place, this is less with SFP than with 
area payments. In other words, CAP reform reduces farm restructuring 
                                                 
11  Notice that we do not assume that all individual farms are more efficient than all 
corporate farms. We assume that some individual farms can use (some) land more 
efficiently than some of the corporate farms, as is reflected in the two demand 
functions. Without imperfections, the rental market will transfer land up to the point 
where land productivity is equal in corporate farms and individual farms, at the 
margin. As can be seen from the graphs, we assume an "interior solution", meaning 
that in this equilibrium, corporate farms will still use some of the land. These 
assumptions are consistent with the empirical literature. Studies measuring relative 
farm efficiencies in CEECs typically find (a) that the relative efficiency depends on 
various factors, including the types of activities (e.g. grain, livestock, vegetables, …), 
institutions, infrastructure and economic conditions, (b) that at least part of the new 
individual farms are more efficient than the corporate farms they replaced, and (c) 
that the variations in farm efficiency within the "corporate farm" group and within 
the "individual farm" group is often larger than between the groups (see e.g. 
MATHIJS and SWINNEN, 2001). 
12  Since the argument is about the reduction in transaction costs, we only discuss the 
perfect competition model – the imperfect competition analysis is in CIAIAN and 
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and restricts productivity gains associated with it. The old CAP system 
would yield the largest change in land allocation from IF to CF. The SFP 
may even lead to a total freeze of farm structures if subsidies are large 
compared to the reduction of transaction costs.  
Finally, attempts to address this problem by making new individual farms 
eligible for SFPs will stimulate farm restructuring but simultaneously 
induce a shift of policy rents from farms to landowners. The logic is 
analogous to that of proposition  4. The introduction of additional 
subsidies for new entrants effectively transforms the SFP situation into an 
area payments effect at the margin, stimulating more restructuring, but 
pushing up rental prices as well, shifting CAP benefits to landowners. 
In summary, while CAP reform will shift CAP benefits from landowners 
to farms there is an important trade-off. Restructuring, needed to increase 
the competitiveness of the NEMS farm system, will be constrained. 
Granting the SFP to new entrants mitigates this problem, but will 
simultaneously induce a transfer of policy rents to landowners.  
6.4 Concluding  comment 
We should caution about simplistic interpretations of our results. The effects 
on rural households depend on whether the households are landowners or 
farmers, or both, and on the importance of corporate farms. These structural 
conditions differ strongly between NEMS (Table 2). For example, farming 
in countries like Slovakia and the Czech Republic is concentrated on large-
scale corporate farms, who rent most of their land. Land ownership is 
fragmented and many landowners are living in urban areas. In contrast, in 
countries such as Poland and Slovenia, farming is dominated by small 
family farms (IFs), owning most of their land. Most other countries, such as 
Hungary and Bulgaria, have a mixed structure. In Hungary, IFs use 59 % of 
farm land and CF use 41 %. CF rent most of the land they use, while IFs use 
both owned and rented land. The share of rented land typically increases 
with the size of the IF (VRANKEN and SWINNEN, 2006). 
Obviously, the implications of our analysis are different for these countries, 
with such different structures. Leakages of policy rents to land owners 
through increased rental rates is a major issue in countries like Slovakia and 
Hungary, while less of a problem in Poland since most farms are IFs who 
themselves own the land. However, also in Poland this analysis is relevant 
since (a) the most dynamic farmers are typically younger and land 
ownership is typically concentrated in older rural households, and (b) there 
are important regional variations: In the north and western regions of 
Poland, many larger farms operate on rented land (CSAKI  and LERMAN, 
1997). Land market developments, imperfections, and effects in transition countries 
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Interestingly, there was a persistent view in the 1990s in NEMS that "land 
markets are not working" and "prices are very low". All this changed 
dramatically since 2002. The anticipation and the implemen-tation of CAP 
payments strongly pushed up land prices and rental rates in many NEMS.  
Finally, an important issue which needs further analysis is the interaction of 
the land market imperfections and the subsidy systems with other market 
imperfections. In particular labor and credit market imperfections have an 
important impact on land allocation and farm structures in NEMS (RIZOV 
and SWINNEN, 2004; WORLD BANK, 2001). There are interactions between 
these imperfections and the subsidy effects. For example, subsidies that 
increase land values may reduce credit constraints by improving collateral 
options. Also, labor market constraint will affect the farm restructuring 
impact of the various subsidies. These interactions between various factor 
market imperfections and the subsidy effects are complex and beyond the 
scope of analysis in this article. This is the topic of our future research.  
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Table 1:  Land rents in the Czech Republic and Slovakia by farm type  








Czech Republic       
1999  718  346  2.1 
Slovakia       
2001  795  242  3.3 
2002  816  333  2.4 
Source:  Czech Ministry of Agriculture; Research Institute of Agricultural Economics, Farm 
Accountancy Data Network, Bratislava, Various years. 
 
Table 2:  Farm structures in CEECs 
Family farms  Corporate farms 




Share in total 
agricultural area (%) 
Average size 
(ha) 
Bulgaria  52  1  48  536 
Czech Republic  28  20  72  937 
Estonia  63  2  37  327 
Hungary  59  4  41  312 
Latvia  90  12  10  297 
Lithuania  89  4  11  483 
Poland  87  8  13  n.a. 
Romania  55  2  45  274 
Slovakia  12  42  88  1185 
Sources: European  Commission and national statistics. 
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Figure 2:  Land renting and purchasing by farm size 
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Figure 5:  Percentage of transactions with (total or partial) cash payments 
for unregistered family farms in Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, 
Moldova 

























No legally forced co-ownership Legally forced co-ownership
Owner-cultivation Rent out to cooperative
Rent out to private company Rent out to rural household
Abandonment
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Figure 9:  Effect of subsidies with imperfect competition and transaction 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper reexamines the role of farmland and the equity embodied in farmland 
within the agricultural policy debate. We also examine land markets in the 
context of U.S. and Canadian agricultural policy, and the impact of the farmland 
market on possible changes in farm size. The debate over the role of farmland as 
a fixed factor of production is steeped in the lore of economics. An early 
proponent of land reform, John Stuart Mills, supported the imposition of a 
confiscatory tax on increases in land values (STIGLER, 1969). This position was 
echoed by Henry George who saw rental payments as a natural tax on production. 
1 EMPIRICAL SITUATION 
Total agricultural assets, agricultural equity, and farm real estate values typically 
increased between 1960 and 2004 (Figure 1). The only exception involves the 
period of financial stress the sector experienced in the mid 1980s. While the 
movement of each series appears highly correlated, the correlation is not perfect. 
In fact, the series fail to cointegrate over time. This lack of perfect correlation is 
due to two factors. First, the aggregate debt-to-asset ratio varies significantly 
over time, starting at around 12 percent in 1960 and reaching a high of around 
22 percent at the height of the financial crisis of the mid 1980s, before declining 
to 14 percent. Analyzing the data somewhat differently, Figure 2 presents the 
share of real estate in the overall portfolio of agricultural assets. In 1960, 
agricultural real estate accounted for 70 percent of all agricultural assets. This 
percentage increased to 80 percent in 2004 following the decline in farmland 
values during the financial crisis of the mid 1980s. 
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Turning to the farmland values per acre, Figure  3 depicts the rapid increase in 
farmland values over the past century, focusing on farmland values in California, 
Florida, and the Corn Belt states of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. Farmland values 
were relatively stable, starting with farmland prices per acre of $8/acre in Illinois, 
$11/acre in Indiana, and $20/acre in Ohio in 1850. These values had risen to 
$54/acre in Illinois, $39/acre in Indiana, and $69/acre in Ohio by 1900. At the 
same time, farmland values in California largely caught up with values in the 
Corn Belt. Farmland values in California started out at $1/acre in 1850, but had 
increased to $25/acre in 1900. Farmland values in Florida were still much lower 
than the other states in this group, rising only to $9/acre by 1900. Higher 
farmland values in the Corn Belt than in California and Florida persisted until 1922 
when farmland prices in California surpassed those in Indiana and Ohio. Farmland 
values in California persistently exceeded those in Illinois beginning in 1983. In 
2005, Californian farmland values were 43 percent higher than those in Illinois. 
Similarly, Florida’s farmland values exceeded those of Illinois in 1985 and were 
27 percent higher than those in Illinois in 2005. 
Accompanying the rapid rise in farmland values during the closing years of the 
twentieth century was a dramatic change in the structure of U.S. agriculture. 
Specifically, the share of agricultural output being produced by smaller farmers 
decreased significantly from 1969 to 1982 (Figure 4). In 1969, sixty-seven percent 
of farmland in the Corn Belt marketed less than $40,000 of agricultural output a 
year. This declined to thirty-eight percent  in  1982.  Production in these sales 
classes was largely offset by gains in farms producing from $100,000 to $500,000 
of sales per year. Thus, the data support the farm size increase from 1969 to 1982. 
2 DESCRIBING FARMLAND MARKETS 
The market for farmland in the United States can be broken down into three 
general periods: A period of expansion with the distribution of free or low cost 
land, a period of agricultural intensification, and a period of increasing alternative 
uses for farmland. The first two periods are discussed in Cochrane’s book The 
Development of American Agriculture: A Historical Analysis (COCHRANE, 1993).  
One resource the United States possessed early in its history was abundant farmland: 
Abundant land – cheap or free, distributed with or without corruption – 
served as an important stimulus to the overall development of this 
nation [the United States]. Land was the magnet that drew the first 
settlers to English colonies, once the bubble of instant riches had been 
pricked. It was the magnet that continued to draw them to these shores 
for almost three centuries…. To the landless and land-hungry people 
of Western Europe the pull of cheap or free land in North America 
was overwhelming. They came in droves and they suffered untold 
misery to make that land their own. (COCHRANE, 1993, p. 173). Charles B. Moss, Andrew Schmitz 
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During the period of settlement, the United States disposed of over one billion 
acres of public domain land to support settlement, reward military service, build 
roads and other transportation infrastructure, and even to support education (e.g., 
the establishment of the Land Grant University system). In this period, land was 
distributed cheap, but not free. Cochrane states that the amount of farmland 
given away free under the Homestead law and other provisions was about 
147  million acres. Most of the land was purchased at between one and ten 
dollars an acre. In 1847, California entered the United States following the close 
of the Mexican-American War; it was admitted to the Union in 1850. Thus, the 
$1/acre price corresponds to the distribution of farmland under the Land Ordinance 
of 1785.  
The period of agricultural expansion ended in the 1890s with the land-runs in 
Oklahoma. The end of free or cheap land marked the end of the extensive phase 
of agricultural development and the beginning of the intensification phase. The 
intensification phase of the farmland market was marked by increasing 
mechanization and demand for capital. The demand for capital led to the establish- 
ment of new institutions such as the Federal Land Banks, which was established 
under the Farm Loan Act of 1916, and the Production Credit Association, which 
was established as an independent agency under the Farm Credit Act of 1953. The 
emergence of agricultural credit markets, the intensification phase of agricultural 
expansion following the end of cheap land, and the simultaneous increase in 
farmland values point to a complex ultimately production-oriented farmland 
market that would exist through the twentieth century. In this market, farmland 
values would be largely determined by the Ricardian rents accruing to production. 
Increases in the productivity in the sector would imply increased future Ricardian 
rents and, hence, increased farmland values. Increased wealth from increased 
farmland values could be used to collateralize increased debt to purchase new 
technologies. 
Cracks in the circular flow of Ricardian rents, technology, and the capital market 
began to appear in the late 1960s (MOSS and KATCHOVA, 2006). CHRYST (1965) 
observed that farm incomes appeared to be relatively stable while farmland 
values continued to increase. Several alternative hypotheses were suggested to 
explain this empirical anomaly. HAYAMI and RUTTAN (1970) hypothesized that 
technological changes introduced a factor bias that favored larger farms. Along 
these lines, HARRIS and NEHRING (1976) found that large production farmers were 
able to pay relatively more for farmland than were small production farmers   
(a conclusion that is consistent with the farm size results presented in Figure 4). 
MELICHAR (1979) provided a competing hypothesis to explain the divergence 
whereby anticipated future increases in returns to agricultural assets put 
downward pressure on current returns. Also there is the inflationary hypothesis 
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The divergence between the price of farmland and the cash flow from the 
cultivation of farmland continued through the end of the twentieth century and 
the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, regional differences in the 
growth of farmland values bring into play the increasing importance of non-
agricultural factors such as differences in urban pressure (LIVANIS et al., 2006). 
The effect of urban pressure is demonstrated in part by the changes in relative 
land values (Figure 3). Although specialty agricultures in California and Florida 
imply different levels of profitability than those in the Corn Belt, the emerging 
farmland values in California and Florida during the closing years of the 
twentieth century and the initial years of the twenty-first century support the 
conjecture that urban pressure now significantly affects farmland values. 
California and Florida now have the largest and fourth largest number of 
residents in the United States. Looking at population growth, Florida was the 
ninth largest U.S. state in 1970, and is expected to replace New York as the third 
largest U.S. state in 2010. Over the same time period, agricultural returns in each 
state have been largely static. 
The emergence of a significant component of farmland values not directly 
related to the value of agricultural production through the Ricardian framework 
raises several significant policy issues. MOSS, MISHRA  and  ERICKSON (2006a) 
demonstrate the decomposition of agricultural returns to the factors of production 
using the standard Euler theorem results. They demonstrate the standard contention 
that paying each factor of production its value of marginal product exactly 
exhausts the value of the product produced. Building on this model, any additional 
cost introduced by increased farmland values above the Ricardian rents to 
production implies at least a short-run disequilibrium.  
While divergence is a relatively recent phenomenon in the United States, the 
topic was at the center of the land tenure debate in England during the eighteenth 
century. Elements of the debate crossed the Atlantic to the Americas in the work 
of HENRY GEORGE (1912) who saw rents to farmland as a leakage or unnecessary 
cost that distorted the efficient allocation of resources. GEORGE (1912) started his 
discussion of rents by differentiating between the common usage of rents and 
the economic definition of rents. He notes that rents, as commonly defined, 
typically include payments to both natural resources (such as farmland) and 
manufactured capital (such as buildings and machinery) while economic rent 
focuses primarily on payments only to natural resources. In addition, the 
economic definition of rents applies both to transactions between individuals 
and implicit transactions (such as opportunity costs). However, George’s most 
striking criticisms involve the role of scarcity in determining both the common 
usage of rents and the economic definition of rents. George conjectures that the 
market definition of rents implies scarcity while the traditional Ricardian 
definition of rent does not. For example, if an abundance of productive land is 
available for use in agriculture, landowners may be unable to charge for the use 
of their farmland, and farmland will have no value. Once land becomes scarce, Charles B. Moss, Andrew Schmitz 
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the landowner can charge for its use, and it will have a positive value. George 
then conjectures that the ability to charge a positive price is a result of 
monopolistic behavior. Based on these assumptions, he then turns to "Ricardo’s 
law of rent" – "the rent of land is determined by the excess of its produce over 
that which the same application can secure from the least productive land in use" 
(George Book III, Chapter II, p. 7). Algebraically, George defines rent implicitly 
with the equation 
Produce Rent Wages Interest =+ +               ( 1 )  
Given this equality, he then resolves the equation to yield 
Produce Rent Wages Interest −= +               ( 2 )  
Thereby George concludes, "Thus wages and interest do not depend upon the 
produce of labor and capital, but upon what is left after rent is taken out; or upon 
the produce which they could obtain without paying rent – that is, from the 
poorest land in use" (George Book III, Chapter II, p. 13). Under this formulation, 
the value of the output and rents paid determine the amount that can be paid to 
laborers and providers of other capital inputs. Put slightly differently, in 
George’s paradigm the rental rate determined in a monopolistic market 
determines the wages and interest that can be paid. 
George’s work drew a significant response from ALFRED MARSHALL (1969) who 
in a series of public lectures took many of George’s conjectures to task. 
Marshall’s response to George is a victory for marginal analysis. Marshall 
contends that the reason labor returns in less sparsely settled areas of the in the 
Western United States (at the time of the debate) were higher than in areas that 
had been previously settled, such as the Midwestern area, had less to do with 
rents to farmland and farmland values and more to do with the marginal product 
of labor. Given that the marginal product of any input declines as the level of the 
input expands, the value of marginal product for labor in previously settled areas 
will be lower than the value of the marginal product in areas that are more 
sparsely populated. Thus, the availability of labor and its implied marginal 
productivity, along with the productivity and scarcity of farmland, jointly 
determine the Ricardian rents to farmland and, hence, the value of farmland. 
Thus we are forced to reject George’s major contention that monopolistic power 
of landlords allows the extraction of economic rents from producers through 
land rents. However, certain facets of George’s leakage framework need closer 
examination in the current context of urban pressure on the land market. 
Specifically, the model estimated by LIVANIS et al. (2006) allows urban pressure 
to affect farmland through two mechanisms. The first mechanism is the increased 
possibility of conversion of farmland into urban uses. With the population growth 
in Florida at the start of the twenty-first century, producers refer to the effect as 
the "effect of planting condominiums". However, a second mechanism involves 
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Specifically, reduced transportation costs to urban areas may increase the relative 
demand for ornamental plants and fresh (self-picked, organic, or specialty) fruits 
and vegetables. Thus urban growth may have a productivity footprint (or region 
of farmland affected by the opportunity to export to an urban market) as farmers 
switch from traditional commodity-oriented production to higher-valued produce. 
LIVANIS et al. find evidence of a productivity footprint largely in the Northeastern 
United States. They attribute the lack of such in California and Florida to the fact 
that both of these regions would specialize in higher-valued fruits and vegetables 
even in the absence of urban growth. However, the production of fruits and 
vegetables in areas like New Jersey may be largely attributed to proximity to 
urban centers instead of agronomic considerations. 
In addition to the effect of urban pressure on access to markets, LIVANIS and 
MOSS (2006) contend that urban pressure leads to a portfolio effect where farmers 
are forced out of lower-valued, commodity-oriented agriculture. Specifically, as 
urban pressures increase the opportunity cost of farmland, growers producing 
lower-valued crops are the first to leave agriculture. Thus, urban pressures may 
increase the productivity of farmland through two mechanisms. Farmers may shift 
production into higher-valued crops to exploit a growing urban market for higher-
valued crops, or farmers who continue to produce lower-valued commodities may 
be the first to sell their farmlands for conversion because of increased opportunity 
costs. These effects can be viewed as opposite sides of the same coin. 
SCHMITZ  and  JUST (2003) examine the role of development pressures in the 
market for farmland, focusing specifically on farmland in Dade County, Florida 
(U.S.). They analyze a scenario where a farmer in Dade County grows tomatoes 
for the winter vegetable market (a fairly high-valued crop). Such a producer 
would be willing to pay a rent of $450 per acre (well above other rental rates in 
the state). At the same time, the market price for farmland in Dade County was 
$11,507. Assuming a 5 percent rate of return on capital, this would imply a 
rental price of $575 per acre, which is well above the rental rate that the 
producer would be willing to pay. In fact, the rental price paid by the producer 
represents an implicit rate of return of 3.9 percent. Unfortunately the story does 
not end there. Tomato production in the region may occur on farmland less than 
five miles from a major U.S. city (Miami, Florida). In 2001, such bare farmland 
was worth $40,000 per acre for development purposes. Using a 5  percent 
discount rate, this would imply a rental price of $2,000 an acre, or 4.44 times the 
amount a producer would be willing to pay. 
3 BOOM/BUST CYCLES IN FARMLAND PRICES 
Apart from the historical regimes (i.e., extensive development, intensive 
development, and period of urban pressure), farmland markets in the United 
States have exhibited significant boom/bust cycles (SCHMITZ, 1995). Charles B. Moss, Andrew Schmitz 
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Specifically, SCHMITZ (1995) demonstrates that farmland values were 
appropriately priced in the long run (i.e., changes in farmland values could be 
explained by changes in the returns to agricultural assets) while price deviations 
were correlated in the short run. Thus, in the short run, markets were inefficient 
because purchases or sales could yield a systematic profit. Further support for the 
long-run equilibrium in farmland values is demonstrated by ERICKSON, MISHRA 
and MOSS  (2003), but FEATHERSTONE  and  MOSS (2003) support Schmitz’s 
conjecture of boom/bust cycles using a stochastic trend model for farmland values. 
Their results for Illinois indicate that the predicted value of farmland from 1976 to 
1982 persistently exceeded the actual value of farmland (Figure  5). Farmland 
values overreacted to the onset of financial difficulties in the sector in 1985. 
The possibility of boom/bust cycles in farmland prices is important for a variety 
of reasons. First, given that farmland values are the dominant source of 
agricultural equity, the sector’s solvency could be adversely affected by each 
cycle. In boom periods, farm households may be encouraged to expand yielding 
overcapacity in the sector, since their increased wealth reduces the relative 
interest rate paid. On the other side, in periods of bust, reduced levels of 
solvency would increase the relative interest rate or reduce their access to credit 
markets at reasonable terms. Such reduction in credit resources could exacerbate 
a contraction in the sector both in terms of productive assets and numbers of 
farmers. Second, reductions in agricultural wealth have dramatic consequences 
for rural communities (SCHMITZ, 1995). Reductions in agricultural wealth 
caused problems for local merchants and banks. These multiplier effects then 
cause reductions in local tax bases, leading to the demise of local communities. 
The policy question is then: What factors contribute to the boom/bust behavior 
of farmland values, and what steps can be taken to minimize their effect? The 
literature suggests several factors that may contribute to boom/bust cycles, 
including imperfections in the capital markets (SHALIT  and SCHMITZ, 1982), 
transaction costs (CHAVAS, 2003; LENCE, 2003; MILLER, 2003), and hysteresis 
(TURVEY, 2003). 
The models of imperfect capital markets highlight the possible effect of 
imperfect information and credit rationing in the agricultural credit market. The 
advent of the intensive phase of agricultural production in the United States was 
facilitated by the introduction of a variety of new credit providers. Prior to the 
introduction of the Farm Credit System, capital structure requirements limited 
the ability of local banks to fund the purchase of farmland. Certain 
characteristics of land loans made it difficult for small rural banks to enter this 
market. First, any significant land purchase may exceed the regulatory amount a 
bank could lend on an individual loan (i.e., the limit could be set to ten percent 
of the bank’s owner equity plus retained earnings). Second, the term required on 
a land loan typically exceeded the local bank’s commitment period (i.e., land 
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cooperative lending system established under the Federal Land Banks provided 
a mechanism for meeting these requirements. However, the characteristics that 
made land loans untenable for commercial banks also imposed significant 
constraints on the operation of cooperative lending institutions. For example, 
prior to the financial crisis of the mid-1980s, most the Federal Land Banks lent 
money based on collateral considerations as opposed to the ability of the loan to 
cash-flow. Given the size of most land purchases, these collateral practices meant 
that farmers had to possess money to access the capital market to purchase 
additional farmland. Thus, holding farmland increased your ability to acquire 
additional farmland through access to the credit market (SHALIT and SCHMITZ, 
1984). In this formulation, farmland would only be liquidated in periods of 
excess stress since any reduction in holdings would limit a producer’s future 
access to the credit market. Thus, imperfections in the debt market exacerbate 
other elements of farmland markets. 
A similar model involves the significance of transaction costs in the farmland 
market. Anyone who has entered into a real estate transaction recognizes the 
proliferation of costs related to the transaction. Governments require a host of 
deed and mortgage stamps. Given the size of the typical transaction, there are 
often significant costs associated with obtaining credit, such as guaranteeing that 
mortgaged property conforms to its legal description and insuring the loan’s 
repayment. Finally, there may be other fees, such as realtor’s fees associated 
with finding the property and arranging the transaction. In summation, these 
transaction costs create a stickiness or rigidity in the market for farmland. They 
increase the change in price required to make it worthwhile for the buyer or 
seller to enter into a market agreement. The increased rigidity undoubtedly 
increases the overall volatility of the market price of farmland. Obviously, 
market corrections for small fluctuations in farmland prices do not occur within 
the band created by transaction costs. However, the extent to which these 
transaction costs contribute to boom/bust cycles is unclear. Once a price movement 
exceeds the transaction costs, incentives for the market to force the market price 
back into equilibrium are consistent with any other market. 
A third factor that may contribute to the existence of boom/bust cycles in 
farmland prices is the possibility of hysteresis. The hysteresis model builds on the 
investment under irreversibility and uncertainty model proposed by DIXIT and 
PINDYCK (1994) who developed a real option value model of investing. In this 
case, the question of when to sell farmland is not simply whether current market 
price of farmland exceeds the present value of continuing agricultural production, 
but must include the option value of continuing farm production for an additional 
year and selling the farmland next year. In the second scenario, the farmer 
maintains the option to sell the farmland in the future. This option to sell in the 
future may cause farmers to continue to hold farmland during periods of escalating 
farmland values. If all farmers factor in an option value of selling farmland in the 
future, the result could be an investment hysteresis (or a rational bubble). Charles B. Moss, Andrew Schmitz 
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4 CAPITAL MARKETS, OPTIMAL DEBT, AND MODELS OF FARM 
FAILURE 
Taken together, the significance of farmland values in the portfolio of agricultural 
assets and the possibility of boom/bust cycles could lead to increased probability 
of a farm financial crisis. Specifically, RAMIREZ, MOSS and BOGGESS (1997) 
formulate a model of optimal farm debt that can be used to develop the effect of 
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where  r is the discount rate for future farm consumption,  () Ct is the level of 
farm consumption, b is the constant relative risk aversion coefficient,  ( ) Wt is 
the level of farm wealth,  () A t μ  is the mean rate of return on agricultural assets, 
() Kt is the cost of capital,  ( ) t δ  is the debt-to-asset position,  () A t σ  is the 
standard deviation of the rate of return on agricultural assets, dt  is the change in 
time, and  () dz t  is a standard normal random increment. Given this formulation, 
RAMIREZ, MOSS and BOGGESS solve the stochastic optimal control problem for a 
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Substituting these optimal values back into the equation of motion for farm 
wealth in equation 4 yields 
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In this formulation, debt and the  percent of wealth consumed are increasing 
functions of the expected rate of return on assets and decreasing functions of the 
standard deviation of the rate of return on assets. Substituting both of these 
results into the change in wealth expression in Equation 5, the expected change 
in wealth is an increasing function of the expected rate of return on assets and a 
decreasing function of the standard deviation of the rate of return on assets. Farmland markets, boom/bust cycles, and farm size  89
Building on these general results, the stages of the farmland market in the 
development of agriculture in the United States has dramatic implications for 
optimal debt, consumption, and changes in equity over time. The rate of return 
on agricultural assets in the above model can be decomposed into the rate of 
return from operations and the return from capital gains. Thus, the expected rate 
of return and variance of the rate of return on agricultural assets can be 
expressed as 
() () ()
() () () () () ()
22 2 2 2 2
AO L
AO L O L O L
tt t
tt t t t t
μ= α μ+ β μ
σ= α σ+ β σ+ α β σσρ
           (6) 
where  () O t μ  and  () L t μ  are the expected rate of return from operations and 
capital gains, respectively;  ( )
2
O t σ  and  ( )
2
L t σ  are the variance of rate of return 
from operations and capital gains, respectively;  ( ) OL t ρ  is the correlation between 
operating returns and capital gains; and α and β are parameters used to weight 
the asset portfolio components. During the early phases of agricultural 
development in the United States, the abundance of farmland reduced the 
significance of capital gains on farmland. Thus, either  0 β →  and  1 α→ , or 
() ()
2 ,0 LL tt μσ → . Thus, the optimal debt, consumption, and changes in wealth 
were largely determined by operating returns. With the end of free land in the 
United States in 1890, farmland started to become more valuable while farmland 
prices were largely determined by the Ricardian rents from agricultural 
production. Hence during the intensification of agriculture in the United States 
0 β≠ ,  () 0 L t μ>  and  () 1 OL t ρ→ . However, following the timeline developed 
above, since 1985, other factors, such as urban pressure in many areas, have 
reduced the correlation between operating returns and farmland values (i.e., 
Ricardian rents from agricultural production are not the only factors driving 
farmland values). Thus  0 β≠ ,  ( ) 0 L t μ> , but  ( ) 1 OL t ρ    which implies changes in 
the optimal debt, consumption, and expected changes in wealth. 
To demonstrate these effects, we use data from the Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey for 2003 for very large farmers. The average level of farm 
wealth for these farms was $2,158,755. Their debt level was $505,934 and they 
paid $33,023 in interest. On average they earned $246,070 from farming. The 
standard deviation of the income from farming was $18,470 and the average 
level of consumption was $44,887. We combine with this scenario the observed 
capital gain rate for farmland in California from 1985 to 2005 of 0.04076 with a 
standard deviation of 0.05223. We start by assuming a correlation coefficient 
between operating returns and capital gains of 0.75 and take  1 α =  and  0.70 β=  to 
model the aggregate balance sheet in California. Next, since the aggregation 
procedure used to generate the ARMS dataset reduces the overall variance (i.e., 
the procedure yields the variance of an average), we increase the standard 
deviation of income by 75 percent. To parameterize the model, we begin by Charles B. Moss, Andrew Schmitz 
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solving for the relative risk aversion coefficient equating the observed debt-to-
asset ratio to the optimal debt-to-asset ratio. This yields an estimate of 
0.0708 b =−  which is consistent with risk aversion and relatively close to a 
logarithmic utility function. Substituting the estimate for the risk aversion 
coefficient into the consumption expression in Equation 4 yields an estimate of 
an individual’s discount rate (r) of 0.0613 which appears reasonable (i.e., 
somewhat higher than the interest rate on government bonds). At the point of 
approximation a 1  percent increase in the rate of return on assets yields a 
75.73 percent increase in the debt-to-asset ratio, a 2.09 percent increase in the 
percent of wealth consumed, and a 21.38 percent increase in the expected change 
in wealth. Similarly, a 1 percent increase in the standard deviation on the rate of 
return on assets yields a 40.13 decrease in the debt-to-asset ratio, a 1.10 percent 
decrease in the percent of wealth consumed, and a 5.59 percent decrease in the 
expected change in wealth. Given the conservative nature of the aggregate 
solution, the probability of bankruptcy given at the point of approximation is 
0.037 percent. 
To analyze the impact of the reduced correlation between farmland values and 
Ricardian rents, we reduce correlation coefficient from 0.75 to 0.50. This results 
in an increase in the optimum debt-to-asset ratio from 0.1899 to 0.4325 and an 
increase in the percent of wealth consumed in each period from 0.0208 to 0.0218. 
In absolute terms, consumption increases from $44,887 to $47,126. However, the 
reduction in relative risk causes the sector to become less risky. The aggregate 
probability of bankruptcy falls from 0.037 percent to 0.005 percent. 
5 AGRICULTURAL POLICY, WEALTH, AND LAND MARKETS 
Starting with the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture of the World Trade 
Organization, the focus shifted to the design of agricultural policies that were 
decoupled from production or non-distortionary. The argument was that support 
payments that did not encourage overproduction of agricultural commodities 
represented pure rent transfers from taxpayers to producers while at the same 
time trade flows were not affected. The Federal Agricultural Improvement and 
Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 included several provisions that attempted to 
decouple farm program payments from production, notably Agricultural Market 
Transition Act Payments (AMTAPs) that were based on traditional program 
payments and did not depend on current production levels. The decoupling goals 
in the FAIR Act were soon modified with the onset of lower agricultural prices 
in 1998. The Federal Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act of 2002 
returned to several of the same policies that were included in farm legislation 
prior to the FAIR Act (e.g., higher loan rates and the return to the target 
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GOODWIN, MISHRA and ORTALO-MAGNÉ (2003) analyze whether the AMPTAPs 
affected farmland values by testing whether these payments were decoupled 
from production. They regressed AMPTAPs on farmland prices. Their results 
suggest that the AMPTAPs had a small positive effect on farmland prices, which 
varied by year and location. They concluded that the payments were in fact 
coupled to land values. These empirical results raise several questions about the 
design of agricultural policy. Specifically, given that AMPTAPs were fixed and did 
not depend on production levels, why did farmland prices react to these payments? 
One possibility involves the capital structure of agriculture. Historically, 
agriculture in the United States has relied on debt markets to raise capital (as 
discussed above). Thus, one possibility is that AMPTAPs provide a source of 
capital for farmers that are credit constrained because of imperfections in the 
credit market. Recent work on cotton policy indicates that cotton policy is not 
totally decoupled (ROSSI, SCHMITZ and SCHMITZ, 2005). Also, land values are 
affected by water subsidies. Their work shows that if farmers respond to the 
target price rather than the loan rate, Ricardian rents increase by roughly 
50 percent. (There is a much higher degree of coupling at the target price). 
Agriculture in the United States has been highly dependent on government 
payments. WOMACK (2006) notes that a large percentage of net farm income is 
made up of farm payments. Figure 6 presents the total farm payments as well as 
the specific payments under certain program categories. In total, agricultural 
payments reached a maximum of $23 billion in 2005, split rather equally between 
direct payments to farmers, loan deficiency payments, and countercyclical 
payments. 
In addition to direct payments under commodity programs, government support 
for the farm sector in the United States and other developed countries often 
includes research and development expenditures ostensively conducted to 
increase the competitiveness of agriculture. In the United States, investment in 
agricultural research is typically split between the federal government and the 
state. One question that arises is whether these expenditures affect farmland 
values. For example, some contend that technological gains resulting from these 
expenditures on agricultural research are simply bid into farmland values (i.e., 
the increase in Ricardian rents arising from the increased productivity simply 
result in higher land values and, thus, do not benefit farmers). MOSS (2006) 
estimates that agricultural productivity is affected by investments in agricultural 
research and development, but that these benefits are largely captured by 
consumers (this result is supported by MUNDLAK, 2005). There is no evidence 
that increased productivity affects either net cash income or farmland values. 
Agricultural policy, technology, and urban pressures combined significantly 
affect the farmland market. Figure 7 shows the effect of agricultural policy on the 
debt-to-asset position in the United States and Canada for 1981 through 2004. 
The debt-to-asset position in each country is relatively similar until 1995 when Charles B. Moss, Andrew Schmitz 
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Canada dramatically reduced its support for agriculture. Beginning in 1996, the 
overall debt level for Canada began to decline relative to that of the United States. 
At the current time, government payments to grain and oilseed producers in the 
United States far exceed those in Canada. This partly explains the growth in land 
values in both countries. In the United States the real price of agricultural land has 
not fallen, but in Canada it has fallen steadily over time (PAINTER, 2002). It is 
likely that in the United States, investment in farmland has done as well as an 
equivalent investment in the stock market, which has not been the case in 
Canada (PAINTER, 2002). 
6 FARM SIZE 
One fact that economists agree upon is that over the last two decades, farm 
numbers in North America have steadily declined. According to MUNDLAK (2005), 
during the twentieth century, the number of farms declined over fifty percent. 
Along with this decrease in farm numbers has been the steady growth of the 
percentage of rented land that makes up an individual farm unit, at least in parts 
of the United States. Traditionally, California, for example, experienced very 
early in its history a significant percentage of a farm unit being made up of 
rented land. This is still true. Also, in Missouri, for example, data on sample 
farms suggest that the ratio of owned to leased land has been relatively stable 
and remains near forty percent (WOMACK, 2004). However, in states such as 
Montana and South Dakota there has been a significant increase in land rented 
by farmers. In the prairie region of Canada, only ten to fifteen percent of the 
farm land was rented twenty years ago. Now, the range is about fifty to fifty-five 
percent. 
There are many determinants of farm size, including the age of the farm 
operator, composition of family members, location, size and quality of the labor 
pool, and available technology. A major determinant that has driven farm size is 
the availability of technology, especially the introduction of the four-wheel drive 
tractor. This enabled an individual family unit to farm much more land than 
prior to its introduction. For example, in the 1950s in the wheat growing area of 
North America, a large two-wheel drive tractor was capable of pulling a discer 
between eighteen and twenty feet for planting. However, it is not uncommon 
now to pull sixty feet of seeding equipment with a four-wheel drive unit. 
Accompanying the four-wheel drive tractor were large sprayers for applying 
chemicals. In addition, hydraulic systems allow equipment to be moved more 
easily from field to field, enabling farmers to farm land large distances apart. 
Behind all this was the development of larger threshing combines, the capacity 
of which has increased by at least fifty percent since the 1950s. (One of the 
largest combines in that era was the Super 92 Massey, which was considerably 
smaller than any large John Deere, International, or New Holland combine 
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needed to produce commodities such as corn or wheat. It seems natural that if 
the size of the equipment doubles, then farm size will also double. 
There has been considerable discussion on the role of farm labor in North 
American and European agriculture (MUNDLAK, 2005; SCHMITT, 1991). 
Technology replaced a large percentage of the labor force in agriculture at the 
same time farm size was increasing. In this connection, it may be instructive to 
consider three categories of farms: (1) small farms where part of the family 
members work off-farm jobs; (2) farms that are owner operated with or without 
help from family members; and (3) large farm units that are operated and 
managed by the owner but require additional hired labor. Farms in category one 
have always had trouble staying in business. They are unable to take advantage of 
modern technology nor add significantly to their land holdings. In the second 
category are farms that are large enough to take advantage of modern technology 
but not duplicate the technology (i.e., the farm families operate the equipment 
themselves using one combine, one tractor, etc.). Then there is category three 
where farms are much larger than can be farmed by the farm family and employ 
hired farm labor. There has been a significant increase in category three farms 
over the last two decades, which has been facilitated by the ease at which farm 
land can be rented. Not only do these units employ hired labor, they also are of a 
sufficient size to use duplicate technology. In Saskatchewan, for example, it is not 
uncommon to see grain operations that are owner-managed that have a land base 
that utilizes three to four grain combines, four-wheel drive seeding units, and the 
like. These farms are four times larger than the category two farm described 
above. In this regard, wage rates for farm workers are an important determinant 
of farm size and profitability. These farm units must compete for skilled labor 
that is also in demand by other sectors of the economy, including the oil industry 
(in Canada, a considerable amount of the work force from agricultural regions is 
attracted to the oil fields in Alberta at very high wages). 
Unfortunately, we know little about the economies of scale of agricultural 
production. PAUL et al. (2004) argue that family farms in the United States are 
both scale and technically inefficient. "Potential for the exploitation of significant 
scale and scope economies, and some greater technical efficiency, seem to be 
driving trends toward increased farm size and dwindling competitiveness of the 
small family farm" (PAUL et al., 2004, p. 185). But how efficient are the farms in 
category two above compared to those in category three? Do per unit costs keep 
falling for farms larger than those managed and operated by the farm family? 
We have no evidence to suggest that per unit costs rise as farm size increases. 
The economic notions of economies of scale can be examined through the long-
run average cost curve as presented in Figure 8. The long-run average cost curve 
is an envelope relationship for short-run average cost of production based on a 
given machinery complement. In 
* q  is that quantity; that is, where the scale of 
production is feasible in the long-run. This would be the point where the operator Charles B. Moss, Andrew Schmitz 
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would be operating a four-wheel drive tractor under the current equipment 
paradigm. While the exact shape of the long-run average cost curve is the subject 
of some debate, the standard contention is that the curve is relatively flat over a 
wide range of quantities but begins to slope upward at some point. Given that 
the long-run average cost curve slopes upward, we could hypothesize some 
output level q % which bounds the long-run feasible size of the firm. 
In the discussion on farm size and economies of scale, an often neglected 
element is the economies of scale in marketing. Generally, the larger the farm is, 
the larger the volume of output and the greater the tendency for management to 
hire marketing expertise that includes services for optimal selective hedging. In 
addition, larger farms because of volume can experience a reputation effect. This 
is especially true in the marketing of feeder cattle where operators with large 
herds establish a reputation for having "good cattle" with better conditioning or 
feed conversion (SCHMITZ, SCHMITZ  and MOSS, 2005; SCHMITZ, MOSS  and 
SCHMITZ, 2003). In addition, these farms may also obtain price advantages when 
purchasing inputs. These price advantages would be depicted in Figure 8 by an 
upward shift in the long-run price of output from  p to 
* p  and an outward shift in 
the long-run average cost curve from  ( ) LRAC w  to  ( )
* LRAC w . Taken together, 
these price advantages shift the long-run feasible production region from q % to 
* q % . 
Another factor affecting farm size is specialization. Some farmers are willing to 
hire other farmers to spray, combine, bail hay, and other activities. This 
specialization could reduce the level of capital inputs required, allow for the 
development of specialized skills, and potentially increase the timeliness of 
certain field operations. 
None of these considerations were taken into account by ALLEN and LUECK (1998) 
who analyzed whether the family farm was an optimal form of legal 
organization for the farm. They contend that the family farm will remain the 
basic production unit in the United States. Their analysis focuses mostly on the 
seasonality of farm production. Specifically, most crop farms face a cyclical 
demand for labor within the year dictated by agronomic considerations. In the 
Corn Belt, corn and soybeans are planted in early or mid spring. Depending on 
the technology, certain field operations, such as spraying, are then required 
throughout the summer months, followed by a harvest period beginning in 
October or November. Given this annual cycle, the family farm is prone to 
periods of excess labor that are inconsistent with other legal forms of 
organization (i.e., limited partnerships or corporations with a standing hired 
labor force). More work is needed using Allen and Lueck’s formulation to 
answer the more complex questions related to land markets, farm size, and 
economies of scale. 
The adjustment of farm size to the optimum or satisfactory scale is a complex 
process. Changes in farm size and numbers are dynamic in nature. Some farms Farmland markets, boom/bust cycles, and farm size  95
are sold because of financial pressures and because of the lack of sons to inherit 
the farms. The landscape is ever changing. Unfortunately, some farmers who 
tried to expand their units to match the available technology got trapped on the 
wrong side of the land market and went bankrupt in the process. This was 
especially true in the 1980s.  
What does this discussion have to do with agriculture in Europe? Clearly, 
Eastern Europe had huge state and collective farms. There is little information 
on how the efficiency of these farms compared with those in North America. 
Now that these farms are becoming privatized, it will be interesting to see what 
type of farm units emerge. It is our prediction that farm size will follow that in 
the United States with the emergence of some ten to fifteen thousand hectare 
farms under a one owner-management unit accompanied by a significant amount 
of hired farm labor. 
In this regard, one can also draw observations from Brazil where there has been 
a rapid rise in the increase of farm size, so that now many farms are very large. 
Case studies on sugar and soybean as examples should be done to detail the 
prevailing farm structure. We hypothesize that most of this production occurs on 
the largest farms (those large enough to take advantage of both the economies of 
scale in production and the benefits of increased output prices from reputation 
effects or integrated marketing as well as reduced input prices from market 
power). 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Technological changes in agriculture radically changed the optimal size of the 
farm firm during the twentieth century. Regardless of the factors determining the 
boundaries of feasible farm sizes, the price of farmland and access to credit 
markets determine the ability of producers to reach an efficient farm size. 
Various factors, such as boom/bust cycles and urban pressure, complicate in 
different ways obtaining these feasible sizes. The boom/bust cycle increases the 
collateral risk facing lenders and, hence, increases the interest rate that must be 
charged on real estate debt. Thus, boom/bust cycles are an impediment to 
obtaining an efficient farm size. The effect of urban pressure is more complex. 
On one hand, urban pressure tends to increase land prices beyond that which can 
be justified (and paid) from residual rents to farmland. From this perspective, 
urban pressure hinders the attainment of a feasible farm size. On the other hand, 
urban pressure increases a farmer’s equity, reducing the effective interest rate on 
credit. This reduces the price of obtaining an efficient operational size, but also 
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Figure 8:  Defining the farm size by the long-run average cost curve 
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The duality of Moldovan farm structure is manifested by the relatively small 
number of large corporate farms at one extreme, and a large number of small and 
very small family farms at the other. "Medium-sized" family farms, the backbone 
of any market agriculture, virtually do not exist in Moldova. Moldovan 
agriculture is characterized by a much greater concentration of land in large farms 
than agriculture in market economies. Small individual farms on the whole are 
more productive and more efficient than large corporate farms, producing higher 
incomes for rural families than corporate farms. The main conclusion of the paper 
is that land should be allowed to flow from large corporate farms to small family 
farms through land markets until an equilibrium is established between the two 
farm sectors at a new level closer to that observed in market economies. 
Keywords: Farm structure, efficiency, productivity, land fragmentation, land 
concentration, farm size, Moldova. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The privatization of agricultural land and assets, followed by the restructuring of 
collective and state farms, were among the primary goals of Moldova’s transition 
to a market-oriented economy in the post-Soviet era (LERMAN et al., 1998). 
During the first phase of land reform, between 1992 and 1998, state-owned land 
was privatized through the distribution of land ownership certificates to more than 
one million rural residents (30 % of Moldova’s population). The second phase 
of land reform began in 1998 and led to a sweeping conversion of the paper 
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certificates to physical plots, which averaged less than 1.5 hectares. The share of 
agricultural land in state ownership dropped from 100 % in 1990 to less than one-
third in 2003, much of it held in state reserve for future reallocation to individuals.  
Progress with land privatization did not produce a commensurate shift to 
individual or family farming. Less than half the landowners who received 
physical plots as a result of land reform decided to farm their land independently 
(DSS, 2004a). The rest (57 %) leased their land to operators, including so-called 
"leaders" or "managers", i.e., enterprising individuals who founded new corporate 
farms by consolidating the dispersed small plots of passive landowners. Today 
there are about 1,500 corporate farms – limited liability companies, joint stock 
companies, agricultural production cooperatives – with an average size of 400-
800 hectares. These new corporate farms use private, not state-owned land, and 
are substantially smaller than the traditional collective and state farms, which 
averaged 2,000-3,000 hectares in 1990. 
The distribution of land to the rural population led to dramatic changes in the 
structure of land use by farms of various organizational forms (Table  1). 
Particularly notable is the shrinking share of former state and collective farms 
and a corresponding increase in land used by the individual sector. Thus, in 
1990, more than 90 % of the 2.5 million hectares of agricultural land in Moldova 
was managed by corporate farms (about 30  % by state farms and 60  % by 
collective farms). In 1990, the individual sector (household plots at that time) 
cultivated less than 9 % of the land, but as of 2003, the individual sector (which 
now consists of household plots and peasant farms) controls 40  % of the 
agricultural land. Approximately the same land area is operated by large-scale 
corporate farms, mostly new organizational forms with private ownership of 
land and assets. These new corporate farms are basically corporate shareholder 
structures with joint land cultivation. The traditional collective farms practically 
disappeared during the last decade, as many of them have been privatized or 
liquidated, while others have registered as new legal forms. State farms still 
persist, but they operate in highly specialized areas that can be legitimately 
regarded as a public good (seed selection, livestock selection, experimental 
stations, agricultural education and research). 
Table 1:  Structure of agricultural land use in 1990 and 2003* 
 1990  2003 
State sector (state farms and reserve land)  32.1  27.4 
Corporate forms (private sector)  59.5  32.5 
Individual sector  8.5  40.1 
Total agricultural land  100.0  100.0 
    ‘000 ha  2562.2  2528.3 
Source:  State Cadastre Agency, land balance tables; transposed to end of year. 
Note:  
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While corporate farms average 400-800 hectares, the individual farms (household 
plots and peasant farms) are much smaller. Thus, the average peasant farm has 
1.9 hectares and only 342 peasant farms (out of some 300,000 in total) are larger 
than 50 hectares (DSS, 2004b). Half the agricultural land in Moldova (excluding 
Transnistria) is in units smaller than 10 hectares (WORLD BANK, 2005).  
The existence of a relatively small number of large corporate farms at one 
extreme and a large number of small and very small family farms at the other is 
manifested in the duality of farm structure. "Medium-sized" family farms, the 
pillar of any market agriculture, almost do not exist in Moldova. Yet the 
relationship between organizational form and farm size is not always single-
valued. Family farms are typically small, but some of them fall in the category 
of large farms. A similar picture is observed with corporate farms, which are 
typically large, but not always. Therefore, the duality of farm structure will be 
examined in two dimensions: The organizational form dimension and the farm 
size dimension. 
2 THE ORGANIZATIONAL FORM DIMENSION: CORPORATE FARMS 
VS. INDIVIDUAL FARMS 
Two conflicting scenarios were envisaged in the early 1990s regarding the 
outcome of land reform and farm restructuring in transition countries. According 
to one scenario, the removal of socialist state controls would result in the 
collapse of the chronically-inefficient collective and state farms and produce a 
complete shift to family farming. According to the second scenario, corporate 
farms would persist because rural families did not have the required human 
capital and managerial skills to start independent farming. In reality, none of 
these scenarios has materialized and a large variety of farm structures have 
emerged during transition, spanning the whole spectrum of individual and 
corporate farms (LERMAN et al., 2004; SWINNEN, 2006). 
Individual or family farms include very small household plots operated virtually 
by every rural family and somewhat larger peasant farms established by 
relatively enterprising individuals. Individual farms are managed by the head of 
the household and rely mainly on family labor and family-owned land. They are 
typically small or very small, ranging in size from less than a hectare to about  
5-10  hectares. In contrast, corporate farms are owned by shareholders and 
managed by hired professional managers. In Moldova and other transition 
countries, the shareholders are typically the local village residents who were 
formerly members of the local collective farm and received shares in its land 
and assets. Corporate farms typically use land leased from their shareholders and 
rely on hired labor.  
The emergence of two well-defined categories of organizational forms as a 
result of the post-socialist land and farm structure reforms has triggered ongoing Zvi Lerman, Dragos Cimpoies  108 
debate among policy-makers and economists concerning the efficiency and 
performance advantages of corporate farms versus individual farms in transition 
countries. Traditional socialist thinking believed in economies of scale and thus 
gave preference to large corporate farms. Western market-oriented thinking 
attaches more importance to individual incentives and thus emphasizes the 
advantages of smaller family farms. GORTON and DAVIDOVA (2004) note that, 
contrary to prior expectations, there is no clear-cut empirical evidence in 
transition economies that family farms are more efficient than corporate farms in 
all farming activities. While significant differences have been found in favor of 
family farms against the average corporate farm, the best corporate farms still 
tend to perform as well as the best family farms. Yet these findings clearly 
support the previous conclusion (LERMAN  et al.,  2004) that, contrary to the 
economies-of-scale school of thought, large corporate farms do not have a 
significant performance advantage over individual farms. We use national statistics 
and survey data to examine the comparative performance of individual and 
corporate farms in Moldova. 
Table 2:  Land, output, and labor by farm type 1990-2003  
(end of year data for selected years) 
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1990 2301.8  90.7  9.3  16189  77.8  22.2  610  83.2  16.8 
1995 2196.4  82.7  17.3  10293  59.9  40.1  771  69.2  30.8 
2000 2146.7  56.1  43.9  7917  26.9  73.1  766  23.1  76.9 
2001 2076.0  44.6  55.4  8427  28.4  71.6  764  20.7  79.3 
2002 2069.2  44.1  55.9  8717  29.0  71.0  747  20.6  79.4 
2003 2059.8  46.9  53.1  7535  24.7  75.3  583  23.9  76.1 
Source:  DSS (2004b): Statistical yearbooks of Moldova for various years.  
Note:   Land used by farms is agricultural land, excluding the areas not allocated to agricultural 
producers (state reserves, miscellaneous state and municipal lands). 
The shift of agricultural land from corporate to individual farms noted in Table 1 
has led to significant changes in the production structure of Moldovan agriculture: 
The output of the corporate farm sector has decreased, while the output of the 
individual sector shows steady growth. At the beginning of agricultural reforms 
in the early 1990s, the individual farms sector was producing 20  % of 
agricultural output on less than 10 % of agricultural land; in 2003 individual 
farms produced three-quarters of agricultural output on half the agricultural land 
(Table  2). The discrepant shares of the two farm sectors in land and output 
clearly show that individual farms use their land more productively than corporate 
farms. This phenomenon has persisted since 1990, as the share of individual Duality of farm structure in transition agriculture: The case of Moldova  109
output has always been greater than the share of land in individual tenure 
(Table 2). 
Labor is another basic factor affecting the performance of agriculture. 
Agricultural labor in corporate farms decreased sharply over time, while in 
individual farms it increased. In farms of both types, the changes in labor use are 
strongly correlated with the changes in land use (the coefficient of correlation is 
greater than 0.95 for 1990-2003). The increase in labor in individual farms, 
especially after 1998, is thus linked with the land distribution efforts during the 
second-phase reforms, which focused on the conversion of land share 
certificates into physical plots. The opposite employment trends in corporate and 
individual farms have resulted in a sharp increase of the share of agricultural 
labor in the individual sector – from about 25 % in the early 1990s to more than 
75 % in 2000-2004 (Table 2). 
The full time series underlying Table  2 was used to calculate the partial 
productivity of land and labor in absolute terms. The partial productivities of 
land and labor decreased over time in both corporate and individual farms, and 
the results are summarized in Table 3 as averages for the entire period 1990-2003 
and for two sub-periods. Despite the declining trend, the land productivity of 
individual farms was higher than that of corporate farms (the differences are 
statistically significant for the entire period and for both sub-periods). The 
difference in labor productivity, on the other hand, is not statistically significant 
for the entire period 1990-2003 and for the latter sub-period 1997-2003. 
Moreover, the direction of the difference in labor productivity does not always 
match the findings in other transition countries, where labor productivity, unlike 
land productivity, is observed to be lower for individual than for corporate farms 
(a manifestation of the "labor sink" effect of individual farms). Thus, the two 
partial productivity measures for land and labor do not provide a consistent 
picture: While land productivity is definitely higher for individual farms, the 
results for labor productivity are ambiguous.  
Table 3:  Land and labor productivity for corporate and individual farms 
1990-2003 (averages for selected sub-periods) 
Productivity of land, ‘000 lei/ha  Productivity of labor, ‘000 lei/worker
Years 
Corporate  Individual Corporate Individual 
1990-2003 3.4
* 10.1








* 13.1 12.2 
Source: Calculated  from  full  time series underlying Table 2. 
Note:  
* The differences between corporate and individual farms are significant at p < 0.1  
   by both parametric and non-parametric tests. 
To resolve the ambiguity, we have to switch from one-factor partial 
productivities to Total Factor Productivity (TFP), which is calculated as the ratio Zvi Lerman, Dragos Cimpoies  110 
of the value of output to the aggregated cost of all inputs used. In the absence of 
market prices for valuing the cost of inputs (such as the price of land), TFP is 
usually determined by estimating a production function and then using the 
estimated input coefficients as the weights to calculate the value of the bundle of 
inputs. Due to considerations of data reliability, we have decided to calculate 
production functions using two inputs only: Land and labor.  
A qualitative picture of TFP changes over time was obtained from national 
statistics by assuming a conventional Cobb-Douglas production function with 
stylized factor shares of 0.7 for land and 0.3 for labor (these are the factor shares 
that we consistently obtained in production functions estimated using various 
farm surveys in Moldova). Figure 1 presents the TFP results calculated with 
these land and labor weights using the full time series underlying Table 2. The 
TFP for individual farms is higher than for corporate farms over the entire 
period 1990-2003. The respective means for 1990-2003 are 11.5 for individual 
farms and 4.4 for corporate farms (the difference is statistically significant). 
Figure 1:  Total factor productivity for individual and corporate farms 
1990-2003 
 
Notes:  Inputs from national statistics (see Table 2) aggregated using hypothetical factor 
shares of 0.7 to land and 0.3 to labor.  
The TFP results in Figure 1 are derived by production-function methodology 
using national statistics, and they reflect Total Factor Productivity in a sectoral 
perspective. A different methodology can be used to estimate the efficiency of 
specific farms from survey data (at a point in time). The efficiency of input use 
for a particular farm is measured in relation to the production frontier, which is 
the locus of "best attainable" points, i.e., points where the maximum output is 
achieved for every given bundle of inputs. Once the production frontier has been 
constructed, we can calculate the technical efficiency of each farm by measuring 
its relative distance from the frontier. Points on the frontier are technically 
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efficient; their distance from the frontier is 0, and their technical efficiency (TE) 
score is 1. As the distance of a particular point from the frontier increases, its TE 
score decreases. Each TE score is the fraction of the "best performer" output that 
a given farm achieves with the same bundle of inputs.  
Table 4 presents the mean TE scores obtained for farms of different types in two 
samples from 2003 surveys in Moldova.
1 While all farms surveyed are relatively 
inefficient (compared to the efficiency benchmark of TE = 1), individual farms 
achieve higher TE scores than corporate farms (the difference is statistically 
significant in both samples). This indicates that the individual farms, on average, 
utilize the two inputs (land and labor) more efficiently than the corporate farms: 
For any given bundle of inputs they produce, on average, more than the 
corporate farms. These results are consistent with the TFP results: Individual 
farms are more productive and more efficient than corporate farms. 
Table 4:  TE scores obtained by Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)  
   
WB 2003 survey 
(n = 198) 
WB 2003 survey pooled 
with PFAP 2003 corporate 
farm survey (n = 719) 
Corporate 0.46
a  (n = 22)  0.67
b  (n = 543) 
Individual   0.64
a  (n = 176)  0.70
b  (n = 176) 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on DUDWICK et al. (2005) for WB 2003 survey; 
MURAVSCHI and BUCATA (2005) for PFAP 2003 survey. 
Notes: 
a Difference statistically significant at p = 0.10 by parametric and nonparametric tests. 
   b  Difference statistically significant at p = 0.10 by nonparametric test only. 
3 THE FARM SIZE DIMENSION: LARGE FARMS VS. SMALL FARMS 
The second dimension of farm-structure duality involves farm sizes – large versus 
small. The optimum farm size is difficult to define because opinions about the 
farmers’ objective function differ and because the same determinants can affect 
farm size in different ways across different farms or countries (KOESTER, 2003). 
The optimality of farm size for a given country is largely an empirical question 
(SWINNEN, 2006). In general, the optimal farm size is a relative notion that 
depends on local conditions such as the share of rural population and land 
endowment.  
In the absence of a universal optimum, average farm sizes can be meaningfully 
compared only for countries with similar natural conditions. It makes no sense 
to compare the farm sizes in densely populated Moldova to those in Russia or 
Ukraine (both sparsely populated, land-rich countries). While farm sizes in 
                                                 
1  The TE scores were derived by Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), an econometric 
production frontier technique that is conceptually close to production function estimation. 
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Russia and Ukraine may be compared to the United States and Canada, an 
appropriate benchmark for Moldova is provided by the relatively densely 
populated and land-poor European countries such as Portugal, Greece, and Italy. 
These three countries actually have the smallest family farms among the EU-15 – 
5-10 hectares, compared with an average farm size of around 20 hectares for the 
EU-15 as a group (Eurostat data from EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005). Family 
farms in Portugal, Greece, and Italy are thus not dramatically larger than the 
average peasant farm in Moldova (2 hectares national average, 4-5 hectares in 
various surveys – see Table 5), but they are certainly much smaller than the 
average corporate farm in Moldova (400-800  hectares as mentioned in the 
Introduction).  
Table 5 presents size characteristics and partial productivity measures for small 
and large farms in four recent surveys in Moldova. While the large farms as a 
group are substantially larger than the small farms by all measures – output, 
land, and labor, the partial productivities show a mixed picture:  
•  The partial productivity of land (output per hectare) is higher for small 
farms. 
•  The partial productivity of labor (output per worker) is lower for small 
farms.  
•  The number of workers per hectare is much higher in small individual farms 
than in large corporate farms (the "labor sink" effect of individual farms).  
Table 5:  Size characteristics and productivity measures for small and 
large farms in Moldova: Survey data 
















observations  176 22 1,166  521  170 180 
Ag. land (ha)  4.48  971  4.02  918  5.7  533 
Workers  4.51  332 6.27 150 1.6 43.7 
Ag. output 
(‘000 lei)  25.8  3,230 25.3 2,038  75.4 1,642 
Output/ha  (lei)  6,765  2,745 9,535 2,085  6,414 3,145 
Output/worker 
(lei)  6,857  17,135 5,145 17,824  55,304  54,393 
Workers/ha  1.42  0.26 3.25 0.19     
Source: DUDWICK et al. (2005) for WB 2003 survey; MURAVSCHI and BUCATA (2005) for 
PFAP 2003 surveys; LERMAN (2001) for WB 2000 survey. 
Note:   All differences between small and large farms are statistically significant at p = 0.1 
(except the differences in productivity of labor – output/worker – in the WB 2000 
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The ambiguity in partial productivity measures is resolved by calculating total 
factor productivity (TFP) in the production function paradigm. First, the sum of 
the coefficients in a Cobb-Douglas production function sheds light on the 
behavior of the returns to scale: The returns are constant to scale if the 
coefficients sum to 1; the returns are increasing to scale (i.e., larger is more 
productive) when the sum of the coefficients is greater than 1; and finally the 
returns are decreasing to scale (i.e., smaller is more productive) when the sum of 
the coefficients is less than 1. Second, differences in TFP between categories of 
farms can be captured by estimating appropriate production functions with a 
dummy variable for different farm types. If the dummy coefficient for type A 
farms is found to be greater than for type B farms, this implies that type A farms 
produce a greater value of output at any given bundle of inputs and essentially 
means that type A farms have higher TFP than type B farms. This procedure 
enables us to assess differences in TFP without actually calculating the TFP in 
absolute values.  
Simple two-input Cobb-Douglas production functions relating the aggregated 
value of output to land and labor were estimated for the 2003 WB survey with 
198 farms classified into large and small. The two-input production function was 
first estimated without dummy variables (Model 1 in Table 6). In this model, the 
coefficients of the two factors of production (land and labor) summed to less 
than 1, and the difference from 1 was statistically significant at p = 0.10. The 
production function thus shows decreasing returns to scale: Large farms produce 
less per unit of inputs in the margin than small farms. 
Table 6:  Estimation of Cobb-Douglas production function for large and 
small farms 
Dependent variable: 
Value of output (lei)  Model 1 coefficients  Model 2 coefficients 
Explanatory variables:     
Land (ha)  0.60  0.69 
Labor (workers)  0.30  0.31 
Farm type (dummy): Large 
farms relative to small farms  – -0.58 
Sum of input coefficients  0.90  n.a. 
R
2 0.770  0.773 
Source:  Authors’ estimations based on 2003 WB survey from DUDWICK et al. (2005).  
This conclusion is strengthened and quantified by estimating the same two-input 
production function with a dummy variable for large and small farms (Model 2 
in Table 6). The intercept for large farms (relative to small farms) is negative, 
which means that at each level of inputs (land and labor) large corporate farms 
attain lower output than small individual farms (the negative coefficient was 
statistically significant at p = 0.10). The mathematics of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function translates the negative dummy variable coefficient of -0.58 Zvi Lerman, Dragos Cimpoies  114
into a difference of 45 % in output between corporate and individual farms for 
each bundle of inputs. 
4 DISENTANGLING THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND 
FARM SIZE 
We have shown that individual farms in Moldova are more productive than 
corporate farms and that small farms are more productive than large farms. 
Typically, individual farms are small, while corporate farms are large, and 
there is a fairly sharp size gap between the farms of two organizational forms 
(WORLD BANK, 2005). It could therefore be argued that the farm-size effect 
observed in our analysis is simply a result of the organizational form effect, or 
vice versa. To try and disentangle the two effects, we have looked at two 
homogeneous samples: A sample of corporate farms (without any individual 
farms) and a sample of peasant farms (without any corporate farms).  
The homogeneous sample of 521 corporate farms from the 2003 PFAP survey 
(MURAVSCHI and BUCATCA, 2005) was grouped into three size categories 
(Table 7). The productivity of land clearly increases with farm size, whereas the 
productivity of labor does not. Most importantly for our purposes, total factor 
productivity calculated by aggregating land and labor with appropriate weights 
from the production function shows a definite increase with farm size in the 
homogeneous sample of corporate farms. 








Number of farms  238  225  58 
Land productivity (output/ha, lei)  1,927  2,162  2,430 
Labor productivity (output/worker,  lei)  18,660 16,580 19,219 
TFP (lei per unit of aggregated inputs)   3,162  3,603  4,167 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from MURAVSCHI and BUCATCA, 2005. 
In a homogeneous sample of peasant farms from the 2005 WB survey (WORLD 
BANK, 2005), the standard of living of rural families was observed to increase 
with farm size. Here, a qualitative variable characterizing different levels of 
family well-being ("comfortable", "subsistence", "poverty") was used as a proxy 
for farm performance in the absence of TFP estimates for this sample. Among 
peasant farms, a comfortable standard of living is associated with much larger 
family farms than lower standards of living. Peasant farmers reporting a 
comfortable standard of living had 11 hectares on average, compared with less 
than 5  hectares for farms in the two lower categories: Poverty, when family 
income is not sufficient to buy food, and subsistence, when family income is 
sufficient to buy food and daily necessities (the difference between farm sizes is Duality of farm structure in transition agriculture: The case of Moldova  115
statistically significant at p < 0.01). Peasant farmers’ standard of living is thus 
an increasing function of farm size, as is commonly observed in farm surveys in 
CIS and other transition countries.  
A different view of the relationship between standard of living and farm size for 
peasant farmers is presented in Figure 2, which plots the probability of being in 
one of the three standard-of-living levels as a function of farm size. The 
probability of being in the highest standard of living (gray curve) increases with 
farm size, while the probability of being on the lowest "poverty" level (thick 
black curve), sharply decreases with farm size.
2 These results provide support 
for increasing the average size of the individual farms through land market 
development and land consolidation policies. 
Figure 2:  Probability of achieving a given standard of living as a function 
of farm size for peasant farmers  
 
 
Source: Authors’  calculations based on WB 2005 survey (WORLD BANK, 2005). 
Notes:  Definition of standard of living levels: "Poverty" – family income not sufficient to 
buy food; "Subsistence" – family income just sufficient to buy food and daily 
necessities; "Comfortable" – family income sufficient to buy food, daily necessities, 
and durables. 
These results demonstrate that farm performance actually improves with 
increasing farm size for farms of the same organizational form. The inverse 
productivity-farm size relationship is observed for mixed samples that include 
farms of different organizational forms (both individual and corporate). This 
suggests that the decrease of productivity with farm size is primarily an 
organizational form effect, and not a farm size effect: Individual farms are more 
                                                 
2  The probabilities of achieving a given standard of living were obtained in a multinomial 
logistic regression with the three-level standard of living as the discrete dependent variable 
and farm size as the continuous covariate. 
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productive than corporate farms, and the size effect observed in our analysis 
appears to be simply a proxy for the organizational form effect.  
5 LAND CONCENTRATION 
The pronounced difference in average sizes between individual and corporate 
farms in Moldova is reflected in a strong concentration of land in a small 
number of very large farms – a feature inherited from the sharply dual farm 
structure of the Soviet period. The Lorenz curve provides a standard tool for 
visualizing the inequality of land distribution between large and small farms. 
Plotting the cumulative percent of the number of farms (from smallest to largest) 
on the horizontal axis and the cumulative percent of agricultural land used by 
farms on the vertical axis, we obtain a curve whose downward bulge below the 
diagonal provides a measure of inequality or concentration. In the absence of a 
country-wide size distribution for all farms in Moldova, we produced a "sample" 
Lorenz curve, ordering by size the 1,885 farms included in three 2003 surveys 
(DUDWICK et al., 2005; MURAVSCHI and BUCATCA, 2005). 
The Lorenz curve for Moldova (Figure 3a, black curve) shows that about 70 % 
of farms (mostly small individual farms) account for just 1 % of agricultural 
land while the remaining 30  % of large farms (basically corporate farms) 
account for 99 % of land holdings. At the top end of the distribution, just 5 % of 
the largest farms control 53 % of the land. 
Although it is not entirely appropriate to compare the somewhat ad hoc sample 
results for Moldova with the systematic Eurostat data for the EU countries, we 
have nevertheless superimposed the aggregated land concentration curve for 
EU-15 on Figure 3a (grey curve). In the 15 countries of the EU combined, 10 % 
of the largest farms control 64 % of agricultural land compared with as much as 
73 % in Moldova (Table 8). On the other hand, the small-farm tail in EU-15 is 
much thicker than in Moldova, with 80  % of the smallest farms controlling 
16.5 % of agricultural land compared with only 6.4 % in Moldova.
3  
Figure 3b presents the corresponding graphs for Italy, Greece, and Portugal – the 
three EU-15 countries that in our view are the most appropriate for comparison 
with Moldova. In Greece, 11 % of the largest farms control 54 % of the land, in 
Italy 7 % of the largest farms control 59 % of the land, and in Portugal 6 % of 
farms control more than 70 % of agricultural land. Portugal is the country with 
the highest land concentration in the EU-15, but even here 80 % of the smaller 
farms control 14 % of agricultural land, compared to less than 7 % for the same 
percentage of small farms in Moldova. As a result, 20 % of the largest farms 
control 93 % of the land in Moldova and 86 % of the land in Portugal.  
                                                 
3  Land concentration in the EU-15 is increasing over time. In Table 8 both the number and 
the area decreased between 1995-2003 for small- and medium-sized farms and increased 
for large farms. Duality of farm structure in transition agriculture: The case of Moldova  117
Figure 3:  Land concentration curves  
 
Sources:  European countries based on Eurostat harmonized national data and EC surveys of 
the structure of agricultural holdings for 2003 (EUROPEAN  COMMISSION, 2005); 
Moldova from WORLD BANK (2005). 
Contrary to the established market economies of the EU-15, Bulgaria and 
Romania, two East European transition countries that are now candidates for EU 
accession, are close to Moldova by their levels of land concentration: 5 % of the 
largest farms control more than 80 % of agricultural land in Bulgaria and about 
60  % of the land in Romania (EUROPEAN  COMMISSION, 2005). In these two 
countries, as in Moldova, the post-Soviet land reform led to extreme fragmen-
tation of land ownership, which on the one hand produced large numbers of very 
small farms, while on the other hand encouraged many small landowners to 
entrust their land to large corporate farms.  
Table 8:  Agricultural land distribution by farm size in the EU-15 
Holdings, %  Used agricultural land (UAA), %  Farm size class 
(ha UAA)   1995  1997 2000 2003 1995  1997  2000 2003 
0-5  56.9 55.8 57.6 56.6  5.7  5.4  5.2  4.8 
5-10  13.0 13.3 12.3 12.2  5.2  5.1  4.6  4.3 
10-20  10.6 10.8 10.2 10.2  8.6  8.3  7.7  7.2 
20-50  11.5 11.5 10.9 11.0 20.9  19.8 18.6 17.4 
Over  50  8.0 8.6 8.9 9.9  59.6  61.4  63.8  66.3 
Sources:  Eurostat harmonized national data and EC surveys of the structure of agricultural 
holdings for 2003 (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005). 
The observed results for Moldova fall somewhere between the market model 
and the former Soviet model: The land concentration is not as extreme as in 
Russia and Ukraine, which are still very close to the former Soviet model 
characterized by sharply dual farm structure, but it is substantially more 
pronounced than in the EU (and also in the US and Canada). To move closer to 
the market pattern, Moldova has to undergo further farm size adjustment. 
 EU-15
 Moldova
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Analysis based on national statistics and survey data shows that individual farms 
are more efficient than corporate farms. This conclusion does not necessarily 
mean that corporate farms should be eliminated and replaced with family farms. 
Corporate farms do exist in market economies, which proves that they are able 
to compete with individual farms. The small number of corporate farms that do 
exist in market economies appear to be even more efficient than individual farms 
as a group: In the United States, corporate farms control 2 % of agricultural land 
and generate 20 % of output (in Moldova, the relationship is reversed: Corporate 
farms control 50 % of land and generate less than 30 % of output). The market 
economies have achieved an equilibrium farm structure, which includes a mix of 
individual farms (the dominant majority) and corporate farms (a small minority) 
determined by resource availability, managerial capacity, and personal 
preferences of farmers and investors. A similar process can unfold in Moldova, 
but the development of corporate farms must be left to market forces, free from 
government intervention and programming. 
Analyzing the dichotomy between small and large farms, we conclude, based on 
several surveys, that small farms are more productive and more efficient than 
large farms. This result is based on a mixed sample of both individual and 
corporate farms, which overall show decreasing returns to scale. On the other 
hand, a homogeneous sample comprising only corporate farms shows increasing 
returns to scale, i.e., among farms of the same type size has a beneficial effect on 
performance. Similarly, in a homogeneous sample comprising only individual 
farms, family well-being increases with farm size. Based on these findings we tend 
to believe that the different behavior is determined primarily by organizational 
form: Small farms do better than large farm not because of a size effect, but 
because individual farms (which happen to be small) outperform corporate farms 
(which happen to be large). In this context, the Government of Moldova should 
abandon its preference for large-scale corporate farms and concentrate on 
improving the operating conditions for small individual farms. 
The farm structure in Moldova reveals a much greater concentration of land in 
large farms compared to established market economies. In the EU countries 
closest to Moldova such as Italy, Greece, and Portugal, and even in EU-
candidate countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, large farms control a 
substantially smaller proportion of land. Therefore, to move closer to the farm-
structure pattern typical of market economies, Moldova should allow land to 
flow from large corporate farms to small individual farms. This can be 
accomplished by emphasizing the development of a land market mechanism, 
which will simultaneously act to increase the average size and to reduce the 
number of small individual farms (284,000 farms is too much for a small country 
with a population of less than 4  million). These processes will reduce the 
concentration of land in large farms, while alleviating land fragmentation and Duality of farm structure in transition agriculture: The case of Moldova  119
thus will bring Moldova in closer conformity with the farm-structure patterns 
observed in market economies. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the paper is to show and assess the changes in the organizational 
structures in Bulgaria during the period 1998-2004 and to analyze the problems 
of the market-oriented structures in Bulgarian agriculture in the period leading 
to EU accession. 
The evaluation of the changes in the distribution and characteristics of the pro-
ductive structures is based on the census of agricultural holdings carried out in 
Bulgaria in 2003 and the results of two scientific projects done by the authors. 
The paper encompasses the following parts: 
•  Results of organizational restructuring during the period 1998-2004; 
•  Agricultural producers’ problems in adapting to agricultural policy requi-
rements; 
•  Expected changes in the characteristics of organizational structures. 
The paper defends the thesis that the organizational restructuring of the agricul-
tural sector is not yet completed although the changes initiated after 2000 are 
similar to those in the EU. Gradually, in the pre-accession period, the characteris-
tics of the organizational structures will come to resemble those of the developed 
EU countries. 
Keywords: Single area payment scheme, agrarian producers, organizational 
structures. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
During the last couple of years, constant changes have taken place in the produc-
tive structures of Bulgarian agriculture. Until 1998-1999 they were mainly due 
to the consequences of the process of agricultural land restoration and, after that 
period, due to the gradual application of stimuli similar to those applied in the 
EU countries. 
The accession of Bulgaria to the EU will introduce a new working environment 
for our agricultural producers. This working environment will have new rules 
and requirements which a considerable number of Bulgarian farmers will find 
difficult to implement. This is acknowledged not only by the farmers but by all 
Bulgarian citizens. According to data from Euro-barometer, the greatest fears of 
all Bulgarians are linked with the difficulties for agricultural producers and the 
danger that the country will have to pay more and more to the EU, fears which 
are shared by 55 % of the population. These concerns outstrip even those linked 
with international organized crime and the increase in drug trafficking (53 %), 
economic crisis (44  %), and power loss in the small municipalities (42  %), 
which in practice affect all Bulgarian communities.  
The purpose of the paper is to assess the organizational restructuring in the 
agrarian sector and to assess the problems agrarian structures face, which are 
linked with Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) implementation and the ex-
pected changes in their behavior and characteristics. 
The thesis of the paper is that, despite the dynamic changes in the number and 
significance of the main market-oriented agricultural holdings in the last five 
years due to the gradual implementation of some CAP elements, our accession 
to the EU will be the start of a new period for the organizational restructuring of 
the sector. Moreover, the initial implementation of single area payments (probably 
up to 2010-2012), followed by the implementation of single holding payments, 
will create mixed signals for agricultural producers and is a precondition for in-
consistency in agrarian policy. 
2 RESULTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING DURING THE 
PERIOD 1998-2004 
During the last decades, the significance of the agricultural sector has been con-
siderably higher in Bulgaria than in the rest of Europe. In the last couple of years 
there has been a trend towards some decrease in the significance of the agricul-
tural sector. However, according to Eurostat data, in Bulgaria (2004) the relative 
share of agriculture in the Gross Added Value is 5.1 times higher than the EU-25 
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level in the EU). This shows the great influence that CAP implementation will 
have on Bulgaria, not only in the agricultural sector but in the economy as a 
whole, compared to last ten new EU members.  
Labor occupancy in agriculture in Bulgaria is higher than the EU average. In 
2004 this indicator was 10.7 % in Bulgaria, whereas the average EU level was 
5 %. Only Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Greece, and Portugal had levels of agricul-
tural labor occupancy higher than in Bulgaria. Expressed in Annual Working 
Units (AWUs) per holding, the figure is 1.19 for Bulgaria, compared to 0.92 for 
the EU-25 and 0.9 for the EU-15.  
In Bulgaria 0.57 AWUs corresponds to 1 worker, whereas in the EU it is 0.45, in 
the Czech Republic 0.78, and in Malta 0.24. According to this indicator, our 
country is close to the levels for Denmark (0.62 AWUs) and Ireland (0.63 AWUs) 
which shows the relatively efficient labor usage in agricultural holdings.  
For average size of Used Agricultural Area (UAA), Bulgaria takes one of the 
last places, ahead of only Malta and Cyprus. Moreover, our 4.4 ha of UAA are 
similar only to the average size of Used Agricultural Area in Greece (4.8 ha) and 
Hungary (5.6 ha). Far ahead are the agricultural holdings in the Czech Republic 
with 79.4 ha UAA, the UK with 57.4 ha UAA, Denmark with 54.7 ha UAA, and 
others. As a whole the average size of the Used Agricultural Area is 3.6 times 
lower than that in the EU-25 (15.8 ha in 2004). Although some regions in Bul-
garia have most of the characteristics of the South European Agricultural Model, 
the above-mentioned size indicates the unfavorable situation in Bulgarian agri-
culture after a 15-year transition period.  
Bulgarian agriculture has a noticeably dualistic structure compared to the average 
situation in the EU (Table 1). Only in the Czech Republic and Germany do large 
agricultural holdings have higher relative shares of the Used Agricultural Area, 
whereas small agricultural holdings have a higher relative share only in Malta. In 
Bulgaria 96.8 % of the agricultural holdings cultivate only 15 % of the Used Agri-
cultural Area and 75.8 % of the UAA is used by only 0.8 % of producers (Table 1). 
The situation with livestock is analogical. The average size of herds in Bulgaria 
is 10 times lower than in the EU. In practice, it is difficult to make comparisons 
with the leading EU countries such as France and the UK. In Bulgaria, where 
57.6 % of milking cows are bred in holdings with up to 2 cows, agricultural hol-
dings with very small numbers of animals are predominant. They cannot secure 
the appropriate conditions for breeding or reach the required veterinary, sanitary, 
and ergonomic norms and standards.  
Although the Bulgarian Parliament and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
have adopted several legislative norms for area required per animal, for breeding 
conditions and other aspects, in practice the prevailing number of holdings do 
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Table 1:  Structures of holdings by number and used agricultural land in 
the EU-25 and Bulgaria 
Farm size (ha) 
Percentage of  
agricultural  
holdings 






  EU-25 Bulgaria 
Up to 5  61.9 6.2  96.8 15.0 
5-10  13.1  5.9 1.5 2.2 
10-20  9.9  8.8 0.6 1.8 
20-50  8.3 16.6  0.4  2.6 
Above 50  6.8  62.5 0.8 78.5 
Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION; FAO;UNSO; MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, 
2003.  
The low farm size combined with the poor technological level of production 
leads to unsatisfactory yields and productivity. This is the basis of the consi-
derable differences between the economic sizes of the agricultural holdings,  
reflecting to a great extent income differences between agricultural producers. 
Whereas this size is € 68,000 in the EU-15
1, in Bulgaria it is only € 1,940. 
The distribution of agricultural holdings by economic size indicates that in the 
EU-15 small holdings produce only 4.8  % of agricultural output, whereas in 
Bulgaria this value is 46.31 % (Table 2). 
On the basis of the agricultural holdings by economic size and other indicators, 
we can say in summary that Bulgarian agriculture and its organizational struc-
tures differ substantially from those in the EU-25 countries. These differences 
are preconditions for the specific difficulties which our producers face. 
During the 7-8 years since the start of Bulgaria’s negotiations for EU accession, 
a start has been made in gradually implementing some elements of policy simi-
lar to those applied in the EU. The funds available to agricultural producers from 
the State Agriculture Fund, SAPARD, and other funds have contributed in 
varying degrees to the development of organizational structures. Some types of 
structure have become predominant in certain regions, at the expense of other 
forms. 
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outputs  Farm size 
ЕU-15 Bulgaria 
Small (up tol 8 ESU)  32.35 4.8  98.69  46.31 
Medium small  
(8-16 ESU)  18.88 6.2  0.51  3.47 
Medium large  
(16-40 ESU)  23.34 14.7  0.35 5.37 
Large (41-100 ESU)  17.03 27.7  0.25 9.89 
Very large  
(above 100 ESU)  8.5 44.6  0.2  34.96 
Total  100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION; FAO;UNSO; MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, 
2003.  
Although no stable trends can be elucidated from such a short period, in the years 
since the start of Bulgaria’s negotiations for EU accession the following organi-
zational structural changes can be seen: 
•  An increase in the relative share of the Used Agricultural Area of agri-
cultural holdings which belong to legal entities, together with a decrease 
in the average size of the holdings (from 432 ha in 2000 to 346.4 ha in 
2003). 
•  An increase in the number and significance of the structures registered 
under the Trade Law (Figure 1) on account of the decrease in the number 
of those registered under the Law on Cooperatives (Table 3). Thus, there 
is a continuing transition from collective structures to structures with 
one or more (most often fewer than seven) owners and with differentia-
ted managerial rights.  
The preliminary data from the census of agricultural holdings held in 2003 
showed that 63.75 % of those registered under the Trade Law in Bulgaria pre-
ferred the status of sole trader. The average area of the agricultural land used by 
them was 114.4 ha.  
•  Diversification in sole traders’ productive specializations and an increase 
in the number of those specializing in livestock, as well as of those using 
different forms of productive integration on the land-end product chain. 
•  An increase in the relative share of agricultural land in the so-called 
land-leased holdings, which have long-term periods of functioning, 
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Figure 1:  Number of agricultural enterprises (2000-2003) 
 
Source: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY IN BULGARIA, 2003.  
 
Table 3:  Changes in the number and size of agricultural cooperatives  
Year  Number of  
cooperatives 
Used agricultural 
land (million of ha) Average size (ha)  Share of used agri-
cultural land (%) 
1998  3,269 2.427  760.1 40.3 
2000  2,405 1.738  722.9 51.0 
2003  1,963 1.169  587.0 40.0 
Source: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY IN BULGARIA, 2003. 
 
The continuing establishment of various partnerships, cooperatives and other 
structures for facilitating access to credit, products, and services. The speed of 
development of these processes is not satisfactory, despite the favorable precon-
ditions. 
As a result of the changes which have taken place in the country in the last 
couple of years, agricultural cooperatives have the highest relative share of 
UAA. Figure 2 shows that, at 40 %, they rank first followed by the holdings of 
physical persons – 30 %, holdings registered under the Trade Law (LLC), sole 
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Figure 2:  Ownership structure of used agricultural land, 2003 
 
There are substantial regional variations in the distribution and significance of the 
organizational forms (Table 4). In four of the regions, the largest amount of agricul-
tural land is cultivated by agricultural cooperatives; in two of them, physical per-
sons’ holdings predominate. In the southeastern region, units registered under the 
Cooperative Law and under Trade Law cultivate the same amount of land.  
Agriculture in the southeastern and south central planning regions bears similari-
ties to the North European Model of agriculture, whereas the southwestern re-
gion and some parts of the south central region could be defined as typical of the 
South European Model. 
Table 4:  Distribution of used agricultural land by holdings in planning regions 
















Northwestern region  37 33  14  15  2 
North-central region  24 48  11  16  1 
Northeastern region  26 37  17  20  1 
Southeastern region  31 43  6  17  3 
South central region  37 41  8  12  2 
Southwestern region  58 27  4  8  3 
Bulgaria  30 40  12  16  2 
Sources: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, 2003. 
Substantial regional differences can also be seen in the average size of holdings 
in general and of those holdings which are of prime importance to those belonging 
to agricultural cooperatives and to physical persons. Table 5 shows that the ave-
rage size of holding varies more than six fold among the regions. 
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Table 5:  Average size of used agricultural land by all types of holdings, 
2003  
Regions  All types of  
holdings (ha) 




Holdings of physical 
persons (ha) 
Northwestern region  4.2  95.45  503.7  1.6 
North central region  6.1  138.63  748.7  1.5 
Northeastern region  8.2  186.36  724.6  2.1 
Southeastern region  5.8  131.82  731.9  1.8 
South central region  2.6  59.10  445.5  1.0 
Southwestern region  1.3  29.54  190.9  0.7 
Bulgaria 4.4  100.0  592.7  1.4 
Source: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, 2003. 
3  AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS’ PROBLEMS IN ADAPTING TO  
AGRICULTURAL POLICY REQUIREMENTS 
Although there are several months to go before Bulgaria’s accession to the EU 
and the overall value of direct payments, market support, and regional support 
have already been set, the majority of the agricultural producers are not yet pre-
pared to function in a market environment. Moreover, most owners of agricul-
tural holdings are still postponing their decisions regarding registration as agri-
cultural producers. This is due to the late definition of the minimum area eligible 
for direct payments, as well as the lack of opportunity for agricultural producers 
to define the amount of the single area payment before registration. 
The minimum size of holding eligible for support via single area payments is 1 ha 
for the majority of crops or 0.5 ha for vineyards, perennials, and tobacco, was 
fixed only in February, 2006. The second condition for obtaining such payments 
is that the size of the land parcels be not less than 0.1 ha. With this decision, 
Bulgaria adopted the minimum size of holding eligible for support prevailing in 
the majority of the new EU members: 1 ha; and, like Hungary, set a different 
lower limit for holdings specializing in the cultivation of labor-intensive crops. 
The lower limit can be assessed from two points of view: In terms of the criteria 
used up to the moment for agricultural producers and in terms of the data from 
the census of agricultural producers. In comparison with the criteria applied from 
1999 to 2005, those for 2006 are two times higher for mass crops and 5 times 
higher for special crops. Although official data on the agricultural producers 
have not been published, officials say most holdings are occupied by physical 
persons and are close in size to the minimum eligibility requirements. Moreover, 
in all probability some of the already-registered holdings will not meet the new 
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It must be underlined that stimuli applied by the State Agriculture Fund,   
SAPARD, and other agencies have not had enough effect on producers activity, 
and that only an insignificant number of producers have registered. Data from 
agrarian reports from recent years show that the number of registered agricul-
tural producers is increasing, but that in 2004 they totaled only 10 % of all 
holdings (Table 6).  
The low relative share of registered agricultural producers in the total number of 
holdings reflects the majority of Bulgarian farmers’ lack of experience in accoun-
tancy. Keeping accounts is a precondition for obtaining the direct area payment 
and requires Bulgarian farmers to be educated in this respect. 
Table 6:  Number of registered agricultural producers and tobacco 
growers, 2001-2005 
Year 




as percentage of all 
holdings  




growers as percentage 
of all holdings 
2001  29,059 3.8  47,784  6.2 
2002  37,836 4.9  60,076  7.8 
2003  43,930 6.6  62,789  9.4 
2004  66,772 10.0  61,917  9.3 
09.2005  64,127 9.6  65,965  9.9 
Source: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, 2004, 2005. 
Based on census data from 2003 and the lower size limits for eligibility for sub-
sidies, we can say that 49.4 % of holdings are eligible to register. This means 
that it is possible to register at the maximum another 323,000 holdings. 
At the same time, the size of the direct area payment is critical to the owners of 
small holdings in deciding whether to register. For those of them who do not 
plan to avail of other subsidies, it is extremely important that the direct area 
payment be higher than their social and health insurance payments. For 2006, 
when the minimal monthly insurance income is € 112.50
2 (220 Leva) and there 
is a preference for agricultural producers to be insured at € 56.24 or € 28.12 (for 
those active only in agriculture), this gives, respectively, figures of € 195.71 and 
€ 97.86. Assuming that a single area payment of € 47.50 per ha, the average for 
the other new EU member countries, will be made, this gives us a figure of 2 ha 
of UAA. Even more unfavorable would be the situation if we accepted a payment 
level close to Latvia’s, in which case one would need 5 ha in order to receive 
enough money to cover social and health insurance. 
The experts’ expectations are that in Bulgaria the single payment per hectare 
will be around € 75.  
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Table 7:  Minimal size of Used Agricultural Area and value of single  
payment per ha in the new EU members 
States  Minimal size of UAA 
(ha) 
Value of single  
payment per ha in Euro 
National differences in 
the size of the single  
payment in % 
Cyprus  0.3 80.8 168 
Czech Republic  1.0 57.3 120.6 
Estonia  1.0 26.8  56.6 
Hungary  1.0/0.3 70.2 147.7 
Latvia  1.0 20.7  44.8 
Lithuania  1.0 35.9  75.6 
Poland  1.0 44.5  93.6 
Slovakia  1.0 43.8  92.0 
Average    47.5 100.0 
Source: EU,  2005. 
The adaptation of the single payment per hectare creates different stimuli for the 
agricultural producers with different specializations. Expenses for growing dif-
ferent crops vary from € 150-200/ha to € 1,000-1,500/ha, which means that the 
value of the subsidy in relation to production costs will vary eightfold to tenfold. 
Even more unfavorable is the situation of agricultural producers specialized in 
animal breeding who do not produce own fodder and do not cultivate agricul-
tural land. They will not receive single payments under this scheme. 
At the same time, only relatively large producers will be able to reach the ap-
proved minimum intervention quantity (other than for hard wheat) because in 
Bulgaria this would require a holding of 20-40 ha. 
The approved milk quota and payments at 25 % of EU levels, coupled with the 
small size of Bulgarian holdings, will put them in an extremely unfavorable po-
sition. The envisaged three-year period after our accession after which it will be 
impossible to buy milk from small producers requires substantial restructuring 
of the sector towards increasing the number and significance of large holdings. 
When assessing the position of Bulgarian milk-producers, it should not be un-
derestimated that they will receive only 25 % of EU-15 levels of help for 2007 
and 30 % for 2008; only in 2016 they will receive the same amount of help. This 
means that during the whole decade 2007-2016 the situation of our farmers will 
be affected by the low size of holdings and by low levels of subsidies. 
The situation for the producers of fresh fruit and vegetables could also be seen 
as unfavorable. For the moment the European practice of offering the subsidies 
to organizations of such producers cannot be applied in Bulgaria. The contracted 
three-year period during which the subsidy will be in the form of single-area 
payments for individual producers will require great efforts from the Bulgarian 
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Although measures to encourage their establishment were introduced with SA-
PARD measure 1.5, "Establishment of groups of producers", and criteria for 
their recognition were defined in Regulation N24 of the Bulgarian Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, such organizations in practice do not exist. Mainly for 
these reasons, it has been decided to decrease the minimum requirements for mem-
bership (form 30 to 5 agricultural producers) and volume of sales (from € 150,000 
to € 100,000), but even these limits are too high for current conditions in the sec-
tor. Taking into consideration the average prices of vegetables for the last couple 
of years, this would mean that members of one group would have to achieve 
around 200-400 tons of production. 
The agreed measures for helping the development of rural regions will create 
opportunities for rural households to receive additional income. In this respect, 
the organizational restructuring will be improved by the measures entitled "market-
oriented holdings in process of restructuring", "standards of community", "food 
quality", and others. Farmers' voluntary participation in these measures will help 
them to develop their holdings and their characteristics to become more similar 
to holdings in developed EU countries. 
On the basis of the above-mentioned and other approved measures, the conclu-
sion can be drawn that Bulgarian agricultural holdings will face the competitive 
environment of EU agriculture where farm size and levels of subsidies differ 
substantially, being roughly four times higher in the EU. This means that in the 
coming years, as levels of subsidies are gradually equalized, major changes will 
occur in the distribution and significance of the various organizational forms of 
farming and in specialization. 
4 EXPECTED CHANGES IN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 
The application of single payment per ha as an instrument directed at agricul-
tural producers will be the basis of the next organizational restructuring. It will 
be directed towards: 
•  Increasing demand for agricultural land for lease and/or purchase;  
•  Expanding production in the favorable regions combined with an increase 
in the UAA; 
•  Increasing the number of agricultural holdings which produce some or 
all of their own fodder; 
•  Establishment of producers’ organizations in tobacco, vegetable, and 
fruit growing, and in other areas; 
•  Increasing the number of livestock per holding; 
•  Decreasing the overall number of agricultural holdings. Organizational restructuring of the agrarian sector in Bulgaria  131
The plans for implementation of single area payments in Bulgaria is already in-
fluencing the lease-purchase market in land there. There is an increase in the ac-
tivity of both the leaseholders and the landowners. The first are motivated by the 
opportunities for receiving higher amounts of money for land-lease payments 
and landowners are in a process of re-thinking their decisions for establishing 
their own holdings or for long-term provision of agricultural lands for lease to 
production cooperatives or agro-business companies. 
At the same time the single payment per ha will influence landowners to seek 
higher levels of lease payments. This will impose a substantial increase in the 
levels of payments for land-lease in the main productive areas due to the more 
developed land-lease market there. Probably this will cause a reduction in the 
size of some cooperatives because some of the landowners will prefer to create 
their own holdings or to offer their land to other companies. 
By the end of 2006, agricultural producers have to register with the System for 
Identification of Land Plots. This is a prerequisite for them to be able to receive 
European subsidies under the scheme for single area payments after Bulgaria 
joins the EU. Owners will be required to declare any changes in the amount of 
land under cultivation. 
As a result of the implementation of the direct payments, the size of several 
holdings will increase, particularly in the southeastern and Northeast planning 
regions. 
Changes in the characteristics of some agricultural holdings which specialize in 
livestock will be encouraged by the support based on UAA. When there is enough 
agricultural land for lease and purchase, in all probability a considerable number 
of producers will direct their efforts towards independent fodder production. 
Thus, apart from the market support for milk and other animal products, they 
will add the direct area payments for the Used Agricultural Area. This will lead 
to a decrease in the amount of land offered for "personal use" or "productive 
service", which in some regions reaches between 11 and 13 % of the UAA of 
production cooperatives. 
On the whole, a decrease in the overall number of agricultural holdings is ex-
pected. Most affected will be the so-called semi- market-oriented holdings and 
the smaller market-oriented holdings. Their continued existence will be possible 
only via some form of cooperation on a contract basis with other producers and 
processors of agricultural produce or via their participation in organizations of 
producers of fresh fruit and vegetables, tobacco, etc.  
Due to the short period of operation of the scheme for single payment per hectare, 
Bulgarian agriculture will in only a few years begin its transformation, which 
will create new conditions for income support for agricultural producers.  Julia M. Doitchinova, Ivan St. Kanchev, Albena Miteva  132
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This paper employs New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics to analyze 
Bulgarian agriculture. It evaluates the efficiency of dominant governing forms on 
the eve of EU accession, and assesses the likely impact of Common Agricultural 
Policy CAP implementation on farming structures. Firstly, assessment is made on 
the comparative efficiency, complementarily, and sustainability of major farm 
structures such as agro-firms, cooperatives, unregistered and subsistence farms. 
Next, principal modes of land, labor, service, inputs and financial supplies, in 
addition to marketing in different types of commercial farms, are identified and 
evaluated. Finally, a feasible pace for CAP implementation in the Bulgarian 
condition is projected, and the likely impact on farm structures is estimated. 
Keywords: Farm structures, efficiency, sustainability, impact of CAP, Bulgaria. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of transition, a specific governing structure has evolved and 
dominates Bulgarian farming: It consists of a huge number of subsistence and 
small farms, the widespread use of (over) integrated and cooperative modes, a 
big reliance on large scale "personal relations", the domination of "grey" 
structures, and poorly functioning formal institutions, etc. (BACHEV, 2005).  
The broadly applied "traditional approach" for assessing farm efficiency and 
sustainability focuses on productivity, financial independence, and correspon-
dence to the EU farming model (KANEVA et al., 2005). However, this "institution-
neutral" and "transaction costs-free" framework fails to explain the high 
efficiency and sustainability of dominant, low-productive subsistence and part-
time farming, over-integrated forms and production cooperatives. Moreover, it 
entirely ignores some of the typical forms of governing agrarian and rural activity 
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such as integral modes, interlinked arrangements, and the great variety of 
informal forms. Finally, it contributes little towards understanding the feasible 
pace and impact of CAP implementation in the Bulgarian condition.  
This paper employs New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics to 
analyze Bulgarian agriculture, evaluates the efficiency of dominant governing 
forms on the eve of EU accession, and assesses the likely impact of CAP 
implementation on farming structures.  
2 THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS APPROACH 
We adapt the New Institutional (Transaction Costs) Economics framework 
(FURUBOTN and RICHTER, 1998; NORTH, 1990; WILLIAMSON, 1996) to assess the 
efficiency and sustainability of governing structures in Bulgarian farming 
(BACHEV, 2004; BACHEV, 2005). Following this "new" logic, the institutional 
framework and transactions costs are considered as crucial factors that affect 
agent behavior, and organizational and contractual choice. An individual 
agrarian transaction is turned into a basic unit of analysis. Various market 
(spotlight/classical contract), special contractual (private ordering, alliances), 
internal (one person farm/firm, cooperation, partnerships), and hybrid forms, are 
all considered as alternative modes of governing transactions. Selection or 
invention of a particular arrangement for governing resources and carrying out 
activities is regarded as a (transaction) costs minimizing undertaking. 
We analyze the specific factors of transaction costs – institutional (structure of 
formal and informal rights/restrictions, and systems for their enforcement); 
behavioral (agents’ bounded rationality, tendency for opportunism, risk aversion, 
trust, experiences, preferences); dimensional (frequency of transactions between 
partners, uncertainty surrounding transactions, assets specificity/dependency, and 
appropriability); and technological (modernization of production, storage, 
transportation, communication, and enforcement technologies).  
We apply the discrete structural analysis and assess the comparative advantages 
and disadvantages of available/feasible forms in terms of capacity to: Increase 
transaction benefits; comply with and take advantage of various institutional 
restrictions/opportunities; decrease bounded rationality and uncertainty; improve 
coordination and incentives; control transactions; protect dependent investments 
and (absolute/contracted) rights from possible opportunism; resolve disputes; 
overcome risk; and save current and long-term transacting costs. 
In this paper we take a particular look at two issues. Firstly, we evaluate the effi-
ciency of the dominant forms of farm organization – agro-firms, cooperatives and 
unregistered and subsistence farms. Major modes for governing land supply, labor 
supply, service supply, inputs supply and finance supply, and marketing of farm 
products and services in different type farms are identified and assessed. Effective 
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to explore technological possibilities (economies of size/scale on specific and 
specialized capital) and maximize benefits of/economize costs on transacting.  
Next, we assess farm sustainability
1 though analyzing their potential (incentives, 
ability)  for adaptation to an evolving market, institutional, and natural 
environment. A feasible pace and extent of CAP implementation in Bulgarian 
conditions, overall development of the "rules of the game", and likely prospects 
for organizational modernization are all taken into account.  
This study is based on official and original data collected from the managers of 
2.8 % of all cooperatives, 1.2 % of agro-firms, and 0.3 % of unregistered com-
mercial farms, respectively. All farms were selected as representative of the 
main regions of the country. 
3 MODES OF FARM ORGANIZATION  
3.1  Business organizations (Agro-firms) 
According to official data, there are 665,548 farms in Bulgaria, mostly (98.4 %) 
designated as utilized agricultural area (UAA) (MFA 2004). Agro-firms are 
registered as Sole traders, Companies, or Partnerships and account for a tiny 
portion of all farms, but concentrate a significant part of total UAA (Table 1). 
These organizations govern a good part of cereals, industrial crops, orchards, 
chickens and pigs and are also a major employer of hired labor in the sector. 
Table 1:  Share of different type of farms in total number of holdings, 
major agrarian resources and productions in Bulgaria 





traders  Companies  Partner-
ships 
Number of holdings with UAA (%)  99.0 0.3 0.4  0.2  0.05 
Utilized agricultural area (%)  30.3 40.3 11.7  16.1  1.6 
Average size (ha)  1.4 592.6 118.8  352.5 126.2 
Number of breeders without UAA (%) 96.1 0.2 1.9  1.7 0.1 
Workforce (%)  95.5 1.2 0.8  1.4 0.3 
Labor input (%)  91.1 4.1 1.4  2.8 0.6 
Cereals (%)  26.6 41.8 13.0  17.3  1.3 
Industrial crops (%)  20.5 45.1 14.2  18.6  1.6 
Fresh vegetables (%)  86.4 4.4 4.2  4.6 0.4 
Orchards and vineyards (%)  52.3  29.5 2.9  10.7 4.6 
Cattle (%)  90.2 5.1 1.5  2.5 0.7 
Sheep (%)  96.0 1.4 0.8  1.0 0.8 
Pigs (%)  60.3 1.4 7.0  30.5 0.8 
Poultry (%)  56.5 0.2  13.3  29.3 0.7 
Source:  MAF, Agricultural Holdings Census in Bulgaria, 2003. 
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Agro-firms are commonly large, specialized enterprises averaging 187.6  ha, 
breeding more than 100,000 poultry or 1,000 pigs. Most of these firms were set 
up as family/partnership businesses during the first years of transition by younger 
generation entrepreneurs. Specific management skills and "social" status, and a 
combination of partnership assets (technological knowledge, business and other 
ties, available resources) led to the rapid extension of farms through an enormous 
concentration of (management, ownership) of resources, exploration of economy 
of scale/size, and modernization of enterprises (BACHEV, 2000). Institutional 
uncertainty, unsettled rights on assets, personal relations and "quasi"/entirely 
integrated modes were extensively used to overcome transaction difficulties. 
Some state companies were taken over by managers and registered as 
shareholdings. Joint ventures with non-agrarian and foreign capital started to 
appear as well. The number of agro-firms has doubled since 2000, and the share 
of UAA has been augmented; they increasingly have incorporate new types of 
activities and organizational schemes, including integration into processing, 
marketing, etc.  
Business farms are profit-oriented organizations, and farmer(s) have great 
incentives to invest in farm-specific (human, material, intangible) capital 
because they are the sole owners of residual rights (benefits) of the farm. 
Owners are family members or close partners, and internal transaction costs for 
coordination, decision-making, and motivation are not high. The organizational 
style of a firm is preferred since it provides the opportunity to overcome coalition 
difficulties (e.g. forming joint ventures with outside capital, disputed ownership 
rights through the court system); to diversify into farm related/independent 
businesses (trade, agro-tourism, processing); to develop firm-specific intangible 
capital (advertisement, brand names, public confidence) and its extension into a 
daughter company, trade (sell, licensing), and transfer through generations 
(inheriting); to overcome existing institutional restrictions (e.g. for direct foreign 
investments in farmland and engaging in trade with cereals/vine/dairy); to 
provide explicit rights for taking part in particular types of transactions (export 
licensing, privatization deals, assistance programs). 
Their large size and reputation make business farms preferable partners in inputs 
supply and marketing deals. The recurrence of transactions with "the same 
partners" is high, which restricts  information asymmetry and opportunistic 
behavior, and develops mutual trust and other mechanisms for facilitating 
(lowing costs of) relationships – planning, adjustment and payment modes, 
guarantee schemes, dispute resolution devices, etc. Besides, agro-firms have 
giant negotiating power and effective economic and political mechanisms to 
enforce contracts. They also possess great potential to collect market 
information, search for the best partners, use experts and innovation, meet 
special (collateral) requirements and bear the risk and costs of failures. In 
addition, they could explore economy of scale/scope on production and 
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interlinking inputs supply with know-how supply/crediting/marketing). They are 
also able to invest considerable relation-specific capital (information, expertise, 
reputation, lobbying, bribing) for dealing with funding institutions, agrarian 
bureaucracy, and market agents at national or even international scale.  
Under the conditions of non-working court and contract enforcement systems, 
all critical farm transactions are governed (controlled/protected) through internal 
modes. Farm-specific assets such as critical machinery, vineyards, orchards, 
animals, processing facilities, and adjoining land, are all safeguarded by 
ownership. Low cost standard (one-season, share rent) lease-in contracts are 
widely used to govern land supply from tens/hundreds of proprietors (Figure 1). 
Critical transactions are integrated through extensive labor employment (Figure 2). 
Besides, core labor (specialists, mechanists) is hired on a permanent basis and 
special forms such as output-based compensation, interlinking (housing, 
services), social disbursements, paid holidays, etc., are further used to enhance 
motivation.  
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Source:  Personal interviews with farm managers. 
Own supply (making) rather than outside procurement is typical for essential 
services and inputs (Table  2, Table  3) which prevents risk from unilateral 
dependency (opportunism of supplier) or missing market situation. In the case of 
high asset interdependency (product specificity; quality/quantity dependency) with 
a downstream partner’s reciprocal supply of inputs against, marketing is applied. 
Funding is secured through an effective combination of equity, debt, public and 
hybrid modes (Table  4). Standard activities/assets are financed by bank credit 
since it is easy to arrange a loan. Alternatively, farm-specific investments are 
financed through private modes – own sources, "personal" loans and co-invest-
ment. Also, special contract modes are used to mitigate funding difficulties  Hrabrin Bachev  138
(e.g. shortage of working capital) or to facilitate mutually-dependent relations 
with buyers/suppliers, such as delayed payments for inputs supply (zero interest, 
"loans in kind"), interlinking credit with inputs supply and marketing, leasing or 
accepting outside investment ("hostage taking", joint ownership) of long-term 
assets.  
Figure 2:  Modes of labor supply in Bulgarian farms 








Own and family labour
 
Source:  Personal interviews with farm managers.  
 
Table 2:  Governing of service supply in Bulgarian farms (% of farms) 
 Service type    Modes  Unregistered Cooperatives  Agro-firms 
Own supply  24 49  65 
Own cooperative  5  7  15 
Technological 
knowledge and 
advises  Market supplier  13  10  25 
Own supply  18 85  60  Mechanization 
services  Own cooperative  22  0  18 
 Market  supplier  15  15  28 
Own supply  40 65  60 
Own cooperative  15  7  12 
Spreading 
chemicals and 
pesticides  Market supplier  12  25  28 
Own supply  20 60  40  Veterinary 
services  Own cooperative  5  0  0 
 Market  supplier  40  40  60 
Source:  Personal interviews with farm managers.  
In recent years, new opportunities have appeared which stem from preferential 
public programs for agriculture (SAPARD, STA). Agro-firms are especially 
quite successful in developing good proposals, meeting formal requirements, 
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purchasing machinery, building orchards/vineyards/processing facilities, 
improving ecological performance, etc. As much as 64 % of the projects funded 
by the SAPARD Measure "Investments in agricultural holdings", were won by 
agro-firms (MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY BULGARIA, 2004). 
Table 3:  Governing of inputs supply in Bulgarian farms (% of farms) 
Inputs type   Supplier  Unregistered Cooperatives  Agro-firms 
Chemicals Own  production  17 0  0 
 Own  cooperative  10 5  15 
 Market  supplier  55 95  90 
  Buyer of farm output  24 13  33 
Own production  47 53  33 
Own cooperative  3 15  23 
Seeds and 
seedlings 
(crop farms)  Market supplier  50 32  45 
  Buyer of farm output  4 41  44 
Own production  55 65  50 
Own cooperative  0 0  35 




Buyer of farm output  9 6  53 
Machinery Own  production  12 13  0 
 Own  cooperative  20 17  46 
 Market  supplier  68 70  54 
  Buyer of farm output  15 0  19 
Livestock Own  production  37 50  28 
 Own  cooperative  21 31  33 
 Market  supplier  42 19  39 
  Buyer of farm output  40 17  13 
Source:  Personal interviews with farm managers.  
In marketing farm output and services, classical trade across the market 
(wholesale market; business with market agents) dominates (Table 5). Since the 
main part of a farm’s product has a standardized (commodity) character, market 
prices/competition effectively govern relations with partners. However, when 
specificity of output to a particular buyer (processor, retailer) is high 
(technology, quality, packaging, time of delivery, origin, site-specificity) then 
delivery contracts with a respective partner are employed to tailor or protect 
transactions.  
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Table 4:  Governing of finance supply in Bulgarian farms (% of farms) 
Supplier  Type of funding  Unregistered Cooperatives  Agro-firms 
Own financing  Short-term  91  81  79 
 Long-term  49  48  55 
Relatives and  Short-term  31  7  10 
friends Long-term  20 0 23 
Inputs supplier  Short-term  22  27  28 
 Long-term  31  23  34 
Outside investor  Short-term  0  11  13 
 Long-term  0  0  17 
Farm organization  Short-term  13  16  7 
 Long-term  14  4  14 
Commercial bank  Short-term  6  18  38 
 Long-term  3  11  23 
Short-term 11  56  62  Public program 
Long-term 7  19  22 
Source:  Personal interviews with farm managers.  
Table 5:  Governing of marketing in Bulgarian farms (% of farms) 
Output Modes  Unregistered  Cooperatives  Agro-firms 
Grain Own  cooperative  9  7 9 
 Another  farm/firm  50  85  75 
 Processor  25  39  37 
 Retail  6  7  16 
Vegetables Own  processing  0  0  15 
 Another  farm/firm  24  24  35 
 Wholesale  market  6  5  15 
 Processor  38  66  30 
 Retail  12  0  6 
Own processing  15  7  19  Fruits and grape 
Own cooperative  24  7  9 
 Another  farm/firm  48  39  32 
 Wholesale  market  0  22  22 
 Processor  15  36  25 
 Retail  6  0  0 
Meat Own  processing  0  10  15 
 Another  farm/firm  65  71  80 
 Processor  29  43  30 
 Retail  15  36  20 
Milk Own  processing  0  10  15 
 Another  farm/firm  42  43  40 
 Processor  51  64  45 
 Retail  19  0  15 
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Intra-firm processing and retailing is practiced by some farms. Larger 
operational size and frequency of transacting provide an economic opportunity 
for the internal exploration of interdependent assets (farming-processing-
retailing). Vertical integration helps protect dependent investments and payoffs 
from marketing processed/retail products, i.e., getting full profit (final products), 
brand name trade, lessened market dependency (easy storage/transportation), etc.  
3.2 Agricultural  cooperatives 
Cooperatives are the biggest farms in terms of land and labor management 
(Table  1). They concentrate a major part of cereals, oil and forage crops, 
orchards and vineyards, and they are key service providers for their members 
and for rural agents.  
More than 3,000 new-type production cooperatives emerged during and after the 
liquidation of old "cooperative" structures between 1992 and 1995. BACHEV 
(2000) has demonstrated that the cooperative was the single most effective form 
of organization in the absence of settled rights for main agrarian resources 
and/or inherited high interdependence of available assets (restituted farmland, 
acquired individual shares in the actives of old cooperatives, narrow 
specialization of labor). Moreover, most cooperatives developed along with 
small-scale and subsistent farming. Namely, the "not-for-profit" character and 
strong membership (rather than market) orientation attracted many households. 
As for production, the co-op was perceived as an effective (cheap, stable) form 
of supplying highly specific individual farm inputs and services (feed for 
animals; mechanization; storage, processing, and marketing of output) and food 
for households. The cooperative, rather than other formal collective (firm) 
forms, has been mostly preferred. Co-ops were initiated by older generation 
entrepreneurs and tradition has played a role. Besides, this mode allows 
individuals an easy, low cost entrance and exit, thus keeping control over a 
major resource (land), and "democratic" participation in/control over 
management. In addition, the cooperative form provides some important tax 
advantages (exemption from sale transactions with members, and received rent 
in kind) and possibilities for organizing transactions that are not legitimate for 
other modes (e.g. credit supply, marketing, and lobbying nation-wide).  
A larger operational size gives cooperatives a great opportunity for the efficient 
use of labor (teamwork, division and specialization of work), farmland 
(cultivation in big consolidated plots, effective crop rotation), and material 
assets (exploration of economy of scale/scope of large machinery). In addition, 
they have superior potential to minimize market uncertainty ("risk pooling", 
advertisement, storing, integration into processing and marketing), to organize 
critical transactions (accessing credit; negotiating positions in input 
supply/marketing; facilitating land consolidation through lease-in and lease-out 
deals; technological innovations), and to invest in intangible capital (reputation, 
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Cooperative activities are not difficult to manage since internal (members) 
demand for output/services is known and "marketing" secured. In addition,   
co-ops concentrate on a few highly standardized (mass) products with a stable 
market and profitability; all this assists financing, as advance funding of 
activities commissioned by members is commonly practiced, while producing 
universal commodities is more easily financed by public programs or 
commercial credit (Table  4). Furthermore, co-ops offer low-cost, long-term 
leasing of land (Figure 1). That is often coupled with simultaneous lease-out 
deals as a specific mode for cashing co-ops output or facilitating relations 
between landlord-private farms. The integral organization of critical "services" 
and inputs supply is broadly practiced (Table 2, Table 3). Output-based payment 
of labor is common, which restricts opportunism and minimizes internal 
transaction costs. Besides, cooperatives provide employment for members who 
otherwise would have no other job opportunities – housewives, pre- and retired 
persons. They are prefered employers since they offer higher job security, social 
payments, paid holidays, etc. Marketing risky output is governed by effective 
delivery contracts or integrated into own processing (Table 5). In a situation of 
"missing markets" in rural areas, the cooperative mode is also the single form 
for organizing certain transactions such as bakeries, retail trade, etc. Given the 
considerable transacting benefits, most of the coop members accept lower than 
market returns on their resources – lower wages, inferior or no rent for land and 
dividends for shares.  
There have been some adjustments in the size of co-ops, memberships, and 
production structure. A number of them have moved toward corporate ("new 
generation") type governance, applying profit-making goals, closed-membership 
policies and joint-ventures with other organizations. At the same time, 
cooperatives show certain disadvantages as a form for farm organization. A large 
coalition makes individual/collective management control very difficult (costly), 
thus providing the possibility of mismanagement (on-the-job consumption, 
unprofitable members’ deals). Besides, there are differences in investment 
preferences of the diverse members (old-younger; working-non-working; large-
small shareholders) due to the non-tradable character of cooperative shares 
("horizon problem"). Given the fact that most members are older, small 
shareholders, and non-permanent employees, the incentives for long-term 
investment have been very low. Finally, many co-ops fall short when adapting to 
diversified (service) needs of members and exploring potential of inter-
cooperative modes. Accordingly, co-operatives’ long-term efficiency diminishes 
considerably in relation to the market, contract and partnership modes, and 
almost 40 % of existing co-ops have gone bankrupt/ceased to exist in the last 
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3.3  Small-scale and subsistent farming 
According to various data, subsistent farms comprise 0.64-1.5  million farms, 
accounting for 15 % of farmland. More than 97 % of livestock holdings are also 
miniature "unprofessional farms" breeding 96 % of the country’s goats, 86 % of 
its sheep, 78 % of the cattle, and 60 % of its pigs (MAF, 2004). Consequently, a 
significant portion of the entire output of vegetables, fruits, vine and livestock is 
for "self consumption". According to the Agricultural Holdings Census, less 
than 39 % of unregistered farms reportedly sold products, and in more than 50 % 
of the cases, those were surplus, not to be consumed by households (MINISTRY OF 
AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY BULGARIA, 2003). Almost 1 million Bulgarians are 
involved in part-time farming, and use it as a "supplementary" income source 
(MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY BULGARIA, 2004). 
Post-communist agrarian reform has turned most households into owners of 
farmland, livestock, equipment, etc. The internal organization of available 
family resources in one’s own farm was an effective way to overcome great 
institutional, market, and economic uncertainty and insecurity, and minimize 
transaction costs (BACHEV, 2000). During transition, market/contract trade of 
household capital (land, labor) was either impossible or very expensive due to 
"missing" markets, high uncertainty, risk, asymmetry of information, 
opportunism in time of hardship, little job opportunities and security. Low 
payoff from outside trade (high inflation; non- or delayed payment of pensions, 
wages, rents) was combined with an increased share of households’ food costs. 
Therefore, internal organization was the most effective way of protecting and 
getting a return on resources and securing a stable income. The long-term 
tradition of "personal plots" and insignificant costs for acquiring specific 
knowledge (information, learning by doing experience) has made developmental 
costs for one’s own farm accessible to everybody. In addition, there has been 
great uncertainty associated with the market supply of basic foods and for many 
consumers, own production has been an effective mode of guaranteeing cheap, 
stable, safe, and high quality products. Internal organization (own farm) is also a 
preferred/secure mode for providing full- or part-time employment for family 
members. Also, for many, farming happened to be a favorable full-time or free-
time occupation. 
Unregistered farms are not a unified group and there are highly-commercialized 
small/middle-size enterprises. The latter are mainly specialized in labor-
intensive productions (vegetables, tobacco, vineyards, berries, melons, flowers, 
livestock).  
Unregistered farms are predominately individual or family holdings, and farm 
size is exclusively determined by the available household resources – farmland, 
labor and finance. Internal governing costs are insignificant because transactions 
are between family members (common goals, high confidence, and no cheating 
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organization for some activities is also practiced, which allows the partial 
exploration of economies of scale or makes part-time farming possible (e.g. group 
pasture of animals, common guarding of yields). This form is cost-effective 
since transactions are not complicated, easily controlled, and between close 
friends and relatives (here mutual trust and self-restriction of opportunism 
govern relations).  
Farmers have strong incentives to adapt to market demand and increase produc-
tivity (intensification of work, investments in human/material assets) since they 
own whole residuals (income). The extension of farms through outside supply of 
labor/services is restricted since directing, monitoring, and disputing costs are 
extremely high in labor-intensive and spatially-dispersed productions. External 
financing of farming via debt, equity sell-off, or public programs have been out 
of reach because of the high costs for preparing project proposals; meeting 
formal (paper, ownership, co-financing) requirements; arranging funding. Thus, 
the possibility of effective farm enlargement and growth in productivity through 
mechanization, application of chemicals and innovation is limited by small 
internal investment capacities (savings, profit). In general, primitive technologies 
and poor environmental and animal welfare standards prevail. As much as 40 % 
of surveyed farms report not using essential services at all. Low cost, outside 
land supply (leasing) is practiced by commercial farms to explore economies of 
scale on existing assets. The outside supply of indispensable inputs/services 
(seeds, chemicals, veterinary) is not connected with significant costs since they 
have an occasional and standardized character (low specificity, many suppliers). 
In contrast, highly-specific feed supplies for animals and mechanization services 
are effectively secured through joint ownership modes such as cooperative/group 
farming.  
"Marketing" of output is not associated with considerable costs for commodity 
and locally-demanded produces – short distance, low volume, high frequency, 
and personal character of transactions. When symmetrical capacity, quality, time 
of delivery, etc. dependency with a buyer (middlemen, processors, retailer, 
exporters) is in place. then tight marketing or an interlinked arrangement are 
applied (marketing against credit/inputs/extension supply). However, a great 
number of small farms face marketing difficulties – they are not preferable 
partners for big buyers because of their small volume and less-standardized 
character of output, as well as the impossibility (unaffordable costs) of verifying 
the quality of products though tests, certificates, etc. On the other hand, official 
wholesale markets are inaccessible due to great distances, high fees, 
requirements for volume, special preparation, certification. Besides, small farms 
frequently experience problems with meeting contractual terms (none or delayed 
payment), huge market price fluctuation, (quasi-) monopolistic situations, 
missing markets, etc. The development of effective collective organizations for 
risk sharing, price negotiation, marketing, or lobbying for public support have 
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diversified interests of individual farmers (old/young; larger or smaller size; 
specialized/diversified), and the mismanagement of emerging organizations. 
Only tobacco producers, which have significant political representation, are an 
exception. The majority of small commercial farms are vulnerable and have 
poor mechanisms to protect from outside institutional, market and natural 
disturbances. Most of them have little ability to meet institutional and market 
restrictions, bear risks, and safeguard against natural/market hazard (buying 
insurance, diversifying, or cooperating). All these result in significant income 
variation for individual farms, (sub)sectors, and different years.  
4 LIKELY IMPACT OF EU ACCESSION AND CAP IMPLEMENTATION 
Almost two-thirds of surveyed farms indicate they "intend to enlarge their farm 
in future" (91 % of firms, 59 % of unregistered farms, 46 % of cooperatives). 
According to managers, the highest transaction costs are associated with credit 
supply, marketing, and contract enforcement. Thus, problems with governing 
later transactions are major factors that restrict farm enlargement. For most 
managers, the "main factors for farm development" relate to improving the 
institutional environment – guaranteed marketing, enforcement of laws and 
private contracts, macro-economic stability, legislation framework, and access 
to free markets.  
EU accession will introduce and enforce a "new order" (regulations, quality and 
safety standards, protection against market instability, export support) which 
will eventually intensify and increase the efficiency of agrarian transactions. 
Market access will enhance competition and let local farms explore their 
comparative advantages (low costs, high quality, specific produces). Furthermore, 
EU funding, which agriculture will receive from 2007 on, will be 5.1  times 
higher than the overall level of present support for farming. Hence, CAP 
implementation would improve funding opportunities, and facilitate farm 
extension and modernization.  
The impact of implementing a "common" policy in Bulgaria would not be like 
other countries because of the specific local priorities (weights), asymmetric 
implementation and enforcement, the additional support of CAP aspects, and 
dissimilar farmers’ involvement and compliance. There will also be "practical" 
difficulties in introducing CAP in the public and private sector – information 
and technical deficiencies, lack of administrative staff experience, enormous 
initial costs (registrations, formalizing relations with landlords, preparing 
projects), widespread corruption, etc. Thus, there will be some time lag until 
"full" CAP implementation, with great regional variation that will depend on the 
pace of building effective capacity, and also training administrative staff, 
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A significant portion of Bulgarian farms will start receiving direct payments
2. 
Based on the currently low state of support, the direct payments will augment 
the level of farm efficiency (increasing/preventing reduction of income). They 
could even induce usage of abandoned lands (eco-conditionality) and provide 
new income in less-favorable regions. However, public support will unevenly 
benefit different farm types, as 3 % of farms will touch more than 85 % of the 
subsidies. Many effective small-scale operators will receive no or only a tiny 
fraction of the direct payments. Besides, livestock farms will not be eligible for 
support under that scheme. That will foster disparity in income and efficiency 
among different farms and sub-sectors. On the other hand, this mode will 
support less productive structures (small-scale, part-time, cooperative farms) and 
non-market forms (subsistence, cooperative farming). As a result, sustainability 
of these farms will increase – small-scale operations will become viable; 
cooperatives will be able to pay rent; subsistence farming will be more 
profitable. Direct payments will increase farmland price/rent, and thus enlarge 
costs for land supply in the largest farms. Small-scale operators will retain entire 
subsidies and see their income increased. Subsequently, the transformation of 
land management to the most effective forms and restructuring of farms will be 
delayed. Moreover, EU funds will be used effectively to subsidize food self-
supply of a large part of the population. 
Significant EU funds for rural development will be also available, and will 
exceed 4.7 times the current level. These funds will allow more and smaller 
farms to gain access to public support. New measures will finance essential 
activities such as commercialization/diversification of farming, organic farming, 
maintaining productivity/biodiversity on abandoned farmland, revitalizing 
mountainous agriculture, etc. That will provide new opportunities to extend 
farms though more labor, inputs/service supply, and marketing of new products/ 
services. Some cooperatives, group farms, and firms would specialize in new 
functions (environmental preservation, maintenance of farmland) and see their 
size expanded. 
The CAP will modernize farms structures through widening the variety of 
contractual and organizational innovations – specific sort of contracts, new types 
of producers associations, spreading vertically-integrated modes, etc. Special 
forms will also emerge, allowing agents to take advantage of large public 
programs that will specialize in project preparation, management, and execution; 
investing in "relations capital" or "negative" entrepreneurship; modes for 
lobbying and representation; coalitions for complying with formal criteria   
                                                 
2  Farms will get a single payment according to the amount of UAA: 69-74.20 €/ha in 2007, 
82.8-89.10 €/ha in 2008, and 96.80-104.10 €/ha in 2009. Exact figures will depend on the 
governmental decision on the minimum size of farm eligible for support (between 0.3-1 ha). 
National top-ups could be also added. Thus, 153,640 up to 668,000 farms would benefit 
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(e.g. minimum size of UAA for direct payments, membership requirements for 
producers’ organizations), etc.  
The actual system of governance (management, control, assessment) for public 
programs is not likely to change overnight. Therefore, funds will continue to 
benefit the largest structures, more abuses will take place, and CAP support will 
not contribute to diminishing divergence between farms and regions.  
Some of the terms of specific contracts for the environment and biodiversity 
preservation, respecting animal welfare, keeping tradition, etc., are very difficult/ 
expensive to enforce and dispute. In Bulgaria, the rate of compliance with these 
standards will be even lower because of the lack of readiness/awareness, 
insufficient control, ineffective court system, domination of "personal" relations 
and bribes. Correspondingly, more farms than otherwise would enroll will 
participate in such schemes (including the biggest polluters and offenders). 
Besides, costs for respecting requirements of agri-environmental programs 
(expenses/lost income) will vary considerably between farms. Keeping in mind 
the voluntary character of most CAP instruments, the biggest polluters and those 
non-compliant with quality, agronomic, biodiversity and animal welfare 
standards will simply not participate in them. Moreover, government is less 
likely to set up high performance standards because of the strong internal 
political pressure and possible outside problems with EU control (and sanctions) 
on compliance. Therefore, outcomes from the implementation of such 
instruments would be less than in other countries.  
The CAP will foster the restructuring of commercial farms according to modern 
market, technological, and institutional standards. A large part of agrarian 
inputs, technologies, and outputs will have a "mass" (standardized) character, 
and market transacting will dominate at the farm gates. There will also be a 
parallel tendency toward specialization into productions for "niche markets" and 
products with special quality (specific origins, special technologies). All that 
will require investments with higher specificity to a particular buyer(s), and 
"integrated" management of transactions in farming, processing, retailing and 
exporting. Besides, some diversification of enterprises into related activities 
(trade with origins, agro-tourism) for dealing with market risk should be 
expected. All this would bring new, special modes for private governance such 
as long-term contracts, collective agreements (codes of professional behavior), 
trilateral modes (independent third-party certification/control), "quasi" or 
complete integration.  
Farming will be increasingly characterized by the domination of larger and 
highly competitive business enterprises, which will concentrate activities in all 
sub-sectors. Large agro-firms will maintain comparative advantages in terms of 
adaptability, governance, and productivity by having greater access to EU 
markets and opportunities to benefit from public support and rural development 
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Most cooperatives will keep/extend their advantages to a large number of petite 
landowners, rural labor, and smaller farms. Besides, they will have greater 
potential to explore economies of scale/scope on institutionally-determined 
investment, adapt to formal requirements for support and use expertise/finance 
to execute projects. That will extend/intensify transactions governed by co-ops. 
EU support will also provide an opportunity to mitigate the cooperative funding 
problem. Direct payments will allow the extension of activities and offer 
attractive rent, while access to investment subsidies will modernize farms. 
Besides, some environmental and rural development projects requiring large 
collective actions would be effectively initiated, coordinated, and carried out by 
cooperatives or mixed modes.  
New institutional restrictions and competition will be connected with decreasing 
the number of small commercial farms (joint ventures, failures, non-market 
orientation). Most livestock farms will hardly meet the EU (hygiene, quality, 
veterinary, phito-sanitary, environmental, animal welfare) standards and will 
have to cease commercial activity. At the same time, restructuring a large 
portion of smaller-scale and subsistent farms will not have a positive effect. 
Changing the sustainability of these farms is mostly determined by the overall 
development of the economy, but it is less likely to have immediate progress in 
non-farm employment/income. Most subsistent farms have no intention of 
increasing their size because of other major occupations, limits of household 
demands/resources or the advanced age of farmers. Transaction costs to enlarge 
farms through the outside supply of additional land, labor, finance and 
marketing would be extremely high (no entrepreneurial capital). Vast costs for 
studying and respecting new institutional restrictions and establishing "relations" 
with agrarian bureaucracy (registrations, certifications, paper works) will also be 
restrictive. Besides, more than 40 % of farm managers are older than 65 and 
more than half of those employed are in pre-retirement or retirement age. That 
puts serious restrictions on effective farm adjustment and enlargement (low 
investment activity and entrepreneurship, limited training capacities, no 
alternative employment opportunities). For the government, it will be practically 
impossible to enforce official standards in such a huge informal sector of the 
economy. Moreover, there will be strong political pressure to relax the 
application of EU rules for non-market farm transactions (respect voters 
interests). Thus, massive (semi-)subsistence farming will continue to exist in 
years to come. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The comparative institutional and transaction costs analysis provides insights on 
the evolution, efficiency, and complementarities of farming structures in Bulgaria. 
Responding to the specific market, economic, and institutional conditions, 
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informal; market, private, hybrid; simple, complex; uni-, bi-, multilateral; 
subsistent, member-oriented, commercial, business, etc. Specific boundaries 
(size) of farms cannot be understood with technological determinants but 
necessitate analyses of governance features. Furthermore, the actual efficiency of 
a particular mode for land, labor and input supply, financing, marketing, etc., can 
be properly estimated only by taking into account the total costs for governing a 
farm and household economy. This approach requires giving up traditional 
"production costs" models,  uni-sectorality, and uni-diciplinarity; analyzing 
structure and enforcement of de-facto rights; identifying the spectrum of 
agrarian and rural transacting, and modes for their organization. It also calls for 
new types of microeconomic data and a system of direct/quasi indicators for 
costs, critical attributes, and specific modes of transaction. Finally, this approach 
lets us make more realistic assessments about the prospects of farming 
development and the likely impact of CAP implementation in Bulgarian 
conditions. Not least important is that the Bulgarian model of governance 
(market-driven, unsupported, over-integrated) could even provide insight on the 
future of European agriculture in the course of the global orientation toward 
liberalization, specification, and diversification. 
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LEADERSHIP MAY HAVE A DECISIVE INFLUENCE ON THE 
SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION OF PRODUCTION COOPERATIVES
1  





In Hungary an increasing number of cooperatives have gone bankrupt or broken 
up because of not being competitive under market conditions in the aftermath of 
radical reforms. Others, however, have been able to maintain or even improve 
on previous levels of success. Individual farmers have also established new 
cooperatives. 
The paper discusses the importance of the leadership of cooperatives during 
transition, a topic which is not well addressed in the literature. Production co-ops 
were not only economic units but also social networks. Two successful coopera-
tives, one old and one new, have been used and comparisons of their development 
and leadership structure have been made. The findings show that, in the 
traditional agricultural co-op, a more social- (member-) oriented leadership has 
helped to overcome economic, social, and psychological barriers raised during 
transition, while, in the case of the new co-op, improving cooperation has 
depended mainly on the increased level of social capital after radical reforms. 
Keywords: Social capital, transformation of coops, leadership, producing co-ops. 
1 INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Most Central East-European countries (CEECs) had a system of large-scale 
farms which had to be restructured on the road to a market system. Prior to the 
radical reforms in Hungary, agricultural co-ops had a 48-50 % share in Gross 
Agricultural Output (GAO) and another 33-35  % came from household 
production integrated with co-ops. After the end of Communism, members of  
                                                 
1  Reserach carried out under the IDARI project WP3 coordinated by Humboldt University. 
*  Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development. CORVINUS University of 
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cooperatives had to choose whether to continue farming cooperatively or to 
leave the co-op. Two major lines of cooperation will be evaluated.  
At the beginning of the 90s, not many co-ops within the agricultural sub-sector 
were broken up, but more were in the following years. 7-10 % of co-op members 
decided to leave their co-ops in the early 90s. The average size of new individual 
farmers’ holdings was 2-3  ha. Some decided to join newly-established coope-
ratives later on. 
The case study is based on research in literature and interviews. Field work was 
carried out in a traditional cooperative, BÉKE, and in a newly-established 
Purchasing and Marketing Cooperative, HAJDÚ GAZDÁK (PMCHG). 
The research gives an insight into the motivations of private farmers as well as 
those of co-op members and underlines those factors pushing private farmers to 
join cooperatives on the one hand, and, on the other, pushing members of 
traditional co-ops to maintain their membership. 
Besides the directors of PMCHG and of the BÉKE Co-op, another key person 
from PMCHG was also interviewed. In addition, based on a standardized 
questionnaire, five members of each co-op were asked to answer questions. 
Relevant documents and observations were also used to complete the case study. 
The paper is structured in the following way. In the second part, the objective of 
the case study and the hypotheses will be described. In the third section, an 
insight will be given into the establishment and performance of both co-ops. The 
fourth section deals with methodology and the analytical framework, including 
the role of leadership in cooperation. In the next section, the visual presentation 
of the actors and their interactions will be focused on. Section six discusses how 
people have tried to improve social capital under different institutional back-
grounds. Finally, findings on social capital in the two co-ops will be summarized. 
2 OBJECTIVE OF THE CASE STUDY AND HYPOTHESES 
The objective of the case study was to compare the development of a traditional 
and a new type of cooperative after radical reforms and to underline key factors 
affecting cooperation. 
2.1 Radical  reforms 
The political changes which took place in the early 90s greatly changed the 
political and economic environment of farming. The major pillars of the new 
agricultural policy were: "a) the country must have internationally competitive 
agriculture, b) subsidies should be reduced to a much lower level, and c) as in Csaba Forgács  152
the EU, the family farm must be supported in becoming the prevailing 
structure."
2  
Only in the case of land was there an opportunity to claim back in physical terms 
property owned by individuals up to 1949. Due to the four laws
3 on compen-
sation, an additional approximately 1.3-1.5 million landowners with an average of 
1.5-2.0  hectares besides the existing approximately 1  million landowners have 
appeared, resulting in fragmented land ownership (VARGA, 2000). 
2.2  New institutional framework for marketing products 
Concerning institutions, the loss of the old regime’s role in helping small 
farmers to access markets has created the following problems: a) local markets 
existed and accepted limited supply; but b) the earlier General Consumer and 
Marketing Cooperatives (GCMCs), which functioned well, mostly disappeared; 
c) a number of inexperienced new middlemen appeared and started business in 
the vertical chains; d) producers’ co-ops no longer felt an ethical responsibility 
for the marketing of products from small individual farmers; e) former 
procurement and processing companies were no longer obliged to purchase 
agricultural products; f) social capital was destroyed before the building up of a 
new competitive distribution system; and g) to establish a new system starting 
from the bottom up needed more time and resources. 
There have been several new institutions dealing with establishing a new 
environment for coordinating market performance under the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development, including: a) Office of Agricultural Market 
Regime, b) Center for Agricultural Intervention, later named Office of Agri-
culture and Rural Development (paying institution), c) Product Councils (PCs) 
established by producers, processors, traders and consumers of selected products 
or groups of products, d) Producers’ Organizations (POs). 
In addition, some other institutions have also represented the interests of 
agricultural producers, e.g. the Agricultural Chamber, the National Federation of 
Agricultural Producers and Co-operators (NFAPC), and the National Federation 
of Farmers (NFF). 
                                                 
2  Ministry of Agriculture (1992): New Agricultural Policy, Manuscript. 
3  The Parliament passed a law on partial restitution (XXV
th Law (1991) covering all kinds of 
assets destroyed, partially destroyed, or taken over by the state. This law was followed by 
four others (XXIV
th Law of 1992, XXXII
nd Law of 1992, II
nd Law of 1994 and XXXIII
rd 
Law of 1997) all dealing with compensation. People whose ownership was damaged by the 
laws released after May 1, 1939 and listed in the annex and ownership damaged by the 
laws released after June 8
th, 1948 and listed in the annex of the law (XXV
th Law (1991) 
had to be compensated. The amount of the compensation was determined on a regressive 
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2.3  Transformation of production co-ops 
In 1992 a law was passed dealing with how cooperatives could be transformed 
to meet new requirements and allowing members to leave their cooperative. In 
transformed co-ops three major groups of landowners have appeared: First, 
people who are really engaged in agricultural production. Second, retired people 
who are still co-op members. Third, "outsiders" new landowners not interested 
in private farming. Besides the land itself, means of production (machines, other 
tools, etc.) have also had to be distributed among landowners in the form of co-op 
shares and business shares. An increasing number of business shares are in the 
hands of pensioners, resulting in conflicts of interest. Success in restructuring 
agricultural co-ops has very much depended on the expertise of leaders on the 
one hand and members’ trust in leaders and institutions on the other. 
2.4 Research  hypotheses 
The following research hypotheses were formulated and tested:  
Hypothesis 1: Where trust in formal institutions is low, high transaction costs 
are experienced in dealing with the State and actors will rely 
on informal institutions to solve their problems of collective 
action.  
Hypothesis 2: The more frequent and complete the communication between 
agents, the greater the cooperation.  
Hypothesis 3: Reducing transaction costs generates changes in governance  
structure. 
Hypotheses 4: Prior to reforms, social capital in CEE countries was low. 
Hypotheses 5: Although the market is based on competitive forces, a network  
of cooperation is nevertheless required for its sustenance. 
3 UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
In this section, the historical development of two cooperatives will be discussed. 
It will be shown how social capital, after the destruction of the old distribution 
system, has been able to contribute to improving or maintaining cooperation. 
3.1  A brief history of and the challenges facing the BÉKE Co-op,  
Hajdúböszörmény 
The BÉKE Co-op was founded on June 27, 1955, by the poorest peasants in the 
town. The founders had a total of 73 ha of agricultural land. Both the number of 
co-op members and the area under cultivation were increased significantly in 
1960 (MÓNUS, 1999). Specialists came and worked for the co-op and huge 
investments were made over the years. Since 1967, farms have been interested 
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governance of the BÉKE Co-op was changed in 1978. In the following years, 
the co-op won the "Cooperative of Excellence" award several times. 
During the transition to a market system, many agricultural cooperatives broke 
up and disappeared. In the BÉKE Cooperative, the president was replaced by a 
new one in 1990 after 27 years of service. The new leadership decided to go on 
the offensive and distributed part of the land and assets among members and 
employees as permitted by law. At the same time, the president held face-to-face 
negotiations with all members. Finally, 64 out of 960 members (some 7  %, 
below the national average) left the cooperative. 
Over the years, BÉKE has carried out a total 100 % leverage buy-out of the 
Zelemér agricultural co-op. In addition, a turkey plant has been bought and two 
more beef and one pig production units have also come into BÉKE ownership. 
Finally, the co-op merged with the Agro-Balmaz Agricultural Coop in 2000. 
Nearly 600 people work for the co-op in 26 different units running business 
cooperation with more than 100 entrepreneurs and cultivating a land area of 
7,000 ha owned by 4,000 landowners. 
Although the co-op has faced real challenges over the years, it has still managed 
to achieve significant economic growth and results. The cooperative has 
followed an expansive development policy by making new investments to 
become more stable but these have not always been tested by market needs and 
have required more and more loans.  
Some 50  % of business shares in the cooperative were bought by the 
government in the late 90s, which, under a new law on cooperatives passed in 
December, 2005, will be given back to cooperatives but can be used only under 
conditions of joint ownership. 
3.2  The establishment and development of the Hajdú Gazdák Purchasing  
and Marketing Cooperative (PMCHG) 
The Hajdú Gazdák Agricultural Association was established at the beginning of 
the twentieth century but was suspended under the Communist regime. After 
1990, individual farmers wanted to bring this association back into operation. 
First, the Farmers’ Club was established in 1993 with the objective of 
"representing the interests of the members, improving the skills of producers, 
increasing both the output and the quality of production…." (MÓNUS, 1999).
 The 
Farmers’ Club was succeeded by the HAJDÚ Purchasing and Marketing 
Cooperative (PMCH) in July, 1996, focusing on gathering and spreading 
information, joint purchasing of inputs, and marketing of products. In 1999 
PMCH decided to establish a new producers’ organization (PO) called the 
"HAJDÚ GAZDÁK Purchasing and Marketing Cooperative" (PMCHG) to 
access additional government support. Justification for such an action was 
underlined by MURRAY (2004), saying "Cooperation between people requires 
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visible action on a collective level for a predetermined goal or social dilemma."
 
Shortly after the establishment of PMCHG, the new and old cooperative, with the 
same members, merged under the name PMC HAJDÚ GAZDÁK (PMCHG). 
The cooperative is managed by the Board of Directors consisting of five 
members, supervised by a board of three members. The Members’ Council 
meeting is the top-level decision-making body, with one member one vote. 
Payment for departing members is based on an equity ratio, and new members 
have to pay the same amount that departing members take out. 
4 METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
More recently, social capital has been focused on by researchers pointing out 
that it is one of the key elements of economic growth measured by the level of 
trust. However, the level of "social capital depends on a person’s connections 
(whom they know, but also connections through common group membership), 
the strength of these connections and resources to their connections." (MURRAY 
and BECKMANN, 2004). The latter demands that the issue of social capital and its 
strength be discussed and evaluated in the given socio-economic context. The 
IDARI Project WP3 dealt with social capital, governance, and institutional 
innovations by analyzing processes of achieving cooperation and by seeking to 
understand the failure of cooperative strategies.
 To understand the concept of 
trust, communication and social learning are focused on in case studies.
 
MURRAY  (2004) underlined that the extent of networks of relationship is 
determined by the prevailing social norms of the group, the necessity for 
interaction, and individuals’ motivations for interacting.
  
4.1  Social capital under the socialist system  
CHLOUPKOVA et al. (2003) have made a comparison of social capital development 
in cooperatives in Denmark and Poland and concluded that, although levels were 
similar before World War II, the level of social capital was now higher in 
Denmark than in Poland, suggesting that under the Communist regime social 
capital was destroyed in Poland. However, one has to be careful in making 
general statements on the social capital situation in former socialist countries. 
First, socialist countries had strong national characteristics. Second, in contrast 
to other former Communist countries, in Poland small farms dominated 
agriculture under the socialist system. Third, small farmers in Poland have 
accumulated sufficient experience concerning their trust towards each other and 
market players as well as towards government.  
In Hungary private farming had a marginal role in GAO after collectivization 
(1961), but small-scale (household) farming was an important source of income 
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increased. Vertical cooperation between producers, buyers, manufacturers and 
traders was deepened and transaction costs decreased. 
4.2  The decline of social capital after radical reforms 
Agrarian reform in CEECs has been seen from such different points of view as 
political economy, property rights theory, transaction cost economics, etc. 
VALENTINOV (2004) points out that in all these approaches social capital has 
played a decisive role concerning the outcomes of reform. Each approach was 
shown to reveal some specific aspects of the social capital concept which led to 
additional findings.
 It is a fact that social capital substantially declined in CEECs 
following radical reforms. What was the reason(s) for this? 
First, land ownership has been changed substantially with different attitudes 
among new landowners to farming and a low level of social capital in the case 
of new landowners. Second, for a time people have not been sure to what 
extent the new agricultural policy will be changed. Third, the level of social 
capital and the cohesion among cooperative members prior to political change 
were in many cases high. Trust in leadership has become a decisive factor in the 
case of many cooperatives in Hungary. Fourth, social capital, social norms, and 
levels of trust were affected very much by radical reforms. Fifth, the economic 
environment has not been transparent for years, more people and businesses 
have broken rules and the value of norms has declined.  
4.3  The leadership issue 
After the introduction of the new agricultural policy in 1990, it was a real 
challenge for co-ops to adjust. The question of how high was the level of 
people’s trust in the cooperative as such and in its leaders became a decisive 
factor. In Hungary only 127 out of 1,441 cooperatives were not able to meet new 
legal requirements by the deadline and disappeared. Some 10  % of members 
decided to leave their cooperatives. The rest decided to continue their membership. 
The vast majority of members did not think of leaving the cooperative and farming 
on their own. This was evidence that people’s trust in cooperative leaders and in 
the cooperative as an organization was, in general, high. 
What were the main reasons that certain cooperatives have been able to survive 
and how have they done it? It has turned out that leadership and the members’ 
trust in leaders played key role in adjustment. MURRAY (2004)
 emphasizes that 
leaders and leadership may have a decisive role in improving and maintaining a 
high level of social capital. Relationships between leaders and members cannot 
be explained by economic arguments only. Working together and helping each 
other for years only to cease all these forms of mutual support would have 
demanded changes in human behavior which could not be accepted by the 
leaders of many cooperatives. Findings from both the experimental study and 
the cross-sectional survey by CREMER and KNIPPENBERG (2005) showed that 
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that perceptions of trust in the leader and feelings of collective identification 
mediated the effects of this self-sacrifice.
 Focusing on different group aspects of 
leadership in social dilemmas, VUGHT (2002) concluded that the effectiveness of 
leaders’ solutions to social dilemmas depends upon the correspondence between 
leader’s characteristics and members’ expectations.
  
5 VISUAL PRESENTATION OF ACTORS AND THEIR INTERACTIONS 
This section deals with actors from both case studies at the beginning of 
transition. he width of arrows in Figures 1 and 2 reflect the weight of a given link.  
5.1  The BÉKE Cooperative – A traditional production cooperative 
The laws on compensation, on (new) cooperatives, and on the transformation of 
traditional agricultural cooperatives have created a new legal environment. By 
law, cooperatives’ equity, such as animals, machines, buildings, etc., had to be 
distributed among their members. 
In 1990, a new president (director) was elected. There was a high level of trust 
between the former and the new president and between them and most of the 
members. So the internal factors of social capital were at a high level and 
cooperative members did not want to break up the cooperative community that 
they had built up together over the years. Others mainly focused on the possible 
advantages of individual farming and somehow neglected the disadvantages. 
Relations and interactions between actors in the BÉKE Cooperative before the 
decision on transformation of the cooperative can be seen in Figure 1. Finally, 
only 7-8 % of members left. 
5.2  The HAJDÚ GAZDÁK Purchasing and Marketing Cooperative  
(PMCHG) 
Government policy in the early nineties encouraged family farming. Those who 
left cooperatives were sure they would be more successful as individual farmers. 
For them, some individual farmers in the region were successful pioneers. Their 
level of social capital was not high in relation to co-ops and co-op leaders. Csaba Forgács  158
Figure 1:  Actors and their interactions in the BÉKE Cooperative before 
the decisions on future development. 
 
 
As a first step towards cooperation, individuals established the Farmers’ Club in 
1993. Key players had strong influence in setting conditions for the further 
development of cooperation. The leader of PMCHG took only necessary 
administrative jobs but did not have such strong influence on governance as the 
BÉKE president did. Social capital among members was above average. 
Internally, part of this was connected with the founders having sufficient 
experience in family farming and former cooperative members being well 
informed about agricultural policy issues. Concerning external factors, people 
trusted very much in the new government and also in the institutional 
environment.  
Linkages and interactions between different actors can be seen in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2:  Actors and the interactions between individual farmers before 




5.3  A brief comparison between the BÉKE Cooperative and the Farmers’  
Club 
At the beginning of the nineties, social capital in general was somewhat stronger 
among BÉKE members than in the Farmers’ Club, due to their history of 
successful collective achievements. However, in some areas the picture was the 
opposite. The previous president of the BÉKE Cooperative had enjoyed a high 
level of trust among members. The atmosphere between leaders and members 
had been sufficiently good, and the legal environment had been transparent and 
stable. The level of trust in leaders remained high after the election of the new 
president in 1990. However, after radical reforms, trust in state institutions, in 
the legal environment, and in agricultural policy declined as the government 
favored family farms over cooperatives. 
The Farmers’ Club focused only on sharing information in the early stages of 
cooperation. Later on members raised the need to make joint purchasing inputs 
to reduce transaction costs and, later again, the need for joint marketing. At the 
end of the nineties the need for joint investment was raised and agreed on. 
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6 DETERMINANTS, EFFECTS, AND PROCESSES OF COOPERATION 
AND RURAL INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION 
In this section, a parallel evaluation of interviews, five interviews from each co-op 
and those with the two managing directors will be analyzed. 
6.1  The role of trust/mistrust and opportunism 
Social capital, trust, and cooperation involve people always looking at the possi-
bility of working together in a smaller or larger community in order to benefit from 
such cooperation. 
Eight out of ten interviewees said they were not formal members of any local or 
regional group or association. One person from BÉKE was a member of the 
regional federation of cooperatives and one worked for local government. 
Members of PMCHG emphasized explicitly the economic advantages of joining 
in decreasing transaction costs. "From an economic viewpoint, social capital 
recognizes value in social relationships, which can have market benefits, and as 
such should be considered akin to physical capital" (GLAESER et al., 2002, after 
MURRAY, 2004).
 The duration of personal relationships was an important factor 
but it was less significant than in the case of the BÉKE Cooperative. Among the 
benefits of trust members emphasized the following: That people were helpful, 
that trust is the basis of common interests, that mutual trust is the greatest 
treasure, and that the benefits depend on the people themselves. Members of 
PMCHG said: Solving problems raised by the group should be mainly managed 
by the cooperative rather than by national or local government agencies. 
Members of the BÉKE Cooperative found it important to mention that their 
parents were also members and that three of them had already been employees 
of the cooperative. For two of the respondents the town and the neighborhood 
meant their community, one defined the family and working colleagues as such, 
and one emphasized the importance of the whole county. Most of them had 
joined the cooperative many years previously. According to them, cooperation 
and integration had brought advantages to members. Others who joined later had 
been attracted by the cooperative’s reputation. Although they were more 
cautious or more critical about trust BÉKE members displayed a higher level of 
trust in EU institutions and in both national and local government officials. They 
also found mutual trust advantageous but stronger emphasis was given to more 
efficient work and a good working atmosphere. BÉKE members were more 
cautious, admitting that conflicts could come up everywhere, although it is not 
typical in the co-op. Economic problems should be solved by the national 
government, but the co-op must also do its best to solve problems. Members 
were more informed on historical aspects of farming and had information based 
on deeper analysis of economic issues in comparison with PMCHG members. Leadership may have a decisive influence on the successful transition  161
The reasons given for joining the cooperative were rather different in the two 
cases. In both co-ops, interviewees underlined the importance of the duration of 
personal relationships among members. Discussing trust in more general terms, 
members of PCMHG had higher levels of trust with business partners even 
without any documentation. Their levels of trust had changed based on their 
own experience gained over the years. BÉKE members were more pessimistic as 
a result of negative experience after 1990. 
Members in both co-ops regarded trust and reciprocity as important element of 
social capital. However, their approach to the issue reflects different standpoints.  
Trust towards formal institutions differed in the two co-ops. Members of PMCHG 
had low levels of trust in current government officials and EU institutions. In 
contrast, BÉKE members had more trust in national government their trust in 
EU institutions was also above average. However, where trust levels in state 
institutions were low, to reduce transaction costs people looked for informal 
institutions to solve their problems. Hypothesis 1 was justified. 
6.2  The role of communication and learning 
People in communities always change their views on different issues based on 
information gained through different communication channels. How intensively 
these channels are used affects the level of social capital. 
Concerning government and EU issues, local markets and shops, government 
agencies, political parties, and internet communication channels are not used at 
all in either group. 
Members of PMCHG tried to find more channels to gain information and used 
them more frequently, while BÉKE members mostly relied on national media 
but less on local community leaders. Information from cooperative leaders was 
backed up by obtaining and analyzing information from various governmental 
and other sources of information. 
Collecting information on community issues was done rather differently in both 
groups. The frequency with which information was gathered was significantly 
lower in BÉKE. All PCMHG members got information mainly from community 
leaders as well as from community and local newspapers.  
The extent to which people were satisfied with the information they had was a 
key point. Based on the Ostrom approach (after MURRAY, 2004) that during the 
communication process social capital is enhanced or eroded through the 
establishment of trust, reputation and reciprocity, we can see a positive outcome 
in both co-ops as the general picture was excellent. PMCHG members found 
decisions on investments to be a weak point in communication. Blockage or 
withholding of information within the cooperative was not indicated as a serious 
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The high level of satisfaction with the supply of necessary information was 
supported by the fact that in both cooperatives there was a continuous discussion 
among members on important business issues. The dialogue is quite intensive 
and new information is shared as soon as possible. PMCHG members were 
more optimistic concerning members’ capacity for problem-solving. 
As regards external contacts with relevant people from similar organizations, 
members in both cooperatives thought that such tasks were mostly the job of 
leaders. It is true that external relationships are not very strong in either case. 
People emphasized that, whether working for the cooperative for a shorter or a 
longer period, one always gains something from it. The members of the younger 
cooperative put a high value on joint efforts and collective action while 
members of BÉKE indicated the value of being well informed. 
All ten interviewees said they were satisfied with the information they had been 
provided. When not, then additional efforts made had proved sufficient to 
acquire the missing information.  
In both cases, people have used different channels at different intensities to 
obtain sufficient information. Communication has not been used as a source of 
power by central actors, but as a bridge through which more help could be 
given to members. Hypothesis 2 was justified. 
6.3  Transaction costs and governance structure 
PMCHG members regarded as most important the incentives (economy, 
environmental protection) which most affected transaction costs and, to reduce 
transaction costs, they were willing to cooperate and open to extending 
cooperation with non-members. To reduce transaction costs, BÉKE members 
appreciated very much the historical background of relationships and education. 
Most of the interviewees had not calculated any costs of attending internal 
meeting but more of them calculated costs related to attending external 
meetings. 
Membership was seen as a benefit, especially in the PMCHG Cooperative. The 
benefits they indicated included market access, the reduction of input costs, joint 
use of machinery, and getting farm gate prices based on quality. In the case of 
BÉKE, people listed those benefits which they had had for years but were at risk 
of losing. 
To improve efficiency and enhance cooperation, BÉKE changed its governance 
structure in the late seventies. 
PMCHG changed its governance structure in 1996 as well as in 1999 in order to 
reduce transaction costs or to become eligible for additional resources and to 
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It was shown that cooperatives, in order to reduce transaction costs, have decided 
to change governance structure and have adjusted to new economic conditions 
and market situations. Hypothesis 3 was justified.  
6.4  The role of the state and formal institutional environment in  
cooperation 
Members of both cooperatives agreed that cooperatives had been efficient and in 
good economic shape in socialist times. Besides the coming into force of a new 
economic mechanism in 1967, there were two more factors which improved 
cooperation.  
First, cooperatives were allowed to engage in so-called non-agricultural activities 
(construction work, producing spare parts, etc.) which produced more profits 
than animal husbandry or crop production. Taking advantage of subsidization 
policy, they developed the infrastructure on the farms, bought the latest 
technology and new machines, produced more profits, and paid more to members 
and employees. Second, cooperatives could do the latter because farm gate 
prices were gradually increased to approaching market prices. Agriculture 
achieved a high growth rate in the first half of the seventies and a still 
reasonable level in the second half of the decade, but growth slowed down 
thereafter. An experiment showed that if cooperatives got more freedom they 
would be able to increase efficiency and to generate more profits.  
People’s attitude towards cooperation has changed significantly since the 
introduction of radical reforms. Mainstream views have become more negative, 
making people more reserved and less likely to engage in cooperative activity. 
Compensation on land was not well prepared and managed. The level of trust 
among people has declined and members were cautious when asked about 
additional steps in cooperation.  
The majority of responses made clear that trust towards central and local 
government has deteriorated. This decline was more pronounced among 
PMCHG members and only one person out of ten responded that trust in 
government had increased since the beginning of the transition. It was also 
mentioned that the declining level of trust was due to the ruling government.  
Members of the BÉKE Cooperative have been mostly unsatisfied with the 
performance of the state while PMCHG members were more positive. In 
general, people were disappointed with the agricultural policy preparations for 
EU membership.  
After the introduction of a new economic mechanism in agriculture in 1967, 
social capital started to increase and developed as the economic environment 
became a mixture of a centrally planned and a market economy. Social capital 
was not low in Hungary during the seventies and eighties. Hypotheses 4 was 
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6.5  The role of communities, social networks and informal institutions 
The motivation of helping the community has been strong in both cooperatives, 
even if only other members of the local community could benefit from it. The 
general attitude of cooperative members has been highly community-oriented. 
People feel motivated to help if this involved only giving their time. If, in 
addition, money was required for community development, fewer people were 
ready to contribute. All PMCHG members interviewed were willing to sacrifice 
more and would be willing even to pay money as well. Members of the BÉKE 
Cooperative were also in favor of improving cooperation but they expected to 
get direct benefits if a financial contribution were required. 
The majority of PMCHG members mentioned that conflicts should be openly 
discussed. For major issues the cooperative’s by-laws must be used. BÉKE 
members said that both formalized and informal mechanisms could be used to 
find solutions. On recognizing a problem, people in both cooperatives would take 
action to clarify it with the initiator (BÉKE) or to address it to the cooperative 
leader or have a meeting for the entire group (PMCHG).  
People in PMCHG did not perceive a clique to exist in the group. In the case of 
BÉKE, two members mentioned that such cliques existed.  
Cooperation is affected by several factors. All investigated factors (8) were 
found very important or somewhat important in both cooperatives, but on 
average stronger support was given by members of the BÉKE Cooperative. All 
nine members who responded underlined the factor of keeping well informed, 
and having sufficient information to make decisions was the number one factor. 
Besides that, a high level of trust and market-driven incentives for cooperation 
were also mentioned.  
It can be emphasized that informal institutions were not seen as a necessary 
determinant for achieving cooperation. People could efficiently make use of 
formal institutions and only very seldom tried to find solutions by informal 
means.  
6.6  The role of the market and competition in fostering/hindering  
cooperation 
Members of PMCHG took a practical approach, saying that agriculture is 
sustainable until it is profitable. Most interviewees from the BÉKE Cooperative 
also thought agriculture could not be sustainable because of not profitable. 
Sustainability much depends on subsidies available for the sector, they said. 
Concerning environment-friendly agriculture, people found different areas worth 
underlining, but organic farming was the leading one.  
The competitiveness of the cooperative was evaluated at different levels. In the 
case of PMCHG, one member found the cooperative competitive, two thought 
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from the BÉKE Cooperative used the argument that, as the cooperative had been 
operating for 50 years, it should be competitive. It was also added that, nowadays, 
neither the cooperative’s foreign nor its domestic market could be regarded as 
stable. Tourism was not seen as an activity which might be a solution to regional 
or local problems.  
Hypotheses 5 was justified as people found market forces important and 
under-lined the need for cooperation to become competitive and to meet market 
requirements.  
7 CONCLUSIONS 
People in both cooperatives have had different experiences since the end of the 
socialist era and have followed different paths of development since the intro-
duction of radical reforms. 
Members of the PMCHG Cooperative started to increase cooperation with the 
benefit of experience gained from individual farming and justified by reducing 
transaction costs. Members of the BÉKE Co-op achieved successful 
development from the mid-sixties to the late eighties; they strongly believed in 
cooperation and had a high level of trust in their leader going back many years.  
In the case of both co-ops, it turned out that a high level of trust is an effective 
way of reducing transaction costs, even where this level of trust is based only on 
one’s own or on one’s parents’ experience. The latter has been proved a stronger 
factor for members of the BÉKE Co-op and indicates that co-op members had 
high levels of social capital under the socialist system.  
The role of leadership was partly different in the two cooperatives. In the BÉKE 
Co-op, the major goal of leaders was to avoid breaking up the cooperative 
community, while at PMCHG the main job for key persons was to persuade 
individual farmers to start and deepen cooperation in order to build up a new 
cooperative community. Trusts in leaders of both co-ops indicated that 
leadership plays an important role in cooperatives.  
Based on different experiences from history, trust towards formal institutions 
differs in the two co-ops. It was justified that the level of communication affects 
the level of cooperation. The latter has not been handicapped by a shortage of 
information in either co-op and communication has not been used as a source of 
power by central actors in either co-op. In order to reduce transaction costs, 
changes in governance structures took place in both co-ops.  
People could find their own way of solving problems relying on formal 
institutions. However, if the latter did not work, they used informal institutions. 
For members of the PMCHG Cooperative, informal methods played a more 
important role at the very beginning of cooperation.  Csaba Forgács  166
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The paper investigates empirically the relationship between contractual 
arrangement and its enforcement in Chinese agriculture. An analysis of surveys 
of 116 agribusiness firms in Zhejiang province of China indicates that the 
contract arrangements such as contract format, floor pricing, and specific 
investments required for smallholders in facilitating self-enforcement can have a 
significant effect on enforcement in a business environment characterized by the 
absence of effective public enforcement institutions. 
Keywords: Contract enforcement, transition agriculture, China. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The enforcement of contract has long been recognized as an important pre-
condition for efficient exchange and investment in economic activities in general 
and agri-food business in specific. Contracts can be enforced through a variety 
of mechanisms, either public, private or a combination of both. In many 
developing and transitional countries public institutions such as legal system 
are either absent or ineffective at ensuring contract enforcement. Under such 
conditions, private enforcement mechanisms may provide a suitable replacement 
for public enforcement institutions (GREIF and KANDEL, 1995; HAY and SHLEIFER, 
1998; MCMILLAN, 1997; GOW et al., 2000, 2001; BECKMANN and BOGER, 2004; 
TAO and ZHU, 2001).  
Transitional economies typically do not have an effective legal system for 
contract enforcement. Given weak enforcement, one should expect that 
transacting parties would not rely heavily on formal contracts, and if they do 
sign formal contracts, they do not rely on third parties for enforcement. China is 
no exception. As an American lawyer observed, "contracts in China have more  
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of a sense of moral obligation than absolute rights. There is no concept that they 
are binding" (MCMILLAN, 1997). 
In fact, the formal contract law of the People’s Republic of China did not come 
into being until July 1, 1982, almost 4 years after the start of the economic 
reform in 1978, and quickly became outdated. It was written at a time when 
China was basically a planned economy, and one major objective of the law was 
to "ensure the implementation of the states’ plans" (Article 1). Therefore, many 
of the articles in the law did not fit with the reality which was increasingly 
moving toward a market economy. It was not until 1993 that the National 
People’s Congress passed a revision of the old Contract Law. Of 57 articles in 
the original law, 10 were retracted and 25 were revised. However, the revised 
contract law still could not keep pace with the ever-changing economic reality. 
There were also many other laws governing contracts. Numerous fragmented, 
incomplete, and sometimes conflicting laws hampered enforcement. In 1998, a 
unified, comprehensive draft contract law with more than 400 articles was put 
before the Congress’ legal affairs committee for review (XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, 
August 24, 1998); and it was eventually passed in March 1999 taking effect in 
October that year. The more serious problem with China’s legal system, however, 
is not the lack of good laws but the lack of enforcement of the laws. 
Administrative interventions, corruption, incompetence, shortages of professional, 
and poor incentives have all hampered enforcement (TAO and ZHU, 2001). 
Despite the weakness of its legal system, contract farming has been able to 
sustain an impressive growth for the past fifteen years. In the process of 
agricultural industrialization in China since 1990, contract farming has been 
supported by the Chinese government for the sake of making agricultural 
production more profitable and competitive. According to a survey of national 
agricultural industrialization development by the Ministry of Agriculture in 2001, 
the number of agribusiness firms involved in contract farming had almost 
quadrupled between 1996 to 2000, and the number of smallholders who signed 
contract with firms increased twofold over the same period (NIU, 2002). In a survey 
of 116 agribusiness firms conducted in the Zhejiang province of China in 2004, 
100 firms were involved in contract farming. Experience with contract farming 
varies from firm to firm. Out of total 65 firms which have engaged in 
contracting for more than 3 years, 31 firms are between 1 and 3 years and only 4 
firms have less than 1 year experience. Among 100 agribusiness firms involved 
in contract farming, over 75 % signed smallholders can enforce their contracts 
well. Most of the contracts with smallholders had not been breached. According 
to the survey, only 7 % of 100 agribusiness firms involved in contract farming 
believed they could enforce the contracts through the courts when the 
smallholders breach contracts. The investigation shows that the courts play a 
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Effective, formal contract enforcement mechanisms are often regarded as 
necessary to prevent opportunistic behaviour in most arms-length market 
transactions. Chinas’ recent contract farming development in the absence of 
effective formal contract enforcement mechanisms, however, appears to 
contradict well-accepted doctrine (CHOW, 1997). This paper attempts to explain 
why most of the contracts with the smallholders were not breached under the 
condition of inefficiencies in the legal system. This papers’ main objective is to 
identify the relationship between contract arrangement and enforcement. What 
kinds of contract arrangement reduce the likelihood of contract breach?  
The paper is organized as follows: The literature with regards to the relationship 
is reviewed in Section  2. In the section  3, we develop a simple contract 
enforcement game model to make theoretical hypotheses about the relationship 
between contract arrangements and its enforcement. In the section  4, we 
examine the data by means of regression analysis and discuss the results in 
relation to theoretical propositions. And finally, we draw some conclusions. 
2 CONTRACT ARRANGEMENTENT AND ENFORCEMENT: A REVIEW 
Contract arrangement is a multi-criterion decision problem. BOGETOFT  and 
OLESEN (2002) identify three main objectives. First, a contract aims to ensure 
that the right products are produced at the right time and place. Second, a 
contract is to ensure that the parties have individual incentives to make 
coordinated decisions. Third, a contract is to ensure that coordination and 
motivation are provided at the lowest possible cost. There are many specific 
means and instruments in the contract arrangement to realize these objectives.  
In practice, contracts vary significantly in terms of type, form and specifications. 
For example, a contract can be informal (i.e., oral) or formal (i.e., written). With 
informal contracts the agreed norms of coordination can take the form of 
implicit conventions established by repeated interaction. Even formal contract 
are naturally incomplete as agents find it difficult and expensive to foresee all 
possible contingencies and to enforce these contracts, especially when outcomes 
are unobservable or non-verifiable by a third party (HART, 1995). Contractual 
incompleteness often results in parties exposing themselves to ex post costs and 
hazards related to the sunken investments in relationship-specific assets, that is 
the occurrence of delay; If "hold-up" in an industry term then use it, otherwise it 
sounds quite colloquial. "A hold-up" can also mean a robbery. Consider 
revising. 
Economic literature on contract enforcement shows two mechanisms to reduce 
the likelihood of a hold-up including public (legal) enforcement and private 
enforcement (self-enforcement). The public enforcement assumes that 
agreements and contracts can be best, and cheaply enforced within the legal 
system. The self-enforcement implicitly or explicitly assumes that contracts Hongdong Guo  172 
between two parties can be enforced by private sanctions not by courts   
(e.g. TELSER, 1980; KLEIN and LEFFLER, 1981; KLEIN, 1996). Private sanctions 
include both the losses that result from termination or non-renewal of the 
contract or relationships and the damage of the reputation in business or social 
networks (ELLICCKSON, 1991, 1994). In particular, WILLIAMSON (1979, 1985, 
1991, 1996) emphasized that specific investments, which create valuable relation-
ships, make both court ordering and self-enforcement very costly and give way 
to different ways of private ordering.  
Traditional contract theory usually considers court enforcement and private 
enforcement as alternatives. KLEIN (1996) emphasizes fundamental complemen-
tarities between court enforcement and private enforcement. In fact, empirical 
evidence shows that legal enforcement is often possible, but prohibitively costly. 
Especially in many transitional countries the legal and judicial system are in 
their embryonic stages of development, hence court decisions are highly 
uncertain and non-transparent. It is sometimes not viable to use legal dispute 
mechanisms due to combination of litigation costs, ineffective contract law, poor 
third party verifiability (GOW et al., 2000). Therefore, when actors choose a 
viable enforcement mechanism, it is necessary to consider the cost and benefits 
resulting from contract breach under different enforcement mechanism. The 
compensation for losses resulting from contract breach depends on contract 
arrangement to adequately determine the magnitude of damages and enforce 
claims resulting from contract breach. 
3 A  THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT ARRANGEMENT AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
Most of the contracts between agribusiness firms and smallholders are future 
contract (see figure 1). Before the smallholders produce, the agribusiness firms 
sign the contract with them at date 0. The smallholders invest in production 
facilities to produce the product according to the request of the agribusiness 
firms at date 1. During the harvest time, the agribusiness firms buy the product 
from the smallholders according to the signed contract at date 2. Hold-ups occur 
when unanticipated changes in the external environment at the enforcement date 1 
affect the cost/benefit ratio sufficiently to make contractual breach optimal for 
one party. 
Figure 1:  Time line for contract enforcement 
  Date 0    Date 1     Date2   Date3 
    Contract signed      Executes action     State of nature       Renegotiation 
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In China, most contract breaches occur when the expected market price differs 
greatly from the contract fixed price (CHEN, 2004). So we can regard the 
contract enforcement problem as a game between agribusiness firms with 
smallholders when the expected market price changes. Now we assume 
smallholder A, producer of agricultural product X, needs to invest in production 
facilities for a delivery to agribusiness firm B which processes product X into 
product Y. In order to process the product X, the agribusiness firm B also needs 
relationship-specific investments. To prevent a hold-up by agribusiness firm B 
or by smallholder A, both parties agree on a contract which specifies product 
characteristics ("quality"), quantity and a fixed price. Assume the price is set at 
the expect market price  fixed P .  
Once the contract has been agreed upon, the actual market price, P, may deviate 
from the contracted price  fixed P . If  fixed PP ≥ , we assume the actual market price as 
good P . Under such higher actual market price condition, the contract provide 
unanticipated rents to agribusiness firm B and the benefits of contract breach 
increase for smallholder A, since it could get higher price by selling its product 
on the market. The smallholder A’s benefits of contract breach depend on the 
gap between the actual market price and the contracted price as well as the 
contracted quantity Q, which can be devoted by  () good fixed QP P − . The cost of the 
smallholder A’s breaching the contract is determined by different enforcement 
mechanisms. When smallholder A breaches the contract, agribusiness firm B can 
apply two enforcement mechanisms: (1) self-enforcement (termination) and/or (2) 
court enforcement. Both of these mechanisms are connected with different costs 
for smallholder A. Under the self-enforcement agreement assumption, if 
smallholder A breaches contract, agribusiness firm B will accept the financial 
loss, but never trade with smallholder A again in the future. The cost to 
smallholder A includes both the value  h W  of losses that result from termination 
or non-renewal of the contract or relationship and the damage to the 









+ ∑ , δ  for 
the discount rate,  hi W  for the value of losses in the future i year, n for the 
duration of the smallholder dealing in. 
Under the court enforcement mechanism, if the smallholder A breaches the 
contract, agribusiness firm B would immediately take legal action to force 
smallholder A to compensate the losses resulting from contract breach. This 
depends on the value of compensation D for losses resulting from contract 
breach and the ability ρ  of the courts to adequately determine the magnitude of 
damages and enforce claims resulting from contract breath. The possibility ρ  of 
compensation for losses resulting from contract breach is determined by costs of 
contract enforcement. Although the extreme assumes that the agreements and 
contracts can be best enforced within the legal system at little or no cost, in fact, Hongdong Guo  174 
empirical evidence shows that legal enforcement is often possible, but quite 
costly. The costs of contract enforcement are time, effort and money that must 
be spent to take legal action. These are affected by (1) efficiency of the legal 
system, (2) contract arrangement, (3) characteristics of the firm or smallholder.  
If  fixed PP ≥ , smallholder A will weigh the costs and benefits of contract breach. A 
hold-up will occur only when the benefits  () good fixed QP P −  were greater than the 
costs  () h WD ρ +  to agribusiness firm A, which can be defined by 
() good fixed h QP P W D ρ −≥ + . 
 On the other hand, If  fixed PP ≤ , we assume the actual market price as  bad P , under 
such market condition, it becomes optimal for agribusiness firm B to breach 
contract and to purchase supplies on spot markets. In the same way, agribusiness 
firm B will breach contract only when the benefits  () fixed bad QP P −  are greater than 
the costs () f WD ρ +  to smallholder A, which can be defined by 
() fixed bad f QP P W D ρ −≥ + .  f W  for the value of losses that result from termination or 










+ ∑ , δ  for the discount 
rate,  f i W  for the value of losses in the future i year, n for the duration of 
agribusiness firm B dealing in. 
According to the above discussion, we can devise a game model between the 
smallholder and agribusiness firm, as illustrated in Table 1 and Table 2.  
From Table 1, we can see that when the market price is good, the dominant 
strategies for the agribusiness firm is to enforce the contract. For the smallholder, 
the strategic choice depends on the benefits and costs of different strategies. Only 
if  () good fixed h QP P W D ρ −≥ + , will smallholders choose to breach contract. 
Table 1:  When the market price is good, smallholder and agribusiness 
firm’s payoff 
  Agribusiness firm enforce  Agribusiness firm breach 
Smallholder  
enforce 
,( ) fixed good fixed QP Q P P −   ,( ) fixed good f DQP P W D ρ ρ −− −  
Smallholder 
breach 
,( ) good h fixed good QP D W Q P P D ρ ρ −− − + ,( ) good fixed good QP Q P P −  
 
From Table  2, we can see that when market the price is bad, the dominant 
strategies for smallholder is to enforce the contract. For agribusiness firms, the 
strategic choice depends on the benefits and costs of different strategies. Only if 
() fixed bad f QP P W D ρ −≥ + , will agribusiness firms choose to breach the contract. Contractual arrangement and enforcement in transition agriculture  175
Table 2:  When the market price is bad, smallholder and agribusiness 
firm’s payoff 
  Agribusiness enforce  Agribusiness breach 
Smallholder 
enforce 
,( ) fixed bad fixed QP Q P P −   ,( ) fixed bad f DQP P W D ρ ρ −− −
Smallholder 
breach 
,( ) bad h fixed bad QP D W Q P P D ρ ρ −− − + ,( ) bad fixed bad QP Q P P −  
 
From the above discussion, we can determine that ρ ,  ,, fh WWD  and the gap 
among  ,, fixed good bad PPP  will affect contract enforcement. But these values are 
determined by the contract arrangement such as contract type, contract terms 
and so on. So we can provide the following propositions about contract 
arrangement and enforcement. 
Proposition 1: The organization type of contract arrangement between the 
agribusiness firm and smallholder will affect contract enforcement, a 
contract signed directly is less likely to be enforced, everything else remaining 
constant.  
Above, we can determine that the damages D of breaching the contract is greater 
and the possibility ρ  of acquiring indemnification of compensation for losses is 
higher, the contract is more likely to be enforced. If D is very big and  1 ρ = , 
agribusiness firms or smallholders will certainly enforce contract. But the 
damage D in reality is not very high, otherwise agribusiness firms or 
smallholders face very high risk, and would not like to sign contract. But ρ  is 
determined by the cost of the court enforcement and the negotiability of the 
other party. Seen from the organized type of contract in China, there are two 
broad models. One is a centralized model, which involves a centralized 
processor and/or packer buying from a large number of smallholders, with 
agribusiness firm and smallholder signing contracts directly, this type is also 
named "firm + smallholder" in China. Another broad model is intermediary 
model, which involves agribusiness firms in subcontracting linkages with 
smallholders to intermediaries such as farmer cooperative. This kind of type is 
named "firm + intermediaries + smallholder" in China. Because in China most 
of smallholders live in dispersion, the quantity is numerous and the scale is very 
small. Under the centralized model, the agribusiness firm deals with thousands 
of smallholders, if the smallholders broke contract, the cost of the court 
enforcement would be very high. The possibilityρ of the agribusiness receiving 
indemnification would be very low, so when smallholders break contract, the 
agribusiness firm’s reasonable choice usually is "silent". If the agribusiness firm 
breaks the contract, the smallholders must compare the cost and the income of 
the court enforcement. For a solitary smallholder whose trade amount is small, 
the possible income which would be gained by compensation for losses resulting 
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high for a single smallholder. So when the agribusiness firms break the contract, 
smallholders usually have no choice but to give up the trade. Therefore, the 
contract which agribusiness firms and smallholders sign directly is more likely 
to be broken.  
Proposition 2: The format of contract arrangement between the 
agribusiness firm and the smallholder will affect contract enforcement, the 
formal agreement (written agreement) is more likely to be enforced than 
informal agreement (verbal agreement), everything else remaining constant.  
The various formats that a contract may take are formal agreement (written 
contract) or verbal agreement (unwritten). Formal agreement is explicit, legally 
endorsed contract formats, which closely detail the conditions and obligations of 
each party. The informal agreements (verbal agreement) are commonly used by 
informal individual developers and sometimes by corporate sponsor. A major 
problem of verbal agreements is the interpretation of responsibilities and 
specifications. Confusion and misunderstanding can easily occur if the 
agreements are not clearly explained by management to the smallholders and 
their representatives. If the agribusiness firm or the smallholder breaches 
contract, it is very difficulty for the court to determine responsibility. But under 
the formal agreement (written agreement), if the agribusiness firm or the 
smallholder break the contract, it is easy for the court to obtain evidence and 
establish responsibility and to improve the possibility ρ  of acquiring indem-
nification. So the formal agreement (written agreement) is more likely to be 
enforced. 
Proposition 3: The pricing arrangements of the contract between the 
agribusiness firm and smallholder will affect contract enforcement, the 
minimum floor pricing agreement is more likely to be enforced than other 
price arrangement, everything else remaining constant. 
In the above discussion, we can see that the gap between fixed price and the 
market price will affect contract enforcement. If the gap is wide, the 
agribusiness firm or smallholder may take default action; in turn, if smaller, the 
likelihood of the agribusiness firm or smallholder breaching contract will be 
very small. Pricing arrangement is the most frequently discussed and 
challenging components of all farming contracts. There are several ways prices 
are offered to smallholders by agribusiness firms in China, with minimum floor 
pricing being the most common. The practice is usually to offer smallholders a 
minimum price at the beginning of each season. If the market price is higher 
than minimum price, the agribusiness will calculate the price at the market price. 
If the market price is lower than the minimum price, the agribusiness will 
calculate the price at minimum price. Such an arrangement provides income 
guarantees for smallholders but the agribusiness firms take all the risk of market 
price fluctuations. Under this kind of price structure, the likelihood of the 
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market price fluctuations being mainly undertaken by agribusiness firms. For 
agribusiness firms, the possibility of contract breach mainly rests on the gap 
between minimum price  fixed P  and  bad P . If the gap is very wide, the agribusiness 
will take great loss to enforce the contract. When the agribusiness firms cannot 
bear huge market risk, they may take default behavior. Because  fixed P  is provided 
by the agribusiness firms, such situations seldom occur. Price calculated on 
spot-market values is another important method in China. In such an 
arrangement, payment based on spot market price, the smallholders have to take 
all the market price risk. The main problem with this approach is that the 
agribusiness firms and smallholders must arrive at a common understanding of 
what constitutes a market price that is relevant to higher quality that contracted 
smallholders could to be expected to produce. In most cases the open market 
pricing system is unsatisfactory, as the smallholders do not have control over the 
price they receive or knowledge of how it is calculated.  
Proposition 4: Specifications of contract arrangement such as duration of 
contract, payment arrangement, and safeguards arrangement will affect 
contract enforcement. The longer the contract duration, advanced payment 
and greater the specific investments required for smallholders, the more 
likely a contract to be enforced.  
From above discussion, we can tell that agribusiness firms or smallholders 
compare the short term gains they can achieve by not performing consistently 
with the contractual understanding with the discounted expected future profit 
stream they will lose if the relationship is terminated for non-enforcement. If the 
duration of the contract is longer, the year of the discounted is also longer, the 
discounted expected future profit stream will be bigger. So the longer duration 
of contract, the more likely enforcement of the contract will occur. If the 
agribusiness firms provide advanced payment to the smallholders, the 
agribusiness firms will be more likely to enforce contract. If agribusiness firms 
breach contract, they will lose the payment directly. So an advanced payment 
contract is more likely to be enforced. Seen from safeguards arrangement, if the 
agribusiness firms require the smallholders to make specific investments to 
produce the product for the agribusiness firms, the contract is more likely to be 
enforced. If the smallholders breach contract, their specific investments will 
become sunk cost and they will lose much in future trade. So the more specific 
the investments required for the smallholders, more likely a contract to be 
enforced. If the agribusiness firms have bonuses for the smallholders who 
enforce the contract well and provide some services such as provisions of input 
and production services, the contract is more likely to be enforced. If the 
smallholders breach contract, they will have no chance to get the service and the 
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4 DATA AND METHOD 
4.1  The study area 
The Zhejiang Province is located in the southeast coast of China. Since the 
1980s, the "People's Commune" system has been dismantled and replaced by 
individual family farms based on the "Household Responsibility" System. It 
encourages smallholders’ creativity, investment and efficiency. The output of 
agricultural product increased significantly in the 1980s. Meanwhile with a leap 
increase in agricultural production, the market of agricultural products has shifted 
from shortage to relative surplus since the 1990s. With the development of 
market-oriented economy, more and more economic crops have been planted 
replacing grain crops, the grain crops planting area was 1454.53 thousand hectare 
in 2004, down 57.5  % compared with 1980. The area of vegetable was 
661.02 thousand hectares in 2004, increased 5.11 times compared with 1980. The 
area proportion of cash crop increased 26 % of total sown acreage in 1980 to 
48  % in 2004. With changes in agricultural commercialization and market 
conditions, marketing of surplus agricultural products has become more important 
task for the smallholders. Most of the smallholders scale is very small. From 1985 
to 2004 the total number of rural households increased by nearly 33.8 %, at the 
same time, total cultivated areas shrank by 11.3 % with the rural industrialization 
development, the average cultivated areas of each rural household was only 
0.133 hectares, down 33.2 % compared with 1985. Moreover, the smallholders 
are loosely organized. It is difficult for such smallholders to access the market 
directly. Since the middle 1980s, the government has taken many policies to help 
smallholders to access to market. One of the most important measures was to 
foster vertical coordination among stages in supply chain to help the smallholders 
access the market. Contract arrangements between smallholders and processing or 
distribution firms are the main types of vertical coordination in Zhejiang, which 
started in the middle 1980s. In the late 1990s, especially after China’s entry into 
WTO, the development of contract farming has accelerated remarkably. 
4.2 Data 
Data was collected in three phases between February and August 2004. First, 
exploratory interviews were conducted with some agribusiness firm managers, 
government officials and smallholders to understand fully the context in which 
contract farming operated. Second, a questionnaire was designed to explore the 
basis of the relationship between contract arrangements and enforcement. In the 
third stage, we identified the sample of agribusiness firms. There are hundreds of 
agribusiness firms in the Zhejiang province. It would be impossible for us to 
survey all the agribusiness. According to the geographic coverage of agribusiness 
firms in dealing with smallholders, most of them are classified into four types 
such as national, provincial, municipal and county agribusiness according to the 
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contains the names and addresses of 116 national and provincial agribusiness 
firms, most of these firms have contracts with smallholders. The provincial 
government office helped to send questionnaires to the 116 the national, provincial 
agribusiness firms in return for a small administrative fee. A total of 80 usable 
copies of questionnaires were returned. During the same period, we interviewed 
an additional 36 municipal and county agribusiness firms all over the province. 
In total, 116 questionnaires were valid. 
4.3 Methods 
In order to examine the relationships between contract arrangements and 
contract enforcement, we choose to use a maximum likelihood estimator, MLE, 
to conduct a qualitative analysis. The information on contract arrangements and 
enforcement between agribusiness firms and smallholders, as well as a description 
of variable is available in Table  3. We used SPSS 11.5 software to run the 
binominal logit regression. For the purpose of interpretation, we choose backward 
selection to eliminate the variables with smallest t value until significance of all 
variables was achieved.  
Table3:  Definition and descriptive statistics of variables 
Name Description  and  Measurement  Unit  Mean  Std.  Deviation
CE: Contract 
enforcement rate 
Agribusiness firm states that the rate of 
contracted smallholder enforcement 
contract over 75 %=1, else=0 
Dummy 0.72  0.451 
CT1: 
Firm+smallholder 
Agribusiness firm signs contract or 
agreement with the smallholder directly 
=1, else=0 
Dummy 0.50  0.503 
CT2: 
Firm+intermediaries 
Agribusiness firm signs contract or 
agreement with the smallholder by 
intermediaries=1, else=0 
Dummy 0.21  0.409 
CF: Oral contract  Contract form is oral=1, else=0  Dummy  0.15  0.359 
CP1: Flexible 
price 
Delivery price is flexible price=1, 
else=0  Dummy 0.33  0.473 
CP2: Floor pricing  Delivery price is floor pricing=1, else=0  Dummy  0.53  0.502 
CD: Duration of 
contract  length of the contract duration  Number  2.12  1.076 
CC: Advanced 
payment 
Agribusiness firm pays cash in advance 
=1, else=0  Dummy 0.11  0.314 
CI: Specific 
investment 
Agribusiness firm requests contract 
smallholder to invest specific 
investment=1, else=0 
Dummy 0.74  0.441 
CS: Provision 
service 
Agribusiness firm provide specialized 
input (machinery, chemical inputs, 
seeds, etc) to smallholders =1, else=0 
Dummy 0.85  0.359 
CB: Bonus 
Agribusiness firm gives bonuses to 
smallholder who enforces contract 
well=1, else=0 
Dummy 0.73  0.446 
Source:  Surveys of 116 agribusiness firms in Zhejiang province in 2004. Hongdong Guo  180 
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 4 presents all MLE results of the binominal logit model. 
The regression results show contract type variables, CT1 and CT2 have limited 
impact on contract enforcement. Agribusiness firm signs contract with small-
holder directly variable, CT1, has the expected negative but insignificant in six 
of seven model specifications. The agribusiness firm signs contract with 
smallholder by intermediaries, variable, also CT2 has the expected positive but 
not significant in four of seven model specifications. 
The variable CF for oral contract shows a significant positive unexpected 
negative impact on the likelihood in all model specifications at the 1 or 5 % 
level. If the agribusiness firm agrees to contract with smallholder in oral form, 
the likelihood that contract would be enforced by smallholder is increased. This 
result is not supported by some empirical research such as LYONS (1996, p. 27) 
statement: "The arrangement need not to be written, but it is obviously difficult 
to enforce it if it is not written or witnessed by a third party". Written contracts 
increase the verifiability of the agreement by a third party and reduce the cost of 
enforcing them through courts. The reason might lie with the fact that the social 
capital plays an important role in contract enforcement in China. Social capital 
can help economize transactions costs by speeding up search, increase trust, and 
facilitating the circulation of information (FAFCHAMPS  and MINTEN,  2001; 
KNACK and KEEFER, 1997). In China, trust plays an important role in trade, 
especially in rural areas. Smallholders often do business based on trust. When 
they trust the traders, it is not necessary for them to sign contract, they will 
simply enforce the contract. However, when people do not know each other, 
written contracts are often used.  
Among the price arrangement variables, the flexible price, CP1, has the 
expected negative but is insignificant in three of seven specifications. The floor 
pricing, CP2, is significantly positive at 1 or 5 % level in all specifications. This 
results supports theoretical considerations that the price floor will benefit 
contract enforcement. When a price floor is used more, smallholders are more 
likely to enforce the contract. 
The duration of contract and payment of variable CD and CC prove to be of 
limited importance in contract enforcement. Duration of contract variable, CD, 
has the expected positive but is insignificant in two of seven model specifications. 
Payment variable, CC also has the expected positive but is insignificant in five of 
seven model specifications. 
The specific investment variable, CI, consistently shows a significant positive 
impact on the likelihood that a contract can be enforcement in all model 
specifications at the 1 % level. This result supports theoretical considerations that 
when the agribusiness firm requests the smallholder to make specific investments 
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The more the specific investment required to input by the agribusiness firm, the 
more likely smallholders are to enforce the contract. 
Bonus variable, CB, also consistently shows a significant positive impact on the 
likelihood that a contract can be enforcement in all model specifications at the 
1 % level. This clearly supports the view that the Agribusiness firm provide 
bonus to smallholders who enforce contract well improves the likelihood of 
contract enforcement. 
Finally, the results show service variable, CS as an unexpected positive sign but 
is significant in only one of seven model specifications. 
Table 4:  Estimated logit coefficients: Contract arrangement and 
enforcement 
Dependent 










Firm+smallholder  -0.720 -0.785 -0.726 -0.834 -1.077 -1.065 
CT2: 
Firm+intermediaries  1.058 1.040 1.066 0.871  








CP1: Flexible price  -0.581  -0.564 -0.685  








CD: Duration of 
contract  0.203 0.198  
CC: Advanced 











service  -0.193  








-2 Log likelihood  45.255  45.293 45.553 45.986 46.365 47.476  49.402
Nagelkerke R 
Square  0.748 0.748 0.746 0.743 0.741 0.733 0.719
Sample size  100  100 100 100 100 100  100
Notes: 
* Level of significance 10 %, 
** level of significance 5 %, 
*** level of significance 1 %. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of the paper is to identify contract arrangements that determine the 
extent of contract enforcement. The most important results of our study in 
contributing to theory and empirics of contract enforcement are that it is 
sometimes not viable to use legal dispute mechanisms due to a combination of 
litigation costs, ineffective contract law, poor third party verifiability, etc. 
Furthermore, transacting parties may prefer to use private contract enforcement Hongdong Guo  182 
mechanisms as opposed to courts. The implication is that private contract 
enforcement is not just a temporarily important issue, but will continue to play an 
important role in transition economics, and elsewhere, even as public institutions 
become more effective (GOW and SWINNEN, 2001). The role of private contract 
enforcement mechanism in safeguarding contract enforcement depends on the 
introduction of innovations in contracting with smallholders. Contract arrangement 
such as floor pricing, specific investment, bonuses, and so on will reduce the 
likelihood of contract breach. 
However, our research has some weaknesses. Our study only focused on the 
relationship between contract arrangement and enforcement; in fact, the 
characteristics of agribusiness firms and smallholders will also affect contract 
enforcement. In this study, our survey was focused on hold-ups by smallholders. 
In fact agribusiness firms also breached contracts. A widespread example is that 
when the market price is lower than contracted price, the agribusiness firms tend 
to reduce contract buying or lower their service quality standard. These factors 
should be taken into account in future empirical research. 
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We present an empirical analysis of farmers’ contract choice in various supply 
channels in the Hungarian vegetable sector during the 2000-2001 seasons by 
employing transaction cost economics. Data from a survey of Hungarian horti-
cultural producers were drawn from one Hungarian region – Csongrád County. The 
main results of the empirical analyses are: (1) the use of formal contracts is 
found to be positively associated with specific investments, (2) a good reputation 
decreases the probability of a contract, (3) the frequency of transactions has a 
negative influence on the presence of a contract. In terms of contract content, the 
results suggest that once trust is established between both parties, the necessity 
of providing producers with special treatment is negated. 
Keywords:  Transaction cost, contracts, horticultural products, Hungary. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The amount of literature on the role of contracts in agri-food chain is ever 
increasing. However, most theoretical and empirical research focuses on 
developed countries’ agriculture (e.g. HUETH  et al., 1999; GOODHUE, 2000; 
BOGETOFT and OLESEN, 2002; GOODHUE et al., 2004; FRASER, 2005). Recently, 
some studies have focused on various agricultural governance structures in 
transition countries employing various frameworks (e.g. RUDOLPH, 1999; 
GOW et al., 2000; ZAHARIEVA et al., 2002; FERTŐ and SZABÓ, 2002), but studies 
concentrating on the role of contracts in transition agriculture are limited 
(BOGER, 2001; BOGER and BECKMANN, 2004).  
In transition countries, where public institutions are ineffective when it comes to 
ensuring contract enforcement, price systems are generally still inefficient. The  
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absence of enforceable contracts to set up any kind of relationships between 
farmers and food processors or retailers has become extremely difficult. 
Therefore, finding new partners for long run, relation-specific investments has 
been associated with high transaction costs for market players. In addition, this 
creates severe barriers for price discovery, involving high transaction costs to 
when coordinating market exchanges. In those sub-sectors where any type of 
production contracts do exist, agricultural producers face hold-up problems (e.g. 
delayed payment for delivered products, or ex post price reduction by retailers), 
which are stressed by GOW and SWINNEN (2000). Although food processors and 
retailers have significant market power, they also struggle with establishing 
long-term relationships with farmers. 
The aim of this paper is to identify and explain farmers’ contract choice and 
contract design among various supply channels in transition agriculture by 
examining the Hungarian horticultural sector. We present an empirical analysis 
of the key determinants based on transaction cost economics (TCE): The 
analysis is based on a survey among vegetable producers in one Hungarian 
County (Csongrád) with respect to the choice of marketing channels. The 
resulting data are applied to a probit model to test the theoretical prediction. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. The second Section briefly 
reviews the literature on transaction cost economics and its implications on 
contracts, while Section 3 provides an overview on the Hungarian horticultural 
sector. Survey design and the variables are described in Section 4, while results are 
presented in Section 5. The last section summarizes and offers some conclusions 
on the implications for the market mechanisms of Hungary’s beef sector. 
2 TRANSACTION COSTS THEORY AND CONTRACTS 
Transaction costs economics (TCE) claims that a firm’s vertical boundary 
decisions are determined by characteristics associated with the efficiency of the 
chosen form of organization. It is assumed that efficiency is inversely related to 
the extent of the costs of organizing the exchange, which include the costs of 
negotiating and writing contracts and the costs of monitoring and enforcing 
contractual performance (WILLIAMSON, 1985). The theory focuses on identifying 
the characteristics of transactions that are best suited to market and firm 
organization. TCE asserts that all contracts are incomplete and subject to re-nego-
tiations and the possibility of opportunistic behavior due to the presence of 
bounded rationality of agents, asymmetric information and inability to completely 
specify behavior in the existence of multiply contingencies. Thus, the problem of 
opportunistic behavior is more severe when an exchange requires one or both 
parties to make considerable transaction-specific investments, since such invest-
ments create quasi-rent that may be subject to hold up.  Imre Fertő  186
TCE provides several empirically-testable hypotheses on the various aspects of 
contracts, including decision, duration and design (LYONS, 1996; MASTEN and 
SAUSSIER, 2000). The vertical integration, or make-or-buy, decision has been the 
most extensively studied question in the empirical transaction cost literature 
(SHELANSKI and KLEIN, 1995; and CROCKER and MASTEN, 1996). The structure 
of contractual agreements may vary with the objectives of the contracting 
parties, underlying production relations, and the nature and size of informational 
and strategic impediments to contract formation and enforcement. As a con-
sequence, the theory provides no unifying structure for the specification and 
testing of contract design hypotheses (MASTEN and SAUSSIER, 2000). Joskow’s 
study provided evidence that contract duration varies with the benefits of 
contracting (JOSKOW, 1987), whilst FRASER (2005) presents an empirical analysis 
of specific aspects of wine grape supply contract design and implementation. 
FRANK  and  HENDERSON (1992) claim that transaction costs are the 
determinants of vertical coordination in the food industry, and according to 
BASH and DAVIES  (1998) foreign direct investments influence factors in the 
agribusiness contract choice. 
In this paper we focus on the following specific hypotheses:  
H1: Asset specificity. Contracts contain the costs of writing, enforcement, and 
potential inflexibility, and in the absence of sufficient advantages, these costs 
may be a deterrent to formal contracting. The main insight of TCE is that the 
benefits of writing a contract should depend positively on each trading partners’ 
vulnerability to opportunistic behavior. This should be closely related to 
investment in specific assets. The likelihood of contractual agreements increases 
with the value of relationship-specific investments. 
H2: Complexity. Product complexity and product diversification make a contract 
lengthy, leaky and expensive. Thus, formal contracts are less likely to be written. 
H3: Size. The size of firms will be positively associated with the propensity to 
write formal contracts, LYONS (1994). Large firms can more easily shoulder the 
costs of writing a formal contract, because they can spread the overhead of 
retaining legal specialists. 
H4:  Reputation. The greater the expectation that trade will continue in the 
future, the less reliant a contractual relationship will be on legal enforcement. 
Non-legal enforcement requires the incentive of expected future profits. 
H5: Frequency. Contracts will increase along with the frequency with which 
exchange takes place and the extent to which the transaction needs specific 
investments. 
Therefore, the theoretical model we test is: 
Prob(Write formal contract)=f(Asset specificity, Complexity, Frequency, Size, 
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The expected signs of the variables are as follows: 
f1>0, f2<0, f3>0, f4<0 and f5>0.  
3 MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HUNGARIAN HORTICULTURAL 
SECTOR  
Horticultural plays a relatively important role in Hungarian agriculture, 
accounting for 12 percent of total production; also, its share of total agri-food 
exports during the 1990s varied between 17 and 23 percent. In addition, recent 
studies suggest that the Hungarian horticultural sector has retained comparative 
advantage in the last decade (FERTŐ and HUBBARD, 2003).  
The share of private farmers is relatively high in Hungary, accounting for above 
85 percent of total horticultural production and above 70 percent of the total area 
used in horticultural production. Most of the farms are relatively small, 
sometimes with only a household plot. It is very important, therefore, for the 
farmers to use marketing channels that could provide them the strengths of more 
concentrated organizations. Thus, it is indispensable for them to know the 
possibilities of the different forms of vertical coordination and integration in 
their sector. 
According to quality requirements there are alternative quality measurements in 
Hungary, so it is difficult to compare individual cases. Basically, Hungary 
applies the standards of European Union; however, ensuring that producers, 
traders and other actors in the horticultural market are using them is taking place 
only in the case of exports. The increasing influence of retail chains also lifts 
standards to a higher level, since consumers can see the origin, price and class of 
the product in the retail shops, e.g. hyper- and supermarkets. 
A variety of channels and markets exist for agricultural producers from spot 
markets to retailers. It must, however, be underscored that spot markets and 
different types of contracts (including, in some cases, contract production) are 
common forms of coordination. Different retail chains are gaining bigger and 
bigger shares from the fresh horticultural market. However, marketing coopera-
tives and producers’ organizations can also solve the marketing problems of 
horticultural producers. 
4 THE SAMPLE AND KEY VARIABLES 
This study investigates contractual relationships between farmers among various 
supply channels in the Hungarian horticultural sector during the 2000-2001 
seasons. The hypothesis that producers’ decision among various marketing 
channels is influenced by transaction costs and asset specificity is tested 
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taken in one Hungarian region – Csongrád County. The questionnaire was 
prepared in consultation with members of local agricultural extension services. 
Due to financial constraints, postal surveys were used: 720 surveys were mailed 
to vegetable producers asking them their perceptions of four different supply 
channels. A total of 74 useable surveys returned, but we reduced this number in 
the final model to 70 due to missing values. It should be emphasized that the 
sample is not random. The survey targeted larger, market-oriented farmers in a 
traditional horticultural grower region of Hungary. 
Dependent variables. The majority of respondents claim to have formal 
contracts. Thus, the main distinguishing characteristic between various 
arrangements is the duration of contract. The dependent variable in our model is 
CONTRACT, where CONTRACT = 1 if the contract does exist, and zero 
otherwise. We also examine some specific aspects of contracts such as the 
bonus/penalty payment. The PRICEINC takes the value of one if the farmer’s 
partners apply a bonus or penalty payment as a safeguard of quality, and zero 
otherwise. The INPFIN takes the value of one if trading partners offer special 
input finance credits for producers, and zero otherwise. The final contract 
content variable is SERVICES, where SERVICES = 1 if partners provide 
extension services for farmers, and zero otherwise. 
Asset Specificity. Horticultural production’s physical asset specificity is 
captured by two variables: 1) investment in production in the last business year 
(INVPAST); 2) specificity of investment (INVSPEC).  
Complexity and diversification. Production diversity is measured by two 
variables: 1) number of main production activities, e.g. horticultural, crops and 
livestock production (DIVPROD); number of products in horticultural 
production (HORTDIV). 
The size of firm. The size of the operation is measured by the number of 
employees (SIZE).  
Reputation. It is difficult to quantify reputation in a postal questionnaire; we 
used two proxies for measuring reputation. We asked about the reasons for 
purchasing beef from a particular producer. The respondents evaluated the 
importance of specific factors, including trust (TRUST) and personal contact 
(PCONT) on a Likert-scale.  
Frequency. We classify transaction frequency into the following groups: FREQ = 1 
if daily transactions exist; FREQ = 2 if transactions occur every 2-3 days; 
FREQ = 3 in the presence of weekly transaction; FREQ = 4 if transaction 
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5 RESULTS 
Given the nature of the data collected and the various relationships to be 
examined, we estimate several probit models. All models and specification tests 
are estimated using STATA. We begin by presenting results that investigate the 
existence of a contract. We used different specifications to test the sensitivity of 
our results on a particular choice of diversification (DIVPROD/HORTDIV) and 
reputation (TRUST/PCONT) variables.  
5.1 Contracts 
The estimated coefficients of probit contracting models are presented in Table 1. 
The results are quite similar for each specification, with the majority of 
explanatory variables being statistically significant. The estimations indicate that 
asset specificity variables have the expected signs, and that they are significant 
for all specifications. The results provide clear support for the hypothesis that 
fear of opportunism is a genuine concern and encourages the use of contracts. 
Both complexity variables have unexpected signs, but they are not significant. 
Surprisingly, the coefficients of SIZE are significant with unexpected signs for 
three specifications. We may argue that larger farms have more bargaining 
power; therefore, they are less vulnerable to buyers’ opportunistic behavior. 
Both reputation variables also have the expected signs, significant for all 
estimations. This indicates that a good reputation decreases the probability of a 
contract. The FREQ variables are significant for all specifications with the 
expected signs. This suggests that the frequency of transactions has a negative 
effect on the existence of contracts.  







DIVPROD  0.124   0.011  
HORTDIV   0.065   0.025 
SIZE -0.387
** -0.321
* -0.298  -0.291
* 











Cons  0.370 0.220 0.127 0.047 
McFadden's R
2  0.170 0.168 0.176 0.176 
Loglikelihood  -39.10 -39.17  -38.82 -38.79 
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5.2 Contract  contents 
We examine three specific aspects of contract content: The presence of bonus/ 
penalty payments, the input credit, and extension services. Estimations for price 
incentives are presented in Table 2; the results are similar for each specification. 
The asset specificity variables have positive signs and are significant for two 
specifications, which indicates that investing in relation-specific assets more 
likely induces the need of price incentives. We find that complexity is negatively 
related to bonus/penalty payments, but they are significant for the HORTDIV 
models. Both reputation variables are significant with negative signs. The 
negative relationship between price incentive and reputation would suggest that 
once trust is established between both parties, this negates the need of a 
bonus/penalty payment system in a contract. The frequency of transactions 
(FREQ) is negatively related to contract content, but they are not significant. 
The SIZE coefficients are not significant, with negative signs for all specifications.  
Table 2:  Probit models: Price incentives 
 Price  incentive 
INVSPEC   0.122   0.203
**   0.139   0.224
** 
DIVPROD  -0.024   -0.255  
HORTDIV   -0.216
*   -0.247
** 
SIZE  -0.205 -0.246 -0.061 -0.210 





***    
FREQ  -0.023 -0.039 -0.006 -0.054 
Cons   1.730
*   2.423
**   1.749
**   2.383
** 
McFadden's R
2   0.207   0.243   0.246   0.278 
Loglikelihood  -35.66 -34.03 -33.93 -32.48 





The second aspect of contracting we consider is whether or not buyers offer 
special input finance credits for producers. Asset specificity, size of farms and 
frequency of transaction have no significant effect on the input financing. We 
find a negative relationship between input finance and complexity; the results 
indicate that risk-averse farmers who diversify their output are less likely to 
have an input finance clause in their contract with buyers. Both reputation 
variables have negative and significant effects on input finance. Again, we may 
argue that the negative relationship between input credits and reputation 
suggests that the presence of trust negates the necessity of having input credits 
in a contract. 
 Contractual relationships in the Hungarian horticultural sector  191
Table 3:  Probit models: Input finance 
  Input finance 
INVSPEC   0.132   0.189   0.070   0.128 
DIVPROD -0.647
**   -0.624
**  
HORTDIV   -0.188    -0.157 
SIZE   0.152  -0.139   0.130  -0.149 




**    
FREQ   0.057  -0.038   0.023  -0.078 
Cons   0.702   0.858   0.078   0.099 
McFadden's R
2   0.278   0.205   0.147   0.065 
Loglikelihood  -16.41 -18.08 -19.39 -21.26 





Finally, we consider whether or not extension services are included in the 
contract. The asset specificity variables have positive signs and are significant 
for all specifications. This suggests that farmers who invested in relation-specific 
assets required buyers to provide extension services. Similarly, there is a negative 
relationship between extension services and reputation. Other explanatory 
variables such as complexity, size and frequency are not significant. 
Table 4:  Probit models: Extension services 
 Services 
INVSPEC   0.277
***   0.261
**   0.285
***   0.293
*** 
DIVPROD   0.114    -0.075   
HORTDIV     0.033   -0.022 
SIZE  -0.254 -0.192 -0.110 -0.150 





***    
FREQ   0.120   0.137   0.132   0.119 
Cons   0.577   0.487   0.199   0.223 
McFadden's R
2   0.199   0.195   0.210   0.209 





Finally, it is important to note that our results are not sensitive for alternative 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
We have analyzed contractual arrangements between various supply channels and 
horticultural producers in Hungary by employing a transaction cost economics 
framework. The results add to a small but growing body of literature on contract 
design and implementation in transition agriculture. Our results provide some 
support to TCE predictions on contracting: (1) the use of formal contracts is 
found to be positively associated with specific investments, (2) a good 
reputation decreases the probability of a contract, (3) frequency of transactions 
has a negative influence on the presence of contract.  
In terms of specific aspects of contract design, we find that investing in relation-
specific assets positively influences the need for price incentives and extension 
services. The most striking findings are that we find negative relationships 
between reputation and various contract clauses such as price incentives, input 
financing and extension services. These results suggest that once trust is 
established between both parties, the necessity of providing producers with 
special treatment is negated. Finally, sensitivity analyses show that our results 
are fairly robust to alternative specifications. 
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CONTRACT FARMING IN CHINA: PERSPECTIVES OF SMALLHOLDERS 
 
HONGDONG GUO




This paper explores the current status of contract farming in China by examining 
data from a survey of Chinese householders. The survey indicates that the actual 
proportion of householders engaged in contract farming is relatively low and 
significantly less than the proportion of householders willing to produce under 
contract. The primary reason for householders not participating in contract 
farming is the absence of opportunities, particularly for small size farms. 
Householders identify price stability and market access as the key motivations to 
participate in contract farming. Middleman and agribusiness firms were the most 
important organizations for householders to contract with. 
Keywords: Contract farming, China, smallholders. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
As part of the on-going processes of "agri-industrialization", the use of contracts 
is increasingly common across a range of agricultural commodities in both 
industrialized and developing countries. In addition to individual case studies, 
there have been cross country reviews (see e.g DORWARD et al., 1998; LITTLE 
and WATTS, 1994) and formal analyses (e.g. GOODHUE, 1999). From the producer’s 
perspective, the motivation to participate in contract production varies, for 
example, according to prevailing agrarian and market structures or policy 
frameworks. It may also be a response to imperfections in markets for credit, 
insurance, information, factors of production, and raw product, or imperfections 
in transaction costs associated with search, screening, transfer of goods, 
bargaining and enforcement (KEY and RUNSTEN, 1999; KEY, SADOULET and 
DE JANVRY, 2000). Much of the literature assumes that producers predominantly 
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contract to earn additional income. Although a subset of studies do acknow-
ledge, or at least imply, that individual farmers may contract for differing reasons 
(e.g. DELGADO, 1999). Some studies exploring the motivations for smallholders 
in developing countries to participate in contract farming vary even among 
producers in a relatively small geographical area. Further, these motivations 
reflect local economic, social, and institutional conditions and as a result, will 
vary from one context to another and over time in light of changing 
circumstances (MASAKURE and HENSON, 2005).  
The existing literature provides a rich and varied analysis of many salient issues 
relating to the motivations for small-scale producers to participate in contract 
production in different countries (LITTLE and WATTS, 1994; KEY and RUNSTEN, 
1999; SINGH, 2002; MASAKURE and HENSON, 2005). But there are few papers 
about contract farming in China. It is necessary to research the smallholders’ 
motivation to participate in contract farming in China.  
This paper’s main objective is to explore those motivations and factors, taken from 
a survey of small-scale producers in China, which influence smallholders in China 
to participate in contract farming. The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, 
we examine the data by statistical analysis and discuss the results. In Section 3, we 
draw our conclusions.  
2 STUDY AREA AND SURVEY DATA DESCRIPTION 
2.1  The study area 
Over the past 25 years, the Chinese agricultural sector has undergone fundamental 
restructuring. Agricultural production and farm householder income has grown 
rapidly, largely due to agrarian reforms undertaken by the government. 
Beginning in 1978, a series of institutional reforms significantly transformed a 
collectivized, planned agricultural sector into something resembling a capitalist 
structure. Crucial milestones have been the abolition of the communal property 
base, the introduction of the household contract responsibility and the price and 
market liberalization systems, respectively, the revision of the Land Administra-
tion Law in 1998, and, most recently, China’s admission to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Correspondingly, the farm householder has become an 
active agent in the marketplace in contrast to the passive production unit of the 
planned economy. Farm householders at the village level have certain rights to 
decide, subject to some minimum production requirements from local 
government, what they wish to produce and how to market their products. 
However, Chinese farmers face a number of challenges – among them low 
agricultural prices due to large stocks of products, lagging incomes and excess 
labor in the agricultural sector. Externally, Chinese agriculture faces increasing 
competition from foreign products due to its recent entry into the WTO and the 
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urbanization and rising incomes, Chinese agriculture has moved into a new 
developmental stage characterized by significant increases in production levels 
and shifts in food demand. Under these circumstances, millions of small-scale 
farm householders in China are unable to compete – to respond to changes in 
domestic demand and to withstand pressure from international markets. For 
many smallholders, market access has become increasingly difficult and their 
incomes continue to lag behind the rest of the economy.  
Since 1990, contract farming has been supported by the Chinese government for 
the sake of making agricultural production more profitable and competitive. 
Thus, contract farming in China has made considerable progress in the past ten 
years. Four characteristics can be safely generalized from its growth so far. First 
of all, the number of agricultural commodities produced under contract has 
increased steadily. Agricultural products produced or marketed under contract 
have grown from small-quantity, locally-specialized products, such as food oil 
and vegetables, to bulk commodities such as corn, beans, rice and wheat. 
Second, the geographic distribution of contract farming has also expanded 
significantly. Initially, contract farming developed in the economically-advanced 
coastal provinces. Now contract farming is spreading rapidly into the under-
developed areas of central and western China. Most firms sign contracts not 
only with local farmers, but also with farmers in other provinces. Third, the 
scale of products produced under contract – the planted areas, volume of cash 
receipts and number of farmers – has also increased. According to the Chinese 
Department of Agriculture, the planted area involved in all types of contracts 
reached 18.6 million hectares in 2001, which is approximately 40 % higher than 
in 2000. Finally, the number of smallholders and firms involved has also 
increased. According to the most recent survey from the Chinese Department of 
Agriculture, the number of smallholders who signed contracts with firms 
increased twofold over the same period. Correspondingly, the proportion of 
smallholders involved in contract farming went up from 10 percent to 25 percent 
(NIU, 2002). 
2.2 Data 
Smallholder data were obtained through a survey conducted by more than 
60 rural-area  undergraduate  students from Zhejiang University when they 
returned to their home villages during winter break, February 2004. The survey 
contained questions on the farm householder, farm production status and 
involvement in contract farming. Student survey enumerators were carefully 
trained before they returned home. Each student randomly selected 30  house-
holders in their home village to survey. The students returned 1,820 surveys, of 
which 1,036 were complete and usable. Because many of the student volunteers 
came from the Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Shangdong provinces, more data were 
collected from these three provinces. In total, the farmer householders included Contract farming in China: Perspectives of smallholders  197
in the survey represent over 13 provinces and 47 counties. The descriptive statistics 
of surveyed householders are described in Table 1. 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics of surveyed householders 
Householder  
characteristics  Minimum Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation
Land operated 
(hectares)  0.00 30.00  0.53  1.40 
Family members        1  15  4.29    1.411 
Commercial rate (%)  0.00  100    65  33 
Source: Primary  survey. 
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1 Overall  Situation 
Out of 1,036  farmer householders included in the survey, only 220  house 
holders, or 21.2 percent, ever participated in contract farming. However, when 
householders without contracts are asked whether they would be willing to 
engage in contract farming, 97.9  percent answered positively. Only the 
remaining 2.1 percent indicated they would not consider a contract if offered 
(Figure 1). The results suggest that most householders have a favorable view 
toward contract production and would choose to be involved in if they were 
offered the opportunity.  














Have Contracts Accept If offered Reject If Offered
 Hongdong Guo, Robert W. Jolly, Jianhua Zhu  198
From Table 2 we can see that the primary reason for householders not partici-
pating in contract farming is the absence of opportunities. An absence of 
perceived benefit, presumably due to small-scale production and contractors 
showing no interest, account for other reasons. This implies that the existence of 
many small-scale operations influences the growth of contract farming in China.  
Table 2:  Reasons why householders do not participate in contract farming 









small scale  Total 
No. of 
householders  426 169  21 200  816 
Percent  52.2 20.7  2.6 24.5  100 
Source: Primary  survey. 
3.2  Motivations for participating in contract farming 
Table  3 illustrates several potential incentives identified by current contract 
producers that would encourage them to engage in contract farming. Farmers 
strongly identify price stability and market access as the key motivations to 
participate in contract farming. However, credit and technology provided by 
contracting firms were also identified by some householders. 










support  Total 
No. of householders  124 73  17  6  220 
Percent  56.4 33.2  7.7  2.7 100 
Source: Primary  survey. 
3.3  Organizational types of contracting farming  
In Table 4 we present information on householders’ existing organization types 
and willingness to accept organization types. Agri-businesses firms, cooperatives 
and middlemen use contracts with farmers, with middleman and agribusiness 
firms being the most important organizations for householders to contract with. 
Nearly 70  percent of householders contract with middlemen or agribusiness 
firms, and only 0.5 percent of householders contract with farmer cooperatives. 
Since cooperatives are not well developed in China, householders have fewer 
opportunities to contract with them, but about 18.7  percent of householders 
would like to contact with farmer cooperatives. The apparent preference of 
Chinese householders for cooperatives deserves further investigation. Contract farming in China: Perspectives of smallholders  199
Table 4:  Actual organization types and householders’ willingness to 





















34.1 %  34.1 %  12.7 % 0.5 % 5.9 % 12.7 % 100 % 
Willingness 
-to-accept  
18.0 %  32.7 % 8.8 % 18.7 % 14.4 % 7.5 % 100 % 
Source: Primary  survey. 
3.4  Types of contracts 
From Table 5, we can easily see that marketing and product contracts are the 
dominant types in China (a sample contract is provided in Appendix  A). 
Marketing contracts have been used widely in fruit, vegetables and so on. 
Negotiated before delivery or production, contracts typically specify grade and 
price (or formula for price)
1. Commodity ownership usually remains with the 
producer until the product is delivered to the buyer. Product contracts have been 
widely used in livestock, e.g. broilers and hogs, in recently years. Arrangements 
differ widely, but the contracts typically furnish baby pigs or chicks, feed, 
veterinary supplies, and organizational management, e.g. appropriate practices, 
and number and timing of placements. The grower or producer does not own the 
animals but supplies equipment, building, labor, and day-to-day management for 
a fee per animal and an incentive bonus or penalty. 
Table 5:  Types of contract 
Types of contract  Marketing contract  Product contract  Others  Total 
No. of householders  149 61  10  220 
Percent  67.7 27.7  4.6  100 
Source: Primary  survey. 
3.5  Forms of contracts  
Approximately 51 percent of all contracts are written, with the rest being oral 
contracts between agents. But the choice of contract form is highly correlated 
with contractor type. Oral contracts are used primarily by middlemen, and 
written contracts are used by firms. The underlying reason for this comes from 
the reputation and familiarity associated with middlemen who are from the same 
village as the contracting farmers. Social norms make oral contracts perform 
very well. But outside firms would prefer written contracts that clearly specify 
rights and responsibilities for both parties.  
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above the spot or cash market; alternatively, well in advance of product delivery to market, 
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Table 6:  Forms of contracts 
Forms of contract 
Organization 
Oral contract  Written contract 
Total 
Middleman  64.0 %  36.0 %  100 % 
Agribusiness firms  14.7 %  85.3 %  100 % 
Village community  75.0 %  25.0 %  100 % 
Local government  61.5 %  38.5 %  100 % 
Total percent  49.1 %  50.9 %  100 % 
Source: Primary  survey. 
3.6 Contract  specifications 
Householders with contracts were asked to provide information on contract 
specification: Long-term contracts, i.e., more than one year, account only for 
17.7 percent, while the remaining 82.3 percent were short-term contracts, i.e., 
less than one year.  
Approximately 44 percent of the actual contracts reported in Table 7 specified a 
flexible delivery price that fluctuated with the local market. The second most 
common provision, at 27.3 percent, is specified as floor price. When householders 
were asked about preferred pricing mechanisms, 68.6  percent of farmers 
selected a floor price and only 20.9 percent would shift to a flexible delivery 
price. Since price specification is usually provided by contractors, we can see 
that its use does not fully reflect farmers’ preference. 
Table 7:  Price specification and householders’ willingness-to-accept 
Price specification  Flexible price  Floor price  Fixed 
price  Others Total 
Real situation  44.1 %  27.3 %  22.7 %  5.9 %  100 % 
Willingness-to-
accept  20.9 %  68.6 %  9.1 %  1.4 %  100 % 
Source: Primary  survey. 
The delivery payment method is another critical contract specification that 
directly affects farmers’ intent to engage in contract farming. Table 8 showed 
that cash payment at delivery was used in half of all real transactions. Payment 
after delivery accounts for another 22.3  percent. Most farmers would prefer 
immediate cash payment. 








delivery  Total 
Real situation    50.0 %  27.7 %  22.3 %  100 % 
Willingness-to-accept  66.4 %  27.3 %   6.3 %  100 % 
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3.7  Enforcement and violation of contracts 
Information presented in Table 9 indicates 60 percent of farmers with contracts 
did not have a conflict with the other party. About 35.9  percent of farmers 
reported infrequent conflict, and 4.1  percent often had a problem with their 
contractor. The overall enforcement of contracts is relatively high. 
Table 9:  Contract performance  
Do conflicts  
happen a lot?  Never Seldom Often  Total 
No. of householders  132 79  9  220 
Percent  60.0 35.9  4.1  100 
Source: Primary  survey. 
As shown in Table  10, 86.4  percent of farmers think the main reason for 
conflicts is price. In addition, householders reported that most of the conflicts 
were resolved by negotiation between householders and contractors, and only 
2.3 percent were resolved in court. 
Table 10:  Main reasons that contract conflict happen 
Reasons  Price term  Quality term  Quantity term  Delivery time
No. of householders  76 64  6 16 
Percent  86.4 72.7  6.8 18.2 
Source: Primary  survey. 
3.8  Benefits for participating in householders 
Householders with contracts were asked to rank, using a Likert scale, a number of 
potential benefits. From Table 11, we can see that 38.6 percent of participating 
householders believed that contract farming had played an important role in 
stabilizing the sale price, while 31.4 percent thought contract farming had played 
an important role in improving product quality. However, householders did not 
perceive any benefits in reducing production costs and increasing sale price.  
Table 11:  Benefits for participating householders 
Benefits  No  A little  Normal  A lot  Greater  Total 
Reducing 
production cost  31.8 %  30.0 %  24.1 %  13.6 %  0.5 %  100 % 
Improving pro-
duction quality  7.3 %  15.5 %  43.2 %  31.4 %  2.6 %  100 % 
Improving sale 
price  22.3 %  36.8 %  28.6 %  11.8 %  0.5 %  100 % 
Stabilizing sale 
price  10.5 %  15.0 %  30.9 %  38.6 %  5.0 %  100 % 
Reducing 
marketing cost  21.3 %  25 %  19.1 %  27.3 %  7.3 %  100 % 
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4 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This study examined the current status of contract farming from the perspective 
of Chinese householders. The survey indicates that the actual proportion of 
householders engaged in contract farming is relatively low and significantly less 
than the proportion of householders willing to produce under contract. A lack of 
contract opportunities is the primary reason, particularly for small-sized farms. 
Householders identify price stability and market access as the key as the key 
motivations to participate in contract farming. Middleman and agri-business 
firms were the most important organizations for householders to contract with. 
Although householder cooperatives are not well developed in China, most 
householders are willing to have contact with farmer cooperatives. Marketing 
contracts are more common than production contracts, with oral contracts being 
most widely used by middlemen due to the strong social capital and networks in 
rural areas. The floor price provision is favored by most householders due to its 
lower risk and cash payment on delivery is the preferred payment method. In 
China, most contracts can be carried out. The most important role contract 
farming can play for householders is to stabilize sale prices. 
Our results also showed that the degree of commercialization is associated with 
a higher likelihood of contract farming. Public policies that encourage the 
adjustment of agricultural structure so as to improve farmers’ specialization and 
commercialization should be made right now. Developing farmer cooperatives is 
another critical public policy consideration. Firms have to incur increased 
contracting monitoring costs when confronted with a fragmented farm structure. 
Bargaining associations or other types of cooperatives might reduce transaction 
costs and generate better performance.  
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APPENDIX 
AGREEMENT ON PLANTING WATER RADISH 
 
CONTRACTOR: ZHONGSU LIMITED COMPANY, CITY OF LANXI  
CONTRACTEE: THE GOVERNMENT OF YONGCHANG TOWN 
 
In order to encourage farmers to develop contract farming and optimize 
agricultural structure, and thus ensure that they receive substantial economic 
benefits, both contractor and contractee, through friendly consultation, have 
reached the following agreement on the water-radish planting acreage of the 
farmers and the purchase of the yields: 
1.  Contractor will entrust contractee with the responsibility of planting 
techniques and acreage in some villages. Contractee will provide the planting 
families and the planting acreage, which should be over 3,000 mu. 
2. Contractee should be in charge of examining and supervising the farmers and 
for marketing to the contractor the entire planted radish crop. 
3. The quality standard of the water radish sold by the farmers should meet the 
demands determined by the contractor. 
4.  Contractor offers a favorable price for the delivered goods: Higher, by 
3 percent, than the local market price at delivery time.  
5. Upon expiration of the contract, contractor takes priority of renewing it if 
desired. 
6. This agreement will be valid for 2 years.  
7. This agreement is a duplicate and each side has one copy, which becomes 
effective on the date of signing. 
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ARE MACRO POLICIES ADJUSTED TO INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS AT THE MICRO LEVEL?  
SOME EVIDENCE FROM POLISH AGRICULTURE DURING TRANSITION 
 
JAN FAŁKOWSKI, DOMINIKA MILCZAREK
* 
ABSTRACT 
Tremendous changes have taken place during the transition process in 
agricultural sectors throughout Central and Eastern Europe. There is a general 
recognition that the undertaken reforms often lacked appropriate adjustments to 
local needs and capabilities. This paper focuses on the potential causes of 
discrepancies between pursued policies and the way they have been perceived 
by farmers in Poland. It also investigates institutional arrangements which 
evolved in response to such "disequilibrium" and factors that determine the 
scope and direction of this evolution.  
Keywords: Agricultural policy, institutional arrangements, Poland. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Much attention has been paid in recent years to the inadequacies of policies 
which came to be called the "Washington Consensus" (e.g. STIGLITZ, 1998). 
Empirical evidence has indicated that these policies failed to provide a universal 
remedy for economic stagnation and backwardness. Many researchers have 
presented different views with regard to factors accounting for this failure 
(WILLIAMSON, 2004; STIGLITZ, 2005). Nevertheless, a great majority agrees that 
if a certain policy is to become a successful developmental strategy, it must pay 
adequate attention to the pre-existing institutional capabilities of a particular 
country. Therefore, a condition that needs to be fulfilled in order to promote 
development is that macro policies must be adjusted to institutional arrangements 
functioning at the micro level (RODRIK, 2000; PLATTEAU, 2000).  
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Tremendous changes have taken place during the transition process in Central 
and Eastern European countries. In most of them, the appropriateness of 
development strategies was particularly important in food and agricultural 
sectors. Key factors that stimulated changes in agricultural policies throughout 
the whole region were: The need to improve efficiency (in order to recover from 
the decline in production after the collapse of the socialist system, as well as to 
face stiff international competition) and to prepare for EU accession. Nowadays, 
the first group of post-socialist countries is already in the EU and all of them, at 
least partially, have recovered from the shock following privatization and 
liberalization. Therefore, it is interesting to see how policies pursued in these 
countries corresponded to the expectations and capabilities of agents operating 
at the micro level. This paper aims to examine this issue using the example of 
the Polish agricultural sector.  
In Section 2, we briefly present a new approach to economic reforms which has 
evolved from the "Washington Consensus". This part also provides some 
insights to Polish farmers’ perception of post-1989 reforms. In addition, 
examples of the inappropriate adjustment of macro policies to capabilities of 
agents operating at the micro level are presented
1. In Section 3, we focus on 
potential causes of this lack of adjustment. Section 4 uses the black currant and 
dairy sectors to illustrate what institutional arrangements evolved in response to 
this "disequilibrium". This part also investigates what factors were responsible 
for these institutional innovations. Section 5 concludes.  
2 TRANSITION PROCESS IN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR FROM AN 
INSTITUTIONAL AND MICRO PERSPECTIVES 
At the beginning of the 1990s, research on the transition process in Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and Newly Independent States (NIS) 
concentrated on analyzing stabilization policies and their influence on economic 
performance. Recent research on the transition process has examined economic 
and political institutions, which have been recognized as important determinants 
of successful economic transition
2. Theoretical and empirical literature has used 
New Institutional and Political Economy tools to analyze political and economic 
spheres, as well as the relationship between them. It has been shown that results of 
economic reforms influenced the situation of economic agents (e.g. households), 
through which political institutions (e.g. voting mechanism) could influence 
                                                 
1  In our paper, we focus only on discrepancies between introduced policies and expectations 
of farmers (directly affected by these policies). We do realize that this should be treated in 
a broader context, taking into account welfare of the whole society. However, this goes 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
2  See for example: DĄBROWSKI and GORTAT (2002); FIDRMUC (2001) or HAVRYLYSHYN and 
VAN ROODEN (2003).  Are macro policies adjusted to institutional arrangements at the micro level?  207
policy change. This in turn led to changes in economic institutions, economic 
performance, and the agents’ situation (MILCZAREK, 2002).  
Experience from CEECs and NIS with respect to the transition process, debate 
on the "Washington Consensus"
3, as well as the development of institutional 
research have led to the need of developing a new approach to reforms. Many 
authors emphasize the importance of the institutional dimension, which shows 
that changes in policies are ineffective until they are embedded in institutional 
reforms. For example, RODRIK (2004) calls for "second-generation reforms"
4, 
which are meant to overcome the inefficacy of the earlier wave of reforms, which 
relied too heavily on liberalization, stabilization, and privatization policies. Often, 
this inefficacy is related to the so-called institutional disequilibrium caused by the 
conflict between formal and informal institutions (NORTH, 1990). This is 
especially true in the case of CEECs and NIS where new institutions were 
imported from the West and implemented in societies with no democratic and 
capitalistic traditions. In these countries, a communist legacy embodied in 
peoples’ behavior and mentality played an important role in determining the 
scope and speed of the transformation process (BALCEROWICZ, 1995). 
Economic and institutional reforms have heavily influenced agricultural sectors’ 
performance in CEECs and NIS
5. Privatization, as well as price and trade 
liberalization, have created an entirely new environment for all actors from the 
agri-food chain.  
In Poland, total agricultural production from 1997-1999 was 8  % lower in 
comparison to the average from 1986-1990 (LIEFERT and SWINNEN, 2002). 
Moreover, unfavorable terms of trade for agricultural products
6 resulted in the 
drastic deterioration of farmers’ incomes in relation to incomes of those 
employed outside agriculture (WILKIN, 2000). Given this context, it is not 
surprising that Polish farmers have been disappointed with changes that emerged 
after the collapse of the communist regime. According to findings presented in 
CZAPIŃSKI and PANEK (2004) in 2003, as much as 75 % of rural inhabitants 
evaluated these changes as very or rather unfavorable. It is also worth noting that 
this share was higher than that observed for various groups of urban inhabitants. 
                                                 
3  The term "Washington Consensus" was invented by Williamson and included policy 
propositions such as: Fiscal discipline; interest rate liberalization; a competitive exchange 
rate; trade liberalization; liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment; 
privatization; deregulation, etc. (WILLIAMSON, 1990). 
4  These reforms include, for example: Controlling corruption, rendering monetary and fiscal 
institutions independent, strengthening corporate governance, enhancing the functioning of 
the judiciary, etc. (RODRIK, 2004).  
5  It is important to notice that changes in the agricultural sector’s performance differed 
significantly over countries. For a review of the evidence, see ROZELLE and SWINNEN (2004).  
6  In comparison with the beginning of transformation (1990 = 100), the index of price 
relations of sold agricultural products to goods and services purchased by private farms has 
been gradually decreasing and reached, in 2003, the level of 63.9 (GUS, 2004).  Jan Fałkowski, Dominika Milczarek  208
The above statistics help explain farmers’ very critical attitude towards the 
agricultural policies of subsequent governments. In 1992, 72 % of farmers were of 
the opinion that governmental policies were not in interest of rural areas (ROSNER, 
1993). In 1999, this share was even higher and amounted to 85 % (WILKIN, 2000).  
These figures leave no doubt that policies which were pursued in Poland at the 
beginning of transformation failed to meet the farmers’ expectations. This 
problem is even more interesting since disappointment with the state’s policies 
towards agriculture goes with farmers’ belief that it is the government and not 
themselves who can improve the agricultural sector’s performance. When asked 
about the main factors determining the situation of Polish agriculture, 76 % of 
the farmers mentioned "agricultural policy of the government", whereas only 
16 % indicated "farmers’ activity" (WILKIN, 2002).  
To illustrate the discrepancy between undertaken measures and the way they 
were perceived by farmers, one may recall two examples: The first deals with 
the privatization of state farms, and the second concerns the issue of creating 
producer’s groups.  
Privatizing the state sector has caused dramatic changes in the employment 
structure in the majority of rural areas. By the end of 1990s, around 50 %
7 of 
state farms’ employees were dismissed. Restructuring the state farms was one of 
the important reasons behind the very high unemployment rate in western and 
northern Poland (where the share of state-owned land was much higher than 
average). Such a high rate of dismissals illustrates, among others, the clash 
between the interest of new owners and the mentality of former state farm 
employees, who could not adapt to the more demanding requirements with 
regard to their performance (MILCZAREK, 2002).  
Another example of "institutional disequilibrium" was an attempt by the Polish 
government to create producer groups by supporting cooperation. However, a 
very small number of producer groups was established. HARDT (2006) explains 
this by the low level of social capital: Low trust between farmers and the fear of 
being cheated by partners. "Therefore, the government’s attempt to establish 
large producer groups resulted in failure, as there was a mismatch between the 
intention of the formal law and farmers’ social practices" (HARDT, 2006, p. 5).  
Combined with the statistics presented above, these examples build a very 
interesting picture of Polish agriculture, which indicates that notwithstanding 
some farmers contesting the post-1989 reforms, breaking the habits of homo 
sovieticus is progressing very slowly
8.  
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3 POTENTIAL CAUSES OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE MACRO AND 
MICRO LEVEL IN POLISH AGRICULTURE DURING TRANSITION 
Section 2 provided evidence that measures implemented by the state in order to 
facilitate changes in agriculture during transition were inappropriately adjusted 
to local needs. As already mentioned, the reasons for this "disequilibrium" can 
be found in the communist legacy embodied in farmers’ behavior and mentality. 
It seems, however, that there are other factors which contribute to this state of 
affairs
9. Below we attempt to identify them.  
To start with, it is worth noting that although Polish agriculture suffered under 
the well-known shortcomings of the socialist system, it entered a period of 
transformation with a heritage different from that observed in other countries in 
the region. The most important facet to notice is that the production sector, 
notwithstanding the state’s efforts to pursue collectivization, has always remained 
primarily in the hands of family farms. Therefore, in comparison with other post-
soviet countries, the local agrarian structure has been highly fragmented. This, in 
turn, has not only had a prominent impact on the sector’s efficiency, but has 
strongly confined farmers’ bargaining power when conducting negotiations with 
agents acting at other stages of the food chain. In effect, farmers, especially 
smaller ones, have expected support from the state. This has placed the 
government in a very difficult situation as regards launching any policy towards 
the sector. This is because, given the Polish agrarian structure, satisfying many 
(often poorly-organized) individual claimants must have led to the dispersion of 
already limited funds, thus confining their efficacy.  
In addition, while deciding for a certain measure to be undertaken, the 
government must have taken into account the process of gradually ongoing farm 
polarization (PSR, 2003). This, in consequence, led to a situation where the 
government was required to address the needs of not only numerous, but also 
highly differentiated agents. This has made the occurrence of social conflict over 
public fund allocation much more probable. Simultaneously, the probability of 
"disequilibrium" between macro policies and micro expectations has become 
more likely.  
Third, one needs to take into account another point closely related to the 
problem of fragmented agrarian structure – agrarian overpopulation. Registered 
and hidden rural unemployment, estimated at approximately two million people 
(KOLARSKA-BOBIŃSKA et al., 2001) and a share of inefficient farms
10 assessed at 
roughly 50 % (ZIĘTARA, 2001) are a clear illustration of the magnitude of this 
problem. Nonetheless, given the low employment opportunities in both rural and 
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urban areas, the government could have been very reluctant to solve it. This is 
because in these circumstances, the agricultural sector might have been seen as 
buffering the effects of a lack of job opportunities. Agrarian overpopulation, 
however, has been one of the most critical bottlenecks in moving towards more 
efficient farming. Therefore, such a situation must have led to discontent for the 
farmers and thus increased the number of claimants; these claimants have 
comprised, on the one hand, more efficient farmers who expect policies that 
radically facilitate resource reallocation, and on the other hand, those who have 
great difficulties in making ends meet.  
Fourth, while looking at the correspondence between "macro policies" and 
expectations at the micro level in Polish agriculture, one needs to keep in mind 
that due to agrarian overpopulation, this sector, directly or indirectly, concerns a 
very large group of people, with roughly 2.9  million agricultural holdings
11. 
Additionally, about 460,000  people are employed in the processing industry 
(GUS, 2004). As a result, agricultural policies have always been strongly 
influenced by political and social issues rather than economic analysis alone
12. 
From 1989-2005 there were 14 Ministers of Agriculture; thus, one is inclined 
towards the statement that visions for the agricultural sector, if anything, 
changed even more often than with every election. This resulted in the lack of a 
transparent, coherent and long-term strategy for agricultural development. Thus, 
any policies that were invented and administered from the macro perspective 
have had great problems in gaining credence at the micro level.  
Fifth, the discrepancy between pursued policies and the way they were 
perceived by farmers may have resulted from the fact that during transformation, 
Polish agriculture was hardly included in a broader rural development 
framework (WILKIN, 2003). Further, much too little attention has been paid to 
the relationship between agriculture and the rest of economy (TRACY, 1997). 
Instead of an integrated, overall policy framework, agricultural policy was 
implemented in isolation from the other sectors’ policies, not taking into account 
the fact that performance of the former is closely linked to results achieved by 
the latter. In justification of the above failures, one has to say that similar 
problems concerned other new member states as well as the EU itself. This lack 
of a complex and comprehensive approach to rural development and agriculture 
could have influenced farmers’ perception of macro policies in the following 
ways: First, it resulted in the poor coordination of instruments aimed at 
improving the performance of agents operating in rural areas. As a consequence, 
there were many measures which overlapped with each other. This not only gave 
the impression that rural policies were chaotic, but also strongly affected the 
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efficiency of resources being used. Second, it resulted in the lack of efficacious 
policies providing alternative options/safety-net schemes for those leaving 
agriculture. That between 1999-2002, the share of farmers who were afraid of 
becoming unemployed rose from 34 % to 37 % supports this supposition. This is 
the more symptomatic, since earlier, those who were afraid of unemployment were 
rather those working outside of agriculture (FEDYSZAK-RADZIEJOWSKA, 2002).  
Finally, one should also mention that since the beginning of transformation, 
measures supporting rural development in Poland have always been organized in 
a very centralized manner. Regions in particular have had very limited, if any, 
autonomy in deciding what policies should be implemented. Territorial reform 
from 1999, which aimed to change this state of affairs, unfortunately did not 
facilitate achieving the goals that were initially planned. This failure can be 
mostly attributed to incoherently-designed law and the fact that the delegation of 
power was not accompanied by a transfer of appropriate funds (HARDT, 2006; 
WILKIN, 2003). Nowadays, there is a broad recognition among researchers from 
various fields that the same policies may lead to substantially different results 
depending on the countries or regions in which they are implemented. Regional 
differentiation with respect to unemployment rate, average farm size or the 
extent of reliance on non-agricultural income sources in Poland fully support 
this statement. Given this context, it is very likely that the "disequilibrium" 
between macro policies and expectations formulated at the micro level has been 
due to the excessively-centralized way of making decisions.  
The above-presented discussion shows that the appropriate adjustment of 
agricultural policies to local conditions during transition has been very difficult 
in Poland. There have been two factors (the great number and diversity of 
farmers), both inherent to the nature of local agriculture, which have very much 
affected the efficacy of every potential measure, no matter if it was implemented 
by a left or right wing government. Moreover, the great majority of undertaken 
reforms consisted of "rolling back the state" Communism, on the other hand, left 
as its aftermath a people used to relying on the state. The discussed arguments 
revealed, however, other weaknesses of agricultural policies which had been 
pursued. These policies suffered from insufficient integration into the broader 
rural development framework, which resulted in a lack of coordination of 
various policies targeted to rural areas and the inefficiency of spent resources. 
Moreover, the provision of employment opportunities outside agriculture and a 
regional approach to planning and implementing policies were not high on the 
agenda.  Jan Fałkowski, Dominika Milczarek  212
4 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AT THE MICRO LEVEL 
EVOVLING IN RESPONSE TO INAPPROPRIATE ADJUSTMENT  
OF MACRO POLICIES  
In this part, we investigate mechanisms which evolved in response to the 
discrepancy between implemented agricultural policies and farmers’ expectations. 
Further, we identify factors which facilitated the evolution of these mechanisms 
using the dairy and black currant sectors. These examples were chosen for a 
number of reasons; in both fields, Poland is one of the most important producers 
in the EU. With respect to the former, Poland occupies fourth place in terms of 
production, and regarding the latter, Poland holds the first position both in terms 
of overall production as well as deliveries to the EU internal market (Table 1).  











Share in EU 
black currant 
production (%) 
Share of black 
currant deli-
veries to EU 
market (%) 
Poland  11.8  8.3  142.6     33.2
a  56 
EU-25
  142.9 100  429
a 100  99 
Source: IERiGŻ 
Note:  
a For the EU data presents production of all currants. 
Moreover, both sectors entered the transition period with a considerable number 
of farmers’ cooperatives in the processing industry, and experienced quite a 
substantial inflow of foreign capital. Furthermore, chosen sectors have always 
been characterized by a highly fragmented production structure (Table 2 and 
Table  3). At the same time, however, they have always been relatively 
concentrated at the regional level. Given the considerations from the previous 
section, both sectors were particularly vulnerable to the inappropriate adjustment 
of policies geared toward local needs.  
Though they have much in common, during the transition period, important 
differences between these two sectors have appeared. These differences 
included, among others, the concentration process at the farm level and various 
forms of cooperation between farms and the processing industry. In effect, 
development in the milk sector is perceived to be an example of real success. On 
the other hand, the black currant sector is seen as completely unpredictable 
mainly due to price fluctuations. Below, we argue that changes in institutional 
arrangements at the micro level which have taken place in the dairy sector could 
be treated as a response to the fact that policies implemented at the macro level 
were insufficiently "filtered through local practices and needs" (RODRIK, 2000). 
We also provide explanations of why similar adjustments were not the case in 
the black currant sector.  Are macro policies adjusted to institutional arrangements at the micro level?  213
Table 2:  Polish currant producers with respect to farm size in 2002 
Farm size 
(UAA-ha) 









a  2002 2002  1996
a  2002 2002 
< 1  77.6  74.7  11.5  90.7  33.5 
1-1,99   n.a.   4.3   5.2 
96.1 
 5.3  15.2 
2-4,99   n.a.   2.5   7.1   3.0  20.7 
5-4,99   n.a.   0.6   4.1 
 3.6 
 0.7  12.0 
10-15   n.a.   0.2   1.9   0.2   5.5 
> 15   n.a.   0.1   4.5 
 0.3 
 0.1  13.1 
∑   n.a.  82.4  34.3  100  100  100 
Source: IERiGŻ a. 
Notes: 
a Producers of all kinds of berries except strawberries.; n.a. – Not available. 
 
Table 3:  Polish milk producers with respect to herd size in 1996 and 2002 
Herd size 
(cows) 
No. of producers 
(1,000)  Farms distribution (%) Cows distribution (%) 
  1996  2002  1996  2002 1996 2002 
1  41.8  45.9 16.1 14.0 
2 
   873  593 
27.7  21.9 21.4 13.3 
3-4  19.1  15.0 24.8 15.5 
5-9 
   362  225 
9.7  10.7 23.0 21.0 
10-19      19   44  1.5    5.1    6.8  20.0 
> 20        3   11  0.2    1.4    7.9  16.2 
∑  1  257  873  100  100 100 100 
Source:  PSR, 1998, 2003.  
Because the black currant sector is poorly documented in terms of statistical 
data, the presented material regarding this field is based mainly upon expert 
opinion of the fruit and vegetable market gathered during three individual 
interviews.  
As mentioned, both the milk and black currant sector in Poland has had to 
struggle with farm fragmentation. With respect to the former sector, this is well 
illustrated by the fact that since the beginning of transformation, the number of 
milk producers has decreased by about 1.2  million (66  %) and a further 
decrease, though of lesser magnitude, is still expected. As regards the latter on 
the other hand, one may recall estimates pointing out that the optimal number of 
farmers producing all kinds of currants should not exceed 18,000 (PAIZ, 2000). 
From the sectors’ efficiency point of view, small producers may be regarded as 
undesirable for at least three reasons: First, it heavily affects the transaction 
costs of product delivery/collection. Second, the smaller the scale of production, 
the longer the period needed for a given investment to become profitable. In 
effect, a small holding may prevent a farmer from making on-farm investments. Jan Fałkowski, Dominika Milczarek  214
Third, since small-scale production usually goes together with labor-intensive 
production techniques, it is likely to be difficult to fulfill high quality requirements.  
Following YAO (2000) and CARTER  and SALGADO (2001) the inconvenient 
distribution of land endowments is very likely to persist because of insufficient 
land supply, very often due to a lack of employment opportunities outside 
agriculture, or farmer’s limited access to credit, respectively. Therefore, from a 
farmers’ perspective, the problem of small-scale production could be regarded 
as a consequence of exogenous factors. Given that in regions more abundant in 
land and/or less affected by credit rationing, this problem would not be so 
severe, and may be treated as a result of an unfavorable geographical location. 
One may argue then that, as was shown by RODRIK (2003), the negative 
consequences of such a state of affairs can be outweighed by good institutions. 
In this context, almost continuously-increasing unemployment in rural areas 
during the 1990s (FRENKEL, 2003) indicates that formal institutions in terms of 
targeted policies could hardly succeed in encouraging farmers to part with their 
land. Thus, they could hardly contribute to the process of farm concentration. As 
a consequence, informal institutions must have evolved in response to this 
failure. Below we investigate how this evolution looked like in the dairy and 
black currant sectors.  
The main difference between measures adopted in these two sectors relates to 
the issue of the relationship and cooperation between farmers and the processing 
industry. On the one hand, in the dairy sector we observe the development of 
contractual agreements which, already before accession to the EU (when 
contracts became a must) covered almost 100 % of dairy deliveries. On the other 
hand, black currant production, not counting the largest suppliers, has always 
taken place without any previous arrangements.  
This difference in contractual arrangements between these sectors has been of 
great consequence in the level of support given to farmers by processors. As was 
found by DRIES and SWINNEN (2002, 2005) dairies in Poland have developed 
extended programs that aim to assist their supplying farms. These programs 
entail providing access to inputs and leasing cows, as well as loans for buying 
cooling and milking equipment. In addition, most of the companies provided 
farmers with extension services. What is important here is that this support was 
not directed only towards large producers but aimed to increase the scale of 
production of relatively small farms as well (DRIES and SWINNEN, 2002). This 
supports the hypothesis that institutional arrangements at the micro level evolved 
in response to the inadequacies of policies stimulating farm concentration.  
A completely different view emerges from the black currant sector. According 
to interviewed experts, since there are hardly any contractual arrangements, 
processors have no incentives to engage in any form of support to farmers. 
However, this situation could be different if they had loyal suppliers. The example 
presented in MAACK (2005) regarding strawberry producers who have agreed to Are macro policies adjusted to institutional arrangements at the micro level?  215
a four-year contract with a company and benefited from its assistance with credit 
intake and advisory services supports this assertion. This cooperation resulted in 
considerable productivity gains and was beneficial to both contracting parties. It 
seems that nowadays there is a growing recognition that in the long run, these 
kind of agreements are indispensable. Here is a statement from the head of the 
fruit processor, "Wink Polska", who presents his opinion on the matter:  
Our relations with fruit growers and their organizations are not bad, but there is 
a lack of permanent representation of both producers and processors as well as 
forms of day-to-day cooperation, agreeing on interests or analyzing the 
situation in Poland and abroad as regards yields, trees rooting policy, etc. 
There are several associations of fruit growers, but each of them has its own 
priorities and tries to ensure its own interest. There is a similar situation in the 
processing sector. I hope it will change soon […]. Both parties – processors and 
fruit growers – will benefit from stabilization, assured terms of transactions and 
a rational development of the production base. This could be made only through 
contractual agreements, which one needs for support (ZIELONY SZTANDAR, 2004). 
The difference in attitudes towards vertical cooperation between two chosen sectors 
may be due to several reasons. First, during the transition process, prices of black 
currant, compared to milk prices, have revealed much higher fluctuations (Figure 1).  
For example, from 1997-2000, prices increased fivefold only become eleven times 
lower over the next four years. In such unstable circumstances, neither producers 
nor processors have been eager to engage in long-term agreements. Both parties 
simply preferred to count on prices changing in accordance with their wishes. In 
the milk sector, on the other hand, the variation in prices was lower and so were 
incentives for seeking extra profits connected with sudden change in prices. 
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Second, both sectors were obliged to meet different requirements with regard to 
product quality, and so their initial level of adjustment was also different. 
Though it is difficult to compare, one may hazard a guess that quality standards 
were more demanding in the dairy sector. As a result, the introduction of 
contracts and the provision of support to farmers in this sector was driven by this 
additional factor.  
Third, as shown in the above-mentioned quotation, the fruit sector in general 
lacks cooperation between agents operating at the same stage of the supply 
chain. One reason for this relates to the issue of a dramatic reduction in the 
number, and the diminishing role of, horticulture cooperatives. In 1988 there 
were 140 co-operatives controlling roughly 50 % of the market. Within ten years 
their number has decreased to 12, whereas market share has dropped to less than 
1 %. Changes in the number and position of dairy cooperatives, on the other 
hand, were much less severe. Although the number of cooperatives decreased 
from 352 in 1993 to 270 in 1999, they still controlled 70 % of the market. As a 
consequence, fruit growers have not only lost direct linkages to the processing 
industry; membership in cooperatives was also a very important element that had 
been keeping them together. In effect, they suddenly needed to ensure their 
interests on their own, which considerably increased transaction costs incurred by 
themselves as well as their trading partners. Thus, the potential benefits of signing 
a contract are very likely to be outweighed by the costs of its preparation, 
monitoring and enforcement. Recently, a lot of effort has been expended in order 
to organize fruit growers into producer groups, but, as already stated in Section 2, 
the results have been rather unsatisfying. The reason for that is surely the low level 
of farmers’ social capital. However, what seems to matter here as well is lack of 
stability on the market. In such circumstances, in turn, following HAYEK (1988), 
attempts to cooperate could be seen as irrational. This is because individual 
adjustment to changing conditions is much quicker than group adjustment. 
Fourth, it is reasonable to assume that different institutional innovations in the dairy 
and black currant sectors stem from different paths of cooperative development. 
The fact that cooperatives in the dairy sector have retained a strong position must 
have influenced the behavior of other companies. This is because the traditional 
functions performed by cooperatives, in addition to product processing and 
marketing, also included providing its members with inputs and consultancy. 
Thus, other dairies working on their strategies must have taken this into account. 
On the contrary, in the black currant sector this factor could not make such a 
contribution since the role of horticulture cooperatives has decreased over 
transition to become only marginal.  
Fifth, compared to the milk sector, the black currant sector has been 
characterized by the existence of an additional stage in the supply chain, namely 
wholesalers between farmer and processor. The relevance of this intermediary 
could be illustrated by the fact that in 1999, as well as in 2004, 80 % of the Are macro policies adjusted to institutional arrangements at the micro level?  217
whole currant production was supplied through collecting points (GUS, 2005). 
This fact must have determined the nature of relations between farmers and the 
processing industry.  
Finally, the evolution of relations between producers and processors were 
determined by both parties’ hopes and expectations with respect to market 
regulations after EU accession. When compared to the situation before accession, 
nowadays the dairy market looks completely different, whereas in the case of 
black currants, one may say that the status quo has been maintained. Such a state 
of affairs had been surely anticipated by parties engaged. Thus, both sectors had 
much different incentives to stimulate certain adjustment processes. For 
instance, dairies must have taken into account that after May 2004, the milk 
supply in Poland would be regulated by the quota system. In this context, 
institutional innovations that took place in the dairy sector before accession can 
be treated as a way of gaining loyal suppliers.  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Results from recent opinion polls conducted among farmers clearly suggest that 
their assessment of changes that have taken place in Poland over the last 16 years 
is negative. Similarly, they negatively evaluate post-1989 agricultural policies. 
This indicates that measures undertaken in order to facilitate the adjustment of 
local agricultural sectors to newly-emerging free-market conditions have not 
met farmers’ expectations. This paper is an attempt to provide an explanation of 
why such a situation has happened. One reason is the farmers’ mentality itself, 
which is still infused with homo sovieticus habits. The second factor is the 
heterogeneity of actors in the agricultural sector (large number of actors and 
diversity of their needs). Moreover, a lack of coordination in rural policy, as 
well as the excessive centralization of the decision-making process also 
contributed to this state of affairs.  
Further, we argue that contractual arrangements between farmers and the 
processing industry could be seen as a response to the inappropriate adjustment 
of macro policies to local needs. Using the examples of the dairy and black 
currant sectors, we illustrate what factors facilitated the evolution of these 
institutional innovations. Price stability, the strong position of cooperatives, a 
shorter supply chain and high quality requirements all seem to stimulate closer 
and more formal relations between farmers and processors. Adjustments to 
anticipated policy regulations are also important.  
An analysis of the relationship between macro policies and local needs during 
transition allows one to trace the factors accounting for failures or successes of 
particular policies. It may thus provide very useful conclusions, which should 
not be underestimated when evaluating current, or preparing new, policy 
measures. In addition, in Poland there are at least several fields where conflict Jan Fałkowski, Dominika Milczarek  218
between the macro and micro levels may appear in the near future. The concept 
of multifunctional agriculture, the redefinition of the CAP, as well as further 
WTO negotiations or GMO issues could serve as examples. While bearing them 
in mind, one needs to take into account that factors responsible for inappropriate 
policy adjustment during the last fifteen years will not change immediately. We 
therefore hope that our paper may provide some insights which could be used 
for dealing with these problems.  
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THE AUSTRIAN PRIVATE FOUNDATION AS A LEGAL FORM IN FARM 
MANAGEMENT, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON TAX ISSUES 
 
HERMANN PEYERL, GÜNTER BREUER
∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Farmers are faced with numerous problems due to the increasingly difficult 
conditions within management enterprises. Thereby, the choice of legal form, 
amongst other issues, has to be carefully considered to legally minimize tax 
burdens. Existing agricultural enterprises in Austria are mainly sole 
proprietorships, but the establishment of private foundations could gain 
significance in the future. Private foundations’ potential to provide lasting 
security for assets, as well as possible favorable taxation, make this investment 
form especially attractive for larger farms. This paper discusses the basic legal 
aspects of the private foundation in Austria with respect to its suitability for 
agricultural businesses. Furthermore, model cost estimates are illustrated to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the involved taxation aspects. 
Keywords: Farm management, private foundation, inheritance and gift tax, 
income tax. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
European agriculture is characterized by increasing competition and increasing 
capital investments. These developments lead, in turn, to continual structural 
fluctuation, and farmers are subjected to numerous demands in the sphere of 
business management. Alongside the technical requirements of production, it is 
especially necessary to ensure an economic structure suited to these demands. 
Literary sources advocate the theory that the profit margin after income tax is 
relevant in management decision-making (e.g. SCHWINN, 1993; KUßMAUL, 1998;  
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SEICHT, 2002). For this reason, farmers are obliged to minimize their income tax 
burden within the framework of the legal possibilities open to them. 
Presently, farms in Austria are predominately family businesses, run along the 
lines of sole proprietorship. From a management point of view, the question is 
posed as to whether other legal structures would be more profitable to farmers 
in the future, especially in the form of private foundations. Existing private 
foundations in Austria are mostly comprised of family foundations, whereby 
relatives and heirs benefit from the income resulting from assets. In addition, 
assets are protected by limiting the heirs’ accessibility named in the 
foundation. In all these cases, it is obvious that the founder tries to secure the 
right to exert influence over stipulations made in the foundation’s documentation 
(NOWOTNY, 2003). 
Using these introductory factors as a starting point, private foundations’ 
potential as a legal form for family farming businesses will be evaluated in this 
paper, with special consideration given to the range of legal structures 
appertaining to the demands specific to these farming enterprises. Alongside 
taxation aspects, freedom in management decision-making, securing assets, as 
well as business liability and financing are all integral factors to be considered. 
In the majority of cases, not all these aims can be fully realized and in some 
cases antagonistic relationships also exist. 
This paper aims to illuminate the taxation consequences resulting from 
introducing farm assets into private foundations within the relevant legal 
framework. A decisive motive for this choice is the possible savings on income 
tax. Contrary to this are the expenses and taxes of the business, as well as the 
continual expenditure involved in foundation management. Establishing a 
foundation involves complex problems, and therefore a dynamic tax model 
concept will be used to illustrate the estimation of tax effects. The size of the 
farming business itself has a significant influence on the attainable taxation 
advantages. This factor is therefore a central point of the analysis. 
2 LEGAL REGULATIONS APPERTAINING TO AUSTRIAN PRIVATE 
FOUNDATIONS 
2.1 Civil  law  regulations 
2.1.1  Concept and characteristics of private foundations 
Private foundations are juristically independent, non-owned assets that are 
drawn up by the founder by means of a foundation deed to fulfill certain aims. 
Private foundations must be of a domicile origin. Instead of owners, the 
foundation has beneficiaries who have different entitlements according to the 
declaration and wishes of the founder. As a rule, self-use foundations stipulate 
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Article 1 par. 2 of the Austrian private foundation law, a private foundation is 
not allowed to exercise any commercial activities other than those of an 
incidental character. Private foundations are also barred from managing the 
business of trading companies and cannot be unlimited partners. The eligibility 
of immediate agricultural activities for private foundations is a controversial issue, 
but according to the foundation taxation legislation (Stiftungssteuerrichtlinien – 
StiftR) they should be acceptable (ORTMAYR, 1998; StiftR, 2001, Rz 34). 
2.1.2  Establishment and formation of private foundations 
A private foundation can be established for a definite or indefinite period of time 
(GASSAUER-FLEISSNER and GRAVE, 2005). The foundation is formed through the 
legal documentation of the intended foundation declaration, whereby it concerns 
a unilateral declaration of will with no obligatory recipient that can also be 
constructed as a last will. If the minimal requirements of private foundation law, 
stipulated in Article 9 par. 1 are fulfilled in the foundation deed, further stipu-
lations can be made as long as these do not conflict with the compulsory law 
(HUBER, 1995). Quite often, an appendix is drawn up which, unlike the foundation 
deed itself, does not appear in the company register (WERKUSCH, 2001). 
As long as the minimal capital of 70,000 EUR is not presented in cash, the 
services of a court-appointed foundation auditor are required to establish 
whether the value of the capital on hand fulfills this amount (CSOKLICH, 1994). 
The introduction of property accompanying the demand of an "establishment 
audit" must be taken into consideration by farmers planning a foundation and 
the expenses involved must be compensated by tax-saving effects in the 
following years. 
2.1.3 Private  foundation  executive  bodies 
Every private foundation requires a board of directors and an auditor, and in 
addition, depending on the number of employees, an obligatory supervisory 
board is also required. The required number of 300 employees is, however, not 
attained in Austrian farms (LBG, 2005). The board of directors has to consist of 
at least three members for a stipulated or unstipulated period of time, and no 
immediate family member of the founder can be accepted as a member of the 
board. The founder himself, as far as he is a beneficiary, as well as legal entities 
are also barred from this function (HUBER and LEITNER, 2004). The first board 
of directors in the foundation is selected by the founder or the curator and those 
following are either chosen from the old board of directors or determined by the 
court. The founders can also select an advisory board to support the purpose of 
the foundation. This advisory board is not entitled to select or dismiss the board 
of directors due to possible conflicts of interests (BRIEM, 2002). The 
beneficiaries can exercise their control rights through the right to receive 
information and through access to the books; these rights can be exercised at any 
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The foundation auditor is selected, usually at the request of the founder, by the 
court or, respectively, by the supervisory board, and has the status of a chartered 
accountant who has to check the annual statement of accounts, the bookkeeping 
and the assessment report according to the regulations laid down by trade law 
(VETTER, 2000). In addition, the fulfillment of the foundation deed’s aims, as 
well as the status report, are to be checked. 
To summarize, when creating a foundation, a farmer forfeits his unlimited 
powers of decision-making through the obligatory transfer of rights to supervisory 
bodies. However, the appointment of a foundation advisory council, to which 
beneficiaries can also belong, ensures a certain degree of influence. 
2.1.4  Amendments, revocation and dissolution of a private foundation 
The private foundation law allows for extensive amendment and revocation of 
the foundation from the period between its declaration of the establishment and 
recording of the deed. After the private foundation has been established, it can 
only be amended or revoked by the founder if he has inserted a clause to this 
effect in the trust document (RASTEIGER, 2004). If this right should be preserved 
for the following generation, then the heirs would have to have the status of 
founders as well (KRAUS, 2004). 
Prior to the documentation of the foundation, the board of directors has the right 
to alter the declaration under certain circumstances, should the sole founder or 
last founder fall away. After documentation, the board of directors can only 
execute amendments when there is no possibility that the founder himself can do 
so. But the board of directors is, under all circumstances, duty-bound to adhere 
to the aim of the foundation (RASTEIGER, 2004). 
Reasons that can lead to the dissolution of a private foundation are listed under 
Article 35, namely: The expiration of the intended period of time; application 
for bankruptcy procedure; denial of bankruptcy due to insufficient estate; as well 
as the court’s or the board of directors’ unanimous agreement to dissolve the 
foundation. The board of directors has to reach a unanimous agreement for 
dissolution if it receives a valid revocation on the part of the founder, if the aim 
of the trust has been fulfilled, or if the aim cannot be carried out due to lack of 
capital. This also applies where a non-profit foundation that has served as 
support of persons for a period of 100 years and where no unanimous agreement 
has been reached by the last beneficiaries to continue with the trust, or where 
other reasons that are listed in the foundation declaration for its dissolution have 
been unanimously agreed upon by the board of directors (GASSAUER-FLEISSNER 
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2.2  Taxation methods in a private foundation as compared to sole 
proprietorship farming businesses 
2.2.1 General 
The following model concept will be illustrated using the relevant tax 
regulations as a basis, whereby a distinction must be made between capital 
transfer taxation, which generally takes the form of inheritance and gift tax or 
property transfer tax in Austria, and the continual profit tax. Alongside this, the 
taxation aspect of the dissolution of a foundation, as well as the Value Added 
Tax has to be considered. In the first instance, it is necessary to establish that in 
the field of agriculture the assessed value serves as the focal point for various 
taxes and expenditures, whereby this is concerned with a standardized profit 
value that should reflect natural and economic yield conditions and should be 
allotted to each business (BMLFUW, 2005). 
2.2.2  Taxation of the transfer of assets 
Asset transfer after death, or as a gift, is dependent on the inheritance and gift 
tax under Austrian law. The tax assessment stipulations are measured according 
to the value of the transferred assets, whereby in some cases various allowances 
can be deducted. In the case of properties, three times the assessed value is 
relevant. The tax rate increases according to the value of the assets and the 
degree of the family relationship status, and varies between 2 % and 60 %. In 
the case of property bequests, the tax increases, according to the family 
relationship status, by a "property tax equivalent" of 2 % or 3.5 %. 
When transferring a farm, there are certain special regulations. The property tax 
law provides for the transfer of assets to close relatives with reciprocation, 
whereby the beneficiaries guarantee the transfer or provision of livelihood. The 
tax amounts to 2 % of the simple assessed value of the business. If the reciprocal 
value is under the threefold assessed value, then administrative practice takes the 
form of a composite endowment (JILCH, 2002). In this case, there is, alongside 
the property tax that is assessed from the reciprocal value, an additional 
inheritance and gift tax for the amount of the threefold assessed value exceeding 
the reciprocal value. If there is a house included in the properties used for 
farming purposes, allocating the reciprocation value for tax assessment purposes 
is calculated according to the simple assessed value (URBAN, 2005). 
When transferring without reciprocation, taxation takes the form of a gift tax. 
On the other hand, a purchase according to market prices is taxed under property 
tax regulations. In all inheritance and gift tax business transfer cases, there is a 
possible tax exemption of 365,000 EUR, as long as the transferor is aged 55 or 
more, or as long as he is unemployable. Furthermore, the "Promotion of Start-ups 
Act" must be taken into consideration, whereby in certain cases, a business 
transfer can possibly be entitled to a reduction up to a significant amount of 
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In addition, introducing capital into a private foundation falls under the system 
of inheritance and gift tax. In practice however, there is a linear tariff amounting 
to 5 % of the threefold assessed value. The allotment of properties falls under an 
additional property tax equivalent to 3.5 % of the basic value. Furthermore it 
must be considered that the inheritance and gift tax laws include the issue of 
additional taxation. If the capital endowed in a foundation or the representative 
capital is transferred within ten years to a beneficiary, then the difference 
between the beneficiary tariff and the normal tariff must be paid as additional 
taxation (BRAUNER, 2003; LANG, 2004). 
If business capital is included in a private foundation, the book value is 
continued, and the undisclosed reserves are not disclosed. The inclusion of 
individual economic goods can, however, be considered as tax effective 
(StiftR, 2001, Rz 180ff.). In addition, the transfer of properties to a private foun-
dation can take the form of a composite endowment. If the property is burdened 
by a mortgage, then the property tax is estimated on the credit amount involved, 
and the basis of calculation for the gift tax is reduced. Should the mortgage have 
no economic connection to the property, then an additional capital yields tax 
must be paid on behalf of the founder (STINGL, 2003). 
2.2.3 Current  taxation 
The Austrian profit tax laws require that all business income, and this includes 
farming business, declare their profits by annual comparison with business 
capital, and use a double bookkeeping system (DORALT, 2003). For farms, 
however, there are numerous special regulations in the form of a flat rate of 
profit estimation whereby profit is calculated on a certain percentage rate of the 
assessed value, or on turnover. These simplifications are applicable where there 
is an assessed value up to 150,000 EUR and a turnover of up to 400,000 EUR, 
and they tend to produce lower profits than those attained using the double 
accounting system (JILCH, 2002). The basis for tax assessments is the total 
income declared by a tax payer within a calendar year, whereby there may be 
various tax-free and tax-deductible amounts to be considered. Income tax is 
assessed according to the progressive tariff illustrated in Table 1 below: 
Table 1:  Progressive Austrian income tax 
Taxable income  Marginal tax rate 
> 10000-25000 EUR  38.33 % 
> 25000-51000 EUR  43.60 % 
> 51000 EUR  50.00 % 
Source:  Austrian income tax law. 
Farmers who adhere to auditing regulations are entitled to favorable taxation for 
undistributed profits up to the maximal amount of 100,000 EUR per annum. 
Hereby profits are taxed, minus personal withdrawals and plus the investments 
necessary for the business, by the accounted for, half-average tax rate assessed The Austrian private foundation as a legal form in farm management  227
on income as a whole. Should private capital decrease in the following seven 
years due to omitting the consideration of losses incurred, then additional tax 
must be paid. 
Private foundations for own use are, as opposed to farming enterprises, subject 
to corporate tax law at a flat rate of 25 %. Dividends are subject to the additional 
25 % capital yields tax. Contrary to other corporations, the entire range of income 
sources, with the exception of income from non-independent work, can fall 
under this category (KNAUS, 2001). National and international participatory 
profits in private foundations are, independent of the degree of participation and 
for the purpose of avoiding double taxation, exempt from the corporation tax 
law (StiftR, 2001, Rz 39ff.). 
A private foundation’s accounting has to be executed by the board of directors 
and carried out according to Article 18 of the private foundation law, whereby 
there has to be a guarantee of information governed by numerous commercial 
law regulations (GASSAUER-FLEISSNER and GRAVE, 2005; GELTER, 2001). The 
taxable profit estimations are, however, dependent on the general tax law 
framework. Due to the norms of obligatory bookkeeping laid down by private 
foundation law, all other methods of ascertaining taxable business income fall 
away. Outside of the business, for example when letting or leasing, the income of 
the private foundation is to be declared as an excess income above the professional 
expenses, according to the principle of in and out flow (KNAUS, 2001). A 
double-entry accounting for tax purposes is not applicable in this instance. 
Of great relevance for making a private foundation fiscally attractive is the 
"intermediate taxation" of certain capital income sources, whereby in the case of 
money investments, claims securities and, under special circumstances, income 
from participation, a reduced corporate tax rate of 12.5 % is applicable. The 
intermediate tax is assessed separately from the normal tax, and is declared in an 
evidence account. If the private foundation offers an endowment to beneficiaries, 
then it is consequently subject to assessment under the 25 % capital yields tax 
(KÖNIG et al., 2002; StiftR, 2001, Rz 84-114). 
2.2.4  Taxation aspects of the dissolution of a private foundation 
The taxation consequences in the case of revocation or dissolution of a private 
foundation must also be taken into account. As a general rule, taxation is 
assessed on the level of the last beneficiary, with 25  % capital yields tax, 
whereby undisclosed reserves are generally not disclosed. Only if the foundation 
is revoked is the income shortened on the application in order to reduce the 
relevant values by the values that were present when endowed to the private 
foundation. Similarly, only in the case of revocation can the gift tax be refunded. 
A simultaneous takeover of liabilities also reduces the basis for tax assessment. 
It must be taken into account that where there is an endowment to beneficiaries, 
the speculative time span in Article 30 of the Austrian income tax law comes 
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Furthermore, the issuing of property results in an inheritance and gift tax 
situation (KNAUS, 2001; OBERNBERGER, 2005). 
2.2.5  Value Added Tax 
The introduction of assets into a foundation does not usually subject itself to 
VAT, but the businesses that are run from the foundation are eligible for VAT. 
While those farmers who are not obliged to carry out double-entry accounting 
do not have to pay VAT to the tax office, this does not apply for a private 
foundation. The VAT taxation that is applied in this case can be disadvantageous 
and must be taken into consideration. 
3 PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS IN THE FIELD OF FARMING – 
POSSIBILITIES FOR THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE LEGAL 
STRUCTURE 
Forming a private foundation with the aim of including farming businesses 
offers various alternatives for practical application. On the one hand, the whole 
business can be brought into and managed by the foundation. However, the 
possible restrictions to the farmers’ influence over the management of the 
business must be considered, as the board of directors is the most important 
decision-making organ. From the taxation point of view, it should be considered 
that all taxable income of the farming business has to be declared through 
double-entry accounting. The often favorable estimation of profits after general 
rates, as well as the advantages in terms of the VAT, are not, under any 
circumstances, relevant in a foundation. 
Due to these considerations, it is often worthwhile, instead of managing a 
business through a private foundation, to lease the farmland to the beneficiary. 
In this case, the properties can still be managed by the sole proprietor and the 
lease payments can be deducted from the tax base. In the foundation, the lease 
payments result in income from property. The beneficiaries can still enjoy 
practically unlimited freedom of action, although mortgage loans on properties 
are not possible due to missing ownership rights. The founder can therefore 
attain a securing of assets by utilizing the various structural possibilities. Due to 
the smaller equity capital of the remaining farm, it will be less credit-worthy. 
Generally, though, and dependent upon the formulation of the foundation 
document, the foundation can take the responsibility for credits of the 
beneficiaries (BOLLENBERGER and CSOKLICH, 2001). 
Not applicable to the above variations is the inclusion of domestic and business 
buildings in the private foundation. Hereby, the founder can reserve the right of 
abode without being subject to taxation. Only if this right is conceded after 
forming the foundation are the beneficiaries taxable on this endowment. In the 
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that analogous to the business management through the foundation, a 
considerable restriction of the beneficiaries’ economic freedom is incurred. These 
various possibilities can only be of use in farming businesses if the buildings 
entail high capital investment and consequently high profit expectations through 
their usage, as, for example, stables, or storage and production buildings. 
4 MODEL ASSESSMENTS FOR EVALUATING TAXATION ASPECTS OF 
THE PRIVATE FOUNDATION IN THE FIELD OF AGRICULTURE 
4.1 General 
In the following chapter, the tax burden will be illustrated by means of 
quantitative model assessments. Because the structure and size of farming 
businesses are a decisive factor for the taxation advantageousness of a legal 
form, this criteria builds the central point of the considerations dealt with here. 
Alongside this, a farmer’s dividend policy (private consumption) exercises 
considerable influence in profit taxation and must therefore be taken into 
account. 
4.2  Tax burdens in transferring the farm 
First, the taxation method of the transfer of assets can be seen within the context 
of all the framework conditions (Figure 1). The transfer of a farming business to 
close relations with a secured livelihood in reciprocation is not subject to 
property taxes up to a basic value of 75,000 EUR, where the "start-up promotion 
law" is applied. A larger amount is taxed at a rate of 2 %, whereby there is only 
a minimal general tax burden. If the transfer is made without reciprocation, and 
where the beneficiaries are not eligible for the Promotion of "start-ups Act, taxes 
are considerably more. Where there is an assessed value of 65,000 EUR, for 
example, the inheritance and gift tax amounts to more than 19,000 EUR. This 
tax burden increases even more in the case of distant relatives being the 
beneficiaries. In the transfer of assets to a private foundation, there is a linear 
tariff which lies between the favorable and unfavorable farm transfer tax amount 
assessed. In addition to the tax, there are the founding costs, which amount to 
around 10,000 EUR (KRAUS, 2004). On the other hand, the costs involved with 
drawing up a contract along conventional lines for transferring the farm 
properties falls away. Hermann Peyerl, Günter Breuer  230
Figure 1:  Establishing an agricultural successor and the related inheritance 
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Source:  Own calculations based on the Austrian inheritance and gift tax law. 
Notes:  Sole proprietor not benefited: Inheritance and gift tax in tax bracket 1 with a tax-free 
amount of 2,310 EUR, including the property tax equivalent, no application of the 
"Promotion of Start-ups" Act. 
    Sole proprietor benefited: Transfer with "security" of livelihood, 2 % property tax 
taken from the assessed value, application of the "Promotion of Start-ups" Act. 
    Private foundation: 5  % gift tax plus 3.5  % property tax equivalent, based on 
threefold assessed value. 
As can be deduced from this partial viewpoint, forming a private foundation is 
of greater advantage the larger the business is, the fewer beneficiaries entailed in 
a sole proprietorship and the more distant is the family relationship. Also, a 
private foundation can be of advantage in the case where, due to shorter 
intervals of inheritance succession, business transfers are expected to take place 
more often, because the inheritance and gift tax is payable only in the first 
instance. 
4.3  Model evaluations of the profit tax burdens 
Alongside the expenses incurred in a foundation, the current profit tax burden 
plays a significant role in the advantageousness of a legal form. Figure  2 
illustrates that the annual income tax of a sole proprietorship is dependent upon 
the size of the arable farm itself. The spectrum of businesses that are mostly 
obliged to render taxable bookkeeping systems is illustrated in the diagram. For 
smaller farms, a private foundation is in all probability not advantageous for 
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The model evaluations are based upon the assumption that all the illustrated 
farms show a profit that results from double-entry accounting. All the 
calculations are based upon the assumption that the land is solely owned and 
managed, with an average yield of 1,800 EUR per hectare. The taxable income 
from agriculture is simplified by using percentages ranging from 20 to 36 % of 
the yields, according to the sizes of the business in question. In addition, social 
insurance contributions are deducted according to the respective sizes of the 
farms. It is also assumed that the sole proprietor withdraws 100 % of the profit 
and the favorable taxation of profits that are not withdrawn is therefore not 
applicable. In the case of the private foundation, the sole proprietor pays a lease 
of 450  EUR per  hectare to the foundation, and also in this case the farmer 
withdraws the same absolute amount from the business. Additionally, the annual 
management costs incurred in the foundation are given as 7,000 EUR and are 
already included in the profit tax calculation in the diagram. 
Figure 2:  Profit tax of an agricultural sole proprietor compared to a sole 
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Source:  Own calculations based on the Austrian income tax law. 
Income tax is dealt with in two aspects, firstly under the assumption of a 
progressive income tax rate without income outside of the farming income; and 
secondly, that there is a marginal tax rate of 50 %. In this case, further income of 
at least 5,100 EUR annually must be presented. To begin with, it is determined 
that arable farms of up to approximately 20 hectares show book losses under the 
assumed circumstances, whereby the income tax of 50 % is incurred due to the Hermann Peyerl, Günter Breuer  232
possible balance of losses, which can result in a tax credit. It must be pointed out 
however, that if this situation persists, there is the danger of the business being 
classified as a hobby by the tax authorities. 
Figure  2 shows that the annual income tax burden of the private foundation 
(including additional management expenses), in connection with a sole proprietor 
farm that has a tax limit of 50 % from approximately 50 hectares of farming land, 
is less than a business run without a foundation. Taking into account that the tax 
is assessed by progressive tax rates, the inclusion of agricultural land is 
advantageous from 75 hectares or more. It must be stressed again, however, that 
the options of flat rate profits have not been taken into consideration here. 
To provide an intermediate summary, it has been established that the profit tax 
burden in arable farms that are obliged to audit their books due to the size of the 
business, and that withdraw tax profits entirely, can be reduced by forming a 
private foundation. If the profits are, on the contrary, fully retained and as a 
result favorably taxed, then the profit tax burden, including the additional 
management costs associated with a foundation, would only be of advantage to 
the sole proprietor with land over 120 hectares, even if the business is obliged to 
show bookkeeping records. 
4.4  Conclusive taxation evaluation of the private foundation in agriculture 
To achieve a comprehensive quantitative evaluation it is necessary to compare 
the costs of forming a private foundation against the annual profit tax burden. To 
illustrate this, a model based on dynamic amortization calculations has been 
constructed. The amortization time span is taken to be that period of time in 
which the invested capital, in addition to the interest due, is released. Sources in 
the literature regard this method as unsuitable for evaluating profitability, but still 
feel that it could be informative as a risk estimate (SEICHT, 1997). This applies to 
the premise that the longer the regain period lasts, the more probable it becomes 
that there will be unpredictable disadvantages (THOMMEN and ACHLEITNER, 2003). 
Because the taxation framework has the tendency to change rapidly and because 
a short amortization time span seems favorable for a private foundation, the 
dynamic investment calculation that follows seems suitable. The following 
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I0  = amount to be invested 
m  = time of return flow 
r  = discount rate 
R  = return flow in the years t 
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Working from this general formulation, the following equation (2) for the 
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AEPF = administration expenses of the private foundation 
CTPF = corporate tax of the private foundation 
CYTSP, PF = capital yields tax of the sole proprietor connected with a private 
foundation 
FEPF = formation expenses of the private foundation 
FESP = formation expenses of the sole proprietor 
IGTPF   = inheritance and gift tax of the private foundation 
IGTSP = inheritance and gift tax of the sole proprietor 
ITSP   = income tax of the sole proprietor 
ITSP, PF = income tax of a sole proprietor connected with a private foundation. 
For the amount to be invested, the difference between the costs of a favorable 
transfer of the farm and the costs involved in the formation of a private 
foundation is calculated. Returns during individual years are mirrored in the 
expected profit tax savings, minus additional costs incurred in managing the 
private foundation, whereby the 12.5  % intermediate tax on specified capital 
income is not considered. The taxation framework conditions and the profit 
situation in agriculture are assumed to be constant. The relative amortization 
time span is illustrated in Figure 3 for two chosen farms of different size, with 
the comprehensive withdrawal of profit and with a discount rate of 3 %. If a 
marginal tax rate of 50 % is assumed, then the formation of a private foundation 
amortizes itself in a business with 120 hectares of acreage land after the third 
year, and by the acceptance of a progressive tax burden, in a time span 
amounting to 10 years. In a business with 200 hectares, the invested amount and 
the calculable interest is released after 5 years. Hermann Peyerl, Günter Breuer  234 
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Source:  Own calculations based on the Austrian inheritance and gift tax law as well as the 
Austrian income tax law. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Farmers have two motives for choosing the private foundation as a legal form. 
On the one hand is a surety of assets, and on the other hand are positive tax 
effects. The first aspect has been discussed with reference to the legal 
stipulations of private foundation law, and subsequently a quantitative analysis 
of the taxation effects was demonstrated. 
Evolving from the comments made regarding private foundation laws, it can be 
deduced that the guarantee of lasting capital security is decisively dependent 
upon the declared will of the founder. In order to meet the demands of farming 
enterprises, the inclusion of the farm land in the foundation, together with 
running the farming business as a sole proprietor seems to be the most favorable 
arrangement. This allows for a compromise between capital security aims and 
the extensive influence of the beneficiaries over the asset management. 
Under the assumed circumstances, the private foundation is advantageous in 
arable farms that are obliged to audit books for tax assessment purposes. As long 
as the amount of the basic assessed value allows for a flat rate profit 
determination, the private foundation would not prove to be favorable as far as 
profit tax perspectives are concerned. Further influential factors are the 
profitability of a farm and the dividend strategy of the business. As far as taxation 
is concerned, the private foundation is to be considered when farms not in the 
family are transferred, thereby creating a higher inheritance and gift tax burden. The Austrian private foundation as a legal form in farm management  235
In this contribution, general tendencies concerning the effects of private 
foundations in agricultural businesses have been discussed. Due to the broad 
spectrum of organizational possibilities, it is important that decisions should be 
made by looking at comparisons with the acceptance of specific plan information. 
It is to be assumed, however, that with the continuous growth in farm size, the 
legal form of private foundations will gain more recognition in the future. 
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CREDIT AS A TOOL OF INTEGRATION BETWEEN POLISH FARMS  





The aim of the paper is to examine the role which credit plays as a tool of 
integration in the food chain in Polish agriculture, particularly in the integration 
of farms with food processors. This issue is explored from the perspective of 
transaction costs theory. The analysis showed that the practice of the use of 
loans by processors varies across the sectors of agribusiness. The data indicates 
that the dairy sector was a leader in implementing the loan contracts. Dairy 
processors were interested in financing different objectives from those supported 
by manufacturers from other sectors of the agrifood system. The former offered 
investment loans, while the latter granted loans for working capital. The credit 
activity creates transaction costs for both partners of the contract. Surprisingly, 
of five variables analyzed, only the period of contract was significant for the 
emergence of transaction costs.  
Keywords: Integration, contract, transaction costs, loan, farmers. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The process of integration by contract between farmers and other agents of the food 
chain is one of the most interesting and important processes that can be observed in 
Polish agriculture today. Integration has many dimensions: Organizational, 
economic, and technological. Its stages, forms and significance have varied 
widely across sectors of agricultural production and regions. This paper focuses 
on the economic dimension of integration. The aim of the paper is to examine 
the role that credit plays as a contractual tool of integration in the food chain in 
Polish agriculture, particularly in the integration of farms with food enterprises 
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which are buyers of agricultural products. The analysis uses a transaction costs 
theory approach.  
The main data source for the analysis is a survey by the author on the terms of 
credits from different sources, and the implementation of credit agreements. The 
investigation was carried out in the first quarter of the year 2004. It involved a 
systematic study of farms by the Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics 
(IAFE), farms which were in debt due to loans (including trade credits) owing to 
different non-financial institutions on 31 December 2001. 128 farms from all over 
Poland provided information about the terms and implementation of 142 credit 
contracts via which they owed money. 48 of these contracts were between farms 
(46 farms) and buyers of agricultural products. The additional information about 
the economics of farms under investigation was sourced from the Institute. The 
results of the analysis are compared with, and supplemented by, findings of 
other researchers in this area. The analysis used comparative and statistical 
methods of analysis: Descriptive method and probit model (MCCULLAGH and 
NELDER, 1989).  
The paper is organized as follows. It begins with an analysis of the impact, 
forms and advantages of integration. Then there is a consideration of the 
characteristics pertaining to the farms and processors in the study. This is 
followed by an examination of the structure of loans by types of lenders, forms 
and objectives. The next part looks at the terms of the loans granted. The final 
section analyzes the determinants of the emergence of transaction costs associated 
with loans granted by the processors to farms. 
2 THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION – IMPACT, FORMS, TOOLS AND 
ADVANTAGES 
There are many motives for integration. Transaction cost economics focuses on 
economizing the transaction costs which occur in the ex-ante and especially in 
the ex-post phase of transaction. This is realized by introduction of the different 
forms of governing of transactions. Williamson points to uncertainty, asset 
specificity and the frequency of transactions as major factors influencing the 
choice of the structure of governance, from market governance at one end to 
unified governance at the other (WILLIAMSON, 1985). Between these two, there 
is a variety of hybrid modes like short-term contracts, long-term contracts, 
franchising, and joint ventures. Williamson’s concept is developed theoretically 
and an attempt is made to operationalize it.
1 
There are many examples of using the transaction cost economic approach to deal 
with the problems of integration in the area of agribusiness. The literature focuses 
on the forms of integration (VERHAEGEN  and VAN HUYLENBROECK, 2001), 
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incentives (SPORLEDER, 1992), and determinants of variation across regions and 
commodities (HARVEY et al., 2005). Special attention is paid to cooperatives 
(SZABO, 2002; COOK, 1995).  
Integration between farmers and buyers of their products typically takes the form 
of a contract regulating the  delivery of agricultural products. The processors 
initiate the cooperation and are in a stronger position than the farmers. This is 
due to the disparity between the number of processors and farms that want to 
sell their products. Moreover, the processors can operate (buy) over a much 
bigger territory than farmers who, because of time cost and scale of production, 
cannot afford to seek out buyers for their products. The stronger position allows 
the processors to control different factors like price, quantity, quality, timing of 
deliveries (SPORLEDER, 1992, p.  1227) and other terms of exchange with 
farmers, of which the terms of payment are very important.
2 But a relationship 
dependent solely on delivery contracts is not always sufficient for the processors 
to achieve their aims, so they have to introduce other tools to influence farmers’ 
behavior, for example pre-financing (SWINNEN and GOW, 2001, p. 197-198). 
Credit can be a single tool, or one of a vast range of tools used by processors in 
their relations with farmers. By its very nature it builds or strengthens the long-
term relations between partners. The credit contract is long lasting and creates 
interdependency between the partners. There are many advantages for processors 
in providing loans to farmers. Loans can: 
•  Accelerate the introduction of technological innovation  
•  Reduce the risks relating to the quality of agricultural products by 
providing the proper technology (milk coolers, feed, seeds) 
•  Finance the specific inputs that help create a stable group of suppliers of 
high-quality products (it leads to the higher specificity of a farm’s assets). 
Loans can be of interest to farmers as a preferable alternative or supplementary 
source to bank credits for financing investments or current activity. The 
comparative advantage of processors’ loans depends on interest rates and other 
terms that influence the transaction costs of borrowing. 
                                                 
2  In the dairy sector farmers usually grant trade credits to processors. According to transaction 
cost theory it can be explained as a way of reducing the costs of paying bills (PETERSON and 
RAJAN, 1997, p. 665), but farmers are often forced to accept disadvantageous terms of those 
credits because of their weak position (POSPISIL, 2001, p.  164). This kind of credit is 
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3 LOANS AS A TOOL OF INTEGRATION OF POLISH FARMERS AND 
PROCESSING COMPANIES  
Polish farmers are familiar with integration by contract, because this was often 
used by state or cooperative enterprises under the communist economy. At the 
beginning of transition, the links between farms and other agents in food chain 
broke down. It has taken some years for them to re-emerge. According to DRIES 
and SWINNEN, foreign investors and enterprises that were undergoing thorough 
restructuring had the greatest influence on this process. Domestic enterprises 
started to follow them quickly (DRIES and SWINNEN, 2004). Among the different 
forms of cooperation like contracts for product delivery, training in the application 
of technology, deliveries of current means of production, loans are often used 
(DRIES and SWINNEN, 2005). The granting of credits by processors operating in 
different branches of the Polish food industry has been examined by a number of 
authors: SZLACHTA (2000), SARNECKI (1999), DRIES and SWINNEN (1994, 1995), 
SWINNEN and GOW (2001) in the dairy sector, URBAN (1999) in the sugar sector, 
OSTROMECKI (1999) in the meat sector. What is more, the processors supported 
farmers in financing the investments made within the SAPARD framework 
(DANILOWSKA and CHOROS, 2005).  
3.1  The parts of loan contracts  
On 31 December 2001, 195 farms out of the 1,270 included in the systematic 
study by the Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics were in debt due to 
loans owing to non-financial institutions. After further analysis, the information 
relating to 128 farms was deemed acceptable for the study. These farms owed 
money on 142 loans. An analysis of the breakdown of loans by creditors showed 
that 48 had been granted by buyers of agricultural products. They provided loans 
to 46 farms throughout the different regions of Poland. It should be noted that 
the buyers consisted of processors only – there were no middlemen. What is 
more, the farmers declared that they cooperated with them steadily. The 
breakdown of loans by types of processors is shown in Table 1.  
Table 1:  Breakdown of loans by buyers of agricultural products 
Source of credits  Number of loans  Breakdown (%) 
Total 48  100 
  Of which:     
   -Dairy processors  40  83.3 
   -Other buyers (processors)  8  16.7 
Source:  Own calculation on the basis of a survey. 
The main group of enterprises granting loans to farmers was dairy processors. In 
that group, there were different dairy companies – from small to large scale 
producers, domestic and international, cooperatives and corporations. They 
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from other sectors of agribusiness – sugar factories, tobacco companies, meat 
processors, fruit and grain processors – was relatively small. In this paper they 
are referred to as "other processors". The imbalance between the number of 
loans provided by dairy processors compared to other processors indicates that 
the loan was a popular instrument in the dairy sector, but rarely used in other 
food sectors.  
The various characteristics of farms which took out loans from processors are 
shown in Table 2. Figues relating to all the farms studied by The Institute of 
Agricultural and Food Economics are also given to assist analysis. The table 
reproduces the basic indices relating to farms, their production potential, inputs, 
investment activity, production and income. 
Table 2:  Characteristics of farms in debt due to loans from processors 
and of all farms investigated by IAFE (December 2001) 
Specification  Dairy processors  Other processors  Farms investi-
gated by IAFE 
39 7  1270 
Total number of farms 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Age of farmer (years)  45.6  45.0  42.7  41.0  45.0  45.0 
Agricultural land (own and 
leased) (ha)  23.9 21.2  44.8 18.1  29.9 16.5 
Fixed assets (000 zł)  420.8 339.1  726.5 739.8  430.6 302.1 
Farm labor resources 
(person)  2.9 3.0  3.1 3.0  2.9 3.0 
Purchased inputs (000 zł) 32.4 24.5  222.6 54.3  46.5 20.2 
Investment outlays (000 zł)  16.7  3.7  62.1 3.1  23.1 2.8 
Market output per 1 ha  
(000 zł)  3.1  2.8  11.5 5.2  3.2 2.7 
Share of animal production 
in final gross output (%)  87.3 90.7  49.3 45.0  64.8 75.4 
Agricultural income (000 zł)  27.5 22.0  45.1 16.3  30.7 14.8 
Total debt (000 zł)  29.9 13.4  130.3 35.2  37.9  5.0 
Source:  Own calculations on the base of data from IAFE. 
The noticeable attribute of farms studied is the difference between the 
economics of the average farm that was in debt due to loans from dairy 
processors and farms that borrowed from other manufacturers. What is more, the 
economics of the average farm supplying the dairy processors was close to the 
economics of the average farm investigated by IAFE. The biggest dissimilarity 
between them concerned the structure of production. The proportion of animal 
production in the final gross output of the farms that supply dairy processors 
was much higher (nearly twice) than that of the average farm investigated by 
Institute.  Alina Danilowska  242 
Farms supplying other processors were managed, on average, by farmers about 
three years younger than suppliers of dairy processors. Moreover, they had 
higher resources of land (90 %), capital (70 %) and labor (7 %). As that group 
involved the suppliers of processors from different sectors of agribusiness, the 
share of animal production in the final gross output was about 50 %, while in the 
other group it was nearly 90  %. The inputs of the former were far greater 
(7  times), and their average market output per 1  ha of agricultural land was 
nearly four times greater. These farms also secured a much larger agricultural 
income. They used credits from different financing sources, which is reflected 
by the level of debt.  
3.2  Purposes and forms of loans granted by processors to farmers 
The striking feature of the types of loans analyzed is the difference in their 
breakdown by the purpose they were granted for (Table 3). 
Table 3:  The breakdown of loans by purpose, and by type of lender  
Dairy processors  Other processors 
Specification  Number of 
loans  %  Number 
of loans  % 
Total number of loans  40  100  8  100 
Purpose of loan:
1       
-  Basic herd  9 21.4  0  0.0 
-  Equipment for specialization of  
production  19 45.2  0  0.0 
-  Machinery  4 9.5  0  0,0 
-  Construction and modernization of  
non-residential farm buildings  2 4.8  2  25.0 
-  Current means of production  7 16.7  4  50.0 
-  Working herd  1 2.4  2  25.0 
Form of loan:         
Trade loan  16  40.0  7  87.5 
Cash loan  24  60.0  1  12.5 
Source:  Own calculation on the base of questionnaire.  
Notes:    
1 In two cases, the credits from dairy enterprises were dual-purpose loans, so 42 "loans"  
    were taken as 100 %.  
Loans from dairy enterprises were dominated by the investment loans. They 
accounted for more than 80 % of all loans, and 90 % of the total value of loans. 
The dairy processors granted investment loans mainly for specialized equipment 
for milk production, generally for appliances for chilling milk. Of secondary 
importance were loans for the purchase of cows, in third place came loans for 
investing in machinery.  
Other enterprises chiefly granted loans for working capital, the most popular of 
which were loans for feed and seed. 25 % of loans were devoted to financing 
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Both types of enterprise gave trade credits and money loans. But the proportion 
of trade credits amongst those farms granted credits by dairy enterprises was only 
40 %, whereas in the other group it was nearly 90 %. Such a high proportion of 
trade credits was a result of farmers’ adaptation to special production technology, 
a move generally forced by processors. 
The comparative analysis of the economics of farms and breakdown of credits 
by their purpose showed that the aim and level of credits granted by processors 
depended on the type of production (commodity).  
3.3  The terms of loans from buyers of agricultural products 
The terms of loans are very important because all of them create credit activity 
costs for lenders, and borrowing costs for borrowers. The lenders’ costs are mainly 
of an administrative nature. Borrowing costs consist of interest and transaction 
costs,
3 that involve different kind of costs (except price) such as fees, costs of 
collateral, expenditure on producing documents to prove creditworthiness, 
traveling costs, opportunity costs of time and others (ADAMS and NEHMAN, 1979; 
PETRICK and LATRUFFE, 2003). 
The terms of the loans studied varied between the groups of processors. For the 
majority of credits granted by the dairy manufacturers, creditors demanded 
payment of interest. In this group, interest rates varied to a large extent, from 
1 % (the minimum) to 24.6 % (maximum). But one must point out that interest 
rates on most (73.9 %) of credits were between 1-5 %, and they were much 
lower than market interest rate.
4 The interest rates of most credits in that group 
were lower than the interest rate paid by the farmers on preferential credits.
5 The 
interest rates on 17.4 % of credits from dairy enterprises were between 5-10 %, 
and only 8.7 % of credits had rates higher than 10 %. The other buyers did not 
require interest payment. But in the case of trade credits (which dairy enterprises 
also granted) it is possible to take account of the interest in the price of the good 
which is the subject of the trade credit. In every case creditors have the possibility 
to put charges on their credits, but they have to take into consideration the level of 
interest rates on credits available for borrowers from other sources, for example 
banks.  
The cost of borrowing consists not only of interest, but of different types of 
provisions and fees, which are charged to borrowers by creditors. The "other" 
enterprises did not charge borrowers any fees, while dairy enterprises used them 
only in 15 % of credits.  
                                                 
3  There are many definitions of transaction costs. A review of them is presented by FURUBOTN 
and RICHTER (2003)  
4  A central bank discount rate can be a benchmark. At the end of 1999, 2000, and 2001 it 
was 19.0 %, 21.5 %, and 14 % respectively.  
5  The interest rate paid by farmers in the case of some kind of preferential credits was 
0.25 of the central bank discount rate, for more details see (DANILOWSKA, 2005).  Alina Danilowska  244
Table 4:  Terms of granting and repayment loans by type of creditors  
Dairy processors  Other processors 
Specification  Number of 
loans  %  Number of 
loans  % 
Total number of loans  40  100  8  100 
Loans charged interest (event)         
-Yes 23  57.5  2  25.0 
-No 17  42.5  6  75.0 
Loans with additional fees (event)         
-Yes 6  15.0  0  0.0 
-No 31  77.5  8  100.0 
   -No answer  3  7.5  0  0.0 
Loans with collateral (event)         
-Yes 23  57.5  1  12.5 
-No 17  42.5  7  87.5 
Type of collateral         
-Personal guarantee (co-signer)  19  47.5  0  0.0 
-Deposit (chattel mortgage)  1  2.5  1  12.5 
-Others 3  7.5  0  0.0 
Form of repayment         
-Money 2  5.0  2  25.0 
-Products 38  95.0  6  75.0 
Frequency of repayment:         
-Single 0  0.0  7  87.5 
-By installment  40  100.0  1  12.5 
Period of repayment (months)         
   0-12  16  40.0  7  87.5 
> 12-36  14  35.0  0  0.0 
> 36  10  25.0  1  12.5 
Source:  Own calculation on the basis of a survey. 
The contract of the loan can be of long duration, and during its term 
opportunistic behavior on behalf of the borrower or other events can make the 
repayment of the loan impossible, so generally lenders require collateral. The 
two groups of lenders examined applied different strategies regarding collateral. 
The other manufacturers required collateral for only one loan (12.5 %), while 
the dairy manufactures required it for 57.5  % of loans. Dairy enterprises 
preferred personal guarantee as collateral.  
The terms of repayment varied noticeably across the two groups. The dairy 
manufactures required repayments by installment and in the form of milk 
deliveries. The majority of loans from the other processors were repaid all at 
once, and in the most cases also by product deliveries. It is worth mentioning that 
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farmers and lenders. It saves on transaction costs connected with repayment in 
the form of cash, the cost of monitoring and additionally, decreases the risk of 
delays and defaults. 
There are differences in frequency of repayment between credits from the two 
groups. It is a result of the specificity of production technology. Milk production 
needs everyday contact and deliveries throughout the whole year, whereas one 
cycle of sugar beet production last some months and is possible once a year. 
Dairy manufacturers account for milk with farmers systematically every month, 
whereas other enterprises perform this once after product deliveries at the end of 
the production cycle.  
4 THE DETERMINANTS OF TRANSACTION COSTS OF LOAN 
CONTRACTS 
The precondition of granting credits by manufacturers to farmers was the 
cooperation between them in the form of product deliveries. The aim of 
providing loans was to strengthen the cooperation and as a result to reduce the 
transaction costs connected with arranging a stable group of suppliers of high 
quality agricultural products. But credit contracts give rise to transaction costs 
for creditors as well as for borrowers. Some activities connected with concluding 
the contract and its implementation create costs for both partners, but in different 
ways, forms or values. They can be described as costs of "bilateral character". 
Collateral can be an example here. The creditor should choose and check the 
collateral; the borrower has to devote resources and time to provide it.
6 The kind 
and the level of these costs depend on the creditor as the stronger contract 
partner and the one that is granting the loan. Some costs only affect the farmers; 
these do not depend on the terms of the contract at all, but on other different 
conditions, like the distance from farm to processor. What are the determinants 
of the transaction costs of loan contracts, and how strongly do they influence 
these costs? This paper will only consider "bilateral" costs that affect both 
contract partners (farm and enterprise). Of course, as already mentioned, these 
are not of the same value and form. To examine the relationship, a probit 
estimation model has been applied. 
4.1  The choice of variables to model 
The emergence of transaction costs for both parties of the loan contract is a 
dependent variable. It is of dichotomous character. It takes the value of 1 if any 
of four possible events given below took place during the ex-ante and ex-post 
period of the contract, or the value of 0 if these situations did not happen. Every 
                                                 
6  Because the personal guarantee was the most popular form of collateral, the cost of travel 
of the cosigner can be an example.  Alina Danilowska  246
selected event creates cost in the form of resources or time. The list of these 
events is:  
1. Additional fees; 
2. Investigation of the creditworthiness of the farmer; 
3. Monitoring the farmer’s situation during the term of the loan contract;  
4. Settlement of collateral. 
A set of independent variables was drawn up (Table 5) as determinants of the 
emergence of transaction costs. They are related to: (i) the economics of the 
farm, (ii) the characteristics of the relationship between the farmer and buyer of 
his products, (iii) characteristics of the loans. Because of the small sample 
included in the study the number of independent variables identified was limited 
to  5. Of these only one is of dichotomous character. Figures relating to all 
variables used in the model are displayed in Table 5. 
Table 5:  Variables used in the probit model 
Variable Mean  Std. 
Dev  Minmum Maximum  Valid 
obser. 
Total agricultural land owned (ha)  18.35  11.67  3.51  53.79  48 
The period of cooperation (years)  13.04  8.58  1.00  32.00  48 
The evaluation of cooperation 
(dummy)  0.85 0.36  0  1  48 
Loan value (000 zł) 5.96  5.02  0.22  21.96  48 
The period of repayment (months)  29.2  28.7  2.0  96.0  48 
Transaction cost appearance 
(dummy)  0.56 0.50  0  1  48 
Source:  Own calculation on the base of survey. 
The economics of the farm is represented by the area of land it possesses. It is to 
be expected that this variable will have a negative impact on transaction costs. 
This variable acts to reduce the transaction costs in two ways: 1. the bigger the 
area of the farm, the better the collateral, even considering that the most popular 
form of collateral was personal guarantee; 2. the size of the farm indicates its 
production potential and similarly the scale of the transactions between farmers 
and processors. Taking the value of the loan as given, the greater the scale of 
agricultural production the buyer is interested in, the smaller the need to take 
other precautions like demanding collateral or investigating creditworthiness. 
What is more, repayment in the form of deducting the installment from a 
farmer’s bills (the bigger the scale of production, the higher the bills) for 
deliveries of a product decreases the risk of delays and defaults. 
The next two variables merit special attention because of their role in the ex-post 
phase of the contract and the essential problem of opportunism. The relationship 
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of cooperation and the assessment of cooperation made by farmers. The two 
variables are likely to influence the transaction costs negatively. The first is 
important, especially in view of the threat of opportunistic behavior which may 
occur. The longer the cooperation lasts, the better the knowledge about farmer’s 
reputation.  
The second variable takes the value 1 if the farmer judged the cooperation to be 
"good" or "very good", or 0 where the assessment was worse ("average" and 
"bad") The opinions expressed by farmers about the quality of cooperation were 
probably nearly the same as those of manufacturers regarding the quality of 
cooperation with farmers. This may be reflected in a creditor’s refraining from 
investigating a farmer’s creditworthiness (ex-ante phase) or monitoring his 
economic situation during the period of repayment (ex-post phase).  
Table 6:  Length of cooperation and its evaluation by farmers 
Dairy processors  Other processors 
Specification 
Number %  Number  % 
Total number of farms  39  100  7
  100 
The period of cooperation
1 (years)         
1-5 11  28.2  4  57.1 
6-10 4  10.3  2  28.6 
>10 23  58.9  1  14,3 
No answer  1  2.6  0  0.0 
The evaluation of cooperation         
- Very good  5  12.8  1  14.3 
- Good  27  69.2  6  85.7 
- Average (not good or bad)  6  15.4  0  0.0 
- Bad  1  2.6  0  0.0 
Source:  Own calculation on the base of a survey. 
Notes: 
1 To the end of 2001. 
The data presented in Table  6 demonstrates the fairly lengthy period of 
cooperation between farmers and processors that granted loans. The cooperation 
of farmers with dairy processors lasted much longer than those with the other 
processors. Nearly 60 % of farmers in the study cooperated with dairy processors 
for longer than 10 years, many of them more than 20 years. Only one of the farms 
that collaborated with other processors has had a working relationship for longer 
than 10 years. Most of the farms in that category cooperated from between 1-5 
years. It indicates that the aforementioned collapse of cooperation between 
farmers and processors generally concerned sectors of agribusiness other than 
the dairy sector.  
The assessment of cooperation was generally positive. All farmers who 
delivered products to "other" processors, and more than 80 % of milk suppliers, 
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The value of the loans ought to influence positively the transaction costs. The 
bigger the value of the loan, the greater the risk and the need of collateral. The 
length of the period of repayment is also likely to have a positive influence. The 
longer the period of repayment, the higher the risk of events not even connected 
with opportunism which can interrupt the repayment or make it impossible.  
4.2  Results of the model 
As shown by the Chi-squared statistic, the model is significant. It is 
characterized by a relatively high prediction accuracy at nearly 70  %. The 
analysis showed that, from 5 variables modeled, only one – the period of 
repayment – is statistically significant. As was expected, the parameter has a 
positive value. Its influence on the emergence of "bilateral" transaction costs is 
quite high, taking into consideration that the length of period of repayment is 
expressed in months. On average, each month of the repayment period increases 
the probability of transaction costs arising by 1.65 %.  
Table 7:  The results of the probit model estimation 
 Coefficient  Std. 
Error  z-value Pr(>|z|)  Marginal 
effect
1 
Constant -0.4253  0.7711  -0.552  0.5811   
Own agricultural land (ha)  -0.0016  0.0198  -0.084  0.9328  -0.06 % 
The period of cooperation 
(years)  -0.0023 0.0251  -0.095 0.9244  -0.09  % 
The evaluation of 
cooperation (dummy)  0.2036 0.5695  0.358 0.7206  7.91  % 
Loan value (000 zł) -0.1102  0.0718  -1.534  0.125  -4.21  % 
Period of repayment 
(months)  0.0433 0.0172  2.506 0.0122  1.65  % 
LR test (Chi-squared)  16.912           (p-value = 0.00467) 
McFadden's R^2  25.5 % 
McFadden's R^2 
(adjusted)  7.7 % 
Prediction accuracy  68.75 % 
Observations 48 
Source:  Own calculation on the base of a survey. 
Notes: 
1 Because of nonlinear dependencies the marginal effect is in percentage points  
      calculated as a sample mean. For the variables of dichotomous character   
   marginal effect was calculated by changes from 0 to 1. 
The results concerning the four other variables which, from the literature on the 
characteristics of contracts (size of partner, period and quality of cooperation, 
loan value), are seemingly important, is somewhat surprising. It indicates that 
they were of no importance for the emergence of transaction costs either 
negatively or positively. It might suggest that the processors granted loans under 
special loan programs (schemes) aimed at the large range of farms. Procedures Credit as a tool of integration between Polish farms and buyers of their products  249
and terms of loans under these schemes were standardized and simplified (to 
reduce the costs of lending especially given that the sizes of loans were not 
particularly high) and the individual characteristics of borrowers, value of loans, 
the period, and quality of the cooperation were not important.  
5 CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the granting of loans by processors to farms that delivered 
products to them has shown that the use of loans varies across the sectors of 
agribusiness in Poland. If we look at the loan contracts as the tools/forms of 
integration by contract, findings are consistent with those concerning other 
countries (HARVEY et al., 2005). The data indicates that the dairy sector is a 
leader in implementing loan contracts. The processors from dairy sector were 
interested in financing different objectives from those supported by 
manufacturers from other sectors of the agrifood system. The former offered 
investment loans, while the latter granted loans for working capital. The reasons 
for that distinction need special attention and investigation. A comparative 
analysis of the economics of farms that sell their products to the two groups of 
processors suggests that the scale of resources which the farms have at their 
disposal could be one of these reasons. Dairy farms seem to be smaller and of 
different sizes. It is in line with the findings of DRIES and SWINNEN (2004, 2005) 
but inconsistent with the observations of the WORLD BANK (2001). 
The terms of loans regarding interest rates, collateral, and frequency of 
repayment were rather advantageous for farmers. The system of loan repayment 
by delivery of products warrants special attention as a tool of reduction of the 
cost (transaction costs) of reimbursement and risk of delays and default.   
The credit activity produces transaction costs for both partners of the contract. 
Surprisingly, the many features of contracts indicated by researchers as very 
important for transaction costs, like the size of partners, value of contract, the 
duration and quality of contacts did not statistically have a significant influence 
on the emergence of the set of transaction costs. Only the period of contract was 
important.  
REFERENCES  
ADAMS, D.  W., NEHMAN, G.  I. (1979): Borrowing costs and the demand for rural credit, 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 15, pp. 165-176. 
BOERNER, C.  S.,  MACHER, J.  T. (2001): Transaction cost economics: An assessment of 
empirical research in the social science, <http://faculty.msb.edu>. 
COOK, M. L. (1995): The future of U.S. agricultural cooperatives: A neo-institutional approach, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 77, pp. 1153-1159.  Alina Danilowska  250 
DANILOWSKA, A., CHOROS, E. (2005): Źródła finansowania inwestycji w gospodarstwach 
rolnych wspieranych programem SAPARD na przykładzie Schematu 2.1. Restrukturyzacja 
produkcji mleka, Prace Komisji Nauk Rolniczych i Biologicznych XLIII, Bydgoskie 
Towarzystwo Naukowe, Prace Wydziału Nauk Przyrodniczych Seria B Nr 57, Bydgoszcz, 
pp. 121-126. 
DANILOWSKA, A. (2005): The credit support system in Polish agriculture. The evaluation of 
10 years performance, XI. Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists 
"The Future of Rural Europe in the Global Agri-food System", KVL University of Life 
Science, Food and Resources Institute, Copenhagen/Denmark, 24.-27.08.2005, CD and 
http://agecon.lib.umn.edu>. 
DRIES, L., SWINNEN, J. F. M. (2004): Foreign direct investment, vertical integration and local 
suppliers: Evidence from the Polish dairy sector, World Development, 32 (9), pp. 1525-
1544. 
DRIES, L., SWINNEN, J. F. M. (2005): The impact of vertical coordination on supplier access 
to finance and investments: Evidence from the Polish dairy sector, paper presented at  
XI.  Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists "The Future of 
Rural Europe in the Global Agri-food System", KVL University of Life Science, Food and 
Resources Institute, Copenhagen/Denmark, 24.-27.08.2005, CD and <http://agecon. 
lib.umn.edu>. 
FURUBOTN, E. G., RICHTER, R. (2003): Institutions and Economic theory, Ann Arbor, The 
University of Michigan Press, Michigan. 
HARVEY, S. J., PETER, G. K., SYKUTA, M. E. (2005): Markets, contracts or integration? The 
adoption, diffusion, and evolution of organizational form, The American Agricultural 
Economics Association Annual Meeting, Providence, Rhode Island, 24.-27.06.2005, 
<http://agecon.lib.umn.edu>. 
MCCULLAGH, P., NELDER, J.  A. (1989): Generalized Linear Models, Chapman and Hall, 
London. 
OSTROMECKI, A. (1999): Znaczenie integracji pionowej w aktywizacji rolnictwa obszarów 
górskich,  Roczniki Naukowe Stowarzyszenia Ekonomistów Rolnictwa i Agrobiznesu, 
Tom 1, number 2, Rzeszów, pp. 235-242. 
PETERSEN, M., RAJAN, R. (1997): Trade credit: Theories and evidence, The review of 
financial studies, Vol. 10, issue 3, pp. 661-691. 
PETRICK, M., LATRUFFE, L. (2003): Credit access and borrowing costs in Poland’s agricultural 
credit market: A hedonic pricing approach, IAMO Discussion Paper No. 46, Halle (Saale). 
POSPISIL, M. (2001): Hidden credits in the agro-food system in the Czech Republic: A farmer’s 
point of view, in: Agricultural Finance and Credit Infrastructure in Transition Economies. 
Focus on South Eastern Europe, Proceedings of OECD Meeting, Portoroz/Slovenia,  
May 2001, pp. 263-265. 
SARNECKI, J. (1999): Powiązania mleczarni z producentami mleka w procesie kształtowania 
bazy surowcowej w wybranych regionach kraju, Roczniki Naukowe Stowarzyszenia 
Ekonomistów Rolnictwa i Agrobiznesu, Vol. 1, zeszyt 2, Rzeszów, pp. 251-255. 
SPORLEDER, T. L. (1992): Managerial economics of vertically coordinated agricultural firms, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 74, No. 5, pp. 1226-1231. 
SWINNEN, J. F. M., GOW, H. R. (2001): The role of trade credit and foreign direct investment 
in improving the agricultural finance situation in transition countries, in: Agricultural Credit as a tool of integration between Polish farms and buyers of their products  251
Finance and Credit Infrastructure in Transition Economies. Focus on South Eastern 
Europe, Proceedings of OECD Meeting, Portoroz/Slovenia, May 2001, pp. 195-206.  
SZLACHTA, K. (2000): Zmiany w podejściu do jakości wyrobów rynku wewnętrznego zgodnie 
z wymogami krajów Unii Europejskiej, Prace Naukowe Akademii Ekonomicznej we 
Wrocławiu, Vol. 865, pp. 247-253. 
SZABO, G. G. (2002): New institutional economics and agricultural co-operatives: A Hungarian 
case study, in: Local society and global economy: The role of cooperatives, International/ 
European Research Conference ICA – Technological Educational Institute (TEI), Thessaloniki/ 
Greece, 09.-12.05.2002. 
URBAN, S. (1999): Współpraca przemysłu cukrowniczego z rolnikami, Roczniki Naukowe 
Stowarzyszenia Ekonomistów Rolnictwa i Agrobiznesu, Vol. 1, No. 2, Rzeszów, pp. 187-191. 
VERHAEGEN, I., VAN HUYLENBROECK, G. (2001): Hybrid governance structure for quality 
farm products, Shaker Verlag, Aachen. 
WILLIAMSON, O. E. (1985): The economic institutions of capitalism, New York, Free Press 
(The Polish edition: Ekonomiczne instytucje kapitalizmu, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 
Warszawa, 1998). 
WORLD  BANK, (2001): Poland, the functioning of the labor, land and financial markets: 
Opportunities and constraints for farming sector restructuring, The World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
  Agriculture in the Face of Changing Markets, Institutions and Policies: Challenges and Strategies 
JARMILA CURTISS, ALFONS BALMANN, KIRSTI DAUTZENBERG, KATHRIN HAPPE (eds., 2006) 
Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Central and Eastern Europe, Vol. 33, Halle (Saale), IAMO, pp. 252-267. 
WHO, WHY AND HOW: PROBLEMS OF FARMERS’  





This paper examines the political access, public status, attitudes and actions of 
farmers in Poland. It also explores how the interests of Polish farmers are 
represented by two agrarian parties (the Polish Peasant Party and the Self-
Defense Party), main farmers’ unions and other organizations. A review of
 the 
theoretical and applied literature suggests that the source of farmers’ power has 
been their ability to organize interest groups or collective actions. In Poland, 
however, the large rural electorate that is likely to shape a policy biased in favor 
of farmers, seems to be highly significant. 
Keywords: Interests, representation, farmers, political parties, Poland. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
According to new political economy, policies result from the interaction of 
individuals (voters, politicians, bureaucrats, lobbyists) in an institutional context 
of decisions. Governance, as the process of making decisions and their 
implementation, contains the many mechanisms and institutions through which 
people and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and 
exercise their legal rights and obligations. Good governance includes the state, 
private sector and civil society. Communication between them is the foundation 
of good governance.  
Farmers should be the main interest group that participates in all dialogue 
concerning agricultural policy that cannot be recognized simply as a question of 
consensus. This policy is still an arena of competing interests. 
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As Lang points out, "We need to recognize that the central driving force in the 
food economy is the desire to make money out of food. As humans, we may think 
of food as an issue of need; economically it is a commodity for greed. Those of 
us who observe and research this process need to build into our analyses the 
complexity of competing sectoral interests" (LANG, 2000). 
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressurizing the 
government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national 
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, 
while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of 
the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers (PUTNAM, 1988, p. 424). 
Broadly, this paper will focus on the heterogeneity of farmers’ interests in 
Poland; political access and the public status of farmers in Poland; attitudes and 
actions of farmers (collective action problem, signaling), and the representation 
of agricultural interests at the national and European level. 
2 DATA SOURCES AND METHODS 
The main data sources include: A literature review; information regarding the 
Sejm’s activities; deputies’ declarations of financial interests and curriculum 
vitae; data collected by the institutions for public opinion (OBOP, CBOS); 
farmers’ organizations, and government agencies. Statistical data is derived 
from the Central Statistical Office of Poland (GUS). 
The paper consists of an overview of the political programs of the main 
"farmers’" parties in Poland regarding agricultural questions. There is also a 
survey of the parliamentary activities of deputies, and voter-deputy communication 
for two parliamentary clubs during the former (4
th) and current (5
th) Sejm 
cadences.  
The analysis is conducted using the conceptual framework of public choice 
theory, including the economic theory of collective action, and new institutional 
economics. 
3 HETEROGENEITY OF POLISH FARMERS AND THEIR INTERESTS 
Polish farmers represent a crucial part of the economy and of the international 
credibility of the country. Unlike in many EU states, the Polish rural sector is of 
major importance to the social and economic equilibrium of a country that is 
home to 38.2 million people, of which 14.7 million (38.4 %) live in rural areas. 
The main factor influencing the social standing of rural people is their economic 
position. The economic status of farmers in Poland depends, amongst other 
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15  years of transition in the Polish economy, the percentage contribution of 
GVA from agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing has been on a steady 
decline from 12.9 % in 1989; 8.3 % in 1990; 7.1 % in 1995, down to 3.76 % in 
2003, with a recovery back to 4.14 % in 2004.  
The significance of agriculture in Poland is much greater compared to the EU as 
a whole, mainly due to the proportion of the population working in agriculture 
and the number of farm holdings. It is estimated that farm workers in Poland 
comprise 18.0 % of the total workforce, but the population linked to agriculture 
is much larger, reaching almost 10.5 million. This means that up to 28 % of 
Poland’s inhabitants live on farm land.  
The employment structure of rural society remains dominated by people running 
family farms. As is well known, farm policies in industrial countries are strongly 
biased against small farmers, and in favor of large ones. Most of the 1.95 million 
Polish private holdings are small, family-style subsistence or semi-subsistence 
farms that rely on their own family labor (ZAWOJSKA, 2004). 
The aging of the population of farmers in Poland seems to have ceased. In 2002, 
almost 61 % of operators of individual farms (above 1 ha UAA) were less than 
50 years old. By comparison, more than ⅓ of larger farm (over 10 ha UAA) 
operators were 40 years old or less, and ¾ were below 50 years of age. 
The position of landowners or tenant farmers is determined by the size of the 
property. Some studies suggest (DUDEK, 2006) that the larger the farm area, the 
lower the likelihood of experiencing poverty. 
Historical figures relating to farms classified by size of area per holding indicate 
that small-scale farmers are not being driven off the land. In 2003, there were 
around 58.8 % of individual farm holdings with 1-5 ha, whereas only 9.9 % 
controlled more than 15 ha (in 1990 52.8 % and 6 % respectively). The latter, 
however, represented 44 %, whereas the smallest only 19.5 % of total UAA 
(GUS, 2003). 
The average Polish individual farm works 7.4 ha of agricultural land (compared 
to 19 ha in the EU) but farm size differs considerably between regions. South-
eastern Poland stands out in particular, with an average farm size of less than 
5 ha. This means that the majority of farm operators here look for other jobs, 
treating farms as an additional source of income. 
The fragmentation, polarization and regional differentiation of Polish farms all 
indicate the complexity and heterogeneity of the interests involved. This is a 
crucial point in terms of coalition-building involving farmers. The heterogeneity 
allows the monolithic view of agriculture, which largely prevails in public 
opinion, to be contested. 
On the other hand, because of similarities in culture and customs among the 
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farmers to learn not only about aspects such as management and market issues, 
but also about agricultural policies that create significant benefits for certain 
groups of individuals, who can therefore organize politically to maximize these 
benefits. 
In this case, the motivation to act and mobilize forces might stem from groups 
that share the same identity rather than the same interests. A group’s identity is 
what produces a social reward for its members, for example, becoming 
recognized as part of a privileged group that is capable of making change 
(GRAFF and MASON, 2005). 
4 POLITICAL ACCESS AND THE PUBLIC STATUS OF FARMERS IN 
POLAND 
As Bordonaro writes "The country’s economy is still centered on agriculture. 
Like many other historical cases, the transition from a strongly rural economy to 
a more  ‘modern’ one is full of social tensions" (BORDONARO, 2005).  
At the beginning of the market economy, political, administrative and economic 
organizations and institutions were perceived as being hostile to farmers, 
demonstrated by the survey "Farmers 1992" conducted on random sample of 
farmers (ROSNER, 1992). At the same time, the farmers declared a lack of 
influence on the development of the agricultural sector and rural areas. 
Another survey conducted by Podedworna in 1995 amongst modern farmers 
indicates that the political activity of the respondents was insignificant. They 
were not interested in politics, particularly not at a higher level. A low level of 
political activity goes together with a belief that farmers have little influence on 
agricultural policy (PODEDWORNA, 1998, p. 15). 
Existing institutions have been losing the trust of the public. Why? To some 
extent this is because they have lost sight of the public interest.  
What do I mean here by institutions? North first explores their nature proposing 
the following definition: "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction." He emphasizes the key implications of institutions: "In consequence 
they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or 
economic" (NORTH, 1990, p. 3). North underlines the intangibility of institutions: 
Rules and regulations are given as examples of formal institutions while 
conventions and codes of behavior are informal institutions. 
Economic institutions, such as the structure of property rights, the presence and 
perfection of markets, for example, determine the motivations of, and the 
constraints on, economic actors, and affect economic outcomes. Various groups 
and individuals usually benefit from different economic institutions, so there is 
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power. The allocation of political power is, in turn, affected by political 
institutions and the distribution of resources. Political institutions allocate de 
jure political power, while groups with greater economic power might possess 
greater political power (ACEMOGLU et al., 2005).  
In Poland, the participation of farmers in decision-making was a new concept to 
most academics, and especially officials who were used to top-down thinking 
and decision-making. Moreover, it was a new notion for farmers themselves. 
According to research into public opinion, since 1998 the level of Poles’ activity 
in civic organizations has been rather stable. However, it was observed that there 
was a better perception of the usefulness of local collaboration, mainly amongst 
farmers. In 2006, 75 % of them expressed such a view, the highest proportion 
since 2002 (41 % in 2002; 55 % in 2004). The optimistic signal is that almost 
35  % of farmers declared they were performing voluntary work in civic 
organizations, and their involvement with those organizations increased 
significantly (CBOS, 2006). 
My hypothesis is that, most recently, farmers have recognized that the allocation 
of benefits is consistent with social construction and political power. My own 
study suggests that they are tending to increase their access to the political 
process. One piece of evidence for this is that, during the 2001 parliamentary 
elections, as many as 61 farmers were elected to the Sejm (13.3 % of seats), but 
this dropped to 35 (7.6 %) in 2005.  
Additionally, voting for specific parties can be treated as an indicator of the 
political orientation of farmers. Farmers figure prominently among populist 
parties.  
The large number of people linked to agriculture suggests that the likely loss of 
rural votes resulting from decisions negatively affecting agricultural interests, 
influences politicians when making these sorts of decisions, especially at 
election time. 
5 ATTITUDES OF AND ACTIONS BY FARMERS 
Under the command economy, Polish farmers were treated rather well. They 
were never forced onto collective farms. And despite the small size of their plots 
of land, they had guaranteed state markets and also could sell privately. But 
times have changed. The old institutional framework – political, economic, and 
social – was damaged and the new institutions were still in the making. 
At the beginning of transition in Poland, life was much less secure for farmers 
than it was under communism. Many families, particularly on smaller farms, 
saw their incomes collapse. A study by Wilkin found that the attitude of the 
average farmer was very disturbing. It was a mixture of pessimism, 
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state assistance) and a sense of helplessness. Farmers were critical of the role of 
the government regarding rural and agricultural issues (WILKIN, 1997). 
They have a deeply rooted conviction that the government should have a very 
active role in agriculture and must act on their behalf. To understand this 
phenomenon, one cannot just analyze the new market conditions but also one 
has to take into account the nature of any collective actions by farmers and some 
constitutional facts.  
Poland has a parliamentary constitution with proportional representation. This 
determines the character of the political parties and consequently is also relevant 
for the problems of farmers’ representation.  
The economic theory of collective action is concerned with the provision of 
public goods (and other collective consumption) through the collaboration of 
two or more individuals. "A common, collective, or public good (benefit) is 
defined as any good, such that, if any person in a group consumes it, it cannot 
feasibly be withheld from the others in that group" (OLSON, 1965, p. 14). 
In other words, collective action means that people do work together towards 
common goals. Public policy, including agricultural policy can be recognized as 
a public good, and as such has an inherent free-rider problem. According to 
Olson, problems of collective political and economic action underlie every aspect 
of human activity and have profound political and economic consequences.  
The possibility of farmers acting collectively to take charge of their own 
interests has received virtually no attention in almost 70 years of policy debates 
(LEVINS, 2001, p. 2). Nowadays, it is believed that working together is beneficial 
for farmers both individually and as a group. Collective action will help them to 
increase economic power in agribusiness as well as political power in the 
decision-making process. What is more, in Levins’s words, farmers "acting 
alone is suicidal" in the 21
st century. 
Generally, the problems of collective action within a new institutional 
environment contributed to political instability, economic under-performance, 
and social inefficiencies in Poland. Early efforts to create and strengthen small 
farmer associations or production cooperatives generally failed, except in a few 
cases, because of lack of trust and misunderstanding of Western-style bottom-up 
cooperatives. 
Research by BANASZAK (2005) carried out in 2003 and 2005 with leaders of 
producer groups in Wielkopolskie voivodship indicates that, for the associated 
farmers, the critical problem appears to be neither cooperation and contacts with 
public institutions nor finding purchasers for output, but collective action i.e. 
members’ commitment, mutual understanding, building trust amongst members 
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According to Olson, the free rider becomes a major obstacle to the creation of 
important groups. When farmers face decisions in which cooperative action 
could benefit all as opposite to individual maximization, i.e., if there are 
dominant or locally dominant strategies for everybody that jointly produce an 
inefficient equilibrium, they may visualize the game as non-cooperative and act 
separately. This is the well-known Olsonian prediction that in various settings 
"rational, self-interested [players] will not act to achieve their common or group 
interests" (OLSON, 1965, p. 2). 
On the other hand, Poland is a good example of collective action among farmers 
to protest the government’s policies and to bring about more favorable policy 
outcomes including tax policy, social policy and, chiefly, agricultural policy. 
To achieve socio-political goals, farmers have practiced non-violent resistance 
or non-violent action. They have shown muscle via frequent blockades of major 
roads, street demonstrations and manifestations, occupying the provincial and 
central administrative office buildings, and even via blockades of railways 
carrying imported grain. The biggest demonstrations of the transition period 
began in February 1999, and they mobilized thousands of small-scale producers 
who raised roadblocks at more than 100 locations around the country to protest 
the government’s failure to improve agricultural sector. 
Those more recent actions (in 1999, 2003 etc.) were made as a signal to the 
government, and widespread enough to warrant a place in the media showing 
that rural population still needs a voice. 
The leaders of the two largest farmers’ unions, Lepper of the radical Self-
Defence union and Serafin of the more moderate National Union of Farmers’ 
Organizations, have been making efforts to channel rural dissatisfaction. Some 
blockades have resulted in increasingly dramatic clashes between police and 
farmers.  
How did government leaders respond to protest movements? Representatives of 
the authorities including Balcerowicz, spoke about "the act of lawlessness and 
anarchy". Balcerowicz thanked the policemen for "defending the law and, in 
doing so, exposing their lives and health to danger" (GOLIK, 1999). 
By contrast, in 1999 an opinion poll revealed that almost all (96  %) Poles 
thought that farmers were justified in their protests, and more than half (52 %) 
of respondents supported the forms of protest practiced by farmers. Moreover, 
81 % of them thought the road blockades organized by farmers was the only 
successful method of forcing the government to deal with rural problems 
(OBOB, 1999). 
One of the crucial factors influencing the decision of potential protesters to take 
action is the probability of success. To assess this probability, individuals use 
information available to them, for example, the government’s response to past 
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office, they will try to maximize their chances of being re-elected. Thus, it 
should be the case that they will take into account their competitors’ policies 
when deciding their response to protest movements (BUENROSTRO et al., 2005, 
pp. 2, 30). 
In Poland the conflicts were usually resolved when the government agreed to 
farmers claims. In 1999, after a few weeks of protests, the government and three 
farmers unions reached a preliminary agreement on government measures to 
address short-term problems in the agricultural sector. However, the Self-
Defense Party rejected the agreement and called for farmers to continue 
blockading roads. The protests ended after the government signed an agreement 
with the farmers on minimum state prices for grain. 
Agricultural interests can exploit agrarian myths, which include the confusion of 
modern commercial agriculture with rural heritage, to generate public support 
for programs which benefit farmers. As Brooks states, "political pressure can 
then lead politicians to collude in propagating these myths. Once politicians are 
lured by the support of vested agricultural interests, they too have a stake in 
ensuring that the public is convinced of the agrarian worth of their policy 
actions" (BROOKS, 2003, p. 3). 
In a young market economy like Poland, however, farmers often focus on only 
what is in their own short-term personal interest, and the competitive process 
puts pressure on less efficient farmers, and increases their incentive to lobby for 
government support. 
6 REPRESENTATION OF AGRICULTURAL INTERSETS AT THE 
NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LEVEL  
According to North, political bodies (political parties, the Senate, a regulatory 
agency), economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives), 
social bodies (churches, clubs, athletic associations), and educational bodies 
(schools, universities) are all organizations (NORTH, 1990, p. 5). 
Poland has a broad range of interest groups that actively and freely take part in 
the political process. These include, among others, trade unions, NGOs, and 
civic associations. Labor groups are possibly the most influential, affecting the 
political process at the local, regional, and national levels. Several organizations 
have a direct impact on public policy, and many current and former government 
officials and policy makers have or have had affiliations with these 
organizations.  
This section deals with the role played by selected organizations in the 
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6.1 Representation  of agricultural interests in the political parties  
and in parliament 
In Poland, farmers had been best able to protect their interests by using the 
legislative route rather than by means of non-violent collective actions. It is 
possible for a farming vote of 6.5 % (even twice as much if those with links to 
the agriculture are considered) of the national electorate to be decisive in 
parliament. 
Free competition for votes resulted in a proliferation of parties. In public 
decision-making, fragmentation slows down the decision processes, makes 
political players more vulnerable to pressures from main economic players, 
increases political tensions through misrepresentation of large chunks of the 
electorate and often facilitates unexpected political consequences (KAMINSKI, 
2003, p. 2). 
The parliament (Sejm) has 460 members, elected for a four-year term by party-
list proportional representation in multi-seat constituencies with a threshold at 
national level of 5 % for a single party and 8 % for coalitions. This requirement 
waived for national minorities.
1 
The 2005 parliamentary election used the d’Hondt-Jefferson divisor method of 
calculating seats, which is friendlier towards larger parties. In the 2001 election, 
seat allocation within party-list proportional representation was made using a 
modified Sainte-Laguë formula.  
According to the current electoral ordinance, only political parties and groups of 
voters can submit candidates for parliament. This means that voters can only 
vote from these candidates. The previous right of social organizations, including 
trades unions, to field candidates, has been removed. 
Parties can be regarded as unitary actors and power is concentrated at the tops of 
their hierarchies. When it comes to coping with actors outside the party, such as 
the electorate in campaigns, or lobbying organizations, it is usually the party as 
such, or the party leadership, that acts. 
Very important is the relation between voters (the principals) and the main 
political actors (the agents), i.e. parties. Two types of such relation are of great 
interest: Delegation and instruction. Delegation requires no more than the 
confidence voters have in the persons elected. Feeling such confidence, they are 
satisfied to delegate the decision-making to the people elected. Instruction 
prevails when the voters do not limit themselves to selecting representatives 
they have confidence in, but also require that they shall execute a certain 
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program. At the same time as people are elected, a program that those elected 
are obliged to implement is actually adopted. The program can be considered as 
an instruction from the voters to the elected (MOBERG, 2000). The Polish system 
seems to be a mixture of delegation and instruction with a tendency towards 
instruction.  
The 2005 election resulted in five parties in newly elected Sejm:  
•  Left wing: Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), social democrats; 
•  Populist left wing: Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona 
RP), agrarian party; 
•  Center: Polish Peasant Party (PSL), agrarian party; 
•  Eurorealist right wing: Liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO) and 
conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS); 
•  Eurosceptic right wing: League of Polish Families (LPR), nationalist 
party. 
Between themselves, the two agrarian parties control 80 of the 460 parliamentary 
seats, as Table 1 shows.  
Both are commonly identified to be legitimate representatives of farmers and 
rural populations. But some studies (PODEDWORNA, 1998; CYBULSKA, 2005) 
suggest that they are not recognized as representative of farmers’ interests. 
Cybulska points out that, in 2005, only 44 % of farmers identified themselves 
with the Polish Peasant Party (PPP), compared to 65 % in 1997. In 2005, half of 
the famers who responded identified with the more influential Self-Defense 
(CYBULSKA, 2005). 
In the 2005 parliamentary elections, PPP captured 6.96 % of the votes and 5.4 % 
of seats. Self-Defense registered 11.41 % of votes and the third highest number 
of seats (12.2  %). In the 2001 elections, PPP received 8.98  % of votes and 
9.13 % of seats, while Self-Defense obtained 10.2 % and 11.5 % respectively. 
In the 2004 European Parliament election, PPP ran as part of the European 
People’s Party and won 6.3 % votes, which gave it 4 of the 54 seats reserved for 
Poland. Self-Defense captured 10.78 % of votes and 6 seats. 
The main political voice of rural interests has traditionally been the PPP, but 
with the emergence of Farmers’ Self-Defense
2 in 1991 this is changing. It could 
signal the beginning of the superiority of Self-Defense as the main and 
legitimate political representative of rural interests. Anyhow, these two parties 
are competitors for rural votes, especially at the local level. 
                                                 
2  Self-Defense was originally a peasant union affiliated with the PPP. It transformed itself 
into a political movement with Andrzej Lepper as leader and split from the mother party. Aldona Zawojska  262
The party programs are best characterized by their attitude towards two main 
areas of agrarian policy: Guaranteed prices in agriculture, and credits, subsidies 
and tax relief (NALEWAJKO, 1994). 
Members of the PPP attempt to sustain the position of small farmers, favoring 
subsidization and protectionism policies which support the inefficient economic 
sector in rural areas. The party argued for guaranteed minimum prices for basic 
agricultural products, preferential credits for infrastructure and expansion of 
farms as well as provision of welfare funds. PPP’s campaign themes stressed the 
importance of rural development but also took on a strongly anti-liberal cast as 
the PPP sought to broaden its appeal beyond the narrow class base of its natural 
rural constituency.  
What distinguishes populist, radical Self-Defense is its style of confrontational 
direct action and radical rhetoric in protection of the "poor and the 
disadvantaged". The party targeted "losers" of transition with a program offering 
simple solutions to complex problems. Its leader, Lepper, roughly criticized the 
government’s agricultural policies and questioned its bargaining positions with 
the EU on a range of issues, including land ownership and farm subsidies. The 
party advocates state-funded agriculture. 
A parliamentary system depends, for its functioning, on the existence of stable, 
centralized, and disciplined political parties. By contrast to Self-Defense, the 
PPP is a veteran of the Polish political scene. During the 4
th cadence, the former 
lost 21 of 53 original members of its Parliamentary Club.  
An important fact is that 69 % of Self-Defense deputies in the 5
th cadence lacked 
parliamentary experience, as opposed to 98 % in the 4
th cadence. The lack of 
familiarity with the workings of parliament is much greater among this party 
than the PPP.  
From the data in Table 1 we find that PPP Club members are clearly better 
educated. An analysis of declarations of assets and financial interests shows that 
69  % of PPP Club members and 53  % of Self-Defense possess agricultural 
holdings. In general, the farm is not the main source of income for them but 
rather, in many cases, the annual parliamentary salary which exceeds PLN 
100,000 (EUR 26,000).  
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Table 1:  Parliamentary clubs of Polish peasant party and self-defense  
4
th cadence 
as of June 2005 
5
th cadence 
as of April 2006 
Characteristics 
PPP  Self-
Defense  PPP  Self-
Defense 
Number of deputies  39  32  25  55 
As % of whole Chamber  8.5  7.0  5.4  12.0 
Re-elected deputies by party (%)         –          –  64.0  30.9 
Shares by education (%)         
Tertiary 79.5  25.0  96.0  49.1 
Secondary 20.5  59.4  4.0  45.5 
Lower vocational  0.0  15.6  0.0  5.5 
Deputies possessing agricultural holding (%) 51.3  68.6  60.0  52.7 
Number of statements per deputy  90.4  145.3  16.2  14.7 
Number of interpellations per deputy  15.1  66.4  9.7  4.8 
Number of written questions per deputy  6.5  15.8  1.6  1.6 
Number of offices per deputy  3.1  1.9  2.5  1.9 
Deputies having their own WWW page (%)  17.9 9.4  32.0  12.7 
Deputies replying to e-mail (%)  15.4  21.9    n.a.  n.a. 
Source: Own  research. 
Notes:  N.a. = not available.  
As a picture of deputies’ activity in the Chamber’s proceedings, one can take the 
number of the statements, interpellations and questions. Figures in Table  1 
suggest that Self-Defense members during the previous cadence were more 
effective. It is possible in both clubs, however, to find deputies who have been 
involved in no activity mentioned above. 
Finally, communication between deputies and voters as well as deputies’ "public 
relations" are of rather low quality in terms of the number of local offices and 
individual web-sites. 
6.2 Professional  agricultural organizations 
Various interest groups and professional associations within the agricultural 
sector have a long tradition and some of them had a fairly broad membership 
even before 1989. Farmers in Poland are one of the most unionized professions. 
Their interests are represented, as a rule, by three main occupation-based 
organizations: The National Union of Farmers’ Groups and Agricultural 
Organizations, the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity of 
Individual Farmers, and the Agricultural Self-Defense Trade Union. 
They are corporatist associations which are aimed at representing the general 
interests of the agricultural sector as a whole, in contrast to the Federation of 
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producers’ associations included in the Federation of Agricultural Producers 
Association, for example. 
The largest is the National Union of Farmers’ Groups and Agricultural 
Organizations (KZRKiOR), a self-governed association of cooperatives, farmers’ 
unions and other farmers’ organizations. It has the longest tradition, since it has 
evolved from the movement of farmers’ groups from more than a century ago. It 
combines 25,000 rural housewives’ groups, 22,500 farmers’ groups and around 
1,200 co-operatives.
3 The organization has about 1.1 million members, of which 
more than 800,000 are rural women. It is a member of the International 
Federation of Agricultural Producers and COPA-COGECA. KZRKiOR supports 
Polish farmers, amongst others, by providing information about EU programs 
and by lobbying the European Commission.  
The Agricultural Self-Defense Trade Union, founded in 1992, is formally a 
separate structure from the political party, but in practice both these formations 
have the same infrastructure and members’ base, whose number is hard to 
assess.  
Of fundamental importance is the confidence of agricultural trades unions, 
especially amongst the rural population and farmers. A TNS Omnimas study 
carried out in 2004 shows that nearly 30 % of rural respondents and 40 % of 
farmers trust KZRKiOR. Similarly, 40  % of farmers but 33  % of rural 
respondents state that they trust the Self-Defense union (OBOB, 2004). 
Polish agricultural interests via the umbrella association COPA are also 
represented by the two previously mentioned trade unions as well as by the 
Federation of Agricultural Producers’ Union and the National Board of 
Agricultural Chambers. 
Agricultural self-government is expected to play the special role in farmers’ 
interest representations. The nationwide structure of The National Board of 
Agricultural Chambers comprises 16 regional chambers. Their activities are 
focused on increasing farmers’ influence on the issues that directly affect 
agricultural production (lobbying for common solutions to ensure the 
independent assessment of purchased agricultural raw materials, e.g. milk 
throughout Poland etc.). Similar to trade unions, they participate in consultations 
and bilateral dialogue with the state administrative organs (Ministry of Agriculture, 
state agricultural agencies). Additionally, the chambers’ representatives have 
participated in the tenders organized by the Agricultural Property Agency.  
Some of the national organizations of Polish farmers are closely linked to 
political parties. Their extensive engagement in electoral activity and the voting 
power of their farm membership leads to representation in parliament. 
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The upward transfer of power to regional and national unions and federations 
ought to be limited to where such transfer is constructive. Otherwise, the local 
farmers lose hold of their own affairs, while national unions representing a wide 
variety of interests and large membership tend to be insensitive to individual 
concerns. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Agriculture in Poland continues to be a strong political force: It accounted for 
over two thirds of the private sector economy in 1989, and it is still a large part 
of the private sector today. In 2002 as many as 99.9 % of farms larger than 1 ha 
were run by private owners. In sharp contrast to the situation in the EU as a 
whole, Polish agriculture is still a relatively large domestic sector in terms of 
jobs and value added. 
Major sources of heterogeneity of Polish farmers are demographic differences 
and distinctions between small and large farmers.  
Polish farmers recognized that they would have little influence on government 
until they were able to organize themselves into groups. Nowadays, they are 
highly organized to defend their economic and political interests, sometimes by 
non-violent collective actions. Farmers, their organizations, and agrarian parties 
have successfully extracted preferential treatment from government. Farmers 
benefit from all the general concessions available, such as exemption from 
income tax and special retirement arrangements for example. They have been 
fighting hard to enter the EU on their own terms including lobbying for more 
rights and subsidies for farmers.  
Nevertheless, farmers want short-term solutions, no matter whether those solutions 
are compatible with their own long-term interests or long-term economic goals. 
Those very government policies designed to preserve and protect agriculture 
have contributed to encouraging small-scale, inefficient farmers to remain in 
operation. 
Farmers in Poland have been successful, since the political evidence is that the 
support of the rural electorate opens the way to government at national and local 
level. Similarly, governments are unwilling to risk losing the electorate’s 
support by making decisions that hurt farmers. One factor has been particularly 
important in determining farmers’ voting power: The size of the farm-related 
vote, which in Poland is relatively large.  
The agrarian parties (PPP and Self-Defense) have focused much of their 
political energies on directing outputs for the selective benefit of those who have 
provided them with electoral support. The proportional electoral law, however, 
is to blame for splitting the political parties from society. Great challenges may Aldona Zawojska  266
rest at the community level, such as how to identify or help create organizational 
bodies which represent the full range of farmer interests.  
Five Polish farm organizations are members of the European agricultural 
umbrella association COPA. They are expected to speak for the interest of 
national farmers, although these bodies are not directly represented in Poland’s 
various social dialogue institutions. As yet, it is difficult to assess how 
influential they are at the European level. 
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This paper discusses the competitiveness of milk production in the Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEEC). The analysis compares the production costs 
at farm level in Eastern and Western European countries were. The analysis was 
carried out using the methodology of the International Farm Comparison 
Network (IFCN). A typical farm database of the IFCN was used as the data 
source.  
Keywords: Milk production, costs, competitiveness, CEEC. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The competitiveness of agriculture in the CEEC has been discussed for several 
years. The fear exists that, owing to lower wages and prices for domestic 
resources, agriculture – and in particular milk production – in the CEEC is more 
competitive than that of Western Europe (SIEMER, 1998).  
At the same time, a majority of countries in Central and Eastern Europe show 
negative trends in the dairy sector, reflected by a decrease in milk production 
since the beginning of the transition period. Between 1992 and 2004, cow’s milk 
production in the CEEC fell from 107.7 to 83.5  million  tonnes. The CEEC’ 
share of global milk production also decreased from 23 % to 16 % (ZMP, 2005).  
Lower costs for resources and a simultaneous decrease in milk production does 
not give an unequivocal answer to the question of the competitiveness of the 
dairy sector in the CEEC. In spite of several studies carried out on agriculture in 
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1 precise conclusions and recommendations regarding competitiveness 
are still unresolved. The goal of this paper is to compare farms and their production 
costs so as to estimate competitiveness.  
2 MILK PRODUCTION IN CEEC 
With an annual total of 83,5  million  tonnes (2004), the CEEC is one of the 
worlds biggest milk production regions. The biggest milk producers are: Russia, 
Ukraine, Poland, Romania and Belarus (Figure  1a). Together these countries 
produce more than 80 % of cow’s milk in the CEEC.  














































Source:  ZMP, 2005  
There are big differences between the CEEC in population and total area. Per 
capita milk production gives us more information about the intensity of milk 
production in the country (Figure 1b). The biggest per capita milk production is 
in Latvia (537 kg) and Belarus (531 kg), followed by Estonia (473). The biggest 
milk producer in the CEEC, Russia, has one of the lowest levels of per capita 
milk production (only 223 kg).  
The current level of cow’s milk production in the CEEC is 23 % lower than it 
was 12 years ago. Negative trends in the dairy sector have been observed since 
the beginning of 1990 in all CEE countries. Political and economic changes 
resulted in a reduction in state support for milk producers and consumers, rapid 
price growth for production equipment, a change in the land ownership and land 
restitution to former owners, and a change in the purchasing power of the 
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population. With political independence, economic contacts were also broken. 
At the same time, Western companies, with their cheaper and attractive products, 
got good market access. (PIRSCHER and TILLACK, 1999) 
Milk producers in the CEEC reacted to the changes in conditions by reducing 
their milk production. The biggest and quickest decreases were observed in the 
first years of transition (Figure 2). During this period, the countries reduced their 
milk amount between 17-47 %. After a significant drop in milk production during 
the first years of transition, most countries stabilized their milk production. In 
some countries like Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria, levels of milk production are 
still decreasing. Today the countries, except Romania are producing 15 % to 
45  % less milk than in 1990, with the biggest decrease in milk production 
observed in the Baltic States.  








































Source: ZMP,  2005. 
The trends in milk production were derived from the trends in livestock numbers 
and milk yield. With respect to livestock numbers, all CEEC have similar trends. 
Since the beginning of the 90
’s, a continual reduction of the numbers of cows in 
all the CEEC was observed, as shown diagram 3a. Belarus, Romania, Bulgaria 
and Poland have experienced the smallest reduction in livestock. While Latvia, 
Estonia, Czech Republic, Ukraine and Slovakia now have less than half of the 
they former stock.  
As regards to milk yield, countries show very different trends. After the reduction 
in the early 90s, milk yield in the new European Union countries showed a 
stable growth since the mid 90s compared to the 1990 level. Only in the former 
Soviet Republics was the milk yield, until recently, significantly below the 1990 
level.  Mikhail Ramanovich, Torsten Hemme 
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Source: ZMP,  2005. 
There are also great differences between the CEEC regarding type of milk 
production and herd size. Milk production on small family farms (households) is 
very common, for example, in Bulgaria and Poland. These are either very old, or 
were built up after the partition of big farms during the socialist era. However, a 
lot of countries retained big farms, which can produce milk at an industrial level 
(Belarus, Czech Republic) (HEMME et al., 2005). 
The production type of milk significantly determines the proportion of milk 
delivered to the dairy. In most cases, small family farms produce milk only for 
home consumption and sell the rest at the local market. Dairies prefer big farms 
because of lower transportation costs and better milk quality. Owning direct 
access to milk plants, bigger farms normally receive higher prices than small 
farms (NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT AGRICULTURAL EXPERTS IN THE CEE CANDIDATE 
COUNTRIES, 2004). In the last few years, milk prices in Western Europe have 
shown negative trends, while in the CEEC prices have grown significantly, 
especially for high-quality milk. Milk prices in the CEEС are still below the 
level of West European countries (ZMP, 2005). In view of impending globalization 
and decreases in custom-tariffs, one can assume that milk production in Western 
Europe could shortly lose its advantage in the form of higher prices for milk.  
In the last few years, milk production in the CEEC has reduced significantly. 
This reduction should not be understood, as a negative trend, but as an 
adaptation to new conditions. It would be wrong to conclude that the production 
decrease during transition is a result of disadvantages in competitiveness 
(SIEMER, 1998). How competitive is milk production in the Central and Eastern European countries 
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3 MEASURING COMPETITIVENESS BY COMPARING TYPICAL FARMS 
Competitiveness cannot be shown directly from statistics or farm data. Neither is 
there a simple concept and definition of competitiveness. One of the definitions 
of competitiveness is: An ability to operate in a local and foreign market and 
simultaneously receive a profit (SCHÜLE, 1999).  
To realize advantages in competitiveness, the enterprise can use one or both of 
these strategies: Cost leadership and product differentiation. For milk production 
as a homogenous product, the cost leadership strategy is more common 
(RAMANOVICH and LAJTOS, 2005). It means that the farms which produce milk at 
lower costs and have a higher profit are more competitive. The enterprises that 
have higher costs will cease production in the long term. On a global scale it leads 
to the shifting of milk production from less competitive regions to more 
competitive ones. Here competitiveness depends on production costs (technology 
and prices for inputs) and prices for milk and by-products.  
Special analyses are necessary to estimate competitiveness. Official statistics do 
not provide such an indication and have a high level of aggregation. Besides, it 
is very difficult to find information on different cost components and on the use 
of resources and labor, expressed in internationally comparable units. This is 
very important as a comparison of various production systems must be done on 
an equal basis. Detailed data at the farm level is available in most cases. 
Different systems of data collection and bookkeeping makes however cross 
countries comparisons difficult. It can distort the results if the returns and 
expenses in the countries analyzed do not express the same components. If we 
want to compare various farm types and regions, an effective tool for 
comparison is necessary (ISERMEYER et al., 2003). 
To solve this problem the International Farm Comparison Network (IFCN) was 
established. The IFCN is a worldwide association of agricultural scientists, 
advisors and farmers. The IFCN methodology of competitiveness analysis is 
based on cost comparison at the farm level (HEMME, 2000). The criteria for 
competitive milk production are lower costs and profitability. To have reliable 
information about production costs and prices the IFCN have built a set of 
typical farms for important dairy areas. Typical farms describe the most 
common type of milk production under the regional conditions (KIRNER, 2003). 
The network started in 2000 with 21 farms in 8 countries. It now already 
includes102 farms from 33 countries (HEMME et al., 2005). 
The advantage of the IFCN database is that it provides very detailed information 
for every farm, which is organized in the same way for different regions and 
countries. It makes comparisons between all farms possible. Owing to a big 
amount of variables it is not only possible to say how big the production costs 
are, but also why they are at a particular level, and what the future perspectives 
of the farms are. Mikhail Ramanovich, Torsten Hemme 
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Creating a typical farm starts with determining the main characteristics (farm 
size, farm type, strategy) of a dairy farm in a region. It should be done in 
discussion with local experts who have good contacts with farmers and access to 
local farm statistics. On the basis of these criteria typical farms for the region are 
constructed. Normally, the first farm corresponds to a typical dairy farm with an 
average number of cows, while the second one is a bigger farm. For farm 
classification other criteria can also be used: Management quality, farm strategy 
and farm type. Typical farms are constructed on the basis of existing farms. To 
verify the data and eliminate untypical factors, the data is discussed with local 
dairy farmers and experts. After this, the farm is ready and can be analyzed 
(HEMME, 2000). 
Typical farms are not statistically representative of the country and, in a large-
scale analysis they can’t compete with country-wide databases, if these exist. A 
peculiar feature of the IFCN farm database is a deep and detailed analysis of 
milk production and a knowledge creation for the regions, where statistical data 
is not available. 
4 ANALYSIS DESCRIPTION AND RESULTS 
For the analysis of competitiveness of the milk production in Eastern Europe, 
farms from Poland, Belarus, Czech Republic and Hungary were chosen. They 
were compared with farms from the main milk production areas in Western 
Europe: Germany and United Kingdom.  
The farms are very different in terms of ownership, herd size and the intensity of 
milk production. The milk yield (Figure 4) shows the intensity of production, while 
the number contained in the farm name signifies the amount of cows on the farm. 














































































































Source: HEMME et al., 2005; IFCN Dairy Report.  
Note:   The data refer to the year 2004.  
The typical farms which were analyzed from Belarus are large-scale agricul-
tural enterprises with 650 cows. They were converted from former Kolkhozes.  How competitive is milk production in the Central and Eastern European countries 
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Large-scale farms in Belarus produce about 65 % of the total volume of milk 
and own about 74 % of cows. The farm types in Belarus were constructed using 
management quality as their basis. The first farm (BY-650-normal) has average 
management quality; the second one (BY-650 best) is managed in the best way. 
The management quality affects the milk yield on the farm. The best-managed 
farm has an annual milk yield of about 5,400  kg; the farm with average 
management only yields 2,900 kg.  
The farms in Poland are typical family farms in the Lubuskie (PL-12NW) and 
Podlasie (PL-60NE) regions. These medium-sized and large family farms in 
Poland own about 36 % of cows in the country, and their share is continuously 
growing. The bigger farms have more intensive milk production with annual 
yields of about 1,500 kg milk or more per cow.  
The typical farms from the Czech Republic are large family farms (CZ-67) and 
cooperative farms (CZ-428). These farm types own more than 82 % of cows in 
the Czech Republic. With more than 7 t milk per year, the milk yield of Czech 
farms is at the Western European level.  
The hungarian farms used for comparison are a family farm (HU-100) and a 
cooperative (HU-400). Farms of this type own almost 80 % of cows and the 
percentage of cows in this group increases yearly. The milk yield on the farms is 
about 6 t per year.  
Farms from Germany and UK are family farms (DE-80, UK-99, UK-206) and a 
cooperative farms (DE-650). The German farms have the biggest milk yield; more 
than 8 t milk per year. Farms from the UK, meanwhile, produce about 1000 kg 
milk less.  































































































5a) Average wages on the farm, US-$/hour






















































































































































































5c) Labor costs per 100 kg milk, US-$
  Calc. costs for family labor
  Wages paid
 
 
Source: HEMME et al., 2005; IFCN Dairy Report.  
Note:   The data refer to the year 2004.  
We asserted earlier (page 1) that, the availability of cheaper local resources 
makes the CEEC have advantages over Western European countries in milk 
production. Figure 5 illustrates the information about labor used on the farms. 
As can be seen, wages paid on farms in the CEEC are much lower than in 
Western Europe. They vary from only 1 US$ per hour in Belarus to 18 US$ per 
hour in Germany. But at the same time, labor productivity is also very different. 
A worker from the 206 cow farm group in the UK produces 10 times more milk 
per hour than a worker on a farm in Belarus. The result of this was that there are 
only small differences in the labor costs per 100  kg milk between Eastern How competitive is milk production in the Central and Eastern European countries 
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Europe and Western Europe. Compared to the UK-206, Eastern European farms 
have a cost advantage of only 0-4 US$ per 100 kg milk. 


























































































6a) Land costs per 100 kg milk, US-$
  Land rents calculated for land owned


























































































































































































6c) Level of land rents, US-$/ha  
# 
Source: HEMME et al., 2005; IFCN Dairy Report. 
Note:   The data refer to the year 2004.  
The situation with land costs is similar, although some slight differences were 
noted. Like wages, land prices (land rent) in the CEEC are much lower than 
those in Western Europe. Compared to the United Kingdom, land prices in the 
CEEC are up to 20 times lower.
2 Differences in land productivity are not as 
marked as with labor. As a result, the UK-206, for example, produce milk with 
higher land costs of 1-4 US$ per 100 kg milk than Eastern European farms.  
These results confirm the hypotheses that the CEEC have competitive 
advantages in milk production. Cheaper labor and land together reduce 
production costs by about 10 US$ per 100 kg milk. As regards competitiveness, 
not only costs for local resources are important, but overall production costs and 
also milk prices. Now we shall compare production costs and milk prices on the 
typical farms in Eastern and Western Europe. 
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Source: HEMME et al., 2005; IFCN Dairy Report. Note:  The data refer to year 2004.  
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The comparison of the production costs show that farms in Eastern Europe 
produce milk at lower costs than farms in Western Europe. The production costs 
per 100 kg milk vary from 14 US$ in Belarus to more than 35 US$ in Hungary. 
Variations in production costs were also observed within the countries. In the 
Czech Republic, for example, there were differences between farms of about 
9 US$ per 100 kg milk. Costs of milk production in Western Europe are much 
higher. Farms in Germany have production costs between 36 and 39 US$ while 
farms in the United Kingdom produce milk with costs of about 33 US$. The cost 
advantage of the CEEC is about 15-20 US$ per 100 kg milk. One of the reasons 
for higher production costs in Western Europe is the high prices for milk quotas, 
which do not exist in most Eastern European countries. Per 100 kg milk, farmers 
in Western Europe had quota costs of 1-3 US$.  
At the same time, milk prices in the CEEC are lower than those in Western 
European Countries. The lowest price received is by milk producers in Belarus: 
Only about 20 US$ per 100 kg milk, which is below the global market price. 
Milk prices in the Czech Republic and Hungary are comparable to those in 
Germany and the UK: 30-38 US$ per 100 kg milk. In the CEEC, milk prices 
depend on the milk quality and as such, the price for high-quality milk is much 
higher.  
All farms in the CEE countries analyzed – excluding Hungary – register a 
business profit from milk production. The 100 cow farm group in Hungary can 
cover all their costs, but do not make any business profit. The 400 cow farm 
group in Hungary produces milk at a loss. The farms in the UK can produce 
milk with a business profit of 3-5  US$ per 100  kg milk. Farms in Germany 
operate at a profit (DE-80), or without loss in their accounts. However, the 
production costs with opportunity costs for their own inputs are lower than the 
receipts. Predicted farm losses can be recovered by making alternative use of 
their own resources. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis has confirmed competitive advantages of milk production in the 
CEEC. A majority of farmers in these countries produce milk at a competitive 
price. Principal reasons for the lower production costs are cheaper local 
resources: Labor and land. Lower labor and land costs account for about 50 % of 
the whole cost advantage. But we must keep in mind that the CEEC can lose 
these advantages if prices for local resources increase. To preserve 
competitiveness, a more effective use of resources is necessary. A disadvantage 
in the CEEC is the lower milk prices, though farmers can get higher prices for 
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PRODUCTION AND TRADE OF ANIMAL PRODUCTS  






The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is an inter-governmental organi-
zation comprising Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and several 
countries of the Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS) including Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The agricultural sector has 
remained a major contributor to the national economies of the ECO member 
countries. According to FAO estimates, in 2002 agriculture generated 25.2 percent of 
GDP and employed 42 percent of the economically-active population in the ECO 
region. Livestock production in the ECO countries is predominately based on 
traditional systems. The amount of livestock products in ECO was about 
6,000,000 metric tons (Mt) during the study period. Most of this production belonged 
to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, but most red meat, skins and honey is produced by CIS 
countries. This paper looks at the performance of livestock production and export of 
Iran and CIS countries within the ECO region and examines the comparative advan-
tage indices for these countries. The data from 1992-2002 is supplied by the FAO 
(2004). Changes in Iran's production and export structure were compared with CIS 
producers. The objectives of this paper are: (1) to identify the comparative advantage 
of Iranian livestock production and export in comparison with CIS countries; (2) to 
discuss the reasons for changes in comparative advantage over time. The research 
results show that past trade and production policies, and the economic behavior of 
producers and exporters, have been such that they could manage neither appropriate 
and timely responses to world demand, nor proper adaptation to market niches.  
Keywords  Comparative advantage indices, livestock production and export, 
Iran, CIS countries, ECO region. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is an inter-governmental 
organization comprising Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Turkey, Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. The ECO region covers a vast land area of 793.72 million hectares 
of arable land, including 116.93 million hectares of perennial crops, 248.62 million 
hectares of pastures and 44.08 million hectares of irrigated land. The population 
of the region (in 2004) was 391.13 million and was growing at 1.54 percent 
annually. An agricultural labor force of 62.2 million constitutes about 38.5 percent 
of the total labor force in the region. Pakistan alone, with 157 million people, has 
over 40 percent of the population of the region. Next comes Iran, with 17.8 percent, 
and then Turkey, which accounts for 18.5  percent of the population. The 
economically-active population employed in agriculture is high, at 45.1 percent 
in Pakistan and 43.3 percent in Turkey. Afghanistan has the highest percentage 
of the economically-active agricultural population with 65.6 percent. However, 
agricultural production in the region has almost stagnated during the past 
15 years. The index of agricultural production (with a base of 1990-91=100) 
improved by only 9  percent in 2004. Up to the year 2000, the index of 
agriculture production remained below 100. Since the population increased 
faster, the index of per capita agricultural production improved by a meager 
4 percent. The region is a net importer of food, valued at about US$ 6 billion 
(in 2000). Yet food imports make up only about 5 percent of the value of all 
goods and services exported by the countries of the region. Kazakhstan and 
Turkey are the countries with the lowest food imports. Regional exports need to 
be promoted to improve incomes and employment. Often it is erroneously 
assumed that better quality and low-priced imports adversely affect local 
production. Experience has shown that when two countries produce the same 
commodities are open to trade, quality and prices in both countries stimulate 
demand, and both of the trading partners gain through improving the quality and 
cost-effectiveness of their products. That promotes exports to destinations 
outside of these countries. The ECO region has considerable scope for 
enhancing its inter-country trade and thereby increasing the level of their foreign 
trade outside of the region. The agricultural sector is important to the economies 
of ECO countries, particularly in terms of its contribution to the GDP and 
provision of employment opportunities, though with considerable inter-country 
variations. In 2003, the share of agriculture of total GDP ranged from more than 
47 percent in Afghanistan to below 8 percent in Kazakhstan; it ranged between 
10-20 percent in Iran, Turkey and Azerbaijan, and between 20 and 35 percent in 
the remaining five ECO countries. In 2003, the agricultural labor force 
accounted for 42 percent of the total labor force in the region. In addition to food 
and feed materials, the sector is a supplier of high quality fiber, wool products, Production and trade of animal products in selected ECO countries  285
silk, honey, fruits and vegetables. The major farm products of the ECO member 
countries in 2001 were wheat, barley, rice, sugar cane, sugar beet, seed cotton, 
potatoes, tomatoes, meat, milk and milk products. The main issues and 
constraints faced in the process of reform in the agriculture and livestock sectors 
in ECO Countries can be identified as: a) lack of an adequate institutional 
framework for implementing the reform policies, b) extremely limited capacity 
for policy analysis to provide technical support in policy-related decision-
making, c) macro-economic constraints, d) limited availability of information, 
especially on cost of production of crops and livestock for making farm-level 
decisions on production and marketing fronts, e) existing food security policies 
aimed at enhancing self-sufficiency at the expense of the long-term efficiency of 
resource use, and comparative advantage in the production of different 
commodities in these countries (LERMAN, 1999). The contribution of agriculture 
to the ECO countries’ exports fluctuates but stays near 8 percent, while imports 
hover around 10 percent. Although intra-regional trade among ECO countries is 
still low, at about 4 percent of total exports, the share of agriculture in intra-
regional trade is quite significant at about 21 percent. The market potential and 
constraints assessment showed that households marketed their livestock 
products as a rule to middleman/middle women and got rather low prices. Only 
meat and milk and milk products are marketable commodities for households.  
The objectives of this paper are: (1) to identify the production and export 
comparative advantage of Iranian livestock products in comparison with CIS 
countries; (2) to discuss reasons for changes in comparative advantage over 
time.  
We start by presenting the methodology applied and the data used for analysis. 
We proceed by describing results and then by drawing conclusions. 
2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
This paper looks at the performance of livestock production and export of 
selected ECO member countries and examines comparative advantage indices 
such as Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) and Revealed Comparative Advantage 
(RCA). Within the framework of DRC methodology, all materials and technical 
resources are divided into marketable (sellable) and non-marketable (unsellable). 
Marketable resources include all types of material and technical resources 
available on the market, including inputs as fertilizers, seeds, fuel and lubricants 
and chemicals. Non-marketable resources include expenses for supplying water, 
rental fees for land, labor costs and the lease of equipment. The Domestic Resource 
Cost formula  as discussed in MONKE  and PEARSON (1994) is in the following: 
"DRC=G/(E-F), i.e., non-marketable resources/world prices – marketable", If DRC 
> 1, it is more cost-effective to import a product, and if DRC < 1, a country has 
comparative advantages in its production. Another applied index is the RCA, Farhad Mirzaei , Olaf Heidelbach  286
which is grounded in traditional international trade theory and based on export 
specialization. The original RCA index was formulated by BALASSA (1965) as 
RCA = (Xij/Xtj)/(Xin/Xtn) where X  represents exports, i  is a country, j is a 
commodity and n is a set of countries (in this case, the ECO members). RCA is 
based on export performance and observed trade patterns, and measures a 
country’s exports of a commodity relative to its total exports and to the 
corresponding export performance of a set of countries, e.g. if RCA > 1, then a 
comparative advantage is revealed. Indices for Iran and CIS countries are 
estimated for the period 1992-2003, with the data supplied by the FAO (2004). 
3 RESULTS 
The animal population in the ECO region grew at an annual rate of 6.7 percent 
from 1994-2003. This increase was 3.75 percent in Iran, 4.2 percent in Pakistan, 
6  percent in Turkmenistan and 2.9  percent in Uzbekistan. In fact, the other 
member states experienced a decline in their livestock populations. The 
contribution of CIS countries to the total value of agricultural products is 
14.1 percent; the share for Iran, Pakistan and Turkey is 33.6 percent, 34.4 percent, 
and 17.9  percent, respectively. The Iranian export rate is 10.4  percent, 
Kazakhstan’s is 25.4 percent, Turkey’s is 43.7 percent, Pakistan’s is 16.7 percent, 
and of the rest of the members’ rate is 4.8 percent. The Iranian import rate is about 
37.7 percent, Turkey’s is 22.1 percent, Tajikistan’s is 19.4 percent, Uzbekistan’s is 
10  percent, and the share of the remaining countries is 10.8  percent. The data 
implies that Iran and Turkey are, respectively, the largest importer and the 
largest exporter in the region. The calculation of livestock products is carried out 
for five major products, namely milk, mutton, beef, poultry meat and eggs. Data 
on the cost of production for livestock products was collected by the Department 
of Livestock Affairs of the Ministry of Agriculture, while the data on trade was 
extracted from the Yearbook of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The calculations 
were carried out in collaboration with the FAO and the Institute of Agricultural 
Planning and Economic Research.  
Due to the absence of non-marketable information for CIS countries, we couldn't 
estimate their DRC index. However, agricultural production plays a major role 
in their economies and it might be reasonable to assume that the DRC index will 
be below one. It is clear that if a country can export its commodity, then it will 
have a comparative advantage in its exportable commodity production. The 
results of DRC analysis for Iran show that its value for dairy products is below 1 
(DRC < 1). This means that there is a comparative advantage in the country for 
milk production. Low DRC values depend on its components, namely the cost of 
domestic factors of production, revenue earned from production and tradable 
cost and input at shadow prices. A low DRC for milk indicates a low ratio of the 
shadow price of domestic factors to the shadow price of tradable factors. In 
addition, the value of DRC for red meat indicates that there is comparative Production and trade of animal products in selected ECO countries  287
advantage for red meat production. Also, the value of DRC indicates a 
comparative advantage for egg production in the country and reveals that there 
are comparative advantages in the country for egg production. The DRC 
calculation results show that there is a comparative advantage for poultry 
production (DRC < 1). 
The RCA trend for livestock products of selected countries during the study 
period shows that there is no harmonized trade policy in these countries with 
respect to regional and global markets (Table 1). A comparative advantage for 
Kazakhstan in livestock production (Figure 1) is revealed (RCA > 1) in 1992, 
but RCA in 1993 declined.  

















However, this country has protected its revealed comparative advantage 
(RCA = 4.54). Although this index was relatively stable from 1996-1999, it 
experienced a significant reduction after 1999. From 2000 on, Kazakhstan lost its 
powerful revealed comparative advantage in the region. This subject indicates the 
inflexibility of trade policy-makers who are trying to protect their trade 
advantage in the regional niche market.  
Table 1:  RCA values for selected countries 
Year/Country  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Iran  0.84 0.27 1.72 0.28 0.29 0.82 0.8 0.92 2.8  2 1.65 1.56
Kazakhstan  5.06 4.54 7.12 7.84 5.53 4.06 5 4.42 0.9 0.61 0.31 0.16
Kyrgyzstan  9.42 3.06  8.1  5.5 2.63 3.03 2.03 2.55 2.63 3.21  1.6 3.34
Uzbekistan  0 0.21 0.07 0.11 0.26 0.21 0.28 0.38 0.31 0.26 0.08 0.19
Turkmenistan  0.01 1.32 0.59 1.75 1.82 2 0.8 1.21 0.87 0.63 1.23 0.51
Tajikistan  0.02 0.74  0.1 0.23 0.23 0.18 0.31 0.1 0.21 0.11 0.02  0.1
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Despite Kyrgyzstan’s revealed comparative advantage (RCA > 1) during the 
study period, fluctuation is also visible for this country (see Figure 2). After 
some vacillation, RCA declined by 2.8 times over the study period (from 9.42 in 
1992 to 3.34 in 2003). 

















Fluctuation is even more characteristic for the rest of the selected countries. In 
Iran (Figure 3) after 2 years of comparative disadvantage, RCA increased in 
1994 to a value above 1. However, Iran again lost its advantage during the 
following years (1995-1999). Although we can observe RCA values above 1 from 
2000 on, the absolute value is decreasing steadily. 
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Uzbekistan (Figure  4) did not realize any livestock product export in 1992 
(RCA1992 = 0). In the following years it didn't gain any revealed comparative 
advantage. 


















Turkmenistan (Figure 5) had an RCA value higher than 1 in 1993, 1995, 1996, 
1997, 1999, and 2002 and an RCA value less than 1 in all other years. The 
regular fluctuation is caused by uncertain policies and trade imbalances.  


































































































AFarhad Mirzaei , Olaf Heidelbach  290
Finally, Tajikistan (Figure 6) shows similar development to Uzbekistan – however, 
its RCA fluctuation is more intensive.  

















Figure 7 summarizes the RCA results for all countries, and shows a clear and 
deductive image of selected countries' RCA. What can be observed are 
instabilities in policy-making and untimely reactions to target market signals, as 
well as increasing regional and world demand. This might be explained by 
higher elasticities of demand for livestock products compared to most crop 
products, i.e., rising incomes have a more significant effect on demand. 
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4 DISCUSSION: PROSPECTS OF THE LIVESTOCK SECTOR IN 
SELECTED COUNTRIES 
The ECO region can become a strong agricultural exporting block through 
regional co-operation in productivity enhancement, including pooling skills and 
experiences, cross training, more efficient use of international consultants, 
savings on joint export infrastructures and safety accredited testing laboratories. 
Enhancing institutional capacities in the region for developing market 
economies and harmonizing trade policies, particularly on pricing and food 
safety standards, will further help to develop the region’s competitiveness in 
international markets.  
The CIS countries have a somewhat different status. This region is comprised of 
five countries that were part of the Soviet Union and are suffering from the 
effects of the inherited central planning and control system. 
Geographically, Kazakhstan is the largest of the CIS group of countries, and its 
agricultural sector contributes 8 percent to GDP and employs 22 percent of its 
economically-active population. Wheat is the major agricultural commodity 
produced. Further products include cotton, meat, poultry and milk. With the 
disintegration of the USSR, demand for these products declined abruptly and is 
only now slightly picking up. Farmers are reducing their production and are 
trying to adjust supply to the market demand. This resulted in the slow adoption 
of modern technologies. This vicious circle of low demand, lower production 
(supply), non-use of modern technologies and inputs is negatively effecting 
incomes and employment in rural areas. This holds especially for small farmers, 
farm workers, women and other weaker sections of society. The livestock sector 
in Kazakhstan has tremendous potential to contribute substantially to income, 
growth, employment and export opportunities in rural areas. Its potentials are 
marked by the vast but underexploited rangelands, the flexible, low-cost 
production structure of the small-holder farms, and the availability of low-cost 
by-products from large-scale crop production (feed grain and oilseed meals). 
The Kyrgyz Republic was one of the poorest states of the former Soviet Union 
and the country was the main provider of high-quality wool, cotton, silk, 
tobacco, fruits and vegetables, and mutton. Agriculture is the most important 
sector of the economy and accounts for about 45 percent of the gross domestic 
product. The livestock sector was one of the sectors that suffered most after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. There is a great need for comprehensive sector 
development with emphasis on small farmers and food security.  
In Tajikistan, agriculture is the main source of living for an estimated 72 percent 
of the total population in the country. The sector contributed about 26 percent to 
the GDP and 35 percent to tax revenues in 2002. It is the second income source 
for foreign currencies (mostly from exports of cotton) after the aluminium Farhad Mirzaei , Olaf Heidelbach  292
sector. Livestock production accounts for about 30 percent of total agricultural 
production. A large share of livestock production comes from private plots – 
63 percent in 1994, compared to only 37 percent from state and collective farms. 
Since 1988, total livestock production has dropped by 35 percent. The sector 
faces a number of constraints: Deterioration of grazing land, insufficient supplies 
of medicine, fodder crops, minerals and vitamins; and weak animal husbandry 
management are some issues that limit growth. 
In Turkmenistan, agriculture is the main source of livelihood for an estimated 
55 percent of the total population. The sector contributed about 27 percent to 
annual GDP in the last five years and is the second most important income 
source for foreign currencies (mostly resulting from exports of cotton) after the 
energy sector.  
In Uzbekistan, agriculture is a priority sector as it is still a major contributor to 
economic growth of the country. It provides about 30 percent to the GDP. More 
than half of the country's population (63 percent) live in rural areas, and are 
engaged in agriculture and related activities. Agriculture employs about 
35  percent of the labor force of the country and is one of the main foreign 
exchange earners of the country.  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Three percent of world’s livestock products are produced in the ECO region, but 
5.9 percent of the world’s population lives in this region. In all of the investigated 
countries, the agricultural sector plays an important role in both income 
generation and employment provision. The livestock sector has a significant, but 
in recent years decreasing, share in agricultural production, partly caused by the 
lowered export potential for most of the investigated countries as shown by the 
results of the RCA analysis.  
Low production and the resulting food insecurity may be overcome by 
enhancing the production of commodities with comparative advantage and 
promoting trade between ECO member countries by abandoning tariffs and 
quotas. 
From a methodological point of view, the RCA analysis provided a framework 
for describing changes in comparative advantage over time. Further analysis is 
necessary to determine the reasons that lead to the changes and draw more 
specific policy conclusions. Production and trade of animal products in selected ECO countries  293
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EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE WITHOUT DIRECT PAYMENTS –  






The paper analyses the effects of a reduction of direct payments on land use and 
production in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Poland. The analysis is 
based on the partial equilibrium model ESIM and results refer to the year 2013. 
According to the model results land use decreases among all countries and all 
agricultural sectors. In case of an abolishment of payments 8 % to 11 % of the 
total agricultural area falls idle. Beef and sheep production is slightly increasing 
in Germany, since direct payments in ruminant production are already abolished 
under the MTR reform so that profitability in production does not suffer from 
reduced payments. In France and the Netherlands, where payments for 
ruminants still exist, a reduction of direct payments is projected to result in 
strong production decreases. Effects on ruminant production in Poland are 
moderate. Apart from the decoupling option chosen under the MTR reform, 
results are driven by the own price elasticity of pasture and ruminants. 
Keywords: Direct payments, decoupling, elasticity, partial equilibrium model. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of the last decade direct payments belong to the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU and as concluded under the Mid Term 
Review (MTR) reform they will be part of the CAP in the near future as well, 
though paid decoupled from production. 
However, policy makers and scientists discuss the legal and economic 
foundation of maintaining these payments in the long-run. Many doubt that the 
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current level of direct payments can be maintained beyond the next revision of 
the CAP for at least four reasons: Firstly, due to the critical financial situation in 
many member states and the immense part of the EU budget which is allocated 
to the agricultural sector subsidies to farmers have already been subject to 
criticism in the course of establishing a new financial perspective for the years 
2007 to 2013. Further EU-accessions and the reform of the sugar market will 
lead to further increasing budgetary shortages. Secondly, by decoupling the 
major part of direct payments from production their trade distorting effect has 
been reduced significantly. However, several WTO members even claim a 
reduction of green box measures. It remains to be seen whether the new CAP 
payments will be under fire within the next negotiations again. Thirdly, direct 
payments have been introduced to compensate farmers for the reduction of 
institutional prices in the course of the MacSharry reform in 1992. It is 
questionable whether farmers still have to be compensated when these price cuts 
took place about 20 years ago. Fourthly, several EU members still claim higher 
support for second pillar measures and a re-allocation of money is expected to 
be on the agenda for negotiations on further CAP reforms again. 
Against this background, this paper has the purpose to look at the effects of 
reducing direct payments on land use and production in individual member 
countries of the enlarged EU. It will be analysed whether these effects will be 
different from the effects of keeping the level of decoupled payments as 
concluded in the MTR reform. This is done by an extended version of the 
European Simulation Model (ESIM).  
The focus in this paper is on agricultural markets in Germany, France, the  
Netherlands, and Poland. These member states have been selected as each of 
them represents a certain group of EU member states, which chose a rather 
similar way of implementing the decoupling regulations under the MTR reform, 
and it shall be identified to what extend the effects of reducing direct payments 
depend on the decoupling option chosen. Germany, for example, represents the 
group of countries, which have (almost) fully decoupled their payments. France 
belongs to those countries, which have coupled their payments to the (almost) 
highest degree possible. Like some other member states, the Netherlands keep 
the largest part of their beef payments coupled, while payments in other sectors 
are fully decoupled. Poland, finally, represents the group of the new member 
states (NMS) that opted for the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS).  
The paper is organised as follows: The next chapter provides an overview of 
ESIM. In chapter 3 ESIM is applied to simulate the effects of reducing direct 
payments. What follows is a sensitivity analysis, which tries to identify those 
parameters, which are crucial with respect to the simulation results. Finally, 
results are discussed and conclusions are drawn. Oliver Balkhausen, Martin Banse  296
2 THE EUROPEAN SIMULATION MODEL (ESIM) 
ESIM is a recursive dynamic partial equilibrium model with lagged price 
responses at the supply side. It is programmed in GAMS and covers 36 products 
plus voluntary set-aside area and 29 regions. World market prices are endogenous 
and trade is modelled as net trade. The models’ focus is on the EU with a detailed 
formulation of agricultural policies in individual EU-15 member states as well 
as in the NMS and the EU accession candidates. In order to model country-
specific options of implementing the decoupling regulations the aggregated model 
region of the EU-15 has recently been split up into individual member states. 
Supply of crops and fodder in ESIM is determined by a yield function, dependent 
on the own price and price indices for intermediate inputs and labour, and an 
area allocation function dependent on own and cross incentive prices (including 
direct payments – see below) as well as intermediate input, capital, and labour 
cost indices. All area allocation functions are isoelastic, homogeneous of degree 
zero in all in- and output prices, and locally symmetric. In order to take into 
account the possibility that producers retire and land is falling idle as a result of 
decreasing direct payments total agricultural area is not fixed but is allowed to 
vary. Supply of animal products is a function of own and cross incentive prices 
as well as a feed cost index (FCI) and price indices for other intermediate inputs, 
capital and labour.  
Direct payments enter the area allocation functions in the same way as prices; 
that is, market price and direct payment per product unit make up an "incentive 
price", which is the explaining variable. The calculation of the level of direct 
payments depends on the country in question and the policy applied: 
•  Coupled payments per ton in member states of the EU-15 are calculated 
by  
Payment per ton * Yield in base period/Actual yield. 
That is, the payment per ton is adjusted by the actual yield for each crop 
and simulation period. Thus, an increase in yield leads to a decrease in 
the premium per ton and vice versa. 
•  Coupled payments per ton in the NMS are calculated by  
Phasing-in factor * Payment per ton in EU-15 
* Yield in base period/Actual yield. 
That is, the calculation corresponds almost to the one applied for EU-15 
members. However, the phasing-in factor takes care that payments in the 
NMS reach the level existing in the EU-15 only stepwise. 
•  Decoupled payments per ton in both member states of the EU-15 and 
NMS are calculated by 
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Thereby, the payment per ha in each member state is calculated by dividing the 
available budget for decoupled payments by the total eligible area. That is, 
decoupled payments in ESIM are generally modelled as a uniform regionalised 
payment per hectare irrespective for which type of the Single Farm Payment 
(SFP) a member state has opted.
1 
Feed demand is modelled for 15 feed components plus silage maize, grass, and 
arable fodder. Product-specific feed demand per unit of animal output is isoelastic, 
homogeneous of degree zero in the prices of all feed products, locally symmetric, 
and the possibility to substitute roughages for other feed components exists. 
Total product-specific feed demand in a country is the product of feed demand 
per unit of animal output. An exogenous additive intercept which represents feed 
demand of animals not covered in ESIM is also included to guarantee market 
clearing for feed demand and supply. 
Based on this approach the endogenous animal product-specific FCI reflects 
relative changes in feed prices. Thus, an increasing price for any feed 
component results in reduced demand for this component due to two effects. 
First, the substitution effect, in which other components are substituted for the 
more expensive one, and second, the output effect, which results in an 
increasing FCI, in lower animal production, and therefore lower feed demand.  
Certain parameters are considered crucial in simulating the impact of reducing 
direct payments on area distribution and production. These are own price 
elasticities of ruminants, own and cross price elasticities of area allocation, and 
own and cross price elasticities of feed demand with emphasis on the 
substitution possibilities between roughages and other feed components. Some 
of these parameters are displayed in Table  1. Area allocation elasticities in 
ESIM are very low for pasture and voluntary set-aside area compared to other 
crops. This is because pasture is modelled as permanent pasture and the 
substitution for crop land is limited due to different soil qualities and geographical/ 
climatic conditions. The same holds for voluntary set-aside, which is generally 
marginal land. Supply elasticities for ruminants are about 1. Elasticities for milk 
are irrelevant due to the binding milk quota under all scenarios presented below. 
Own price elasticities of feed demand are the highest for oilmeals. Feed demand 
elasticities for cereals are still higher than those for roughages, which lie 
between -0.3 and -0.9.
2 
 
                                                 
1  The SFP, which is based on actual receipts by each farmer in the reference period 2000 to 
2002, can not be modelled in ESIM. 
2  More detailed information can be obtained from BALKHAUSEN and BANSE (2005) and from 
BANSE et al. (2005). 
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Table 1:  Selected elasticities for Germany, France, the Netherlands, and 
Poland in ESIM 
 Own  price 
elasticities 
Selected cross- and input-price 
elasticities 
Elasticities of area allocation    
Cereals and oilseeds  0.21 to 0.88  up to -0.16 within group 
Silage maize  0.54 to 0.77  up to -0.10 corn price 
Other fodder  0.68 to 0.72  up to -0.27 common wheat price 
Pasture  0.07 to 0.17  up to -0.01 common wheat price 
Vol. set aside  0.12  up to -0.01 common wheat price 
Elasticities of supply    
Beef  0.79 to 1.06  -0.47 to -0.42 FCI 
Sheep meat  0.95 to 1.27  -0.57 to -0.36 FCI 
Feed demand elasticities    
Cereals  -0.7 to -1.4  up to 0.8 within group 
Oilmeals  -0.6 to -2.0  up to 1.1 within group 
Silage maize  -0.5 to -0.9  up to 0.4 within group "roughages" 
Other fodder  -0.5 to -0.8  up to 0.6 within group "roughages" 
Grass  -0.3 to -0.7  up to 0.4 within group "roughages" 
Source: Own  compilation. 
3 ESIM  SIMULATION 
3.1 Scenarios 
In order to assess the effects of reducing direct payments with ESIM three 
scenarios are formulated and results for Germany, France, the Netherlands, and 
Poland are compared for the projection year 2013. All scenarios include the 
accession of the 10 NMS in 2004 and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 
2007. The "rest of the world" component is calibrated such that FAPRI world 
market price projections (FAPRI, 2004) for 2013 are met. The three scenarios 
include: 
1. A BENCHMARK scenario representing the actual implementation of the 
MTR reform including (partially) decoupled payments in each member 
state. That is, direct payments and national top-ups are fully or partially 
decoupled depending on the policy applied. 
2. A REDUCTION scenario including a 50 % reduction of direct payments 
between 2010 and 2013. That is, from 2010 on direct payments are 
reduced by 12.5  % each year. The released funds are re-allocated to 
second pillar measures and are partly used to improve the agricultural 
structure and competitiveness in EU member states. Accordingly, it is 
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BENCHMARK scenario. Since the largest part of the re-allocated funds is 
used in the NMS, the additional acceleration in technical progress is 
assumed to be higher in Poland than in Germany, France, and the 
Netherlands.  
3. An ELIMINATION  scenario including a complete elimination of direct 
payments until 2013. That is, from 2010 on direct payments are reduced 
by 25 % each year. Since released funds under the ELIMINATION scenario 
are approximately twice as much as under the REDUCTION scenario the 
acceleration of technical progress is assumed to be higher than under the 
REDUCTION scenario.  
3.2 Results  
Table  2 depicts direct payments per ha and per ton for the three scenarios 
described above. All values are depicted in Euro. According to the exchange rate 
assumed for Poland in 2013  one Euro costs 3.67  Zloty. Direct payments are 
shown in real terms. The assumed inflation rate amounts to 1.5 %. 
Table 2:   Direct payments in 2013 under various scenarios 


































































































































Beef (€/t)  0  0  0 357 188  0 407 214  0 136  71  0
Sheep (€/t)  0 0 0  576  303 0 0 0 0  312  164 0
Cereals and 
oilseeds (€/ha)  323 170  0 258 136  0 326 172  0 114  60  0
Grass (€/ha)  323 170  0 183  96  0 326 172  0 101  53  0
Silage maize 
(€/ha)  323 170  0 252 132  0 326 172  0 113  59  0
Fodder (€/ha)  323 170  0 183  96  0 326 172  0 101  53  0
Set-aside (€/ha)  323 170  0 183  96  0 326 172  0     
Source:  Own calculations.  
Table 2 shows that direct payments differ significantly among member states as 
well as among products and product categories, respectively. In case of crops, 
this can be explained by varying yield and base yield levels among countries. As 
mentioned above, direct payments per ha are calculated by a yield component 
multiplied by the premium per ton. Differences in direct payments among 
countries and products can additionally be traced back to different coupling rates 
applied under the MTR reform. In France and the Netherlands, where a part of 
direct payments is kept coupled to production, the available budget for direct 
payments is not completely allocated to the uniform regionalised payment. That Oliver Balkhausen, Martin Banse  300
is, the maximum possible amount of the flat rate payment is only paid in Germany 
(323 €/ha). According to the full decoupling approach, however, payments to 
German ruminant producers are abolished.  
After the SAPS will be expired in 2009 the degree of coupledness of direct 
payments in Poland is based on the average degree of coupledness applied in the 
EU-15. Therefore, direct payments in Poland are partly coupled from 2009 on. 
In the Netherlands payments for beef remain coupled to production under the 
MTR reform. In Poland and France both beef and sheep meat payments are kept 
partly linked to production. Accordingly, under the BENCHMARK scenario and 
the REDUCTION scenario farmers in these countries still receive direct payments 
for beef and/or sheep production on the expense of a higher budget allocated to 
the regionalised payment.  
In those member states, where the payments for cereals and oilseeds are partly 
linked to production (France and Poland), the payment per ha is higher for 
cereals and oilseeds than for set-aside and those products, which were not 
eligible for direct payments before the MTR reform was implemented (grass and 
fodder). In France, for example, payments for cereals and oilseeds amount to 
258 €, while the payments for each grass, fodder, and set-aside amount to 183 €. 
In Table  3 ESIM results of the REDUCTION  scenario and the ELIMINATION 
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Table 3:  ESIM results under various scenarios compared to the BENCHMARK scenario in 2013 in % 
Germany France  Netherlands  Poland 
  Reduction Elimination Reduction Elimination Reduction Elimination Reduction Elimination 
Supply          
  Beef  0.6  1.3 -5.3  -11.2 -5.5  -11.5  2.0  3.7 
  Sheep  1.1 2.3  -7.1  -14.8 5.4  11.7  -1.2  -3.3 
  Non  ruminants  -0.1  -0.4 0.1 0.3 0.9 1.9 0.9 1.9 
Area          
 Total area used  -3.9  -9.2  -3.4 -7.9 -4.5  -10.5 -4.1 -8.5 
 Grandes Cultures  -4.9  -11.9  -3.7 -9.0 -6.0  -12.6 -3.9 -8.2 
    Cereals  -3.8  -8.4  -2.5 -5.3 -3.7 -8.2 -3.9 -8.2 
    Oilseeds  -7.9  -17.1  -6.6  -14.3  -10.1  -21.3  -3.9  -7.4 
    Silage maize  -8.0  -15.0  -7.8  -15.4  -8.5  -16.9  -5.6  -10.7 
 Arable fodder  -7.6  -14.6  -7.8 -15.8 -16.3 -32.3  -7.2 -13.9 
  Grass  -1.7 -4.2 -1.6 -4.1 -2.6 -7.8 -3.9 -8.6 
Incentive Prices          
  Beef  3.6  7.9 -4.0 -8.1 -4.9  -10.0  0.2  0.8 
  Sheep  4.2 9.5  -5.0  -10.1 4.2 9.5  -1.6  -2.9 
 Non ruminants  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 
 Cereals and oilseeds  -13.8  -28.5 -10.7 -22.0 -11.5 -23.7 -11.3 -21.8 
 Silage maize  -14.5  -27.8  -13.6 -26.8 -13.8 -27.1 -12.5 -23.0 
 Arable fodder  -16.4  -31.6  -15.6 -30.8 -25.9 -48.2 -12.0 -22.5 
  Grass  -27.7 -56.7 -26.6 -54.9 -35.9 -74.0 -22.4 -43.5 
Producer Prices          
  Beef  3.6 7.9 3.6 7.9 3.6 7.9 3.6 7.9 
  Sheep  4.2 9.5 4.2 9.5 4.2 9.5 4.2 9.5 
 Non ruminants  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 
  Cereals  and  oilseeds  0.6 1.6 0.6 1.6 0.6 1.6 1.3 3.2 
  Silage  maize  17.7 40.2  8.4 19.6 10.5 24.3 -2.1 -3.0 
  Arable  fodder  18.1 41.7  8.3 20.0 27.5 72.6  9.2 21.1 
  Grass  12.0  28.8 2.6 7.6 3.5  13.0 6.0  16.3 Oliver Balkhausen, Martin Banse  302
As a result of the reduction/elimination of direct payments, incentive prices for 
cereals, oilseeds, and silage maize decrease sharply. Under the REDUCTION 
scenario incentive prices for cereals and oilseeds fall between 10.7 % (France) 
and 13.8 % (Germany), while the decrease lies between 21.8 % (Poland) and 
28.5 % (Germany) under the ELIMINATION scenario. Decrease rates in incentive 
prices for silage maize are very similar compared to those of cereals and 
oilseeds. In general, the decrease in incentive prices is the highest in those 
countries, where the value of direct payments and the share of direct payments 
in incentive prices under the BENCHMARK scenario are comparatively high. This 
is mainly true for countries, which have decoupled their payments for ruminant 
producers under the MTR reform, so that the available budget for direct 
payments for ruminant producers is completely allocated to the uniform 
regionalised payment. For example, in Germany direct payments amount to 
30 % of the incentive price for cereals and oilseeds, while they amount to 23 % 
of the incentive price in France. Due to the decrease in incentive prices the 
Grandes Cultures area falls between 3.7 % (France) and 6.0 % (the Netherlands) 
under the REDUCTION scenario and between 8.2  % (Poland) and 12.6  % (the 
Netherlands) when direct payments are completely abolished. Within the group 
of Grandes Cultures oilseed and silage maize area decrease much stronger than 
the cereal area, which can be traced back to comparatively low own price 
elasticities of cereal products. 
Strong area decreases are also projected for arable fodder. More specifically, 
decrease rates in fodder area lie between 7.2  % (Poland) and 16.3  % (the 
Netherlands) under the REDUCTION scenario and between 13.9 % (Poland) and 
32.3 % (the Netherlands) in case of a complete abolishment of direct payments. 
This is the result of incentive prices that decrease between 12 % (Poland) and 
25.9 % (the Netherlands) under the REDUCTION scenario and between 22.5 % 
(Poland) and 48.2 % (the Netherlands) when direct payments are completely 
abolished.  
The decreases in pasture area are significantly lower than in case of arable 
fodder though decrease rates in incentive prices are much higher for grass. That 
is, pasture area falls between 1.6  % (France) and 3.9  % (Poland) under the 
REDUCTION  scenario  and between 4.1  % (France) and 8.6  % (Poland) when 
direct payments are completely abolished. There are mainly two reasons for this 
comparatively low decrease in pasture area. First, area allocation elasticities are 
higher for fodder than for pasture. And secondly, producer prices for fodder are 
increasing stronger than those of grass, which leads to a substitution of grass for 
fodder in the feed ratio of ruminants. In the Netherlands, for example, costs for 
arable fodder increase by 72.6 % when direct payments are completely abolished. 
Cost for grass, in contrast, increase by 13 % only. 
One of the most significant results of simulating the reduction and/or 
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for agricultural production. Since direct payments are reduced or eliminated so 
that incentive prices fall sharply across all crop sectors and an obligation to keep 
land at least in good condition in order to be eligible for direct payments does 
not exist anymore farmers are expected to lie larger parts of their land idle. 
According to the results of ESIM total area used for production purposes in 
Germany decreases by 3.9 % when payments are reduced by 50 % and by 9.2 % 
in case of a complete elimination of direct payments. In France, the Netherlands, 
and Poland 7.9 %, 10.5 %, and 8.5 % of the total area are projected to become 
idle land under the ELIMINATION scenario, respectively. 
The simulation results for beef and sheep supply are very different across 
member states and the projected results largely depend on the decoupling option 
chosen under the MTR reform. France, for example, decided to keep all 
payments coupled to production to the maximum possible degree. The 
Netherlands have opted for coupled payments in the beef sector. Accordingly, 
under the BENCHMARK scenario direct payments for beef producers still exist in 
both member states while payments for sheep producers are granted in France 
only. Thus, direct payments and incentive prices in both countries decrease 
under the REDUCTION scenario and under the ELIMINATION scenario. As a result, 
beef and sheep supply in France decreases by 5.3  % and 7.1  % under the 
REDUCTION  scenario  and by 11.2  % and 14.8  % when direct payments are 
completely abolished, respectively. In the Netherlands beef supply decreases by 
5.5 % and 11.5 %, respectively. Since beef and sheep production is decreasing 
in several member states of the EU when direct payments are reduced or 
abolished, producer prices for both beef and sheep are increasing across all 
member states. 
In contrast to France and the Netherlands, Germany has opted for the full 
decoupling approach. That is, under the BENCHMARK scenario payments for beef 
and sheep are completely abolished. Accordingly, payments and, thus, incentive 
prices for beef and sheep neither decrease under the REDUCTION scenario nor 
under the ELIMINATION scenario. Instead, German producers of beef and sheep 
benefit from increasing producer prices on the European level, so that supply of 
beef and sheep increases slightly under both scenarios.  
According to the relative moderate coupling rates, which correspond to the EU-15 
average, the effects of reducing and abolishing direct payments in Poland are 
also quite moderate. That is, beef supply increases by 2 % under the REDUCTION 
scenario and by 3.7 % when payments are fully eliminated. In the case of sheep, 
supply decreases by 1.2 % and 3.3 %, respectively. 
In all countries beef and sheep supply is negatively affected by the strong 
increase in feed costs. Costs for arable fodder increase between 8.3 % (France) 
and 27.5 % (the Netherlands) under the REDUCTION scenario and between 20 % 
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for grass increase between 2.6 % (France) and 12 % (Germany) and between 
7.6 % (France) and 28.8 % (Germany), respectively. 
Compared to beef and sheep, incentive prices and supply of non ruminants 
change only slightly across members states reviewed in this paper. That is, 
incentive prices decrease uniformly between 0.2 % and 0.4 % and supply changes 
vary between -0.4 % and 1.9 %. This is no surprise as pork and poultry production 
are not eligible for direct payments under the MTR reform and, thus, are not 
directly affected by the reduction or elimination of direct payments, but only 
indirectly via cross effects from other products. 
3.3 Sensitivity  analysis 
ESIM results crucially depend on certain model parameters for which the 
empirical foundation is limited. These are the own price elasticities of 
ruminants, the own and cross price elasticities of pasture area, and the own price 
and substitution elasticities of feed demand per unit of animal output. These 
parameters are therefore varied for all member states of the EU-15, the 10 NMS, 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. This is done to cover the complete agricultural 
market of the EU in 2013 because of potential cross effects, although these 
sensitivity analyses focus on the German market only. Sensitivity analyses 
performed and their justifications are the following: 
1. PASTURE: Pasture area allocation elasticities are multiplied by 4. Other 
area elasticities are adjusted to meet homogeneity and symmetry for the 
area allocation matrix. As discussed above the pasture area allocation 
elasticity is low (between 0.07 and 0.17) in the original elasticity set. 
Especially in the long run, conversion from cropland to pasture land is 
an option and this is why these crucial elasticities, which restrict this 
conversion, are raised. The calibration of the area allocation matrix in 
order to comply with the conditions of homogeneity and symmetry is 
done mechanically by minimizing the sum of the squared relative 
deviations of price elasticities from the original matrix. 
2. RUMINANT: All ruminant supply elasticities (with respect to own prices, 
cross prices, feed cost, other inputs) are multiplied by 2. No adjustment 
of other elasticities is necessary, as the ruminant supply matrix in ESIM 
contains no cross price elasticities with respect to other products. 
Ruminant supply is often modelled as relatively inelastic in behavioural 
partial equilibrium models because of its linkage to area. This linkage, 
however, is explicitly modelled in ESIM through the feed demand 
matrix. Therefore, higher supply elasticities may be suitable. 
3. FEED: All feed demand elasticities (own and cross price elasticities) for 
arable fodder, grass, and silage maize are divided by 2. Again, all feed 
demand elasticities are adjusted to meet the micro-economic conditions. 
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and other feed components as well as the substitutability among 
roughages.  
4. COMBINED: Combined elasticity changes from sensitivity analyses 1-3. 
These sensitivity analyses are carried out only for the BENCHMARK scenario and 
the ELIMINATION  scenario. In Figure  1, results for major variables under the 
above mentioned sensitivity scenarios are shown as percentage changes under 
the ELIMINATION scenario relative to the BENCHMARK scenario. 
Figure 1:  Effects of the ELIMINATION scenario relative to the BENCHMARK 


























Source: Own  calculations. 
A first observation is that under almost all sensitivity analyses the direction of 
deviations from the BENCHMARK scenario is the same as under the STANDARD 
elasticity set, although considerable deviations exist in some cases. Under the 
PASTURE elasticity set, which implies a higher price responsiveness of pasture 
area, roughage area is decreasing much stronger (-14  %) than under the 
STANDARD elasticity set (-6 %) when direct payments are completely abolished. 
Apart from the higher price flexibility of pasture area this strong decrease in 
fodder and grass area can additionally be traced back to increased costs for 
fodder and grass, which leads to a relative decrease in ruminant production 
(stagnation instead of an increase of 1.5 %) and, thus, a lower demand for arable 
fodder and grass. Since the stronger decrease in roughage area is neither 
compensated by a relative increase in Grandes Cultures area nor by an increase 
in other area uses, the decrease in total area used for agricultural production is 
even stronger under the PASTURE elasticity set (-12  %) than under the 
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Under the RUMINANT elasticity set, ruminant supply increases stronger (+4 %) 
than under the STANDARD elasticity set (+1.5  %). However, this increase in 
ruminant production is obviously not strong enough to increase demand for grass 
and fodder and, thus does not attract a relative increase in production of these 
products. As a result, the decrease rate in roughage area under the RUMINANT 
elasticity set does not differ from the decrease rate under the STANDARD elasticity 
set (-6 %). Since also the area cultivated with Grandes Cultures does not change 
after switching from the STANDARD elasticity set to the RUMINANT elasticity set, 
the share of agricultural area, which becomes fallow land in the course of 
eliminating direct payments, also remains the same. 
Under the FEED elasticity set, which includes decreasing substitution 
possibilities between roughages and other feed components as well as a lower 
substitutability among roughages, ruminant production increases only 
marginally (0.2  %). Under the standard elasticity set the increase rate in 
ruminant production amounted to 1.5  %. This relative decrease in ruminant 
production under the FEED elasticity set occurs because beef and sheep meat 
producers face stronger limitations in switching from roughages to other feed 
components when costs for roughages increase sharply, witch is the case when 
roughage area decreases as a result of reducing/abolishing direct payments. As a 
result, ruminant production becomes somewhat more expensive and decreases in 
relative terms under the FEED elasticity set. 
Under the COMBINED elasticity set beef and sheep supply is not increasing as 
under all other elasticity sets included in this sensitivity analysis, but it is 
slightly decreasing (-0.4 %) when direct payments are abolished. This can be 
explained as follows: The four times higher area allocation elasticity for pasture 
leads to a strong decrease in pasture area and accordingly to a significant 
increase in the producer prices for grass. So far, this has also occurred under the 
PASTURE elasticity set, where ruminant production could even marginally benefit 
from the elimination of direct payments because other feed components could be 
relatively easy substituted for the more expensive components like arable fodder 
and grass. The substitutability between roughages and other feed components, 
however, is more restricted under the COMBINED elasticity set, so that increasing 
production costs through higher prices for roughages can not be outweighed by 
easily changing the feed ration. As a result, ruminant production becomes too 
expensive and decreases even in absolute terms when direct payments are 
eliminated though incentive prices for beef and sheep are higher than under the 
BENCHMARK scenario. The decrease in ruminant production and the resulting 
decrease in demand for grass and/or arable fodder lead to an even stronger 
decrease in grass and arable fodder area than under the PASTURE elasticity set.  
As a final conclusion, the level of area allocation elasticities for pasture has by 
far the most significant impact on area allocation among the parameters looked 
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all elasticities is the same. The increase in supply elasticities for ruminants by 
200 % results in a stronger increase in beef and sheep supply than under the 
STANDARD elasticity set. The variation in feed-demand elasticities does not 
significantly affect the results of this sensitivity analysis. However, combined 
with an increase in area allocation elasticities for pasture the limited substitutability 
of feed components leads to an absolute decrease in ruminant production when 
direct payments are abolished. The deviations in the Grandes Cultures area 
relative to the BENCHMARK scenario do not vary among the different sets of 
elasticities. According to the strong decreases in grass and fodder area under the 
PASTURE elasticity set and the COMBINED elasticity set and the relatively high 
share of pasture land and arable fodder area in total agricultural area the 
strongest decrease of the total area also occurs under these elasticity sets. 
4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
According to the ESIM simulation results a substantial reduction of direct 
payments will have significant effects on agricultural markets in the member 
states reviewed in this paper. Due to a reduction or even abolishment of direct 
payments and a strong decrease in incentive prices crop and fodder area is 
expected to decrease sharply. In case of a complete elimination of payments 
Grandes Cultures area is projected to decrease between 8.2 % in Poland and 
12.6 % in the Netherlands. Decrease rates for pasture area are expected to lie 
between 4.1 % in France and 8.6 % in Poland, while those for arable fodder area 
are projected to vary between 13.9 % in Poland and 32.9 % in the Netherlands. 
Between 3.4 % (France) and 4.5 % (the Netherlands) of agricultural land will fall 
idle in the course of a 50 % reduction of direct payments. In case of a complete 
elimination of payments total area used for production purposes is even projected 
to decline between 7.9 % in France and 10.5 % in the Netherlands.  
While the direction of the effects of reducing direct payments is homogeneous 
among all members when the focus is on area uses, the direction of effects is 
heterogeneous among member states in case of beef and sheep production. In 
this case model results crucially depend on the decoupling option chosen under 
the MTR reform. In France and the Netherlands, where still a high level of 
payments is paid to beef (both countries) and sheep (only France) producers, the 
profitability of ruminant production decreases sharply when direct payments are 
reduced or even abolished. Accordingly, beef and sheep production in France as 
well as the beef supply in the Netherlands decrease strongly. Similar results 
could be expected for Spain, Portugal, Belgium or Austria, which also opted for 
comparatively highly coupled payments in the ruminant production sector. In 
member states like Germany, which have decided to decouple payments for beef 
and sheep completely, beef and sheep producers do not suffer from a reduction 
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current CAP. Due to the increase in producer prices on the EU-level, which 
takes place as a result of the decrease in production in some members, German 
beef and sheep producers even benefit from a reduction of direct payments. In 
Poland as the representative of the NMS the degree of coupledness of direct 
payments for beef and sheep is rather moderate as it corresponds to the average 
coupling rate applied in the EU-15. Accordingly, the slightly negative impact of 
the reduction of direct payments on incentive prices can be more or less 
compensated by the increase in producer prices on the EU-level. As a result, 
changes in beef and sheep supply are comparatively low.  
Apart from the policy options chosen by the member states, the own price 
response of pasture land and ruminants drives model results to a large extent. 
The sensitivity analysis, which has been conducted for the German market, has 
shown how strong area allocation responds to a change in the price elasticity of 
pasture area. The reaction of ruminant supply also depends heavily on the value 
of the own price elasticity. The own price and substitution elasticities of feed 
demand per unit of animal output have a minor impact on model results though 
their influence increases when changes are combined with changes in the price 
elasticity of pasture land. A better empirical foundation of these parameters 
could therefore substantially contribute to more reliable model results. 
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There has been a recent increase in the number of NEIO studies that measure 
and test for the degree of market power in agricultural and food markets in 
developed market economies. These have largely focused on the USA and 
European food sectors. But imperfect competition seems especially prevalent in 
the food sectors of transition countries. A technique for assessing the degree of 
oligopoly market power, developed by BRESNAHAN (1982) and LAU (1982), is 
used here to measure oligopsony power in food processing. As an example, we 
provide an application to the Ukrainian milk processing industry. Our results do 
not show evidence of oligopsony power in this sector during the sample period 
from January 1996 to December 2003. 
Keywords:  Oligopsony power, new empirical industrial organization, milk 
processing industry, Ukraine. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural supply analysis is generally conducted using models that postulate a 
perfectly competitive market structure, because a typical assumption is that there 
is a large number of spatially dispersed farmers and processors who act as price 
takers in a specific agricultural market. However, imperfect competition analysis 
should be given more attention by agricultural economists, because recent 
studies suggest that agricultural markets are more typically oligopolistic 
(MCCORRISTON, 2002). There has been a recent increase in the number of New 
Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) studies that measure and test for the 
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degree of market power in the food processing industry as well as in other 
industries.
1 Moreover, up to now the NEIO studies have typically been 
conducted for industries in developed market economies and have largely 
focused on the USA and European food sectors, thus ignoring market conditions 
of the food industry sectors of transition countries, which are potentially 
different from the situation in developed market economies. The objective of 
this study is to use an empirical market structure model based on the NEIO 
approach to measure the degree of oligopsony market power in the Ukrainian 
milk processing industry. 
2 STRUCTURAL MODEL OF OLIGOPSONY MARKET POWER 
The structural model used in this research to test for oligopsony market power of 
the milk processing industry in Ukraine consists of a farm milk supply function 
and a condition for profit maximizing farm milk demand of the milk processing 
industry. Let us assume that the inverse supply equation for farm milk supplied 
to the milk processing industry can be represented by:  
) , ( S X g WX =   (1)
where  X W  is the price of farm milk,  X  is the quantity of farm milk and S is a 
vector of supply shifters. Given this representation of farm milk supply, the 
profit equation for the milk processing industry can be written as:  
Z W Z Z ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ = Π     ) , ( X W X f P X ,  (2)
where  P is the output price of the milk processing industry,  () Z , X f  is the 
production function of the milk processing industry, Z is a column-vector of 
quantities of other milk industry inputs and  Z W  is a row-vector of prices of these 
inputs.  
The first order condition for profit maximization (FOC) that allows for 












) , ( ) , ( Z S ,  (3)
where Θ is a parameter indexing the degree of market power. If  0 = Θ , then the 
market for farm milk is perfectly competitive. If  1 = Θ , then the market for farm 
milk is monopsonistic and the marginal factor cost and the value marginal 
product should be equated. Intermediate values of Θ imply the presence of 
oligopsonistic structure, in which case the interpretation of the first-order 
condition is that the "perceived" marginal factor cost equals the value marginal 
product of farm milk.  
                                                 
1  For a list of empirical studies on industries with monopoly power, see BRESNAHAN (1989, p. 1051) 
and CARLTON and PERLOFF (1999, p. 263). For an overview of structural model estimates 
for the agricultural and food markets, see SEXTON and LAVOIE (2001), and WOHLGENANT (2001). Measuring the degree of market power in the Ukrainian milk processing industry  311
3 ECONOMETRIC APPLICATION OF MARKET STRUCTURE MODEL 
Let us assume that the farm milk supply function can be written as:
2 
, ln ln ln ln ln
2
1
ln ln ln ln ln ln
2
0
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  (4)
where  X W  is the price at which milk is supplied,  D W  is the direct marketing price 
for milk that is sold directly to consumers
3,  R W  is the price received for beef 
cows,  F W  is the price of mixed feeds (compound feed),  K Z  is the number of 
dairy cows as quasi-fixed factors and T  is a linear time trend to account for 
autonomous change (technical change and other unaccounted-for factors 
affecting short-run supply response over time). Solving equation (4) for  X W  and 
differentiating with respect to  X  yields the following expression for the 








   δ β +
=
∂
• ∂ ,  (5)
where  WX XT X T ε δ β = +  is the own price elasticity of farm milk supply. Let Y  be 
the aggregate output of the milk processing industry,  ( ) n i X i   ,..., 1   =  quantities of 
production factors including farm milk ( ) X , labor ( ) A , capital () K , energy ( ) E , 
and  T  a time trend. The marginal product of  X  is defined as the partial 
derivative of the translog production function
4 (appropriately defined but not 
shown here because of the limitation of space) and is given by: 





XT XE XK XA XX X γ α α α α α + + + + + =
∂
∂
ln ln ln ln .  (6)












⎡ + + + + + =
T





XT XE XK XA XX X X δ β
γ α α α α α 1 ln ln ln ln .  (7)
To account for the seasonality in our monthly data, eleven monthly dummy 
variables are added to equations (4) and (7). To allow for the existence of 
random shocks, an additive disturbance term is added to equations (4) and (7) 
and it is assumed to have a zero mean, constant variance, and be independently 
and normally distributed.  
                                                 
2  Note that equation (4) can be interpreted as a truncated second-order approximation to a 
general logarithmic farm milk supply function. 
3  During transition the market share of milk sold directly to consumers rapidly increased 
from 0.1 % in 1990 to 21.2 % in 2000. This had a significant impact on the milk supply in 
Ukraine. 
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4 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
The data used in the estimation was obtained from the State Committee of 
Statistics of Ukraine. The data set includes 96 monthly time-series observations, 
from January 1996 to December 2003. The choice of the sample period was 
dictated by data availability. Table  1 provides a summarized description of 
variables used in estimation.  
Table 1:  Description of variables 
Data on monthly quantities of milk delivered to the milk processing industry, 
monthly average price for milk delivered to the milk processing industry, and 
average price for the milk that was sold directly to consumers reported at the 
market level were collected from two statistical reports: The sale of milk and 
dairy products to procurement organizations of the milk processing industry by 
all types of agricultural farms and The sale of agricultural products to 
procurement organizations by agricultural enterprises. Data on the number of 
milking cows at the beginning of the month were composed from the statistical 
report The statistical summary data about state stock-breeding by all types of 
agricultural farms. All these statistical reports were published by the Division of 
Agriculture and Environment Statistics, State Committee of Statistics of 
Ukraine.  
Description of Variables     (1) 
Symbol  Mean  Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Monthly quantity of milk delivered to the 
milk processing industry (metric tons) 
X   295730.0 131600.0 92526.0 588200.0
Monthly average price for milk delivered 
to the milk processing industry 
(UAH/metric ton) 
X W   452.2 214.2 166.9 990.5
Monthly average price for milk sold by 
"direct marketing" (UAH/metric ton) 
D W   438.5 171.3 166.9 800.9
Beef cattle price index (January 
1996=100) 
R W   241.5 103.6 100.0 411.2
Mixed forage price index (January 
1996=100) 
F W   263.3 94.4 100.0 426.7
Number of milking cows at the beginning 
of month (thousand heads) 
K Z   5730.3 912.1 4449.6 7531.3
Aggregate output of the milk processing 
industry, in milk equivalent (tons/month)
Y   351570.0 144440.0 126430.0 673380.0
Monthly average number of workers  A  78700.0 7716.1 67940.0 97499.0
Capital (thousand UAH/month)  K   760.5 331.1 491.0 2228.7
Energy (thousand kWh/month)  E   1904800.0 955040.0 572880.0 4369800.0
Output price index of the milk process-
sing industry (January 1996=100) 
P   182.0 52.1 95.5 276.6
Time trend () 96 ,..., 2 , 1 = T   T   48.5 27.9 1.0 96.0Measuring the degree of market power in the Ukrainian milk processing industry  313
Data on price indices were collected from the periodicals of the Division of 
Price Statistics, State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine, Industrial producer 
price indices. 
Data on aggregate output of the milk processing industry were calculated using 
the observations regarding the quantity of dairy products produced monthly 
using the following weights: 22.3 for butter, 3.5 for cheese, 1.03 for fresh milk 
products (liquid products, yogurt, etc.), 6.7 for milk powder (skimmed milk 
powder, whole milk powder and buttermilk), and 2.5 for condensed milk. Data 
on production is published regularly in the statistical issues of Industrial 
products by the Division of Manufacturing Statistics, State Committee of 
Statistics of Ukraine. The weights for dairy products are established by the 
Division of Household Surveys in the State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine. 
The monthly average numbers of workers in the milk processing industry were 
obtained from the Division of Labor Statistics of State Committee of Statistics 
of Ukraine. Annual and monthly data are published in Labor of Ukraine.  
The Capital variable was constructed based on monthly and annual observations 
regarding facilities depreciation in the milk processing industry and the annual 
price indices for capital goods. The annual observations were interpolated to a 
monthly level. The process of constructing this variable unfolds in two steps. 
First, the annual price indices for capital goods which were collected from the 
STATISTICAL  YEARBOOK OF UKRAINE for 2003 (p.  71), 2002 (p.  83) and for 
2000 (p. 75) were used to deflate the annual data for depreciation in the milk 
processing industry. The data on depreciation were obtained from the State 
Committee of Statistics of Ukraine. In the second step, annual observations for 
the period of 1995-2003 were interpolated to monthly levels using the spline 
method in the statistical software SAS (SAS, 1985).  
For calculating the energy variable the annual observations regarding electric 
power consumption to produce butter were used. These data were collected from 
the STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF UKRAINE for 2003 (pp. 101-103) and for 2000 
(pp.  94-96). In order to obtain the variable on a monthly basis it has been 
assumed that the electric power consumption in the milk processing industry has 
developed throughout the year in a fixed proportion to butter output. A detailed 
description of the data is available from the authors upon request. 
5 ESTIMATION RESULTS AND SPECIFICATION TESTING  
Since equations (4) and (7) represent a nonlinear simultaneous equation system, 
they were estimated using nonlinear three-stage least squares.
5 The quantity of 
milk  () X  and the price of milk ( ) X W  were designated as endogenous. Two 
alternative specifications of the market structure models were considered: One in 
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which the parameter Θ was restricted to zero and one in which Θ was estimated 
as a constant parameter. In the first case, the market structure model represents 
the competitive market condition. All the exogenous variables in the system 
were used as instruments. The estimations were carried out using the SHAZAM 
Econometrics Software (SHAZAM, 2004). Table 2 lists some estimation results 
for statistical inference in both models. The fit of each system is quite good. 
Table 2:  Statistical Inference of N3SLS Estimation  
In the case of the farm milk supply equation, the R-square between observed and 
predicted values is 0.98, while that for the first-order condition is 0.97 and 0.96, 
respectively. The values of the Durbin-Watson statistic lie in the inconclusive 
range, where it is not possible to make a decision about the hypothesis of the 
existence of autocorrelation. It is also clear that they are close to the lower 
bound where the hypothesis of the existence of autocorrelation cannot be 
rejected. 
The statistics and parameter estimates for market power and for the competition 
models are reported in Table  3. The asymptotic t-ratios indicate that most 
parameters (with the exception of some dummy parameters) are significant, at 
least at the 5 percent significance level. 
For the milk supply equation, 16 of the 24 parameters yield t-statistics
6 
indicating statistical significance at the 1  % level or less. Moreover, the 
parameters of the supply functions are very robust to change in the model 
specification. In fact, most parameters are almost identical and change only to 
the second decimal. The parameters  X β  and  XT δ  are highly significant at any 
reasonable level of significance. The time trend enters interactively with supply-
side exogenous variables, so that the supply curve rotates with each successive 
time periods. A Wald test of the joint hypothesis that the coefficients of the five 
time trend interaction terms were collectively zero is rejected with a Wald
2 χ  
statistic of 286.36 at the 1 percent significance level ( ) 09 . 15
2
01 , 0 ; 5 = χ . 
                                                 
6  All the test statistics and standard errors reported in this article are asymptotic. 
Competition Model  Market Power Model 
Statistic 
Supply FOC Supply FOC 
R-square 0.9811  0.9748  0.9811  0.9617 
Durbin-Watson 1.0658  1.0897  1.0543  1.5729 
Function Value  159.2445  124.8969 
Objective Value  1.6588  1.3010 Measuring the degree of market power in the Ukrainian milk processing industry  315
Table 3:  Results of N3SLS estimation of Market Structure Models  
Competition Model  Market Power Model 
Parameter 
Estimate  Standard 
Error  t-Ratio Estimate  Standard 
Error  t-Ratio 
Milk supply (Equation 4) 
X β   -1.2521 0.3150  -3.9748  -1.2689 0.2112  -6.0084 
D β   -0.2078 0.1854  -1.1207  -0.1770 0.1707  -1.0365 
R β   -0.1426 0.4015  -0.3550  -0.1512 0.3985  -0.3795 
F β   -1.5624 0.1978  -7.8997  -1.5938 0.1658  -9.6159 
K β   4.3421 1.4330 3.0300 4.4192 1.1412 3.8726 
T δ   0.4832 0.2410 2.0050 0.4816 0.1991 2.4190 
TT δ   -0.0022 0.0004  -5.3676  -0.0023 0.0003  -7.2632 
XT δ   0.0285 0.0050 5.6524 0.0287 0.0048 6.0114 
DT δ   0.0011 0.0038 0.2983 0.0010 0.0038 0.2673 
RT δ   0.0073 0.0059 1.2467 0.0072 0.0057 1.2744 
FT δ   0.0247 0.0051 4.7999 0.0255 0.0041 6.2579 
KT δ   -0.0825 0.0262  -3.1518  -0.0827 0.0208  -3.9677 
2 ξ   0.0274 0.0358 0.7643 0.0279 0.0350 0.7949 
3 ξ   0.3754 0.0365  10.2900 0.3763 0.0360  10.4630 
4 ξ   0.5714 0.0387  14.7460 0.5736 0.0387  14.8330 
5 ξ   1.0948 0.0464  23.6030 1.0989 0.0455  24.1680 
6 ξ   1.2993 0.0558  23.2780 1.3060 0.0539  24.2090 
7 ξ   1.2088 0.0579  20.8730 1.2156 0.0555  21.8990 
8 ξ   1.0942 0.0575  19.0310 1.1012 0.0555  19.8580 
9 ξ   0.9084 0.0523  17.3820 0.9155 0.0518  17.6650 
10 ξ   0.6985 0.0441  15.8300 0.7042 0.0441  15.9820 
11 ξ   0.2906 0.0401 7.2553 0.2951 0.0396 7.4550 
12 ξ   0.2344 0.0534 4.3921 0.2357 0.0437 5.3990 
0 β   -11.1080 12.2950 -0.9034  -11.6840 10.3330 -1.1307 
First order condition (Equation 7) 
Θ  – – –  -0.0060  0.0044  -1.3737 
X α   32.1270 6.2684 5.1252  35.7500 8.4857 4.2130 
XX α   1.5589 0.1502  10.3820 1.4222 0.2051 6.9349 
XA α   -2.8280 0.6386  -4.4282  -3.2495 0.8660  -3.7524 
XK α   -0.5812 0.2146  -2.7091  -0.3500 0.2996  -1.1682 
XE α   -0.9415 0.1242  -7.5802  -0.8612 0.1640  -5.2508 
XT γ   -0.0090 0.0022  -4.1559  -0.0070 0.0029  -2.4031 
2 ξ   21.6900 16.9800  1.2774 26.4290 21.4830  1.2302 
3 ξ   14.6430 18.4150  0.7952 25.0740 23.6600  1.0597 
4 ξ   18.2690 19.2800  0.9475 32.3890 25.2350  1.2835 
5 ξ   -52.1380 24.3420 -2.1419  -33.4830 31.7140 -1.0558 
6 ξ   -60.8760 26.0080 -2.3407  -38.5940 34.2280 -1.1276 
7 ξ   -47.1170 25.0300 -1.8824  -22.5370 33.4830 -0.6731 
8 ξ   -47.8430 24.4940 -1.9533 -2.4698 39.3990 -0.0627 
9 ξ   -31.0330 22.9920 -1.3497  -31.0060 32.1930 -0.9631 
10 ξ   -2.4816 20.4460 -0.1214  5.3974 26.2670  0.2055 
11 ξ   40.4640 17.1080  2.3652 46.4740 21.6780  2.1439 
12 ξ   108.100 17.4570  6.1925 116.270 22.3430  5.2036 Oleksandr Perekhozhuk, Michael Grings  316
The estimates of the parameters of the equation for the first order condition and 
their implications for the market power parameter Θ are of primary interest. The 
estimate of Θ is close to zero and insignificant. While the negative value of Θ 
is not theoretically possible, it ranges from -0.0133 to 0.0013 in the 95  % 
confidence interval. With a Wald
2 χ  statistic of 1.89, the hypothesis that the milk 
processing industry is a price-taker in the farm milk market is not rejected even 
at the 10 percent level ( ) 71 , 2
2
10 , 0 ; 1 = χ . The hypothesis of monopsonistic (cartel) 
behavior is also tested and rejected at the 1 percent level.  
Since the individual parameters of the estimated supply function are not readily 
interpretable, we calculated the supply elasticities and the rate of autonomous 
change  T X ∂ ∂ = Δ ln  in farm milk supply. These are evaluated at the sample 
mean and presented in Table 4. The own and cross price elasticities of farm milk 
supply evaluated at the sample mean are less than one in absolute terms; they 
have the expected signs and are compatible with economic theory. The estimated 
own price elasticity of farm milk supply ( ) WX ε  is 0.13. While the own price 
elasticity for the competition model is not statistically significant, it is highly 
significant at any reasonable level of significance for the market power model. 
Table 4:  Price elasticities and rate of autonomous change  
The sign structure of the cross-elasticities of farm milk supply is of considerable 
interest. The farm milk delivered to the milk processing industry is a substitute 
for the farm milk that was sold directly to consumers and a complement for beef 
cattle. The price elasticity of mixed feeds is negative and statistically significant 
at least at the 1 percent level. A Wald test of the joint hypothesis that the own 
and cross price elasticities of farm milk supply evaluated at the sample mean 
add up to zero (homogeneity of degree zero of the supply function in prices) is 
not rejected with a Wald
2 χ  statistic of 1.19 even at the 25  percent level 
( ) 32 . 1
2
25 , 0 ; 1 = χ . Furthermore, the variable number of milking cows () K Z  has a 
positive but statistically insignificant impact on the farm milk supply. The rate 
of autonomous change in the farm milk supply evaluated at the sample mean is 
Competition Model  Market Power Model 
 
Estimate  Standard 
Error  t-Ratio Estimate  Standard 
Error  t-Ratio 
WX ε   0.1293 0.1573 0.8222 0.1254 0.0213 5.8791 
WD ε   -0.1529 0.1332 -1.1486 -0.1278 0.1165 -1.0973 
WR ε   0.2136 0.1511 1.4136 0.1987 0.1492 1.3320 
WF ε   -0.3642 0.1357 -2.6841 -0.3548 0.1285 -2.7614 
ZK ε   0.3406 0.5919 0.5755 0.4082 0.5846 0.6982 
Δ 0.0141 0.0042 3.3530 0.0143 0.0033 4.3182 Measuring the degree of market power in the Ukrainian milk processing industry  317
significant at any reasonable level of significance and amounts to 18.3 percent 
annually
7. 
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
The objective of this paper has been to measure the degree of oligopsony market 
power in the Ukrainian milk processing industry. For this purpose, a structural 
econometric model has been estimated on the basis of monthly data at the 
industry level. Estimation results show no evidence of oligopsony power in the 
Ukrainian milk processing industry over the sample period from January 1996 to 
December 2003. However, it may be appropriate to conduct similar analyses at a 
regional level, since the concentration of milk processing plants and the 
structure of agricultural farms in the regions of Ukraine are quite different. 
While the Herfindahl-Hirschman index in the Ukrainian milk processing industry 
on the national level is very small and amounts to 0.0088, in 7 out of 25 regions it 
is larger than 0.2387. Hence, it would be desirable to apply the structural 
econometric model also to regional data and to measure the degree of 
oligopsony market power at a regional market level. The authors hope that this 
can be achieved in further analyses. 
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DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN THE FOOD 





The paper discusses the determinants of foreign direct investments in the 
Ukrainian food processing industry. We construct two empirical models of 
foreign direct investments inflows using a knowledge-capital model developed 
by CARR et al. (2001) and a simultaneous equation system for foreign direct 
investments and food imports. Strong support was found for the explanatory 
power of market size of a host country on its foreign direct investments that 
suggests the prevalence of market-seeking investments. Relative wages in 
manufacturing may also play a role, although the empirical results are highly 
sensitive to the choice of regression model. Finally, a complementary 
relationship is found between foreign direct investments in the Ukrainian food 
industry and corresponding imports, which is consistent with earlier findings for 
developing countries. 
Keywords: FDI, food processing industry, Ukraine. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Ukraine ranks among the largest countries in Europe, with a population of about 
47 million. With rich black soil, a favorable climate, Black Sea ports, and close 
proximity to major consumer markets in the European Union, the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU), North Africa and the Middle East, Ukraine has the potential to 
become one of the largest food exporters of Eastern Europe.  
Taking advantage of such potential both in the domestic and foreign markets 
requires modern processing technologies, competitive quality standards, and 
excellent marketing skills. However, since 1991 only half of the enterprises 
made the necessary investments and changed managerial practices to cope with the 
increasingly competitive market environment. Concomitantly, foreign investment 
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has a crucial role to play in building a competitive food processing industry, and 
Ukraine’s food processing sector was the leader in attracting foreign direct 
investments (FDI).  
As of January 1, 2005, the total value of FDI in Ukraine was 8.4 billion dollars. 
The food industry was a major recipient of FDI at nearly $1.13 billion or 14 % 
of total investments. Major sources of foreign investments in Ukraine’s food 
industry include the Netherlands (26.7  %), the United States (13.8  %), 
Germany (9.8 %), Cyprus (8.0 %), and Switzerland (7.6 %). Other sources of 
investments include the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, the Russian 
Federation, Denmark, Austria, and Belgium. Listed countries account for almost 
90 % of total foreign investments in the Ukrainian food processing industry. 
Foreign capital inflows are believed to be of key importance for the restructuring 
of the domestic food industry, since local capital markets appear to be insufficiently 
developed to provide the financial funds needed for the large-scale modernization 
and consolidation of food industry enterprises. In addition to financial capital, 
foreign investors also bring technological and managerial know-how, which are 
similarly in short supply. This central role of FDI for Ukrainian economic 
development results in attracting large inflows of FDI to become one of the 
major objectives in the country’s strategy. Thus it is of interest for the Ukrainian 
government and foreign investors to examine the determinants of FDI in the 
food processing industry and forecast the future prospects of FDI inflows. 
A closer look at the allocation of FDI between individual branches of the 
Ukrainian food industry provides an initial insight into possible investment 
motives of foreign firms. The beverage, tobacco and confectionary industries 
attracted the largest quantities of FDI in Ukraine, while enterprises active in the 
processing of fish and meat, grain milling and production of milk products 
received only relatively small amounts of foreign investments. Hence, FDI are 
mainly concentrated in activities towards the end of the value chain, linked to 
the final consumption stage. This pattern of FDI resembles Multinational 
Enterprises (MNE) activity in other CEE countries (OECD, 2002). KADITI (2004) 
assumes that one of the reasons for these is the aggressive marketing strategy of 
food industries in Western Europe in an effort to achieve economies of scale in 
production and distribution for their large varieties of highly differentiated 
products. Thus, the incentive to invest in the Ukrainian food sector might be 
mainly market seeking, together with the motive of escaping the high tariff and 
non-tariff barriers associated with the exporting of food products to the country. 
Actually, Ukrainian tariff rates for foodstuffs are high. Moreover, the import of 
foods to Ukraine is complicated by other barriers, such as sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, compulsory certification of imports, outdated Ukrainian 
standards, corruption, and non-transparent and quickly changing legislation.  
However, it can be expected that FDI in the Ukrainian food processing industry 
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due to lower prices for natural resources (raw agricultural material) and/or cheap 
labor. It is therefore important to conduct a systematic empirical analysis of 
determinants of foreign investments in the domestic food industry. This study 
aims to construct a model for FDI inflows into the Ukrainian food industry and 
reveal the impact of different variables proposed by the theory and previous 
empirical work. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we sum-
marize the theoretical basis for the econometric analysis. Section 3 introduces 
the econometric models used to identify determinants of FDI in the Ukrainian 
processed food industry, while section  4 presents data. Section  5 presents 
obtained empirical results and section 6 concludes the paper. 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Early theoretical analyses of multinational firms considered FDI to be 
determined by ownership, location and internationalization advantages: The so-
called OLI paradigm introduced by DUNNING (1977). Overall, Dunning concludes 
that foreign countries that attract investments by MNE have a large and growing 
market, a high gross domestic product (GDP), low production costs, and political 
stability. 
Recent theoretical treatments have instead built general equilibrium models in 
which MNE arise endogenously. Since MARKUSEN (1984) and HELPMAN (1994), 
MNE general equilibrium theory has suggested two very distinct motivations for 
FDI: To access markets in the face of trade frictions (horizontal FDI), or to 
access low wages for part of the production process (vertical FDI). More recent 
work by MARKUSEN et al. (1996) and MARKUSEN (1997) combine both the 
vertical and horizontal motivations for FDI in one theoretical model, labeled the 
knowledge-capital model, and CARR et al. (2001) have proposed and estimated 
an empirical specification that explains world FDI patterns based on this 
knowledge-capital model. 
One of the important issues of modern economic theory is the relationship 
between FDI and trade flows. Theories that rationalize substitutability are 
primarily based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade, where 
differences in factor movements are the major causes of trade between countries 
(MUNDELL, 1957; BRAINARD, 1997; GOLDBERG and KLEIN, 1999).  
Discarding key assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model leads to inferences 
of complementarity rather than substitutability. Capital may complement trade 
when there are technological differences between countries (PURVIS, 1972; 
MARKUSEN et al. 1995), or when countries base their trade relations on economies 
of scale (ETHIER, 1982). LIPSEY and WEISS (1981, 1984) found that affiliate 
sales increased exports, when measured at the aggregate country, industry and to 
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investment; and trade and FDI are expected to have a strong complementary 
relationship, especially after the Uruguay Round, as the establishment of more 
openness in trade has also led to liberalized rules for FDI. 
3 METHODOLOGY 
An ample empirical literature has developed around the issue of determining the 
forces attracting FDI in the food processing industry. Most empirical FDI 
analysis constructs bilateral panel data of FDI activity and specifies a list of 
gravity regressors that include the GDP of the host and home countries as well as 
distance between the home and host country. The choice of potential determinants 
depends not only on the subject discussed, but also on data availability. Factors 
such as market size, relative labor costs, interest rates, import protection, 
exchange rates, export orientation, market structure, geographical distance, 
political stability, and cultural similarity are some of the variables used most 
frequently. 
As with trade flows, a gravity specification actually fits cross-country data on 
FDI reasonably well. However, there is no similar paper to ANDERSON and  
VAN WINCOOP (2003) that lays out a tractable model that specifically identifies 
gravity variables as the sole determinants of FDI patterns. In fact, intuition and 
theory suggest that MNE and FDI behavior is likely to be much more 
complicated to model than trade flows. CHAKRABARTI (2001) points out that the 
absence of a consensus on a theoretical framework to guide empirical work on FDI 
is rather conspicuous. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that CHAKRABARTI (2001) 
finds that most determinants of cross-country FDI are fairly fragile statistically. 
The most comprehensive empirical specification we have that is grounded to 
some extent in theory is modified gravity framework introduced by CARR, 
MARKUSEN and MASKUS (2001). Their empirical specification for the FDI from 
country  j to country i in time period t is given by the following linear 
specification with a mean zero error term:
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2 represents a measure of FDI activity, typically foreign affiliate sales 
or the stock of FDI in the host country.  
The first two terms on the right-hand side account for country sizes which are 
most connected with the horizontal MNE aspects of the model. The first, 
SUMGDP, is defined as the sum of the two countries’ real GDPs, and 
                                                 
1 C ARR et al. also include in the specification an independent variable, "trade investment 
costs", which could not be included here due to a lack of data. 
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GDPDIFSQ is defined as the squared difference between the two countries’ real 
GDP. Since horizontal MNE are most common between large countries of 
similar size, there is an expected positive correlation between SUMGDP and 
FDI activity and an expected negative correlation between GDPDIFSQ and FDI 
activity. The intuition is that with some positive level of trade frictions, larger 
and more similar sized markets better support the higher fixed costs associated 
with setting up production across countries (versus exporting) and lead to 
greater MNE activity. 
The next two terms capture relative factor endowment effects and are related 
most to the vertical MNE aspects of the knowledge-capital model. SKDIF is a 
measure of the skill difference (proxied here by wage rate) between the parent 
and host country and is intended to proxy for relative factor abundance 
differences across countries. As higher skill level in the home country means 
higher production cost, it would lead to more affiliate production in the host 
nation and vertical FDI will be encouraged. Thus the higher the skill difference 
(SKDIF) between the home and host countries, the greater the level of FDI 
activity, and this variable should have a positive coefficient. The fourth term 
(SKDIF*GDPDIF) interacts skill difference with GDP differences between the 
parent and host country and is predicted to have a negative coefficient. 
The last four terms on the right-hand side of equation (1) capture trade frictions. 
TCOSTi is the trade cost in the host country (i.e. Ukraine) and is expected to 
have a positive coefficient, as higher trade costs in the host country make 
exporting to that market more expensive, increasing the relative benefits from 
FDI. On the other hand, trade costs in the home countries (TCOSTj) are expected 
to have a negative coefficient, since higher trade costs in the parent country 
make it more difficult to ship goods back to the parent country from foreign 
affiliates. This makes vertical FDI a less attractive option. The next term 
interacts host trade costs with the squared skill difference. When high trade costs 
exist, horizontal investment is preferred to vertical investment, whereas greater 
skill difference favors vertical investment. Thus an interaction between host 
trade costs and squared skill difference is expected to negatively affect FDI 
flow, weakening the direct effect of host country trade costs. Finally, DIST is the 
distance between countries. Since higher distances make both trade and control 
of overseas FDI more difficult, the net effect is ambiguous. It is included since it 
usually performs well in gravity-type models. 
An important issue that requires an empirical answer is the interplay between 
FDI inflows in the food processing industry and food imports. The 
relationship between FDI and trade is unclear and generally little explored. 
Previous empirical studies focused mainly on determinants of FDI outflows 
and exports from developed countries. The earlier studies (CARTER and YILMAZ, 
1999; MARCHANT et al., 1999) estimated both FDI and exports simultaneously, 
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MARCHANT et al. (2002) and MAKKI et al. (2002) developed a simultaneous 
equation system for FDI and exports based on existing theoretical FDI models. 
In particular, MARCHANT et al. (2002) extend the BAJO-RUBIO and SOSVILLA-
RIVERO (1994) FDI model, where a multinational firm chooses the level of FDI 
that minimizes the total cost of producing at home and foreign plants. MAKKI et al. 
(2003), on the other hand, consider the case of a firm that maximizes its profits, 
that is the BARREL and PAIN (1996) model. 
Generally, results of empirical studies indicate that the relationship between FDI 
and exports in food processing industries tends to be substitutive between 
developed countries (GOPINATH et al., 1998, 1999) and complementary between 
developed and developing countries (SOMWARUU and BOLLING, 1999; CARTER 
and YILMITZ, 1999; MALANOSKI et al., 1997; MARCHANT et al., 1999, 2002; 
MATTSON and KOO, 2002). 
Based on previous empirical literature, we specify the econometric model to esti-
mate FDI inflows and food imports into Ukraine as a system of equations that 
accounts for many of the host country characteristics as well as some of the home 
countries’ characteristics. The empirical model in the reduced form is expressed as: 
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where subscript i represents the host country (i.e. Ukraine), subscript j represents 
the home country, subscript t denotes time period; FDI is the FDI inflows into 
the Ukrainian food processing industry; IMP is a value of food imports; GDP 
and PCGDP are, respectively, the Ukrainian gross domestic product and gross 
domestic product per capita; TAR is the Ukrainian import tariff for food; OPEN 
indicates the openness of the Ukrainian economy, measured as a ratio of imports 
plus exports of goods to GDP; EXCHR is the real exchange rate expressed as a 
ratio of local currency (hryvnja) to the home country currency (indexed 
2000 = 100); WAGER is the relative wage rate (ratio of the home country wage 
rate in manufacturing to corresponding Ukrainian wage rate); DIST is the 
distance between countries; EXP is the total value of food exports from the 
home country; FDIST is the FDI stocks in the Ukrainian food processing 
industry at the beginning of the year. 
The choice of some explanatory variables (e.g. market size, per capita income, 
distance) may not require additional justification, while others may require some 
explanation.  
The effect of trade barriers on FDI has been widely debated. MUNDELL (1957) 
proposed the tariff discrimination hypothesis arguing that FDI will be 
encouraged when there are obstacles to trade like tariffs, which make it difficult 
to export. According to this view, trade barriers have a positive effect on FDI 
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The degree of openness is related to the investment possibility and economic 
environment, as most investment projects are directed towards the tradable 
sector, and is expected to positively influence FDI. 
Exchange rate is an indicator of strength (or weakness) of domestic currency to 
foreign currency. It is expected that exchange rates positively influence FDI; a 
depreciation of domestic currency causes an increase in FDI since it becomes 
relatively cheaper for foreign firms to buy assets or to build plants in Ukraine. 
And,  vice versa, exchange rates negatively influence imports, as it becomes 
more expensive for domestic consumers to purchase foreign goods.  
The effect of wages on FDI is rather controversial. Cheaper labor cost should 
encourage "efficiency-seeking" FDI; however, previous empirical studies have 
given conflicting results. 
Total food exports from the home country are the indicator of its power on 
world markets, and are expected to have a positive impact on the value of food 
imported to Ukraine from this country. Moreover, the value of food exports to 
some extent reflects the development of the food processing industry in the 
home economy, as the main world food exporters are also the main investors. 
Consequently, the value of home country food exports is positively related to FDI.  
Finally, imports could negatively or positively influence FDI; a positive 
parameter for imports indicates a complementary relationship between FDI and 
imports, while a negative parameter indicates a substitutive relationship. Much 
the same is true for the import equation. 
4 DATA 
Data on FDI in the Ukrainian food processing industry are obtained from State 
Statistics Committee of Ukraine. The data it provides are recorded in thousand 
USD and based on the quarterly statistical reports of enterprises.  
FDI from offshore countries is a separate. As many Ukrainian and international 
analysts mention, there are rather large volumes of capital flight from the 
country. Usually, these financial resources are settled precisely in offshore 
countries like Cyprus (4
th place in the list of investment leaders, with a total 
amount of FDI accumulated by the Ukrainian food processing industry equal to 
90.5 million USD at the beginning of 2005). When some of this "flight" capital 
returns to the motherland, officially this process is treated as foreign investment. 
Offshores may be used by foreign investors as well. As it is impossible to 
reallocate FDI from offshore countries back to original source countries, they 
are excluded from our study. 
GDP data, population, and exchange rates for each country are obtained from the 
IMF International Financial Statistics online service. Export and import data were 
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capita, imports, and exports) are converted to 2,000 U.S. dollars to maintain a 
common unit of measures. Wages in manufacturing are obtained from the 
International Labor Organization online statistical database. The distance between 
countries is proxied by distance between capitals.
3 
One of the limitations of this study is the tariff data. We use MacMaps’ online 
database (BOUËT et al., 2004) which lists ad-valorem import tariff equivalents by 
a two-digit HS code for each country used in the study for the year 2001. It is 
assumed in this study that tariffs prior to and after 2001 are the same as they 
were in that year. The aggregate food tariff for each country in a specific year is 
calculated as a trade-weighted tariff, with weights given to each two-digit 
product based on how much that product is imported in that year. 
The data cover 22 countries for the years 1996 through 2004.  
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1  Determinants of FDI in food processing industry 
We first test our hypothesis following the knowledge-capital model (equation 1). 
However, this equation was initially developed for affiliate sales as a measure of 
multinational activity. The problem is that data for affiliate sales are available 
for the United States and Sweden only. Still, the equation may be used for FDI 
stock and (to a lesser extent) for FDI flows as well, as was shown in BLONIGEN 
and DAVIES (2000). Thus, in our analysis FDI stocks in the Ukrainian food 
processing industry are used as a measure of MNE activity.  
Another problem is that FDI data are highly skewed, with most of the activity 
confined to a few countries. One simple way to control statistically for this is to log 
the data, which is the typical practice with "gravity" models, whereas CARR et al. 
(2001, 2003) used interactions of variables in levels to deal with nonlinearities. 
However, the proposed linear model is not a structural equation derived from 
theory, so BLONIGEN and WANG (2004) suppose that there is nothing inherently 
inconsistent with specifying a log-linear model, and this functional form 
transformation is often used when data are highly skewed. The absence of 
consequences on this issue leads us to use both approaches. 
During the estimation procedure, we specified different forms of the empirical 
model in order to better fit the data. Table 1 presents estimates for determinants 
of ingoing FDI in the Ukrainian food sector using classical regression models 
(OLS) and panel techniques (fixed effect model and random effect model. 
First, we estimated classical OLS models. The R-squared and F-test statistics for 
the model in level form are quite good, but the coefficient estimates of trade 
costs have the wrong signs. Statistically significant are the coefficients on skill 
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difference and interaction term between skill difference and Ukrainian trade 
costs (tariffs), which have expected positive/negative effects on FDI, respectively, 
and an unexpected positive coefficient on home countries’ trade costs. However, 
the RESET test strongly suggests omitted variable bias or wrong specification, 
and the Breusch-Pagan test detects strong heteroskedasticity. As suggested by 
BLONIGEN and WANG (2004), for a better fit we take the log of the data. For the 
negative values of the interaction variable between skill difference and GDP 
difference, we follow BLONIGEN and WANG (2004) to set them to 0.1. The 
interaction terms on skill difference in the logged model become perfectly 
collinear with skill difference and, thus, two variables (skill difference and its 
interaction with host country trade costs) are dropped from the model. The 
logged model does not show a better fit (R-squared remains unchanged). 
However, this specification can pass the RESET test fairly well and has lower 
heteroskedasticity than the model in level form. All estimated coefficients, except 
the interaction term between skill difference and GDP difference, are statistically 
significant. As expected, FDI is positively related with the economic size of home 
and host countries and negatively associated with difference between them. On 
the other hand, the obtained coefficients on trade costs are unexpected. 
Table 1:  Estimations for the FDI inflows in the Ukrainian food processing 
industry, knowledge-capital model results 
OLS model  Fixed Effects Model  Random Effects Model
Variables 
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** 
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Observations    198 198 198 198 198 198 
Adj. R
2  0.223 0.223 0.102 0.163 0.083 0.216 
Source: Own  calculations. 
Notes: T-statistics  (z-statistics for random effect model) are given in parentheses;  
*, 
** and 
*** denote significance levels at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively. Oksana Luka  328
Although the OLS model fits the data quite well, the LM test allows us to 
conclude that the classical regression model with a single constant term is 
inappropriate for our data. Since the country-specific characteristics may 
generate unobserved differences, we include country effects into the model. The 
LM test rejects the OLS model in favor of a random effects model. However, 
another competing specification might induce the same results: The fixed effects 
model. Moreover, empirical studies suggest that using a fixed effects model in 
our case is preferable to a random effects model, as when the data contain all 
existing cross-sectional units, a fixed effects model performs better. Thus, we 
estimate a fixed effects model and a random effects model and conduct a 
Hausman test to check whether there is any difference in the true coefficients of 
these two models. 
Columns four to seven of Table  1 report the estimation results of the fixed 
effects model and random effects models. These models have much lower R-
squared values and thus lesser explanatory power, than the classical OLS model. 
Based on the Hausman test, we can conclude that among these models the fixed 
effects model is the better choice. As can be seen, outcomes from these models 
(in level form and in logs) show mixed results. The coefficient estimates for the 
sum of the countries’ market size and the home countries’ trade costs have 
expected signs, but the latter is not significant. As in the case of the OLS model, 
obtained results suggest that Ukrainian food tariffs have no impact on the 
investment decisions of MNE, as the coefficient on host country trade costs is 
negative, although it is insignificant. Obtained coefficients on GDP difference 
and interaction terms on skill difference have the wrong signs, but they are 
statistically insignificant. The most surprising result is the negative and 
significant coefficient on skill difference, which is contrary to the theory and the 
results of the OLS model. This implies that obtained empirical results are highly 
sensitive to the choice of regression model. As both models (i.e. OLS and fixed 
effects model) suffer from some weaknesses, it is impossible to draw a precise 
conclusion about the impact of skill difference between Ukraine and the home 
country at the level of FDI into the domestic food industry. 
Relationship between FDI and imports  
The empirical model of FDI inflows and food imports (equation  2) contains 
equations that are independent of each other, as they are not estimating the same 
dependent variable and have different independent variables. However, FDI and 
imports are endogenous since imports are the function of FDI, and FDI is a 
function of imports. Moreover, the equations use the same data, and it would be 
reasonable to allow contemporaneous correlation among the error terms. We use 
the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method, which produces more 
efficient estimates of parameters when errors are correlated between equations 
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variables as a system of equations and facilitate the discussion of how each 
explanatory variable affect different endogenous variables simultaneously. 
All variables are expressed in levels. Although for estimation purposes it is more 
convenient to express variables in the natural logarithms, a large quantity of 
negative observations on FDI flows does not allow this alternative to be used.  
Table  2 presents parameter estimates from the system of FDI and import 
equations. Results indicate that FDI inflows in the Ukrainian food processing 
industry and food imports are complements. FDI flows are found to have 
statistically significant and positive effect on imports, and vice versa. Moreover, 
FDI flows are positively influenced by the value of FDI stocks. These imply that 
countries which have invested in the Ukrainian food industry in previous years 
tend to make further investments. On the other hand, FDI stocks were negatively 
related to imports, although the coefficient is not significant. Countries that have 
made sizeable investments in the Ukrainian food industry are likely to rely to a 
greater extent on local production than on imports. 
Table 2:  Estimations for FDI and food import flows into Ukraine 
FDI equation  Import equation 
Variable  Parameter 
estimate  z-value  Parameter 
estimate  z-value 
GDP 4779.25
***  2.56 -3011.99  -1.07 
Per capita GDP  -219.17
***  -2.57 157.07  1.22 
Tariff -46.94  -0.80  254.72  1.43 
Openness 31265.24
*  1.70    
Exchange rate  -6.75  -0.24  -95.86  -1.12 
Wage rate  36.16  0.94     
Distance -0.24  -0.39  3.097
*  1.67 
Total food 
exports  0.06 0.56  0.78
**  2.49 
FDI stocks  0.08
***  4.86 -0.02  -0.45 
FD inflows      0.82
**  3.91 
Imports 0.09
***  3.90
    
Intercept -37069.60
*  -1.81 -2739.25  -0.17 
Adj. R
2  0.279   0.210  




*** denote significance levels at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively. 
One of the most important determinants of FDI is market size. As we expected, 
market size, indicated by host country GDP, is positively related to FDI inflows. 
An increase in Ukrainian GDP causes an increase in investments since foreign 
firms may decide to take advantage of greater market opportunities. On the other 
hand, per capita income appears to be negatively related to FDI. The estimated 
parameter is negative and statistically significant. Similar results were obtained 
by MAKKI et al. (2003) for the case of developed countries; at the same time in Oksana Luka  330
developing countries higher per capita income evidently attracted FDI. Possible 
explanations of these unexpected results may be found when we look at 
empirical results for the import equation. They indicate that an increase in host 
country GDP causes a decrease in the value of food imports, but per capita GDP 
is positively related to imports, although both coefficients are statistically insig-
nificant. This suggests that demand for processed food, including imports, tends 
to increase with income, but the growth of the whole economy measured as total 
GDP implies the growth of domestic food production, which substitutes for 
imports. 
The openness of countries is an important factor influencing foreign investment. 
Our analysis indicates that openness is positively associated with FDI, and 
significant. Tariffs for food, unexpectedly, are negatively related to FDI and 
positively related for imports; however, coefficients are not significant. This is 
in contrast to the tariff-jumping hypothesis of FDI. A possible explanation may 
be found in the Ukrainian tariff structure. Higher tariffs are usually applied for 
high-value processed food, which accounts for a base of imports from developed 
economies. Thus these countries face a high aggregate tariff for food and, as 
they are the main food exporters to Ukraine, the relationship between tariffs and 
food imports is positive.  
The exchange rate captures the effects of broader economic policies on both FDI 
and trade. Exchange rates were found to negatively influence FDI, but it is 
statistically insignificant. Thus, the depreciation of the Ukrainian currency does 
not attract foreign investors. As expected, the exchange rate negatively affects 
imports, as it becomes more expensive for domestic consumers to purchase 
foreign goods. 
The findings regarding wage rates are consistent with our hypothesis. 
Multinational companies often choose production locations based on labor costs. 
For this study, the wage rate is expressed as ratio of home country wages in 
manufacturing to the corresponding Ukrainian wages. Our results show a 
positive relationship between FDI and wage rates, as expected. 
Empirical results indicate that distance has little impact on MNE decisions to 
invest into the Ukrainian food industry. However, distance is found to be 
positively related to imports, and this finding is not consistent with the theory. 
A possible explanation for this unexpected relationship is the structure of domestic 
food imports. The main food exporters to Ukraine are western economies, which 
are more distant than neighboring CIS countries. 
The total food exports from the home country is found to have a positive and 
significant impact on the value of food imported into the domestic market from 
this country, as expected, but has a little explanatory power in case of FDI. 
Therefore, the results of our study indicate a bidirectional complementary 
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consistent with empirical results obtained by other researchers for developing 
countries. However, to some extent the relationship between imports and FDI is 
based on the level of data aggregation. Aggregate data may mask identification 
of the substitution effects and exaggerate the complementarity effect 
(BLONIGEN, 1999). Therefore, obtained results should be treated with cautious.  
6 CONCLUSIONS  
This paper has analyzed the determinants of ingoing FDI in the Ukrainian food 
processing industry. The contradictory results of the empirical study suggest that 
the knowledge-capital model, as well as the simultaneous equation system for 
FDI and food imports applied in the study, is not able to fully capture the 
complexities of the real world of foreign trade and production by the food 
industry. However, some important conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. 
Strong support was found for the explanatory power of the sum of the countries’ 
market size and market size of a host country, as measured by GDP, in its FDI. 
An increase in Ukrainian GDP causes an increase in investments, since foreign 
firms may decide to take advantage of greater market opportunities. This finding 
confirms a hypothesis that the main incentive to invest in the Ukrainian food 
sector might be market seeking. At the same time tariffs for food, unexpectedly, 
are negatively related to FDI, which is contrary to the related tariff-jumping 
hypothesis. Relative wages in manufacturing may also play a role, as multinational 
companies often choose production locations based on labor costs. However, the 
empirical results are highly sensitive to the choice of regression model. Finally, 
a complementary relationship is found between FDI in the Ukrainian food 
industry and corresponding imports, which is consistent with earlier findings for 
developing countries.  
In addition, the obtained results suggest possible areas for further research. First, 
it might be useful to include industry-specific variables in the analysis. A 
particular advantage of this approach is that it allows identification not only of 
country-aggregate, but also industry-specific determinants of FDI and any 
interaction between them. Moreover, in an empirical investigation of FDI in a 
particular industry of single country, such as one carried out in this paper, 
industry-specific variables are likely to have more explanatory power than 
country-level ones. Second, the complex motivation for FDI is likely to require 
modeling in a multilateral context, a context in which an MNE considers home, 
host and third country characteristics when choosing enterprise activities. For 
example, the multinational firm might choose the most preferable host country 
for its FDI and use this market as a platform to serve other markets through 
exports, presumably leaving other neighboring countries in a low-FDI "shadow". 
Thus it may be fruitful to develop an empirical model of MNE activity in a 
multi-country world that could predict how a variety of neighboring country Oksana Luka  332
characteristics (GDP, trade costs, endowments, etc) should affect FDI in the 
Ukrainian food industry.  
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The article presents an analysis of the allocative efficiency of using resources. 
We compare the values of marginal products within primary types of resources 
with their cost, which allows us to make conclusions concerning insufficient or 
excessive use of these resources. By analyzing data from the Leningrad Region 
with the Cobb-Douglas production function, the author comes to the 
conclusion that there is considerable underuse and deficit both of labor and, 
especially, of monetary resources. This deficit results from the low share of 
profits in the revenue of agricultural enterprises (3-5 percent) and cannot be 
overcome without a state policy that supports agricultural producers’ incomes, 
which still remains very weak in the country. 
Keywords: Allocative efficiency, corporate farms, transitional agriculture, 
Russia. 
  
1 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
In an earlier paper we analyzed the differences in the financial and economic 
performance and efficiency of agricultural enterprises, having divided them into 
five groups using a special algorithm (EPSTEIN, 2000; EPSTEIN, 2005). The best 
group in terms of financial and economic performance became Group 1, the less 
successful being Group 2, while the least successful was marked as Group 5. We 
saw that the differences in financial and economic performance are, by more 
than 50 percent, determined by the quality of managing the enterprise. So the 
question arises of how efficient is the use of different types of resources, taking 
their price into account, i.e., what the allocative efficiency is. This concept is 
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related to the application of the production function and the calculation of the 
marginal products of resources used. When the circumstances of competition are 
close to perfect, the quantity of a resource used by the enterprise is set at a level 
where this resource’s marginal product coincides with its cost. An excess in the 
cost of the marginal product per unit of a resource over the cost of the resource 
demonstrates an underuse of this resource, while an increase in the use of a 
resource can result in an increase in the enterprise’s profit. By contrast, a 
significant excess of a resource’s cost per unit over the price of the marginal 
product points to the excessive use of this resource. The criterion of allocative 
efficiency is thus the ratio between the marginal product of the resources and 
their costs. 
We would like to pay special attention to estimating the allocative efficiency of 
using monetary resources (cash) by evaluating them using various indicators 
(material costs
1, monetary material costs
2, credits and loans). Our hypothesis is 
that, due to certain distinctive features of agricultural markets, without a special 
state regulation system, agricultural enterprises face a significant deficit of 
monetary resources. One of the indicators of this deficit is the extremely low 
profitability of Russian agriculture, which amounted to an average of 4.8 percent 
in 2000-2004 (ratio between profits (subsidies inclusive) and the cost of 
production) (Russian Statistics Yearbook, 2004, p. 593). If there is a monetary 
deficit, developing institutions as well as a general policy of financial support 
for agricultural enterprises, which exists in virtually every developed country, is 
needed. If there is no deficit, other institutional measures are needed, for 
instance, strengthening the bankruptcy policy and reducing the state support, 
which was observed in the recent years. 
2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Classification is based on two solvency measures, defined in the caption to 
Table 1. Both measures calculate a ratio of the coverage of fixed costs (in the 
denominator) by value added (sales revenue less the cost of purchased and 
intermediate inputs) in the nominator, but they use two different definitions of 
fixed costs. K1 is calculated with the full wage cost, plus full depreciation in the 
denominator. K2 is calculated with minimal wage cost
3, plus depreciation of the 
machinery, equipment and vehicles in the denominator. It thus provides a 
measure of contribution from sales to fixed costs.  
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Table 1:  Algorithm for the solvency classification of corporate farms 
Solvency groups 
K1 = (Revenue − Input costs)/(Wages + depreciation) 
K2 = (Revenue – Input costs)/(Minimum wages +  
farm machinery depreciation) 
1 (best)  K1 ≥ 1 
2  K1 < 1 and K2 ≥ 1 
3  K2 < 1 and K2 ≥ 0 
4  K1 < 0 and K1 ≥ −0,3 
5 (worst)  All others 
 
If K1 is greater than 1, the farm generates some surplus after paying its workers 
and covering its depreciation expenses, and can continue to grow. If K1 equals 1, 
the farm can at least maintain the labor and fixed assets at a stable level, without 
attrition. If, however, K1 is less than 1, the value added does not cover the fixed 
costs and the farm needs to raise external capital (i.e., to borrow) in order to 
grow or just stay in place. If no borrowing is possible, the farm will be forced to 
reduce its labor or its asset base (or both). Yet even farms with K1 < 1 can 
continue to survive if their gross earnings are sufficient to cover the minimum 
(reservation) wages and the depreciation of farm machinery, equipment and 
vehicles (excluding farm buildings). This less restrictive solvency measure is 
captured by the ratio K2, which is calculated by the minimum wage cost plus 
machinery depreciation in the denominator. If K2 is greater than or equal to 1, 
the farm can manage to keep its workforce and main production assets even 
without making a profit. If, however, K2 is less than one, the operating earnings 
are not sufficient to cover even these minimum requirements.  
The algorithm used to classify the farms into five solvency groups is shown in 
Table 1. The best and the worst performers (groups 1 and 5, respectively) are 
identified using only the ratio K1. Identifying the intermediate performers 
(groups 2 and 3) requires the ratio K2. 
To calculate the marginal products we plot a revenue production function. The 
data on spending resources are partially presented in kind (labor, land) and 
partially in value terms – as the costs of the used resources (material cost, fixed 
assets, credits). 
All agricultural enterprises (corporate farms) in the Leningrad Region that 
submitted data for 2001 to the National Statistics Committee [Goskomstat] are 
used as the basic body of the data. The Leningrad Region’s agricultural sector is 
one of the most efficient in the country, thus, if we find here shortage of money, 
this shortage could be expected for corporate farms in other regions. Besides, 
this region has a considerably full database of all enterprises. 
Since the allocative efficiency of various specializations (for instance, poultry 
farms and, typical for the Leningrad Region, farms producing milk, potatoes and 
vegetables) can differ significantly owing to different technologies used, it is David Epstein  340
incorrect to evaluate it using one production function. Therefore, we withdrew 
monospecializing farms from the sampling. The latter include poultry farms, 
greenhouse farms, farms that feed pigs and cattle using purchased fodder, and 
farms that produce animal fur. 
The remaining sample consists of 158 farms. When plotting the regression 
equations, the exact number of farms may be lower if this or that indicator is not 
included in the reporting of all farms. 
For our analysis we plotted the sales revenue production function in a Cobb-
Douglas form, and, based on this, calculated the marginal products of the 
following types of resources: Basic (fixed) production assets (F) in thousand 
roubles; labor resources (L) in people; material costs (M) in thousand roubles; 
agricultural land (S) in hectares.
4  
The fixed assets’ cost estimation for a considerable number of the farms is based 
on their initial cost, taking into account the rarely-done reappraisal. At the same 
time, as the experience of plotting production functions shows, given a high 
inflation rate, this indicator (the initial cost of the fixed assets) is often 
insignificant, which is related to the drawbacks of its evaluation by the farms. 
Using the depreciated cost of permanent assets is also of no statistically 
important influence. However, refusal to use any indicator characterizing the 
size and influence of the fixed capital would result in an overstatement of the 
coefficients of other resources. In the allocative efficiency estimation, this would 
mean  a fortiori erroneous results. We therefore used the initial cost for the 
indicator of "cost of machinery and equipment, vehicles" (we shall keep the F 
symbol for this indicator). As the machinery and equipment belong to the most 
frequently upgradeable part of basic capital, the inaccuracy in calculating it is 
significantly lower than that when calculating the cost of fixed assets. The cost 
of "machinery and equipment, vehicles" is generally a significant indicator in 
the regression equations of the production function. 
The Cobb-Douglas function allows us to calculate the value of the marginal 
product of primary resources. 
Indeed, if we only have the four above-mentioned factors (L, M, F, S), then  
4 3 2 1 a a a a
S F M CL Y =   .                 ( 1 )  
The value of the marginal product is determined as the first derivative of Y of 
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4 3 2 1 = ⋅ =
∂
∂ − .                 ( 2 )  
It is obvious that the marginal product of labor with the given number of 
workers is equal to the value of the a1 coefficient to L, multiplied by the average 
labor productivity calculated using the production function.  
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However, with the increase in the number of workers per person there is an 
increase not only in revenue, but also in expenditures – on average, amounting to 
the sum of remuneration of labor with additional social payments. This means 
that if the average wage with social payments at an enterprise is lower than the 
marginal product per worker, equal to a1Y/L, the additional profit per each 
additional worker will increase, while profitability will increase with the growth 
in the number of workers, and vice versa.  








∂ .                   ( 3 )  
If the calculated value of the marginal product per rouble of material costs is 
higher than one, a deficit occurs and there is an underuse of material cost
5, while 
if the marginal product is lower than one, there is an excessive use of material 
resources, resulting in the decline of profitability. 
Marginal products in other types of resources are calculated similarly. 
The marginal product equations above are true if the actual production output 
coincides with the amount of revenue Y (prescribed by the production 
function). It also remains true if there is a permanent proportional deviation of 
the actual revenue from the calculated one, which can be the case in each of the 
groups. 
3 RESULTS 
3.1  Average allocative efficiency of the primary types of resources  
Below we present the characteristics of the primary types of resources, labor, 
land, capital, material resources, in general, and in the context of the five groups 
of enterprises. 
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Farm characteristics across solvency groups 
The distribution of the main financial and physical characteristics of Leningrad 
Oblast farms in 2001, by solvency groups, is presented in Table 2. The number 
of farms is distributed fairly uniformly, with about one-third of the farms in the 
best two groups and one-third in the worst two groups, respectively.  
Table 2:  Main characteristics of corporate farms in Leningrad Oblast, 2001 











































(best)  11 83236  515  3397 50307  33053  44336  6.1 
2 35  39641  315  2997  28424  15106  40181 6.5 
3 53  18077  186  2578  16273  8535  30323 9.9 
4 24  18157  212  2624  19105  8982  29624 9.5 
5 
(worst)  34 10684  148  3158 13844  6601  22474  22.9 
All 
farms  157 25860 234 2861 21273  11367  31700  11.9 
Source: Own  calculations. 
In the context of the groups, the above indicators demonstrate a natural decline 
in resource security with an increase in the number of the group, with the exception 
of land resources. 
Below are the characteristics of the three revenue regression equations. As the 
indicator of running costs, the first equation contains material costs; in the 
second equation, material costs are divided, based on statistical data, into 
monetary and non-monetary costs (CASH_M, NONCASH_M). In the third 
equation, an additional indicator of the sum of credits and loans (CRED) was 
introduced, while the material costs are, respectively, decreased by the sum of 
credits and loans (MMCRED
6). The equations differ in the number of farms, as 
some data were missing for some farms. Credits and loans are mainly used by 
relatively successful farms. 
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Table 3  Regression equation characteristics of revenues from primary 
factors and resources 
Indicator  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 





      




0.378 5.289 0.358 4.691 0.433 4.361 
Agricultural 

























     0.166  6.322 
MMCRED, 
‘000 roubles       0.552  7.694 
N    157   126   113 
R
2    0.956   0.966   0.952 
Standard  error    0.242   0.216   0.266 
F    832.6   678.2   420.5 
Source: Own  calculations. 
Notes:  OLS estimation of Cobb-Douglas models in logged variables. All the coefficients 
significantly different from zero (p < 0.01). David Epstein  344
We see that the equations have high coefficient values that are of statistical 
importance, and that all resources, except agricultural land, obtain positive 
regression coefficients
7.  
The given equations allow us to calculate the marginal products of the resources 
and compare them with the costs of the resources. 
The evaluation of the marginal product of labor and material costs, the value of 
machinery and equipment is given based on the calculated coefficients by means 
of calculating logarithmic values of resources and production output (Table 4). 




























workers, persons  0.378 233.78 23,522.13  100.616  38.03 31.7 Insufficient
Material costs, 




0.132  11367.4 23,522.13 2.069 0.27  0.1 Insufficient
Source: Own  calculations. 
It is obvious that the marginal product of the number of workers is higher than 
its cost, which demonstrates its underuse. 
The average use of material resources is excessive, as the marginal product per 
thousand roubles is only 880 roubles. However, this is the average result for all 
farms, although significant differences in allocative efficiency between the 
groups could be expected. Taking the hypothesis of money deficiency into 
account, it is therefore appropriate to separately consider the ratio between the 
marginal product and the costs of resources for the monetary and non-monetary 
parts of material costs. 
The marginal product of one thousand  roubles in the cost of machines and 
equipment amounts to 270  roubles, significantly higher than the expected 
"normative cost of the resource", which is 100  roubles for machinery and 
equipment, calculated based on the normative usage expectancy period of 10 
years. In fact, we see that the use of machinery and equipment is highly profitable 
in modern Russian conditions, while the "machinery and equipment" resource can 
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be defined as highly scarce. The big gap between the value of machinery’s 
marginal product and the cost of the resource demonstrates a high deficiency in 
monetary resources among the corporate farms. Otherwise, the farms would 
increase the amount of equipment and this gap would be significantly lower. 
We will further consider allocative efficiency in the context of groups of farms, 
and will then make a detailed analysis of the efficiency of using monetary 
resources and credits. 
3.2  Allocative efficiency of using main resources by groups of farms 
Below is the ratio between the marginal product and the resource costs for each 
of the five groups based on the coefficients of equation 1. They are calculated in 
the same way for the whole body of farms, with the average values of resources 
in each group being taken as the parameters of the groups.  
Table 5:  Ratio between the marginal product and the cost of resource by 
groups, for labor, capital, material costs 
Indicators/  Groups  1 2 3 4  5  Average
Number of farms in group, 2001  11  35  53  24  34  157   
Marginal product for labor  61.04 47.50 36.68 32.41 27.25  38.03 
Remuneration for one worker 
with additional payments, 
‘000 roubles 
44.34 40.18 30.32 29.62 22.47 31.7 
Ratio between marginal 
product and remuneration of 
labor for groups, percent 
1.38 1.18 1.21 1.09  1.21  1.20 
Excessive or insufficient use 
of labor 
Insufficient Insufficient Insufficient Insufficient Insufficient  Insufficient
Marginal product per one 
rouble in the cost of capital 
(Machinery and equipment), 
rouble/rouble 
0.33 0.35 0.28 0.27  0.21  0.27 
"Price" of one rouble in the 
cost of machinery and 
equipment calculated based on 
the expected usage of 10 years, 
roubles 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1  0.1 
Excessive or Insufficient use 
of machinery and equipment 
Insufficient Insufficient Insufficient Insufficient Insufficient  Insufficient
Marginal product per one 
rouble of material costs, 
rouble/rouble 
1.32 1.11 0.88 0.76  0.61  0.88 
Excessive or insufficient use 
of material costs 
Insufficient Insufficient Excessive Excessive Excessive  Excessive
Source: Own  calculations. David Epstein  346
It is obvious that there is a deficiency in labor usage and that profitability grows 
for all groups with an increase in the number of employees. A deficiency in the 
number of qualified workers seems to impede the further increase of the total 
number of employees.  
A similar situation can be found using capital represented by the cost of 
machinery and equipment indicator. Even in Group 5, the marginal product per 
rouble invested in machinery and equipment exceeds 0.2 roubles, and is thus 
twice as big as the normative return. The deficit of capital is obvious and is an 
unexpected conclusion, since a number of experts think that there is abundance 
in machinery, especially in weak farms. In reality, even weak farms using it 
fairly effectively, though its numbers are insufficient. 
The situation with material costs is radically different. Only the first two groups 
use material resources profitably, though they have a deficit of these resources. 
But Groups 3-5 face significant losses from each additionally-invested rouble of 
material costs. The considerable decrease in material costs per production unit 
are the condition for making this resource profitable. 
This is a rather important conclusion: Material costs in general are effectively 
used only by the first two groups. This conclusion seems unexpected at first 
glance; due to the obvious deficiency of monetary resources in the enterprises 
from Groups 3-5, they need to spend money efficiently. This leads us to a more 
detailed analysis of the marginal product of material resources issue, taking into 
account that material costs are a fairly complicated aggregation. Apart from the 
monetary material costs
8, they also contain self-manufactured products (seeds, 
feed, dung, etc.), as well as the costs of the resources received as a result of 
barter exchange. In this situation, there is an obvious overstatement of the 
amount of non-monetary material costs by weak enterprises in their balance 
sheets, as they are being evaluated by the self-cost, which is generally 
significantly lower than the actual market price. 
In the next section we will analyze the allocative efficiency of using monetary 
and non-monetary material resources, as well as credits, using equations 2 and 3 
as presented above (see Table 3). 
3.3  Allocative efficiency of using monetary resources and credits 
We included the amount of monetary resources per rouble of material costs in 
Table  6. It is apparent that it is much lower than 1 for all groups of this 
sampling, and is lowest for the farms in Groups 4 and 5. 
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Table 6:  Marginal product and efficiency of monetary and non-monetary 
material costs by groups of enterprises 
Indicators/  Groups  1 2  3 4  5  Average 
Number of farms in group  7  25  44  22  28  126 
Monetary expenditure as 
payment for purchased goods 
and services per 1 rouble of 
material costs, rouble/rouble 
0.623 0.527  0.485 0.430  0.270 0.483 
Marginal product of 
monetary material costs, 
rouble/rouble 
1.10 1.08  0.97 0.94  1.20 1.09 
Marginal product of non-
monetary material costs, 
rouble/rouble 
1.55 1.03  0.78 0.60  0.38 0.87 
 
The given calculations demonstrate that if monetary costs are considered as an 
independent factor, the farms of all groups use monetary material costs with 
a return close to the minimum necessary. The marginal product per rouble of 
cash input costs in Groups  1, 2, and 5 is greater than 1  rouble, and Group  5 
achieves the highest return. Farms in Group 5 thus experience the most pronounced 
cash shortage, and their cash resources are accordingly used with maximum 
return. 
The allocative efficiency of using monetary resources in Groups 3 and 4 is close 
to the optimum. The deficit of monetary resources in these groups is concealed 
by their inadequately efficient use. For three groups out of five, the significant 
deficit of monetary resources is obvious. 
Non-monetary material resources are efficiently used only by Groups 1 and 2, 
while in Groups  3 and 5, their marginal product is significantly lower and 
declines with the number of the group. As we have already stated, this can be 
explained by an overstatement of the amount of non-monetary material costs by 
weak enterprises, since they evaluate their own production at its self-cost. For 
weak enterprises, the latter is generally much lower than the market price. To be 
able to use the non-monetary inputs efficiently, they should significantly 
decrease their expenditures per rouble of revenue. By contrast, the enterprises of 
Groups 1 and 2 could receive additional profit from increasing the use of non-
monetary inputs. It is important here that the deficit of monetary resources can 
be found in farms of all groups. 
Analysis of the allocative efficiency of monetary material resources thus clearly 
points to the deficit of monetary resources. The reason of this deficit is well-
known – it lies in the disparity of prices, resulting in unfairly low profitability of 
agricultural enterprises. 
Our conclusion on the deficit of monetary resources is supported by the 
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In 2001, credits and loans in the Leningrad Region were given to slightly over 130 
enterprises, i.e., to approximately two-thirds of the farms. Since highly-specialized 
industrial enterprises were excluded from the analyzed body, 113 enterprises 
remained. 
Equation 3 (Table  3) demonstrates that an increase in credit results in a 
statistically important positive influence on the output of farms, and the marginal 
product per rouble of credit is higher than one rouble, i.e., there is a certain deficit 
of credits. In Table 7, the values of credit’s marginal product for the five groups 
of enterprises can be found. 
Table 7:  Marginal product per rouble of credits and loans for five groups 
of enterprises 
Indicators/Groups  1 2 3 4 5  Average 
Number of farms in group  13  28  31  20  21  113 
Marginal product of 
credits and loans for 
enterprises, rouble/rouble 
1.51 1.12 1.07 0.93 1.07 1.06 
Source: Own  calculations. 
The average marginal product of credits is somewhat lower than one-third of the 
Central Bank of Russia’s rate, which was 24  percent in 2001. The state 
reimburses no more than two-thirds of the Central Bank’s interest rate to the 
farms. However, commercial credits are provided at higher rates than the Central 
Bank’s rate. Thus, with the Central Bank’s rate of 24 percent, the state reimburses 
no more than 16 percent, but with the commercial credit rate of, for instance, 
26 percent, the farms have to pay 10 percent (the difference between 26 and 16) 
themselves. For Groups 3-5 the marginal product is significantly lower than the 
required 10 percent. That means that even the subsidized credit rate is too high 
for the weaker groups’ farms due to low production profitability. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
We can conclude that 1) credit is a deficit resource for farms in the Leningrad 
Region, and 2) relatively low profitability for enterprises in Groups 3-5 is an 
obstacle to its expansion. 
Thus, the results demonstrate a deficit of both labor and monetary resources in 
the farms, and a deficit of capital. This deficit cannot be overcome without a 
state policy that supports the incomes of agricultural producers, which is now 
very weak. Allocative efficiency of corporate farms in the Leningrad region  349
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PATHWAYS TOWARDS EFFICIENT LEVELS OF MACHINERY 
INVESTMENTS NEEDED FOR THE SUSTAINABLE  





The paper discusses conceptual issues of machinery investment at the micro level. 
Empirical evidence is provided for power intensity of mobile farm machinery 
used on cultivated farm land in grain production areas of Bulgaria. Improved 
models of break-even budgeting of machinery investment projects have been 
developed, taking into account the losses of yield due to the non-timeliness of 
operations and the difference between field reliability characteristics. Analysis of 
the factors influencing machinery-acquiring policy shows that investment 
decisions should be taken carefully because of the differences in farm sizes in the 
EU and Bulgaria, as well as the considerable subsidies for agriculture in EU 
countries. It is concluded that decision models and criteria used will not only have 
to assess the economic benefits, but also requirements for the sustainable develop-
ment of rural areas’ social factor. 
Keywords: Sustainable agriculture, power intensity, machinery investments.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Bulgaria’s transition to a market economy raises various questions for the 
sustainable development of agricultural farms in terms of their competitiveness 
through efficient use of long term assets, labor, management expertise, etc. The 
level of machinery investments is of crucial importance for arable farming 
because of the capital-intensive character of the business and the need for 
renovating machinery fleets.  
The approach for estimating the rational machinery fleet at the farm level is to 
take into account the opportunities for flexible solutions of small versus large 
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productive machinery aggregates in competition with the use of mechanization 
services for some field work. Machinery investment policy has to apply models 
of capital for labor substitution and take into consideration technological and 
social factors. These issues will have to be generalized as well in light of EU 
requirements for sustainable development of rural areas.  
2 POWER INTENSITY OF MACHINERY FLEETS IN BULGARIAN  
ARABLE FARMS BEFORE EU ACCESSION 
Surveys in Bulgaria and other pre-accession countries showed that the level of 
power intensity for agricultural machinery was below the rate experienced in the 
EU-15. The research done by the author in the north-central & northeast regions of 
Bulgaria (the "Wheat belt" zone) (NAYDENOV and JOTOVA, 2004) was based upon 
the hypothesis that the power intensity of mobile agricultural machinery fleets in 
arable farms essentially depends on farm size, in terms of the cultivated land. The 
objects of study were the fleets of mobile machinery in a sample of 154 agricultural 
farms (115  cooperatives and 39  large land renters) of arable specialization. The 
average size of the surveyed farms was 991.6 hectares of cultivated land. 
It was proven that a significant negative correlation exists between the power 
intensity in kW per 100 hectares and the cultivated land in the farm (see Table 1). 
The regression equation for farm size between 100 and 3,000 ha of cultivated 
land was (NAYDENOV and JOTOVA, 2004): 
Y =  1488. X 
– 0,2994,                ( 1 )  
where Y was the approximate level of power density (kW/100 ha) and 
X – the farm size in decares of land. (one hectare is equal to 10 decares).  
Table 1:  Relations of the power intensity of the machinery fleet  
(кW/1,000 da) by farm size (decares, 10 da = 1 hectares)  
  Type of machines in the farm  Correlation 
coefficient 
Model of the relation 
Y = f (X) 
1. 
Mobile agricultural machinery (tractors, 
grain harvesters, forage harvesters) – on 
average 90.29 кW/1,000 da) 
0.818  Y = 1488 X 
– 0.2994 
2.  Tractors – on average 52.77 кW/1,000 da  0.578 





All types of mobile combines (combine 
harvesters, forage harvesters, etc.) – on 
average 36.94 кW/1,000 da 
0.674  Y = 190.98 – 16.4 Ln(X) 
4. 
Only combine (grain) harvesters – 
average power intensity 
27.62 кW/1,000 da 
0.703  Y = 191.98 – 17.2 Ln(X) 
Source: NAYDENOV and JOTOVA, 2004. Nikolay Naydenov  352
The average power intensity of mobile agricultural machinery in surveyed farms 
was 90.29 kW per 100 hectares, i.e., 122.7 h. p. per 100 ha. It was also estimated 
that the power intensity variations narrowed around the theoretical line of 
intensity by farm size. Especially in the range of 200-800 ha, the power intensity 
varied between 30-40  % plus and 20-30  % minus around the line of 
approximation. 
The decline of intensity variations by farm size could be explained by the 
following factors, which have a single or multiple influence on the process. 
Firstly, this was the effect of strong discreetness in the alteration of tractor and 
combine number on very small farms. The difference of one machine in the fleets 
of these farms affected the level of power intensity by at least 40 kW (for tractors) 
or 70 кW (for combine harvesters) per 100 ha. This effect decreased by farm size. 
Secondly, there was a clear trend for small farms to own relatively more 
machines. This could be explained by the fact that the failure of one tractor or 
combine in a fleet of two or three machines during crucial campaigns (such as 
sowing or harvesting) would have catastrophic consequences for the business, 
while that failure could be compensated easily in large machinery fleets on the 
large farms.  
We need also to underscore that the average approximate level of power 
intensity in an arable farm of about 100 ha land was 180-200 кW per 100 ha, 
i.e., approximately two times more than the level of 90.29 кW per 100 ha for the 
"average" arable farm of 991.6 ha land size.  
The difference between the power intensity of mobile agricultural machinery in 
the EC, on average (HEINRICH, 2001; KOVACS et al., 2003) and that researched 
in Bulgaria can be explained by the difference of farm sizes. We suggest that the 
power intensity in a small farm of 50-100 ha in Bulgaria could be extrapolated 
to a power density of 200-250 kW per 100 ha, i.e., it is very close to the average 
level quoted for some EC countries (HEINRICH, 2001). 
It can be concluded that comparison with the EU figures of power intensity 
should be done carefully, because the farm sizes in EU countries are much 
smaller than in Bulgaria, and also due to the considerable subsidies for 
agriculture in the EU-15. Another conclusion is that because of the lack of 
sufficient financing for machinery from EU programs, the process of technical 
renovation is expected to be very slow and difficult.  
3 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH FOR ESTIMATING THE RATIONAL  
MACHINERY FLEET TO BE ACQUIRED ON THE FARM 
3.1  Fleet of tractors and working machines 
Agricultural machinery investment decisions are very important due to their 
strategic and long-term influence. Once the decision is taken and the necessary Pathways towards efficient levels of machinery investments  353
machinery is acquired, it is not possible to change the machinery policy without 
heavy monetary losses when trading machines to second-hand users. 
There are two different groups of machines in arable farming – universal and 
specialized machines. Both groups can be differentiated by their type of use – 
almost continuously-used (universal) machines (tractors, trailers, ploughs, 
harrows, surface cultivators, etc.) and seasonally-used machines. 
Investment into specialized and seasonally-operated mobile machines such as 
combine harvesters and forage harvesters is treated by the well-known economic 
model of "break-even" analysis (KAY and EDWARDS, 1994). Some applications 
have also been developed for single working aggregates for pick-up balling, 
forage harvesting, etc., consisting of a tractor and a working machine. Normally 
these models estimate the minimal size of the annual operational program 
("break-even" size), which justifies the costs of operating own machines versus 
hiring services from contractors or larger farms. 
Investment into whole fleets of tractors and working machines is more complex, 
and therefore more difficult. The problem is that one asset in the fleet, tractors, 
are used with working machines in various combinations throughout the year, 
i.e., they are used under the scheme of (more or less) a "fixed" asset. The 
appropriate number of tractors is usually estimated for the most intensive period 
of field operations under the condition of fulfilling the operations within the 
optimal agro-technical period. Another problem is that an inappropriate unit for 
measuring the work had been used till now – "hectares of shallow ploughing". 
This unit did not express the real energy matter of machinery operations and did 
not allow flexible solutions for choosing a small versus a large number of 
machinery aggregates necessary for a fixed amount of field operation work.  
The idea is to develop and investigate an enhanced model for planning a 
universal machine fleet for investment projects in arable farming based on the 
philosophy of "break-even" budgeting; this is done by expressing the operational 
work as energy consumption. The algorithm for estimating the machines to be 
acquired and those which will have to be used as hiring services can be traced 
by the steps given below, as follows: 
1.  Analyzing the production structures of arable farming that specializes in 
grain in the target area, choosing the appropriate crops to be grown and 
the proportion of crops within the cultivated farm land. 
2.  Preparing technological carts for every crop, which include: Schedule of 
agro-technical operations by month, specified as working periods of 
days/weeks; energy consumption for each operation in kWh per hectare 
(IVANOV, 1999), etc. 
3. Studying  agro-meteorological  statistics data; preparing forecast files of 
working days available by month; investigating plot characteristics such as 
size, configuration, distance, etc.; determining field efficiency ratios, etc. Nikolay Naydenov  354
4.  Calculating the power needed εj,k , kW, for each field operation: 
k j i k j
k j




, . . Δ
= ε                ( 2 )  
where  E j, k is the energy consumption (kWh) of the j-th technological 
operation for the k-th type of crop according to farm specialization;  
Δt j, k – the duration of the j-th operation for k-th crop, days;  
D i – working day duration, hours, during the operation period i; 
R j, k – the index of the field efficiency level. 
5. Summing up the ε j, k by each period i, choosing the most intensive period 
of field operations i max, from which the estimation of machinery fleet 
begins (see Figure 1). 
6. Consequently, the alternatives "own machinery fleet" versus "contracting 
services" are compared by calculating the elements of the following 
inequality for annual costs: 
( ) ∑∑ ∑∑ − ≤
kj
k j k j k j
kj
k j n W Cv Z Cf , , , , ,   .             (3) 
where  n  is the variant of using the appropriate number of tractors of one type in 
combination with working machines for implementing the j-th operation 
for growing the k-th kind of crop; 
Cf n,j,k –  fixed costs of machinery fleet to be owned, consisting of N  
tractors (N=1, 2, …) of the kind n and working machines of j-th type of 
the k-th kind of crop; 
Cv n,j,k – specific variable costs of the fleet of aggregates, Euro per hectare; 
Z j,k – costs of hiring services from contractors or larger farms; 
W j,k – program of j-th operation for k-th kind of crop, hectares. 
Inequality (3) is calculated for N = 1,2, …, beginning with the most powered 
operation in the most intensive period i  max and going further, to next less 
intensive periods i max-1, …, (see Figure 1). The example given shows the case of 
a small farm of 100 hectares growing, for example, winter crops and maize in a 
50:50 proportion.  
It is clear that when owning more universal machines such as tractors, ploughs, 
harrows, trailers and surface cultivators, their fixed costs are spread throughout 
several operations for both crops. If the cumulative fixed costs figure is lower 
than the transformed "break-even" line AA (Figure 1), it would be necessary to 
acquire both the tractors and machinery mentioned above. Respectively, it 
would not be appropriate for this small farm of 100 hectares to buy their own 
fertilizer for winter crops and a sprayer, because these operations are carried out Pathways towards efficient levels of machinery investments  355
less frequently than those mentioned above and the fixed costs figure will 
exceed the "break-even" line AA.  
Figure 1:  Break-even budgeting model to select own machinery fleet versus 
mechanization services  
 
 
Model (3) can also be improved by investigating variants to used tractor 
aggregates of various productivity, i.e., to compare large aggregates versus small 
ones, mixed fleets (simultaneously large and small aggregates) versus 
homogeneous fleets, etc. 
3.2 Specialized  machinery 
The operation of these harvesting machines is characterized by potential high 
losses of yield due to non-timeliness of operation, and because of technological 
losses from worn out machines. It is obvious that model (3) of break-even 
budgeting can be improved via the evaluation and formalization of timeliness 
and reliability factors facing the decision for combine harvesters. Thus, the next 
step of the improved approach is to choose an alternative combine harvester of 
an appropriate capacity for every concrete interval of annual harvesting area 
(NAYDENOV, 1998). 
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Figure 2:  Model for estimating the break-even harvesting area for 


















Source: NAYDENOV, 1998. 
To simplify, let us assume that the annual program per one combine  W in 
hectares is realized by harvesting only the cereals wheat and barley. The cost of 
possible additional grain losses due to non-timeliness of the operation (after the 
agro-technical period of harvesting) of the lower capacity Combine 1 can be 
estimated as (Figure 2-b): 
  Q1 (W) = (W  -  Pd1 . Ta) . ξ ,               ( 4 )  
where Pd1 is the real daily capacity of Combine 1, hectares per day; 
 Ta    –  the normal agro-technical period of harvesting, days; 
ξ – the average losses from each hectare due to a delay of operation 
      behind Ta, Euro per ha. 
Equation (4) is correct if  W > Pd1 . Ta , otherwise  Q1 (W) = 0. 
The costs of owning and operating alternative combines, including yield losses 
due to non-timeliness and technological losses, for the break-even program W’ A, 
1-2 are equal, i.e.: 
  Cf1 + Cv1 .WA’ +  ξ.WA’ - Ta . Pd1 . ξ = Cf2 + Cv2 . WA’  ,     (5) 
 Harvesting area W, 
C1 -Total costs, combine "1" 
А
Total costs including losses 
due to non- timeliness of 
operation 
Cf 1 - Fixed costs, combine 
Cf 2 - Fixed costs, combine "2" 
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where Cv 1 and Cv 2 are the variable costs of both combines (Euro per hectare), 
including the technological losses of yield. 
From (5), the break-even harvesting area per one combine taking into account 
the timeliness and quality of operation  is derived as follows: 
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Model (6) is correct, if Cv1 + ξ > Cv2, as well as if Cf2 + Ta . Pd1 . ξ > Cf1. In 
fact, this model is a little bit approximate because it does not take into account 
the non-perpendicularity of Q1 (W) curve to the line of total costs C1 (W). 
Similarly, if the alternative combines are Combine 2 and a new Combine 3 of a 
much larger size (i.e., daily capacity), a new break-even harvesting area W’A 2-3 
can exist. The amount of the break-even area will be influenced by the fixed 
costs of the second and third combines Cf2 and Cf3 and by the variable costs 
Cv2 and Cv3 , including the technological losses, the average losses ξ due to the 
non-timeliness, the agro-technical period Ta and the daily capacity Pd2. 
It can be concluded that when a decision to choose the appropriate capacity 
machine within an investment project has to be taken in accordance with the 
model (4), a number of factors will have to be assessed. The most important of 
them are: The expected annual harvesting program, the cost of owning and 
operating alternative combines and the losses of yield due to the non-timeliness 
of operation and technological reasons. If the annual program per one machine 
during its useful life is expected to be lower than the break-even area W A, 1-2, 
or, respectively, W A, 2-3, it would be profitable to invest in a machine of smaller 
capacity. 
The value of real daily capacity of the machine aggregates is influenced by a 
number of technical and organizational factors. For example, besides the main 
parameters – width and working speed – the real capacity is strongly affected by 
the level of field efficiency R. In principle, that feature is defined first of all by 
the plot’s size, the grain transport organization, the failure rate of the machine 
and the organization of field repair, as well as by the agro-meteorological 
conditions throughout the harvesting campaign. Thus, both the organizational 
factors and reliability characteristics of the selected machine have to be assessed 
when planning and implementing investment projects. 
If there is not a considerable economic gap between using two machines instead 
of a larger one with double capacity, it is preferable to invest in buying two 
smaller-sized machines. The consideration is that the failure of the larger 
combine for a long period would be a catastrophe for the harvesting campaign, 
whereas the failure of one of two smaller combines will be connected with fewer 
consequences. There are also practical considerations based on repair 
requirements and policy. It is preferable to choose the machine which is of the Nikolay Naydenov  358
same or similar model as those already owned. Thus, the owner keeps small 
inventories of spare parts and avoids additional technological problems in 
repairing machines of new makes.  
Let us discuss an example of estimating the break-even harvesting program with 
real information. Two combine harvesters, imported from Russia are considered. 
The first combine – "SK 5M1" – is used on smaller size farms. The second 
machine – "Don 1500 B" – sees widespread use in agro-companies in the typical 
grain-producing area of North East Bulgaria.  
Taking into account the technological losses and also losses due to non-timeliness 
of harvesting, the break-even program of alternative combines "SK-5M1" versus 
"Don-1500B" is approximately 300  hectares annually, i.e., the campaigns of 
consecutively harvesting wheat and barley, sunflower and maize would take no 
more than 40 days in total, which is normal for Bulgarian conditions. Thus, we 
can conclude that it is appropriate to buy a smaller size combine as "SK-5M1" if 
the expected annual program per machine would be less than approximately 
300 hectares.  
4 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFICIENCY OF MACHINERY  
INVESTMENTS IN ARABLE FARMINBG DURING ACCESSION  
The current level of machinery’s power density in Bulgarian arable farms is a 
"picture" of the process of agriculture mechanization since the 1980s. 
Undoubtedly, the level of efficient investment in machinery is to be estimated 
while bearing in mind the above-described results and various important factors 
that influence the specific investment projects in arable farming. 
It should be noted that appropriate models of capital substitution for labor in 
farm mechanization will have to be developed and investigated (see Figure 3). 
This is because the mechanization level is the result of a fluctuating capital/labor 
price ratio in specific regions of Europe.  
The models are to present the least cost combination points, where a relatively 
large amount of labor is combined with a small amount of capital for machinery. It 
can be concluded that the proportion of agriculture machinery, fuel and lubricants 
costs to the labor costs for fieldwork, repair and maintenance is very important 
for finding the right level of investment in machinery. Furthermore, the 
increasing sophistication and quality of agricultural machinery imported from 
the EU recently is to be analyzed, as are the increased costs of fuel and 
lubricants in 2005 and 2006.  Pathways towards efficient levels of machinery investments  359
Figure 3:  Principle scheme of substitution, "Machinery capital for labor of 
operation and servicing" 
 
 
The problem facing Bulgaria and other pre-accession countries is in making the 
right decision in the context of the economic, social and ecological sustainability 
of agriculture and rural areas. If there are not sufficient funds for supporting the 
machinery fleets’ renovation process through introducing contemporary (but 
expensive) machinery, produced with well-paid labor in the EU countries, the 
solution might be an irrational one – using smaller and older machinery 
requiring less capital investment (Model 1 on Figure 3).  
Model 1 is expensive for farm business due to low labor productivity and the 
need of permanently injecting labor to maintain worn-out machinery. The 
decision must also evaluate the labor for mechanization in the context of 
sustaining the social factor in rural areas. Fortunately, labor in Bulgarian rural 
areas is still cheap in comparison with the EU. 
A further influence on the adoption of larger, more capital-intensive machinery 
has been recognized – the need to improve timeliness of operations (Model 2 on 
Figure 3). This adoption can result in decreasing timeliness losses when 
handling a limited number of arable crops, as a result of a desire to substitute 
power for labor. Timeliness has become increasingly important in European 
agriculture because of the trend towards large rainfall periods during harvesting 
campaigns. It should also to be taken into account that time available for field 
work in Southeast Europe is approximately 30% longer than in Central and 
Western Europe. The conclusion is that the adoption of large, more powerful 
(and expensive) machinery for labor in Bulgaria is to be made carefully, through 
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The third factor of preference for the higher level of machinery density nowadays 
could be the adoption of combinable crops such as wheat and barley (for the 
expanded beer industry) or sunflower and corn, rather than crops that were more 
traditional and labor intensive in Bulgaria before the beginning of transition such 
as perennials and fruits and vegetables. Another factor could be the absence of 
livestock from an increasing number of farms in areas of arable farming. This is 
not an attempt to argue that there have not been cost savings in agriculture 
through power (capital) versus labor substitution, but changing the crop structure 
in accordance to the EU agriculture policy will also have an important influence 
on the man/machine balance in Bulgarian farming patterns. Farmers will continue 
to seek to substitute power (i.e., capital invested in machinery) for labor, but there 
are limits to the size of machines which are most appropriate for the large number 
of small farms in Bulgaria. There are also increasing environmental concerns 
about soil compaction when using very large machines. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
1.  The strong negative correlation between power density (kW per hectare) 
and cultivated farm land is estimated as a result of surveying fleets of 
mobile agricultural machinery in Bulgarian grain production areas. The 
average is 90.29 kW per 100  hectares for fleets of tractors, combine 
harvesters and forage harvesters on one "average" farm of 991.6 hectares of 
land. The difference compared to average EU figures before 2004 can be 
explained by the fact that EU farms are much smaller than Bulgarian farms.  
2.  Improved models of break-even budgeting for agricultural machinery 
investment projects have been proposed. They take into account not only 
the expected costs of owning and operating the alternative machines, but 
also consider the capacity (size) of both machines, technological losses of 
yield, timeliness of operations and the difference between field reliability 
characteristics. 
3.  Comparing the EC and Bulgarian figures in terms of the appropriate level 
of investments for farm machinery should be done carefully because of the 
differences in farm sizes, as well as the considerable subsidies for 
agriculture in the EU countries. Decision-making models and criteria used 
will have to assess not only the economic benefits, but also take into 
account requirements for sustaining the social factor in rural areas. Pathways towards efficient levels of machinery investments  361
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SMALL-SCALE FARMING IN ROMANIA –  






This paper aims to shed empirical light on the relative efficiency of small-scale 
maize producers in Romania. Farmers in transition countries still face heavily 
distorted price systems resulting from imperfect market conditions and 
socioeconomic and institutional constraints. To capture such distortions we 
formulate a stochastic shadow-cost frontier model to investigate the systematic 
input-specific allocative inefficiency. We further adjust the underlying cost 
frontier by incorporating shadow price corrections and subsequently reveal 
evidence on farm-specific technical inefficiency. The empirical results indicate 
relatively high technical efficiency for the small-scale farmers, but relatively 
poor scores for systematic input price efficiency. The usage of extension 
services, as well as agricultural training on the farm level, are found to have a 
positive effect on the technical efficiency level of the farms. All model 
specifications agree on the negative effect on efficiency with respect to the use 
of insecticides. 
Keywords: Efficiency, shadow cost frontier, functional consistency, Romania. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Profound structural changes are still taking place in the process of transition 
from a command to a market-oriented economy in Romania. This is especially 
true for the agricultural sector, where structural reforms are concentrated on the 
privatization of land and the downsizing of agricultural enterprises and have led 
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to the emergence of numerous small farms (LERMAN, 1999; OECD, 2000). 
These farmers – so-called individual farmers – are currently the most important 
actors with respect to land and output markets (OECD, 2000; LEONTE, 2002). 
However, they are still heavily constrained due to an insufficient factor endowment 
and the lack of developed input and output markets. As a result, most technology-
intensive crops have been substituted by the cultivation of more traditional crops 
and the importance of subsistence farming has increased (TESLIUC, 2000). The 
production of maize as one of the main traditional crops in Romania has 
increased in importance, which is also related to its relatively simple manner of 
production and storage (TESLIUC, 2000). Hence, this crop currently plays a 
central role in agricultural production by being cultivated on a relatively large 
territory and providing a relatively large proportion of output (NIS, 2004). 
According to GORTON et al. (2003) maize shows a comparative advantage in 
Romania. Given the importance of maize production for agricultural transition 
and rural development in Romania, this research aims to assess the relative 
efficiency of small-scale maize production and tries to determine different 
factors for maize farms’ inefficiency. Against the background of a restructuring 
Romanian agriculture, the individual farmers’ decisions are often made with 
respect to shadow prices, that is, the prices the decision-maker actually has to 
pay, rather than those observed as prevailing market prices (see TODA, 1976; 
ATKINSON and HALVORSEN, 1980; KUMBHAKAR and BHATTACHARYYA, 1992; 
WANG et al., 1996). The following study therefore uses such shadow prices to 
model and analyze the relative efficiency of small-scale Romanian maize 
producers. With respect to policy-relevant empirical-based productivity studies, 
GORTON and DAVIDOVA realized in 2001 that "(…) there is a lack of evidence in 
the Baltic States and Romania." This lack still exists with respect to Romanian 
agricultural production. After briefly outlining the case of small-scale maize 
production in Romania, the applied model is subsequently described as a 
combination of the shadow price approach for revealing systematic allocative 
efficiency and the error components approach for obtaining producer-specific 
technical efficiency estimates. The estimated models are tested and corrected for 
theoretical consistency, and further bootstrapping techniques are applied to 
investigate the statistical robustness of the most consistent model. Finally, the 
relative efficiency scores and possible factors for their variance over the sample 
are discussed. 
2 THE CASE STUDY – SMALL-SCALE MAIZE PRODUCTION IN 
ROMANIA 
The majority of the restructuring measures in Romanian agricultural since 1989 has 
concentrated on the privatization of land and aimed to change collective agriculture 
to individual agriculture, as well as to downsize farms (LERMAN, 1999). The 
prospective owners could choose among the following options: Individual Johannes Sauer, Borbala Balint  364 
farming, joining a family-based association, joining a formal association, and 
pursuing a mixed strategy (SABATES-WHEELER, 2001). The majority of farmers 
chose individual farming and thus, in 2002, 4.7  million individual farms 
cultivated 62 % of the arable land, with an average size of 1.6 hectares per farm 
(NIS, 2004). However, by reestablishing the situation before collectivization, 
privatization led to the fragmentation of agricultural land and consequently, the 
new individual farmers were constrained in their business development by the 
fragmented structure and small size of the land holdings. The farms could not be 
adjusted to their efficient size because restituted land was banned from resale 
until 1998, and a simplification of the complex leasing law was only conducted 
in that same year. Due to this structure, renting agricultural land was not attractive 
to farmers, as obtaining a large piece of land implied substantial transaction costs 
from coordinating several different land owners (TESLIUC, 2000). Furthermore, 
the new individual producers lacked the necessary know-how to cultivate their 
land. They had no cash to invest and rarely had access to credit or agricultural 
equipment. Further, up and downstream sectors were not restructured to suit 
the needs of small farmers, which led to high transactions costs on the different 
input and output markets. Such transaction costs and the lack of capital 
reinforced the decline in the use of inputs like fertilizer and certified seed 
(KENNETH, 2003; OECD, 2000; TESLIUC, 2000). In response to these difficulties, 
producers diversified their production, substituted commercial with non-
commercial crops, technical crops with traditional crops, and increased 
subsistence production. The latter further promoted stagnation in the 
development of input and output markets and led to a kind of vicious cycle. The 
increase in maize cultivation in Romania during this period is basically linked to 
these developments in the agricultural sector. Maize is one of the traditional 
agricultural productions and the area devoted to it increased from about 26 % 
(1990) to about 36 % (2003) of the arable land (NIS, 2004). The cultivation of 
maize shows the relative advantage of low input intensity: No certified and 
commercially – distributed seed is needed, the crop can be harvested by hand 
and easily stored without the need for sophisticated facilities. Moreover, maize 
can be consumed in the household as well as in animal production; the latter leads 
to relatively less dependence on the purchase of additional fodder (TESLIUC, 
2000). Although economic reforms in Romanian agriculture have reduced 
direct state control over production decisions, various obstacles in the input 
and output markets still distort farmers’ production decisions. Despite some 
studies on the economic efficiency of farming in transitional countries (see e.g. 
HUGHES, 1998; MATHIJS and SWINNEN, 2000) none considers the effects of 
distorted input and output price relations with respect to the relative efficiency of 
agricultural production in Romania. Due to the vast literature on shadow prices (for 
an overview, see e.g. KHUMBHAKAR and LOVELL, 2000) non-observable shadow 
price ratios have to be considered as relevant for producer decisions in distorted 
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shadow prices and the observed market prices can be interpreted as the sum of 
allocative inefficiency due to the prevalence of various market constraints, as 
well as optimization failure by the farm management. Various approaches for 
modeling this divergence can be found in the literature: The usual method 
consists of additively translating observed prices to create shadow prices. 
Alternatively, shadow prices can be modeled by multiplicatively scaling 
observed prices into shadow ones (LAU and YOTOPOULOS, 1971). We follow the 
latter approach here and define the relationship between the normalized shadow 
prices for the variable and fixed inputs  *, * wf and the normalized market prices 
, wf as 
*         * ii i ll l ww f f θ θ ==         (1) 
where  , il θ θ  are (non-negative) price efficiency parameters and  , il are indices for 
variable and fixed inputs, respectively. If no bending market restrictions are the 
case, then  , il θ θ  equal unity, whereas if market distortions restrict optimizing 
behavior, then  01 θ θ ≥∧≠. Consequently, a Romanian maize farmer can be 
regarded as allocatively efficient with respect to observed market prices only if 
observed market prices reflect the farmer’s opportunity cost with respect to 
inputs. It has to be considered that the price efficiency parameters  , il θ θ  may 
reflect both effects of market distortions as well as optimization errors.  
3 THE MODEL – A COMBINATION OF SHADOW PRICES AND ERROR 
COMPONENTS 
We start our modeling efforts by formulating a simple single-output translog 
cost function and its associated cost-minimizing input cost share equations (see 
e.g. ATKINSONM and HALVORSEN, 1980; KUMBHAKAR, 1989; WANG et al., 1996; 
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=≠ = = = = ∑∑ ∑ and where y is maize output; 
w’s are prices of the variable inputs labor and fertilizer; f are prices of the quasi-
fixed inputs land and organic fertilizer; and the control variables e = herbicide 
used, insecticides used, seed applied, subsidies received, extension services 
used, agricultural training received. Incorporating shadow prices according to (1) 
and following the input-oriented approach with respect to technical efficiency, 
observed expenditure and observed input cost shares can be expressed in terms 
of shadow cost and shadow input cost shares as 
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respectively, where symmetry and homogeneity of degree +1 in input prices are 
imposed as outlined above. Classical error terms are appended, one input cost 
share equation is deleted, and the remaining system of I equations is estimated. 
Parameter  χ  includes the relative technical inefficiency with respect to a group 
of farmers defined along different characteristics, and θ  gives the systematic 
allocative inefficiency for the respective inputs. Various recent contributions 
point to the crucial importance of considering the consistency of the estimated 
frontier with basic microeconomic requirements such as monotonicity with 
respect to inputs as well as concavity of the function (see e.g. RYAN and WALES, 
1998; SAUER, 2006). Monotonicity of the estimated cost function – i.e., positive 
first derivatives with respect to all input prices – holds when all variable input 
prices and quasi-fixed inputs are positive for all observations in the sample. The 
necessary and sufficient condition for a specific curvature consists in the 
definiteness of the bordered Hessian matrix as the Jacobian of the derivatives 
/ i Cw ∂∂  with respect to wi and  / l Cf ∂∂  with respect to fl: If ∇
2C(y,w,f) is negative 
definite,  C is concave, where ∇
2  denotes the matrix of second order partial 
derivatives with respect to the shadow translog cost model defined by (4). The 
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Hence, the underlying function is concave and an interior extreme point will be 
a global maximum. The condition of concavity is related to the fact that this 
property implies a quasi-concave production function and consequently a 
convex input requirement set (see in detail e.g. CHAMBERS, 1988). Hence, a 
point on the isoquant is tested, i.e., the properties of the corresponding 
production function are evaluated subject to the condition that the amount of 
production remains constant. With respect to the translog shadow cost function 
model, curvature depends on the specific variable input price and quasi-fixed 
input bundle, as the corresponding Hessian H for our 4 input case shows: 
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for r = i, l and s = k, m. Given a point x
0, it is necessary and sufficient for 
curvature correctness that at this point v’Hv ≤ 0 and v’s = 0 where v denotes 
the direction of change. For some input bundles concavity may be satisfied, but 
for others not, and hence what can be expected is that the condition of negative 
definiteness of the Hessian is met only locally or with respect to a range of 
input bundles. The respective Hessian is negative definite if the determinants 
of all of its principal submatrices are negative in sign (i.e., Detj < 0 where Det 
is the determinant of the leading principal minors and j = 1, 2, …, n). Hence, 
with respect to our translog shadow cost model, every input bundle has to be 
checked a posteriori to determine that monotonicity and concavity hold. If 
these theoretical criteria are jointly fulfilled, the obtained estimates are 
consistent with microeconomic theory and consequently can serve as empirical 
evidence for possible policy measures. Concavity can be imposed on our 
translog shadow cost model at a reference point (usually at the sample mean) 
following JORGENSON and FRAUMENI (1981) and RYAN and WALES (1998). By 
this procedure the bordered Hessian in [6] is replaced by the negative product 
of a lower triangular matrix Δ times its transpose Δ’. Imposing curvature at the 
sample mean is then attained by setting 
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where r = i, l and s = k, m and λrs = 1 if r = s and 0 otherwise and (ΔΔ’)rs as the 
rs-th element of ΔΔ’ with Δ as a lower triangular matrix: 
11 13 11 14 11 11 11 12
12 13 22 23 21 14 22 24 11 21 12 12 22 22
31 13 23 23 33 33 31 14 23 24 33 34 11 31 31 12 32 22
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Our point of approximation is the sample mean, where all data points are divided 
by their mean transferring the approximation point to an (n + 1) – dimensional 
vector of ones. At this point the elements of H do not depend on the specific 
input price bundle. The estimation model of the normalized translog shadow 
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However, the elements of Δ are nonlinear functions of the decomposed matrix in 
(10), and consequently, the resulting normalized translog model becomes 
nonlinear in parameters. Hence, linear estimation algorithms are ruled out even 
if the original function is linear in parameters. By this "local" procedure, a 
satisfaction of consistency at most or even all data points in the sample can be 
reached. The transformation in (11) moves the observations towards the 
approximation point and thus increases the likelihood of getting theoretically 
consistent results, at least for a range of observations (see RYAN and WALES, 2000). 
However, by imposing global consistency on the translog functional form 
DIEWERT and WALES (1987) note that the parameter matrix is restricted, leading 
to seriously biased elasticity estimates. Hence, the translog function would lose 
its flexibility. As a second analytical step, we finally (a posteriori) check the 
theoretical consistency of our estimated model by verifying that the Hessian is 
negative semi-definite (i.e., functional concavity). In a second step, the behavioral 
(shadow price) cost function in its constrained and unconstrained version 
(equation (4) and (11)) is "adjusted" by the estimated shadow price parameters θ  
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prices as direct arguments in the cost function. An adjusted cost frontier is then 
modeled by simply adding the error components 
iii vu ξ =+     (12) 
and applying stochastic frontier techniques to obtain the shadow-cost frontier and 
finally estimates of relative cost efficiency on the farm level (see e.g. COELLI et al., 
1998; KHUMBHAKAR  and LOVELL, 2000). As the price efficiency parameters 
, il θ θ  reflect both allocative effects of market distortions as well as optimization 
errors, the relative inefficiency measured by the adjusted cost frontier consists 
solely of technical inefficiency (systematic and/or farm specific). The stochastic 
frontier decomposes the error term into a two-sided random error that captures 
the inefficiency component and the effects of factors outside the farmer’s 
control. The theoretical foundation of such a model was first proposed by 
AIGNER et al., (1977) and MEEUSEN and VAN DEN BROECK (1977). The two-sided 
random error is assumed to be identically and independently distributed with a 
zero mean and constant variance, and is independent of the one-sided error. 
Distribution of the error’s inefficiency component is assumed to be 
asymmetrical. Following BATTESSE and COELLI (1995), the maximum likelihood 
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where L is the log-likelihood function, N is the number of observations and  ( ) . F  
is the standard normal distribution function. The variable 
2 σ  is the overall 
standard deviation equal to the sum of the standard deviations of the two error 
terms and δ  is here the proportion of the overall error term that is explained by 
the one-sided error. Assuming the half-normal distribution of the one-sided error 
term, the relative efficiency score defined at the mean is given as: 
() ( ) ( )
2
exp 2 exp 1 2 j Eu F σ δ σδ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −= − − ⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
.     (14) 
The measurement of farm level efficiency requires the estimation of the non-
negative one-sided error, which also depends on the assumptions regarding the 
distribution of the two- and one-sided error terms. Based on BATTESSE  and 
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where  ()
2 1 w σ δδ σ =−. The likelihood function is expressed in terms of the 
variance parameters i.e., 
222
vu σ σσ =+ and 
22 / u δ σσ = . By following a single-
equation cost frontier approach on this estimation stage, we are able to avoid the 
"Greene"-problem with respect to the consistent specification of the individual 
error components (see KUMBHAKAR and LOVELL, 2000). Systematic, allocative, 
input-specific efficiency measures, as well as group-wise technical efficiency 
measures are obtained by the translog shadow cost model. Measures of technical 
efficiency on the farm level result from the error components’ model and such 
farm-specific radial cost efficiency measures are obtained by simple calculation. 
As we are also interested in the effects of imposing theoretical consistency on 
the translog cost frontier, we investigate the relative effect of such correction by 










.     (16) 
To test the robustness of our estimates by the adjusted shadow cost model (based 
on (4) and (11)) we apply a simple stochastic resampling procedure based on 
bootstrapping techniques (see e.g. EFRON, 1979, or EFRON and TIBSHIRANI, 1993). 
This seems to be necessary, as our cross-sectional data sample consists of a 
(rather) limited number of observations. If we suppose that ψn is an estimator of 
the parameter vector  n ψ , including all parameters obtained by estimating (16) 
based on our original sample of 64 Romanian maize farmers  1 ( ,..., ) n X xx = , then 
we are able to approximate the statistical properties of ψn by studying a sample 
of 100 bootstrap estimators  ( ) C c c m n ,..., 1 , = ψ . These are obtained by resampling 
our 64 observations – with replacement – from  X  and recomputing ψn by using 
each generated sample. Finally, the sampling characteristics of our vector of 
parameters is obtained from 
[ ] m m ) 100 ( ) 1 ( ,...,ψ ψ = Ψ .     (17) 
4 DATA AND ESTIMATION 
We used data on 64 maize farmers based on a 2003 survey of agricultural 
households in 15  Romanian villages. The sample villages were chosen by a 
multistage, representative random sampling procedure focused on seven regions 
that were defined by historical borders, landscape structure and distance to 
relevant input and output markets. The overall survey focused on data for 2002 
with regard to various outputs, inputs and other household characteristics. The 
most frequently produced crop was maize, cultivated by about 92  % of the 
households; less than a quarter of all households cultivated more technically-
demanding crops such as sunflower, soya or sugar beet. Table 1 summarizes the 
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Table 1:  Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean  Std.  Err.  Min  Max 
Total Costs (in euro)  285.728  641.857  11.01  3,626.525 
Output Maize (in kg)  4,696.313  8,510.552  56  42,000 
Price of Maize (in euro/kg)  0.103  0.017  0.056  0.130 
Quantity of Labor 
(in mandays/month)  563.125 314.864  15  1,506.286 
Price of Labor (in euro/mandays)  0.699  1.259  0.0138  6.399 
Quantity of Fertilizer (in kg)  18.198  37.083  1.176  264.706 
Price of Fertilizer (in euro/kg)  0.187  0.052  0.004  0.320 
Quantity of Land (in ha)  1.909  3.921  0.08  30 
Quantity of Org. Fertilizer 
(in kg/ha)  3,527.145 7,202.45  0  34,188 
Herbicides used (binary)  0.594  0.495  0  1 
Insecticides used (binary)  0.937  0.244  0  1 
Commercial Seed used (binary)  0.406  0.495  0  1 
Subsidies received (binary)  0.297  0.460  0  1 
Extension Services used (binary)  0.5  0.504  0  1 
Training used (binary)  0.187  0.393  0  1 
Source:  Own calculations based on survey data. 
The total costs of maize production are used as the dependent variable for the 
cost function estimations. The total output of maize produced, its price, and the 
prices for the variable inputs labor and fertilizer, as well as the quantities of the 
fixed variables land and organic fertilizers, are applied as explanatory variables. 
Land can be considered quasi-fixed, as, due to the aforementioned inflexibilities 
in the land market, it cannot be expected to be adjusted in a short- or even 
middle-term perspective. Organic fertilizer is considered quasi-fixed, as small-
scale Romanian farmers cannot be expected to flexibly adjust the size of their 
livestock production as a response to crop input needs. Further binary variables 
for the use of herbicides, insecticides, commercial seeds, received subsidies, 
extension services used, and finally agricultural training and received advice are 
applied. All monetary variables are in Euro. The estimation procedure is as 
follows: In a first step, the translog cost system given by (4) and (5) is estimated 
using the cost function, as well as the cost shares si derived from the non-
distorted translog cost function lnC to obtain estimates for the allocative 
efficiency parameters θ  with respect to the individual inputs, as well as group-
wise technical efficiency effects χ . The estimates of the former are subsequently 
substituted in (4) and after adding the error components given by (12) in a second 
step, the adjusted translog cost frontier is estimated by applying the decomposition 
formula given in (14) and (15) to obtain estimates of producer-specific technical 
efficiency. As we "corrected" the cost frontier for price distortions, the resulting 
efficiency estimates u are solely technical. Finally, producer- and input-specific Johannes Sauer, Borbala Balint  372 
estimates of cost efficiency are obtained by simple calculation using the estimates 
for  θ  and u. The two-stage model is estimated using a non-linear iterative 
seemingly unrelated regression (ITSURE) technique with symmetry and 
homogeneity conditions imposed. As GREENE (2000) notes, the OBERHOFER-
KMENTA (1974) conditions are met for the SURE model, so efficient maximum 
likelihood estimates can be obtained by iterating the basic feasible generalized 
least square (FGLS) procedure. This two-stage model is then estimated again 
(model 2) by imposing curvature correctness (i.e., functional concavity) on the 
cost function in (11) by basically following the decomposition shown by (9). We 
thus go beyond similar modeling efforts (see ATKINSON and HALVORSEN, 1980; 
KUMBHAKAR, 1989; KUMBHAKAR and BHATTACHARYYA, 1992; WANG et al., 1996) 
and also incorporate considerations on the consistency of the estimated frontier 
with basic microeconomic principles (i.e., cost minimization). Finally, the 
estimation results of the unconstrained and constrained models are compared with 
respect to the relative differences in the individual efficiency scores. 
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
All estimated cost systems show a relatively good overall fit with respect to 
commonly used statistical criteria. However, in the unconstrained model I, only 
27 % of all observations adhere to functional concavity, in contrast to 80 % in 
the constrained model II (due to space limitations, the parameter/model statistics 
are not shown here but can be obtained from the authors). A trade-off between 
the statistical significance and the theoretical consistency of the estimated function 
as documented by earlier studies (see e.g. SAUER, 2005) are not confirmed by the 
results here. The estimated shadow price parameters show a high significance 
across the models. Table 2 and 3 summarize the estimation results with respect 
to systematic input-specific allocative, producer-specific overall technical and 
producer- and input-specific cost efficiency. 
Table 2:  Systematic input-specific allocative efficiency 
  Model I  Model II 
Efficiency
1 Mean  Std.  Err.
2  Mean Std.  Err.
2 
AE Labor  0.476  0.007
*** 0.320 0.010
*** 
AE Fertilizer  0.138  0.006
*** 0.585 0.009
*** 
AE Land  0.380  0.001
*** 0.503 0.001
*** 
AE Organic Fertilizer  0.260  0.001
*** 0.292 0.001
*** 
Source: Own  calculations. 
Notes: 
1 Allocative efficiency estimates are parameter based: No min. and max. values are  
  available. 
  
2  *, 
**,
 *** Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively. Small-scale farming in Romania –  Shadow prices and efficiency  373
Table 3:  Producer-specific technical and cost efficiency 
  Model I  Model II 
Efficiency Mean  Std. 
Err.
  Min Max  Mean Std. 
Err.  Min Max 
TE 0.938  0.074
*** 0.606  0.999  0.869 0.131
*** 0.488 0.999 
CE Labor  0.447  0.035
*** 0.289  0.476  0.278 0.042
*** 0.156 0.320 
CE 
Fertilizer  0.129 0.010
*** 0.084  0.138  0.509 0.077
*** 0.285 0.585 
CE Land  0.357  0.028
*** 0.230  0.380  0.438 0.066





*** 0.157  0.260  0.254 0.038
*** 0.142 0.292 




*** Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
The systematic allocative efficiencies with respect to the inputs labor, fertilizer, 
land, and organic fertilizer were found to be moderately higher with respect to 
the constrained model  II. However, in the unconstrained model, the variable 
input labor shows the highest efficiency (about 48 %) whereas the same holds 
for the use of the variable input fertilizer in the constrained model (about 59 %). 
On the other hand, the lowest allocative efficiency was found for fertilizer in the 
unconstrained (about 14 %) and for the quasi-fixed input organic fertilizer in the 
constrained model (about 29 %). What can be generally concluded from these 
results is that price distortions prevail in the agricultural input markets for labor 
and inorganic fertilizer. Hence, the underlying modeling assumption that maize 
producers optimize their production decisions with respect to unobservable 
shadow price ratios does hold for the sample. This indicates that cost 
minimization based on observable market prices may be inappropriate, and thus, 
a model incorporating market distortions is more suitable in an agricultural 
transition context. The values for the shadow prices indicate that "prices" 
actually paid by the farmers for the inputs used are far less than the observed 
market prices due to the existence of market distortions. These findings strongly 
suggest that there is a considerable gap between agricultural input market prices 
and farm input prices. Different factors could account for such a price gap with 
respect to labor and fertilizer. As the price for hired labor rises, farmers tend to 
substitute family for hired labor. Due to a lack of data, labor is used here as an 
aggregated measure consisting of hired and family labor. Hence, an increasing 
amount of family labor leads to a decrease in the average individual shadow 
price at the farm level for the variable input labor. With respect to fertilizer, as 
the price increases as a consequence of the availability of commercially-
produced and marketed high quality fertilizers in the market, the scope and 
demand for black market fertilizer also increases. Consequently, the quantity of 
available "underpriced" fertilizer increases, leading to a lower shadow price for 
fertilizer with respect to the individual farmer. The estimated shadow parameters Johannes Sauer, Borbala Balint  374 
for the quasi-fixed inputs land and organic fertilizer show that the farms’ 
resource endowment – i.e., land endowment as well as livestock size – crucially 
influences its relative allocative performance. In the case of land, the evidence 
of the two models is mixed: For model I, evidence suggested that increasing the 
amount of cultivated land leads to an increase in allocative efficiency, whereas 
for model II, the opposite holds. In the case of organic fertilizer, the models 
show evidence for an efficiency gain as the farmers apply more fertilizer when 
producing maize. Based on the estimated allocative efficiency parameters from 
the first step, a maximum-likelihood estimate of the corrected cost frontier is 
obtained and a technical efficiency index is derived for both models. Table 4 
contains the frequency distributions for the producer-specific technical 
efficiencies. 
Table 4:  Frequency distribution – Producer-specific technical efficiency 
Efficiency 




  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II 
0.4-0.5  –  1.56  – 1 –  1.56 
0.5-0.6  – 6.25    5  – 7.81 
0.6-0.7 1.56  6.25  1 9  1.56  14.06 
0.7-0.8 3.12  9.37  3  15  4.69  23.44 
0.8-0.9  14.06 14.06  12  24  18.75 37.50 
0.9-1.0 81.25  62.50  64 64  100  100 
Mean  0.938  0.824     
Std. Err.  0.074
*** 0.162
***     
Min. 0.606  0.423     
Max. 0.999  0.998     




*** Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
The estimated technical efficiency mean is about 94 % (model I) and about 87 % 
(model  II) respectively, whereas the least technically-efficient farm shows a 
value of about 61 % (model I) and about 49 % (model II). This implies that on 
average, up to 13 % of profits are lost due to technical inefficiency, which is 
rather moderate compared to the revealed levels of allocative inefficiency. The 
frequency distributions of the individual farm’s technical efficiency indices 
show that there is a moderate variation in the level among farms in the sample: 
For both models, the majority of farmers show a relative technical efficiency of 
more than 90  %. Based on the estimated systematic input-specific allocative 
efficiency, as well as the estimated producer-specific technical efficiency, 
producer- and input-specific cost efficiency levels are computed (see Table 3). 
With the exception of labor, the cost efficiency levels are moderately higher for 
the constrained model (model II) compared to those for the unconstrained model 
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labor, whereas they least efficiently used the variable input fertilizer with respect 
to costs. For model II, farmers in the sample most efficiently used fertilizer and 
least efficiently used the quasi-fixed input organic fertilizer. These cost 
efficiency results reveal partly mixed evidence for the different model 
specifications. With regard to the effects of different production settings, 
institutional, as well as policy-related factors in both estimation stages delivered 
evidence, either with respect to groups of producers defined along such factors 
(shadow cost estimation stage) or with respect to individual producers (error 
components estimation stage). In the latter case, the derived farm-specific 
efficiency index facilitates the decomposition of the efficiency performance at the 
individual maize farm level and allows for the identification of factors that 
influence farmers’ efficiencies. Table 5 and 6 summarize the various found effects. 
Table 5:  Group-wise technical efficiency effects 
  Model I  Model II 
Factor Mean  Std.  Err.
  Mean Std.  Err. 
TE Difference Herbicide  -0.024  0.011
** -0.042  0.016
***
TE Difference Insecticide  -0.022  0.014  -0.008  0.020 
TE Difference Seed  -0.013  0.009  -0.024  0.013
* 
TE Difference Subsidies  +0.018  0.007
** -0.036  0.038 
TE Difference Extension  +0.025  0.009
*** +0.051  0.015
***
TE Difference Training  +0.029  0.013
** +0.087  0.019
***




 *** Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
Table 6:  Producer-specific technical efficiency effects 
Factor Model  I







Seed -  + 












 *** Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively; ‘-’ represents a 
negative correlation with TE, ‘+’ represents a positive correlation. 
The results for the shadow frontier show that the use of herbicides, the use of 
insecticides, and the application of commercial seeds are negatively correlated 
with the technical efficiency of maize producing farms for both models. The use 
of extension services and agricultural training were found to be positively 
correlated to technical efficiency for both models, however, mixed evidence was 
found for receiving subsidies. These correlations are only partly confirmed by 
the results of the error components estimation: Here, both the unconstrained as Johannes Sauer, Borbala Balint  376 
well constrained model specification agree on a negative effect on efficiency 
through the use of insecticides, the use of extension services, and receiving 
subsidies. Mixed evidence was found for the use of herbicides, the application of 
commercial seeds, and the use of agricultural training. It can be concluded for 
this part of the analysis that only with respect to the use of insecticides do all 
model specifications agree on the negative efficiency effect. The reported 
efficiency results of the unconstrained, as well as constrained model specification, 
point to the relevance of theoretical consistency for the estimated frontier. As 
outlined in Section  3, model  II differs from model  I by applying a matrix 
decomposition technique to impose concavity on the translog cost frontier to 
ensure functional regularity, and the adherence to the basic microeconomic 
principle of cost minimization (see SAUER, 2005). Table 7 illustrates the relative 
differences in the efficiency scores for the unconstrained and constrained 
specifications. 
Table 7:  Relative difference in efficiency scores unconstrained vs. 
constrained specification 
Measure Mean  (%)
2  Std.Err.
1 Min  Max 
Technical Efficiency  7.36  12.14  -18.06  41.45 
Cost Efficiency Labor  30.52  8.15
*** 13.25  53.00 
CE Fertilizer  -131.41  51.49
** -239.19  11.85 
CE Land  -94.09  16.06
*** -127.71  -49.41 
CE Organic Fertilizer  -86.62  13.63
*** -115.14  -48.70 





 *** Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively; 
2 ‘+’ implies means’ underestimation of real efficiency, ‘-’ implies overestimation 
of real efficiency. 
The relative difference in the efficiency scores in absolute terms ranges, on 
average, from about 7.4 % (producer-specific technical efficiency measure) to 
about 131.4  % (producer- and input-specific cost efficiency measure for 
organic fertilizer). Hence, this is empirical evidence for the validity of our 
concerns about the appropriate functional form and its theoretical consistency 
(see SAUER, 2005). Figure  1 illustrates these differences with respect to the 
single efficiency measure. Small-scale farming in Romania –  Shadow prices and efficiency  377

























Source: Own  calculations. 
Finally, the results of the applied bootstrap procedure confirmed the estimates 
for the theoretically-consistent model (model II) on the estimation stage of the 
error-components specification. 
6 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study focuses on the relative efficiency of small-scale maize farmers in 
Romania by using a cost function modeling framework combining the stochastic 
frontier approach of shadow prices, as well as the mainstream error components 
model. Various market distortions are addressed by adopting the concept of a 
shadow cost frontier delivering insights on systematic input-specific allocative 
efficiency. After correcting for shadow prices, we subsequently reveal evidence 
on farm-specific technical efficiency and develop an efficiency index for a 
sample of Romanian maize producers in 2002. Finally, various transition policy-
relevant factors are investigated with respect to their impact on technical 
efficiency on group, as well as individual farm level. By referring to the ongoing 
discussion on the stochastic frontier’s functional consistency with respect to 
microeconomic theory, we formulated two basic model specifications – one 
without and one with functional concavity imposed – and estimated the 
individual cost system by means of iterated seemingly unrelated regression 
techniques (ITSURE). The empirical results show that price distortions prevail 
in the agricultural input markets in the Romanian economy and that a model 
incorporating such market distortions seems to be more suitable in an 
agricultural transition context than one solely based on observable market price 
ratios. The estimated shadow parameters for the quasi-fixed inputs revealed that 
the farms’ resource endowment – i.e., land endowment as well as livestock size – 
-▬-     Mean value 
[   ]    95 %-percentile  
|----|  Total sample Johannes Sauer, Borbala Balint  378 
crucially influences its relative allocative performance. A high technical efficiency 
on farm level with a moderate variation over the sample was found, but relatively 
poor scores on systematic allocative efficiency were also revealed. With respect 
to group-wise technical efficiency, the empirical results for the shadow frontier 
show that the use of herbicides, the use of insecticides, and the application of 
commercial seeds are negatively correlated with the technical efficiency of maize 
farmers. This suggests that there is a need for policy measures targeting efficiency 
improvement with respect to the application processes (i.e., technology) due to 
chemicals, as well as seeding. On the other hand, positive efficiency gains can be 
reported for the use of extension services, as well as agricultural training on the 
farm level, suggesting further engagement by the political actors in these areas. 
However, the results of the error component estimations only partly confirm 
those policy implications. Overall, all model specifications agree – but only with 
respect to the use of insecticides – on the negative effect on efficiency by the 
additional usage of such chemicals. The revealed relative difference in the 
efficiency scores of up to 240 % on the individual farm level, the consequence 
of imposing curvature correctness, confirmed the relevance of theoretically-
consistent modeling with respect to the stochastic measurement of efficiency. 
The empirical applications hence document the need for a posteriori checking 
the regularity of the estimated frontiers by the researcher and, if necessary, the  
a priori imposition of theoretical requirements on the estimation models (see 
SAUER, 2006). 
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HOW LARGE IS THE MARGINAL PRODUCT OF  






The marginal product of arable land and grassland is estimated by a shadow 
price parameterization. The shadow prices are obtained from multiple runs of a 
linear programming model of the Moscow region land market that randomly 
uses varying crop yields. The marginal product of land approximates the 
possible price of agricultural land from 2001-2003 under the assumption of a 
properly functioning land market. In 2003, this value (for arable land) varied from 
290  to 1,309  roubles, depending on distance from Moscow and soil fertility. 
Higher crop yields negatively influence the marginal land product values. There 
is a declining trend of these values during the studied period, which impedes 
emerging market institutions. 
Keywords: Agricultural land, marginal product, land value, transitional economies, 
parameterization, Moscow region. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The agricultural land market in Russia, and specifically in the Moscow region, is 
still underdeveloped, although most of the juridical pre-conditions for its normal 
operation have already been formed. This can be explained by the low marginal 
product of land and high land transaction costs. Because of the limited number 
of transactions, land prices and land rent vary greatly and only weakly relate to 
the true marginal product of agricultural land. To address these problems, the 
true marginal land product has to be determined. It is also useful to inform land 
market agents for taxation purposes and project analysis. 
The aim of this paper is to determine the marginal product value of arable land 
and grassland in the Moscow region. The research questions are defined as 
follows: 
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a)  What is the most applicable methodology for approaching the marginal 
product value of agricultural land given the Moscow region’s current 
situation? 
b) How large is this marginal product and  how is it affected by current 
economic reforms?  
c)  What are the policy implications of the discovered changes in the marginal 
product of land? 
Moreover, we test the following three hypotheses in this study: 
a) The marginal product of land increases during the second stage of 
economic reforms in the agricultural sector (from 2001-2003). 
There are three reasons for this hypothesis. The first is increasing agricultural 
production in Russia and, particularly, in the Moscow region, both gross and per 
unit of land. The second reason is the relative stabilization of farming’s institutional 
environment. The third is that developing the agro-industrial complex was declared 
a national priority by the President of the Russian Federation. Because of this, 
the investment climate in Russian agriculture is expected to turn for the better, 
forming favorable conditions for the growing agricultural land marginal product. 
b)  The marginal product of land positively depends on proximity to Moscow 
city. 
In developed markets, the closer a plot of land is to a major food market and 
industrial center, the higher its agricultural land prices will be. A similar situation 
is likely with land marginal product in an underdeveloped land market which is 
the result of non-market land allocation processes. 
c) Given the fixed capacity of the agricultural product market, increasing 
crop yields causes land marginal product to decline. 
Assuming that sales cannot be increased (which implies price-making behavior 
of market actors) and agricultural land cannot be used for non-agricultural 
purposes, a global increase of yields releases a portion of land from intensive 
production. It is likely that the latter causes the reduction of land marginal 
product and, consequently, devaluates the property. This can be applicable to the 
situation in the Moscow region. 
A review of the current state of agricultural land price studies can be found in 
TRIVELLI (1997). A great deal of international experience with modeling land 
markets (e.g. LLOYD, RAYNER  and ORME, 1991) is scarcely applicable for 
answering the research questions of our study; this is due to a lack of data on 
actual land transactions. 
The estimates of land shadow prices based on common micro-economic 
approaches can often be found in publications that are not specifically aimed at land 
marginal product analyses (see e.g. BOOTS, 1997; OSBORNE and TRUEBLOOD, 2002; How large is the marginal product of land in the Moscow region?  383
BEZLEPKINA, OUDE LANSINK and OSKAM, 2005). The marginal product of land is 
commonly found – following the basic theory presented in CHAMBERS (1988) – 
by estimating either a production function or a profit function for agricultural 
farms. 
Useful experience in valuing agricultural land in the absence of a land market 
has been gained by the Soviet school of agricultural economics, which includes 
two streams. The first, founded by V. Dokuchaev in the 19
th century, determined 
chemical, mechanical, biologic and geographical factors of soil fertility and 
measured their contribution to land value. For this purpose, simple statistical 
tools such as analytical grouping and linear regressions of net farm income were 
used (TYAPKIN, 1987). This stream emphasized the importance of eliminating 
differences in the economic conditions of land use. These studies are mostly 
applicable to the problems of cadastral valuation. 
The second stream of the Soviet school focused on measuring land marginal 
product in actual economic conditions. This approach is particularly relevant to 
agricultural land market studies, and is characterized by the presence of a model 
of agricultural land’s marginal product. The models differ with respect to specific 
research tasks and available data (e.g. BOBYLEV, 1987; BELENKIY, 2003) and 
sometimes such models are accompanied with land market simulations in partial 
equilibrium models (GATAULIN and SVETLOV, 1995). 
In the case of the Moscow region, production or profit functions analyses are 
hindered by the heterogeneity of farm data. Attempts to compile the homogeneous 
sets of farms result in the large variation of estimates of land marginal product 
due to the loss of representativeness. 
Partial equilibrium models are more practical, but labor-intensive to implement 
and very sensitive to missing data. Moreover, in the case of transitional 
economies, farm data is not sufficient to derive land supply and demand functions 
in the vicinity of equilibrium. 
All this justifies the choice of a linear program as the most suitable research tool 
for this study. KANTOROVICH’s (1965) idea of obtaining land rental values 
directly from a mathematical program meets a reasonable criticism (e.g. 
DANILOV-DANILYAN, 2004): The mathematical program for agricultural land use 
displays land shadow prices’ great sensitivity to small changes in those 
parameters, which in principle cannot be precisely defined. As a consequence, 
the opinion has prevailed among economists that this type of model is not 
applicable to land value applications. 
It is noticeable that the large variability of resources’ marginal value is their 
inherent feature rather than a distortion caused by the mathematical 
programming methodology. Decision-makers acting on real land markets face 
uncertainty and fickleness in land marginal product to the same extent as an 
economist working with a mathematical programming model does. Natalia Il'ina, Nikolay Svetlov  384
The practice of real decision-making provides the idea of dampening this 
problem. The factors of land marginal product variation can be split into 
unidentifiable noise and factors that can be explicated. For this purpose, we 
engage the parameterization of agricultural land shadow prices obtained from 
6,000  tests. For testing, we vary (at random) the productivity of the most 
important crops in the linear program to simulate agricultural land allocation in 
the Moscow region. 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This study originates with the neo-classical representation of a price-taking firm 
n acting in a competitive environment: 
   max(wyn – vxn | yn = fn(xn,zn), zn ≤ bn), (1) 
where xn, yn, zn are non-negative vectors of variable inputs, outputs and fixed 
inputs, respectively; v is a constant non-negative vector of prices of variable 
inputs; w is a constant non-negative vector of output prices; bn is a constant non-
negative vector of amounts of freely-disposable fixed inputs; fn(·) is a production 
function. 
In this specification, a firm-specific net marginal product of a resource is equal 
to the Lagrangean multiplier of the corresponding inequality zn ≤ bn. 
Assumption 1. Instead of classical fixed inputs, there exist semi-fixed inputs that 
are marketable within a region but cannot be traded outside it. 
Assumption 2. The firms are price-makers with respect to semi-fixed inputs. 
Assumption 3. Transaction costs at the regional market of semi-fixed inputs are 
negligible. 
These assumptions aim to represent a regional land market. Thinking of 
agricultural land as a semi-fixed input and the price-making assumption stems 
directly from the research question (b): We have to develop a framework that 
can address this question. Nearly zero transaction costs are assumed because we 
are interested in the analysis of the land market when transaction costs are 
reasonably low and virtually do not affect decisions. The situation under actual 
(high) transaction costs does not call for modeling, as it can be observed directly. 
Given the assumptions 1-3 and introducing set N of firms in the region such that 
n∈N, it can be derived from (1) that the totality of the firms belonging to the set 
N reaches the state 
max(wy – vx | y = Σn∈N yn, x = Σn∈N xn,  yn = fn(xn,zn), Σn∈N zn ≤ Σn∈N bn).   (2) 
In this specification, the regional value of the marginal product of a specific kind 
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represents the corresponding quasi-fixed input. All consequent specifications 
and generalizations of (2) inherit this property. 
Assumption 4. All firms in N have the same production function f(·). 
This assumption is quite restrictive with respect to the actual situation in the 
Moscow region. However, it is determined by two reasons: The excess 
complexity of the empirical model otherwise and robustness considerations. 
Assumption 5. There exists a set Q of classes of semi-fixed inputs that are 
mutually-exclusive at the firm level. 
This way we allow for differences in soil fertility and in plot location. Land 
plots that differ in at least one of these two factors are treated as different 
resources that cannot be jointly available to the same farm. 
With the imposed assumptions 4 and 5 we can rewrite (2) as: 
max(wy – vx | y = Σn∈N yn, x = Σn∈N xn,  yn = f(xn,zn), 
   ∀q Σn∈N(q) zn ≤ Σn∈N(q) bn),   (3) 
where q∈Q and N(q) is a class of firms belonging to N that use the resources 
from class q.  
Assumption 6. Firms are long-term profit maximizers. 
This assumption transforms (3) into the following problem: 
   max(wy – (v+d)x | y = Σn∈N yn, x = Σn∈N xn, 
   y n = f(xn,zn), ∀q Σn∈N(q) zn ≤ Σn∈N(q) bn),   (4) 
where d is a non-negative constant vector of incremental capital recovery costs 
per unit of an input. 
This assumption attempts to capture the actual decision-making process on the 
land market, where the bargains have long-term consequences and are thus 
expected to be justified by long-term utility. 
Assumption 7. The firms’ decision-making processes are subject to the 
constraints of the economic environment. 
The corresponding generalization of (4) is the following: 
  max(wy – (v+d)x | y = Σn∈N yn, x = Σn∈N xn, yn = f(xn,zn), 
   ∀q Σn∈N(q) zn ≤ Σn∈N(q) bn, ymin ≤ y ≤ ymax),   (5) 
where ymax is a non-negative vector of satiation levels of exogenous demand and 
ymin is a non-negative vector of the lower boundary of outputs. The purpose of 
vector ymin is to reflect long-term intents, expectations about the future, etc., that 
can neither be identified precisely nor, consequently, explicitly expressed by a 
specification of the utility function. Any component of both ymax and ymin can be 
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3 EMPIRICAL MODEL 
In the empirical model the production function f(·) is assumed to be linear. This 
results in a linear programming specification of (5) and facilitates the 
determination of values of Lagrangean multipliers from the solution of a dual 
linear program.  
Although restrictive, the linear specification is predetermined by the scarcity of 
available data, which does not permit the derivation of a true form of production 
functions. Modeling under the linearity assumption requires controlling for the 
closeness of linear dependencies in the vicinity of an optimum to tangents to 
actual production functions, using both formal and informal analytical 
procedures. 
In our model the technologies are assumed to have a neutral return to scale. To 
derive  f(·), we use average consumption of resources throughout N(q) in all 
production processes reflected by the available data, both empirical and 
technical. In comparison to farm data envelopment, this approach allows for 
optimal inter-farm resource allocation when changing land usage. Another 
important advantage is a maintainable size of the linear program matrix. 
The detailed representation of the agricultural production technologies is not 
presented here due to space limits. It can be found in IL'INA and SVETLOV (2004). 
The empirical model considers the following commodities: 
a)  Quasi-fixed input groups: Arable land; grassland
1. 
For each group, nine mutually exclusive types of quasi-fixed inputs are defined, 
differing in distance from the major Moscow city market (three grades), and in 
soil fertility (also three grades). The grades in distance and fertility are chosen to 
roughly minimize the differences in agricultural land area between subsets of 
farms using a particular type of quasi-fixed inputs. Below we refer to these 
subsets as q-groups, following the notation of (3). 
b) Outputs: Grain; potatoes; vegetables; milk; beef; pork. 
c) Intermediate products in crop production: Grain for fodder; hay from 
permanent grasses grown in arable lands; haylage; corn silage; grass 
silage; grass from annual grasses; grass from permanent grasses grown in 
arable lands; roots for fodder; hay from haylands; gramma grass. 
d) Intermediate products in animal production: Milk for fodder; milking 
cows; sows. 
                                                 
1  The reservation is made in the model-supporting software for three more resource groups 
representing labour, stalls for cattle and pigpens. However, the specification used in this 
study does not consider these quasi-fixed inputs: Because of the previous recession of 
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Vector ymin includes finite components for all six outputs. Vector ymax has two 
finite components: For potatoes and for vegetables. 
The above-formulated problem was solved 6,000 times (2,000 times for each 
year from 2001-2003) varying the normalized (mean = 1) yields per unit of land. 
For each of the 6,000 tests, these parameters are chosen separately and at random 
for four crops: Cereals, potatoes, vegetables and all other crops (i.e., fodder 
crops). 
The random values are chosen from the interval between 0.7 and 1.3 assuming 
uniform distribution. The corresponding crop yields per hectare are calculated 
and placed into the matrix of the linear program, then the model is solved with 
Sunset software XA and the solution is saved for further statistical processing. 
Some of the tests (929 in 2001, 608 in 2002 and 473 in 2003) resulted in 
unfeasible solutions and were excluded from the analysis. For all feasible 
solutions, common logarithms of shadow prices of arable land and of grassland 
were subjected to both linear and quadratic parameterization using the normalized 
incremental yields per unit of land as exogenous variables. 
4 DATA 
Four sources of data were used: Annual data from the Moscow region corporate 
farms registry for the period 1998-2003, provided by Rosstat
2; soil rates of the 
Moscow region corporate farms provided by the department of Statistics of 
Moscow Timiryazev agricultural academy; maps of the Moscow region as a 
source of data on distances between farms and Moscow; data on animal rations 
(KALASHNIKOV et al., 1995). 
The annual data of the Moscow region corporate farms registry include more 
than 200 variables for each of more than 300 corporate farms, of which the 
following categories were used: 
a)  Gross annual sales of each product (in kind); 
b)  Annual revenues from sales of each product (in thousand roubles); 
c)  Gross annual intermediate production (in kind); 
d) Production costs of annual outputs and annual intermediate production, 
including depreciation costs as a proxy for d in equation (4) (in thousand 
roubles); 
e)  Numbers of milk cows, fattening herd and sows (annual average); 
f)  Sown area per crop (hectares); 
g)  Arable land and grassland areas as of November 1 (hectares). 
                                                 
2  Rosstat (former Goskomstat) is a federal statistical agency of the Russian Federation. Natalia Il'ina, Nikolay Svetlov  388
These data are used for calculating parameters of the linear program. We use a 
four-year period prior to the year of estimation to smooth the randomness of 
crop yields. Additionally, data on annual depreciation accrued in agricultural 
production and annual average number of workers in agricultural production are 
used when calculating crop yields per hectare to be used as parameters of the 
linear program. This data enables smoothening (by means of linear regression) 
the differences in intensity between the farms in different q-groups. The reason 
for this procedure is to capture the impact of given distance from Moscow and 
soil fertility. Otherwise, the results would also depend on specific intensity in 
terms of labor and fixed assets consumption. 
The finite components of ymin ( ymax) are set to the lowest (highest) of the 
corresponding values throughout the available annual data. 
5 RESULTS 
The estimated linear functions of the common logarithm of the land marginal 
product are presented in Table 1. The values of F indicate that the confidence in 
the parameterization model is very high, with the influence of fodder crop yields 
on the land marginal product being the greatest. As the majority of crops in 
terms of land share are fodder, this conforms our expectations. The second most 
influential crop is cereals. 
It is noticeable that higher crop productivity (excluding potatoes) is associated 
with lower land marginal product. This supports hypothesis (c). In the case of 
higher crop yields, the market for relatively profitable production is satiated 
while smaller land area is used. The empirical model suggests that land released 
from meat production is used for more efficient vegetable production. Such land 
reallocation takes place until vegetable production reaches the limit of market 
capacity, which is caused by lacks of both market infrastructure and payable 
demand. The situation with potatoes is similar. A further increase of crop 
productivity expands less profitable activities (specifically, cereals and milk 
production) which negatively affects the land marginal product. 
In the majority of cases, the parameters of functions in Table 1 vary from one  
q-group to another within their confidence intervals. The significant differences 
are mostly observed between the parameters relating to the fodder crop yields. 
This gives weak evidence in support of the research hypothesis (b). Wholesale 
prices, herd productivity and other factors varying throughout the groups, 
excluding crop yields per unit of area, appear to have insignificant influence on 
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Table 1:  Common logarithm of marginal agricultural land product in 
the Moscow region, 2003 (thousand roubles per hectare) as a 











Land marginal product function  R
2  F 
A  5.75–0.85x1+0.14x2–0.10x3–1.59x4 0.443  304.4 110 and 
above  G  4.55–0.70x1+0.13x2–0.09x3–1.21x4 0.420  277.7
A  5.79–0.89x1+0.15x2–0.10x3–1.65x4 0.429  287.9
90…110 
G  4.84–0.79x1+0.14x2–0.09x3–1.44x4 0.451  314.1
A  6.01–0.98x1+0.19x2–0.13x3–2.00x4 0.366  221.1
<60 km 
less than 90 
G  5.45–1.15x1+0.20x2–0.14x3–2.19x4 0.474  345.0
A  5.90–0.93x1+0.15x2–0.11x3–1.72x4 0.432  291.7 110 and 
above  G  4.59–0.71x1+0.13x2–0.09x3–1.27x4 0.435  296.5
A  5.89–0.93x1+0.15x2–0.11x3–1.75x4 0.426  283.7
90…110 
G  4.87–0.81x1+0.15x2–0.10x3–1.48x4 0.455  319.9
A  6.13–0.98x1+0.21x2–0.15x3–2.20x4 0.332  190.3
60…110 
km 
less than 90 
G  5.38–1.12x1+0.21x2–0.14x3–2.19x4 0.464  331.8
A  5.08–1.00x1+0.16x2–0.12x3–1.90x4 0.421  278.2 110 and 
above  G  4.66–0.74x1+0.14x2–0.09x3–1.33x4 0.445  307.5
A  6.03–0.98x1+0.17x2–0.12x3–1.89x4 0.417  274.1
90…110 
G  4.88–0.81x1+0.15x2–0.10x3–1.50x4 0.458  323.3
A  6.14–0.88x1+0.25x2–0.19x3–2.45x4 0.261  135.9
>110 km 
less than 90 
G  5.36–1.12x1+0.21x2–0.14x3–2.19x4 0.450  326.0
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
Notes: 
* The average fertility rate of agricultural land in the Moscow region (weighted with  
   areas) is 100. 
    Symbol ‘A’ denotes arable land, ‘G’ – grassland. 
    The variable x denotes normalized yields per hectare (average yield for a group is 1) 
for cereals, potatoes, vegetables and fodder, respectively. The parameters of land 
marginal product functions presented in bold are significant at α = 0.05.  
The fitted quadratic functions are characterized with R
2 within 0.642…0.823 for 
arable land and within  0.792…0.860 for grassland. Corresponding F values are 
within 196.9…507.0 and 416.0…671.7, indicating very high confidence in the 
regression. For 2003, the estimated quadratic function of the common logarithm 
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For both functions, the significant estimates are typed in bold. The negative 
dependence of land marginal product on crop yields remains unchanged: The 
elasticities of the arable land marginal product on the variables are -4.67, 0.39, 
0.44 and -7.41. The positive elasticities are not significant at α = 0.05. 
Table  2 presents the arable land marginal product values estimated by both 
parameterization approaches in comparison to the corresponding shadow prices 
obtained directly from the linear program in the case of mean yields. For one of 
the q-groups, the shadow price does not fit into the 95 % confidence interval of 
the estimate by the quadratic parameterization. 
Since the quadratic form provides a narrower confidence interval and higher F 
and R
2 compared to the linear form, the values obtained from the former are 
more trustworthy. 
Table 2:  Arable land marginal product in 2003 at average crop 
productivity level, roubles per hectare 
By linear  
parametrization 
By quadratic  
parametrization  Distance 
from 
Moscow 
Rate of soil 
fertility* 




above  616  2255  8258 629  1309  2721 714 
90…110 494  1979  7919 504  1108  2438 567 
<60 km 
less than 90  184  1222  8110 183  581  1845 197 
110 and 
above  476  1998  8393 483  1096  2488 540 
90…110 416  1822  7981 422  986  2303 472 
60…110 
km 
less than 90  110  1008  9268 107  442  1825 112 
110 and 
above  342  1720  8646 345  886  2276 383 
90…110 321  1617  8153 323  833  2146 361 
>110 km 
less than 90  43  750  13099 40  290  2121 34 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
Notes:   * Average fertility rate of agricultural land in the Moscow region (weighted with areas)  
    is 100. 
    Values in columns ‘min’ and ‘max’ are the boundaries of 95 % confidence intervals. 
From Table 2 it can be concluded that in the statistical sense, the differences in 
the arable land marginal product of lands belonging to different location-fertility 
groups are insignificant in the majority of cases. But the decrease of this value 
with an increasing distance from Moscow or decreasing soil fertility conforms to 
theoretical expectations, which adds to the robustness of this approach. 
Table  3 presents a comparison of the estimated agricultural land marginal 
product throughout years 2001-2003. The changes during this period have the How large is the marginal product of land in the Moscow region?  391
same direction regardless of type of land or location-fertility class. The land 
marginal product in the Moscow region decreases, contrary to the hypothesis (a). 
Table 3:  Marginal agricultural land product in the Moscow region from 











2001 2002 2003  2003 to 
2001, % 
A 5,395  2,132  1,309  24.3  110 and 
above  G 920  391  308  33.5 
A 5,018  1,899  1,108  22.1 
90…110 
G 1,015  371  275  27.1 
A 4,166  1,370  581  13.9 
<60 km 
less than 90 
G 496  96  73  14.7 
A 5,235  1,944  1,096  20.9  110 and 
above  G 893  378  297  33.3 
A 4,913  1,791  986  20.1 
90…110 
G 991  358  263  26.5 
A 4,066  1,261  442  10.9 
60…11
0 km 
less than 90 
G 442  86  68  15.4 
A 5,064  1,763  886  17.5  110 and 
above  G 866  358  275  31.8 
A 4,775  1,648  833  17.4 
90…110 
G 958  345  254  26.5 
A 3,970  1,161  290  7.3 
>110 
km 
less than 90 
G 423  82  65  15.4 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
Notes:  * Average fertility rate of agricultural land in the Moscow region (weighted with areas)  
    is 100. 
    Symbol ‘A’ denotes arable land, ‘G’ – grassland. 
Another noticeable observation is that the expected dependence of land marginal 
product on distance from Moscow and on soil fertility is observed throughout 
the period of 2001-2003. The exception is the case of grassland in 2001, whose 
marginal product peaks at medium soil fertility. 
The estimated land marginal product is low, characterizing the agricultural land 
in the Moscow region as hardly sufficient collateral. OSBORNE and TRUEBLOOD 
(2002) estimated shadow prices of agricultural land
3 in the Central economic 
district of Russia, to which the Moscow region belongs. Their result was $ 19.7 
per hectare in 1995, declining to $ 11.9 per hectare in 1998. According to their 
estimations, 40 to 120 hectares had to be mortgaged in 1997 to buy a tractor 
                                                 
3 Since  OSBORNE and TRUEBLOOD (2002) do not distinguish arable and low-intensity lands, 
their estimations should be attributed to the type of land that has the smallest marginal 
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(without accounting for transaction costs, which likely made the area of land to be 
mortgaged for buying a tractor raise to infinity). For the Moscow region, where 
relatively intensive suburban agriculture prevails, GATAULIN and SVETLOV (1995) 
found that the equilibrium price of grasslands used for hay production and 
pastures in 1994 were $ 170 and $ 213 per hectare, respectively. 
Our results are $ 51.20 in 2001, declining to $ 28.6 in 2003 for a hectare of 
grassland
4 in the Moscow region. Despite the stabilization of Russian agriculture 
in terms of amount of production, there is no evidence that strengthening market 
institutions increases land price. As a consequence, agricultural land property 
remains unattractive and inefficiently allocated. This situation can be explained 
in accordance to the justification of the research hypothesis (c) formulated in 
Section 1. The agricultural production crisis in the 1990s caused many lands to 
lose value. Recovery has improved crop productivity
5; but meanwhile, market 
capacity has grown slowly – resulting in decreasing land value. 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Research hypothesis (a) is clearly rejected by the results of our study, while 
hypothesis (c) is not rejected. As for hypothesis (b), the differences between 
land marginal products at different distances from Moscow are not significant in 
a statistical sense. However, a stable monotonic dependence suggests that in 
reality the factor of distance is influential, although its effect cannot be reliably 
proved by means of the applied methodology. This calls for its further 
improvement. 
With respect to the research questions formulated in Section 1, the following can 
be concluded: 
a)  The methodology has proved its relevance to the aim of this study. 
b) The marginal land product in the Moscow region from 2001 to 2003 is 
very low. Moreover, it displays a declining trend. 
c) In this respect, for the purpose of making the land valuable there is a 
strong need for expanding markets and diversifying production, the pre-
condition for which is increasing the population’s incomes and, 
consequently, increasing payable demand. 
The declining trend of the agricultural land marginal product signals that an 
effective land policy based on well-developed economic and political 
institutions is missing. Indeed, virtually valueless land hardly substantiates the 
                                                 
4  The case of medium fertility plots located between 60 and 110 km from Moscow. 
5  In the Moscow region, the yield per hectare in 2002, compared to that of 1996, was 
112.1 % (cereals), 129.3 % (vegetables). Both displayed a relatively stable trend, except 1999, 
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expectation that the costs of establishing land market and property institutions 
will be repaid, which in turn slows down institutional reforms in agriculture. 
Prior to utilizing Europe’s experience regarding land markets, the institutional 
development of regional agriculture should facilitate growth of the land 
marginal product. In particular, politicians' fears about foreign landlords 
accumulating land should be replaced with a policy aimed at attracting investors 
regardless of their citizenship. Large land areas should be temporarily taken out 
of agricultural use, both for ecological reasons and for changing the dynamics of 
the land marginal product. Temporary and reasonable protectionism on 
agricultural production markets can also be considered a tool that can help 
establish a truly functioning land market by increasing the demand of internal 
agricultural production. 
Finally, a rural financing system that can perform efficiently in the absence of 
land mortgages should be established. This is a way to prevent a repetition of the 
dramatic failure of P. Stolypin's agrarian reform that took place a century ago 
and was substantially based on land mortgage schemes. 
This study has highlighted many subjects that require improvement in the 
applied methodology. Considering the continuously-emerging "agro-holdings" 
(RYLKO and JOLLY, 2005), the supply and demand of land outside the Moscow 
region is an important factor influencing the agricultural land marginal product 
inside the region. This leads to the idea of a mathematical model that would be 
able to consider data about external supply and demand. However, the problem 
here is in obtaining such data. 
With regard to the utility function, a recent study by SVETLOV (2005) does not 
support the hypothesis about the profit-maximizing behavior of Moscow region 
corporate farms. Furthermore, the depreciation costs only roughly approximate 
the capital recovery costs. To capture the long-term preferences precisely, a 
propensity to invest should also be taken into account. Although we attempt to 
control the effects of unobserved preferences of farm management by 
assumption 7 in Section 2, there is a need for a more precise utility function to 
make estimations more truthful. 
For parameterization purposes, we vary only crop yields. Varying output prices 
as well could enrich the analysis. However, this would introduce additional 
degrees of freedom into the regression equations. To conclude about the pros 
and cons of varying the prices, a further research agenda is proposed. 
Despite the arguments in favor of the chosen representation of technologies (see 
Section  3), the data envelopment representation is also worth trying. Joint 
verification of the models would strengthen the conclusiveness of the study. 
The model presented in this study allows infeasible solutions when testing. Such 
solutions provide incomparable shadow prices that are excluded from the 
parameterization procedures. However, the conditions leading to unfeasibility Natalia Il'ina, Nikolay Svetlov  394 
are quite realistic and can provide valuable data for the parameterization. In this 
respect, a formulation of the model disabling unfeasibility would improve the 
methodology. 
Finally, the present version of the methodology excludes from consideration a 
large area of agricultural lands, namely that area occupied by household plots. 
The reason for this imperfection is the absence of necessary data at our disposal. 
It is very likely that household land is not marginal and therefore does not affect 
the obtained values; however, this is a hypothesis that needs further testing. 
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SPATIAL PRICE TRANSMISSION ON THE TURKISH WHEAT MARKET – 






Spatial price transmission is analyzed on the Turkish wheat market from 1994 to 
2003. The Johansen cointegration test shows that 58  percent of all bivariate 
province pairs are cointegrated. An asymmetric error correction model is 
applied, revealing that 94 percent of the contemporaneous (lagged) adjustment 
occurs symmetrically. Transmission elasticities do not show a regional pattern. 
Keywords: Asymmetric error correction model, spatial price transmission, market 
efficiency, Turkey. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Union started on 
October 3
rd, 2005. Thus, accurate and timely information on the Turkish 
economy in the light of necessary adjustment processes is of crucial importance, 
and not only for policy makers. Agriculture accounts for 11 percent of the total 
Turkish GNP and employs seven million people, or almost 30 percent of the 
total workforce (TURKSTAT, 2004). Thus, agriculture is Turkey’s most 
important sector, with wheat being its major crop.  
Prices play an extraordinary role in market economies, as they coordinate the 
allocation of scarce resources in the most efficient way. Hence, prices for one 
homogenous product should be the same everywhere in the economy – minus 
transportation costs. The aim of this paper is to analyze the spatial price 
transmission on the Turkish wheat market from 1994 to 2003. Section 2 presents 
recent developments in Turkey’s agricultural policy and sketches comparisons 
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to the EU. The next section provides the methodological framework, which is 
followed by the empirical application in Section  4. The main results are 
discussed thereafter. Section 6 concludes. 
2 POLICY DEVELOPMENTS ON TURKEY’S WHEAT MARKET  
Traditionally, Turkey heavily supports farmers through various policy 
instruments such as tariffs, export subsidies, administered prices and input 
subsidies, among others. Table 1 provides an overview of the producer support 
estimate (PSE) published by the OECD. It is expressed in absolute values, as 
well as in shares of domestic production value for Turkey and the EU in 
comparison. 
Table 1:  Comparison of PSE in Turkey and the EU 
   Turkey      EU   
 %  of 
domestic 
prod. value 





Mill. EUR  Share of 
price support
1994  12 %  2,581  37 %  35 %  94,761  64 % 
1995  12 %  2,988  45 %  35 %  96,123  62 % 
1996  14 %  3,910  56 %  32 %  91,727  56 % 
1997  24 %  6,931  73 %  32 %  92,664  56 % 
1998  27 %  9,393  82 %  36 %  102,33  63 % 
1999  23 %  7,651  74 %  39 %  108,241  65 % 
2000  24 %  8,521  86 %  34 %  97,244  59 % 
2001  15 %  4,459  70 %  35 %  103,937  58 % 
2002  20 %  5,912  73 %  34 %  96,989  56 % 
2003  29 %  9,605  80 %  36 %  104,474  55 % 
Source:  OECD, 2005; own calculations. 
Table 1 shows that producer support in the EU was around 30 to 40 percent of 
production value since the mid-1990s and, in absolute terms, peaked at 
€ 108 billion in 1999. In Turkey, the level was around 25 percent at the end of 
the 1990s, with a sharp increase in the last three years. 
The share of producer support received as price support, shown in columns four 
and seven of Table 1, was around 60 percent in the EU and declined to 55 percent 
in 2003. The drop in the years 1996 and 1997 was due to exceptionally high 
world market prices for cereals and was not policy induced. Thus, it was not 
sustainable. The decline in market price support, which started with the 
MacSherry reform in 1992, continued through the Agenda 2000 and the most 
recent Mid-Term-Review. Spatial price transmission on the Turkish wheat market – An initial application  401
In Turkey, a varying share of 37 to 86 percent of producer price support has 
been granted since the mid-1980s. Non-market price support was mainly 
concentrated on input and credit subsidies, but in recent years, an increasing 
share of support has been granted in the form of direct payments to the 
producers. A major step in this direction took place in 2001, when the share of 
direct payments increased four  percent from the previous year, to more than 
20 percent. Also, the share of input payments has fallen from 30 percent at the 
end of the 1980s to less than two percent in 2002-2004 (OECD, 2005, p. 71). 
2.1  Cereal-specific support policies 
Table 2 presents surveys of the Turkish and EU cereal markets (on average) in 
2002 and 2003. The EU is a net exporter of cereals as a product group as well as 
for wheat and barley, and a net importer for maize. This pattern was stable 
during the observation period of 1994 to 2003. Wheat accounts for almost 
50 percent of cereal production and barley for another 25 percent. Somewhat 
more than half of the production is used for feed, and human consumption is 
about 120 kg per capita per year. 
Table 2:  Market data for cereals 
 Wheat  Barley  Maize  Cereals 
EU       
Production (mill. t.)  97.7  47.3  37.1  201.1 
Total human cons. (mill. t.)  38.9  0.3  2.5  46.1 
Human cons. per capita (kg/year)  102.5  0.9  6.5  121.5 
Feed (mill. t.)  42.8  33.2  31.1  121.1 
Net trade (mill. t.)  5.5  7.6  -2.7  10.5 
Turkey       
Production (mill. t.)  19.3  8.2  2.5  30.7 
Total human cons. (mill. t.)  13.4  0.0  1.3  15.5 
Human cons. per capita (kg/year)  189.0  0.0  18.2  218.3 
Feed (mill. t.)  1.2  5.6  2.2  9.3 
Net trade (mill. t.)  -0.9  0.4  -1.5  -2.1 
Turkey/EU in percent         
Production  19.7 %  17.3 %  6.6 %  15.3 % 
Human cons. per capita  184.5 %  0.0 %  278.3 %  179.6 % 
Source:  FAO (2005); own calculations. 
Turkey is a net importer of cereals, as well as for wheat and maize. For barley, 
the trading position is slightly positive, however, it is still close to zero. In 
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the paramount crop and accounts for 63 percent of total cereal production. Some 
30 percent of total production is used for feed, and human consumption is, at 
218 kg per capita per year 1.8 times as high as in the EU. 
Cereal prices in Turkey are supported by an intervention price system, tariffs, 
and export subsidies. Intervention prices vary from year to year according to the 
political situation and the phase of the election cycle. Their impact on market 
prices, however, has declined in recent years, as the quantity bought by the 
Turkish Grain Board (Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi, TMO) has declined significantly. 
Moreover, payments were often delayed so that, due to inflation, the real value 
of the payments was far below that announced at the time of harvest. 
Intervention prices for cereals in August 2002 were about € 165/t for durum 
wheat, € 145/t for common wheat, € 138/t for corn and € 103/t for barley (USDA, 
GAIN Report No.  TU 2033 of 06.08.2002, p.  1). Turkey has bound high ad 
valorem tariffs for cereals, between 45 and 180 percent in the WTO, while applied 
rates are usually much lower and vary over time. In addition to tariff barriers, 
Turkey frequently restricts wheat imports by limiting import licenses (USDA, 
GAIN Report No. TU 2014 of 20.03.2002, p. 7). 
Evaluating the effects of price-supporting policies, Turkey and EU farmgate 
prices for wheat are compared from 1994 to 2003 in Table 3. Turkish cereal 
prices were below EU levels until 1995, but from 1996 on, with increasing 
Turkish prices and decreasing EU prices, Turkish prices exceeded those of the 
EU. In 2001, Turkish prices were lowered, but were still above the EU-level. 
The price decline of 2001 (expressed in €) has to be interpreted in the context of 
a sudden devaluation of the Turkish Lira in that year. The year 2003 saw a sharp 
increase in the Turkish price level. 
Table 3:  Wheat farmgate prices in Turkey and the EU (€/t) 
 1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001  2002  2003
Wheat              
EU  price  140 143 143 134 123 121  120  124  114  123 
Turkish  price  101 124 179 204 182 170  169  143  159  209 
Turkish price in % of EU  72  87  126  152  148  141  141  115  140  169 
Source:  OECD, 2005; own calculations. 
2.2  Non product-specific support policies 
Farmers in the EU receive direct payments per ha, which are regulated in the 
Mid-Term-Review and based on average regional historical payments. These 
direct payments, however, are so-called decoupled, since they are no longer tied 
to producing a specific crop, or producing anything. The premium per hectare is 
neither the same across the EU nor within a member country. It is computed 
taking into account the historic payments that an individual farm received. The 
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In the past, Turkey has provided a high degree of support to farmers through 
subsidization of inputs such as fertilizer and credit subsidies. These policies, 
however, have been phased out (fertilizer subsidies in 2001, credit subsidies in 
2000). Subsidies for pesticides and seed, however, were still in place in 2002. Most 
farmers in Turkey are exempt from income tax payments (GRETHE, 2003, p. 52). 
In 2001, Turkey began implementing a major World Bank-supported agricultural 
policy reform, under which all credit and input subsidies, as well as price support 
provided through state enterprises and agricultural sales cooperatives (valued 
before reform at about $5 billion US) are to be replaced by $1.9 billion in direct 
income payments to farmers (GRETHE, 2003, p. 52). These payments are set at 
$ 81/ha and are limited to 20 ha per farmer. A major challenge for the implemen- 
tation of such a system in a country like Turkey is the registration of farmers and 
agricultural area and the distribution of cash support; Turkey has about 4 million 
agricultural holdings (compared to 7 million in the EU) and the system of area 
registration is much less developed. 
Agriculture in the EU is supported in various ways, but overall, agricultural 
payments consume about 36 percent of the EU budget. Another large share of 
the EU budget (about 11 percent) is spent on the so-called second pillar of the 
CAP, which covers various policies summarized under rural development. This 
policy package includes such heterogeneous measures as agro-environmental 
measures, investment aid, aid for less-favored areas, and early retirement 
schemes. Furthermore, many EU member states provide significant support to 
the agricultural sector through tax exemptions and budgetary outlays for specific 
agricultural social security systems. 
3 THE ASYMMETRIC ERROR CORRECTION MODEL 
The asymmetric Error Correction Model (ECM), initially proposed by   
VON  CRAMON-TAUBADEL  and  FAHLBUSCH  (1994) later elaborated by VON 
CRAMON-TAUBADEL and LOY (1996), is a general case of an ECM. According to 
the Granger representation theorem (GRANGER, 1983), an ECM is an appropriate 
representation for time series if cointegration holds. The basic idea of an ECM is 
that a certain proportion of the disequilibrium from one period is corrected in the 
next period. Thus, there is a long run equilibrium component and a short run 
error correction part. There is a large body of literature on asymmetric price 
adjustment that covers various economic sectors and periods, as well as 
geographic areas. In his extensive study, PELTZMAN (2000, p. 466) finds that: 
"Output prices tend to respond faster to input increases than to decreases." For a 
thorough review of the literature on asymmetric price transmission, see MEYER 
and VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL (2004). The asymmetric ECM has evolved as a 
workhorse and where applied, it generally took the following form: Enno-Burghard Weitzel, Ahmet Bayaner  404 
. 
The error correction term (ECT) is the one period lagged residual from the long 
run regression of yt on xt. Here it is split into ECT
+= max(ECT, 0) and ECT
- = 
min(ECT, 0). MEYER and VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL (2004, p. 597) make three 
important points regarding a specification such as in equation (1). First, it is only 
possible to consider asymmetry with respect to speed, not magnitude, since 
cointegration assumes a long run equilibrium to which the vectors need to 
return. Thus, positive and negative deviations may not be corrected with the 
same speed. However, they are corrected fully at one point. Second, only since 
ENDERS and GRANGER (1998) modified the standard cointegration Dickey-Fuller 
test has it been possible to test for cointegration without maintaining the 
hypothesis of symmetric adjustment in the long run. Third, equation (1) is based 
on linear error correction, meaning constant parameters Φ
+ and Φ
-. However, 
VON  CRAMON-TAUBADEL (1996) investigates possible non-linearity in price 
transmission by allowing for higher order polynomials of the ECT. He finds that 
smaller values of the ECT are more associated with smaller values of Φ than 
larger values of the ECT. Since cointegration is necessary, the bivariate tests are 
conducted applying the maximum likelihood method proposed by JOHANSEN 
(1988). 
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1  Data and unit root tests 
The basis for the following analysis are price data provided by TMARA (2006). 
Prices received by farmers for durum wheat were collected at the provincial 
level for the period of January 1994 to December 2003 and represent averages 
of the first and second week of each month. The average monthly increase of the 
Turkish wholesale price index (WPI) was 3.9 % (TURKSTAT, various issues) 
during the observation period. Thus, having data that was collected within a 
period of two weeks implies that a variation of approximately 1.9 % is due to 
inflation.  
All nominal prices are characterized by the high level of inflation in Turkey, 
which is depicted inFigure 1, which shows the general WPI, the consumer price 
index (CPI) (TURKSTAT, various issues) for food and the exchange rate of the 
Turkish Lira to the Euro (EUROSTAT, 2006). 
(1)Spatial price transmission on the Turkish wheat market – An initial application  405
Figure 1:  Turkish price indices from 1994-2003 
 
Source: Own  representation;  EUROSTAT, 2006; TURKSTAT. 
Notes:  EUR-TL = Euro – Turkish Lira exchange rate; CPI = Turkish consumer price index 
for food; WPI = Turkish general wholesale price index; January 1994 = 100 for all 
indices. 
From 1994 to 2003, the Turkish price level rose by approximately 12,000 %. To 
eliminate the effects of inflation as a common factor on market integration, 
prices were deflated by the general WPI. Furthermore, this enhances the ability 
to interpret the estimated equilibrium parameters. Those provinces that were 
founded after January 1994 were excluded from the sample, as were those 
provinces that lost territory to the newly-founded ones. This should ensure that 
the provincial prices have the same spatial base throughout the observation 
period. The price development of three example provinces is displayed in 
Figure 2, where province six has the lowest average price among all provinces, 
and province 21 has the highest. Only six provinces show significant seasonal 
dummies for single months. Thus, a stable seasonal pattern could not be verified 
and no seasonal adjustment is carried out. Out of the 28 regional price series, 
15  show a significant negative trend. Nevertheless, since this trend is not 
common to all series and it is assumed that this trend is not the exclusive 
component of the data generating process (DGP), no adjustment is made. To 
class the national prices, they are compared to matching international cif 
Rotterdam and fob EU ports prices (IGC, various issues). The US$ notation is 
converted to TL using the monthly average exchange rate provided by 
EUROSTAT (2006) and deflated using the general Turkish WPI (TURKSTAT, 
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Source:  Own representation; TURKSTAT, 2004. 
Notes:  Price development for provinces 6, 21, and 29. 
The first step is conducting an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to the level 
data of all time series. The appropriate lag length is established applying the 
method proposed by HALL (1994), with the results being presented in Table 4. 
The columns give the t-values for the corresponding alternative hypotheses, 
intercept and trend, only an intercept, and none of all, which are denoted trend, 
const, and none, respectively. The according lag lengths are given as n. 
Although the hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in the more general alternative 
hypotheses, it cannot be rejected using the most restrictive alternative hypothesis 
of no trend and no intercept, given in column two of Table 4. Applying the same 
test to the first differences of the time series identifies the degree of integration. 
The hypothesis of a unit root in the first differences is rejected for every single 
province. Thus, one cannot reject the hypothesis that prices for wheat in the 
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Table 4:  ADF test for Unit Roots in levels 
 t-none  n  t-const  n  t-trend  n 
P2 0.69  9 
** -4.27  0 
** -4.26  0 
P3 0.61  9 
**  -3.95 0  -2.89 9 
P5  0.70 8  -2.24 8  -2.23 8 
P6  0.75 6  -2.61 8  -3.16 8 
P7 0.07  8  -2.70  1 
* -3.81  3 
P10  0.18 0  -2.23 0  -2.26 0 
P15  0.17 7  -2.63 0  -2.58 0 
P16  0.10 12  -2.35 12  -3.31 12 
P18  0.30 2  -1.84 2  -2.05 2 
P19 0.43  3 
*  -3.00 0  -3.03 0 
P20 0.04  7 
* -3.32  0 
* -3.47  0 
P21  0.15 0  -2.25 0  -2.67 0 
P23  0.39 9  -2.75 0  -2.81 0 
P24  0.41 12  -1.62 12  -2.18 12 
P26  0.48 9  -1.64 9  -1.75 9 
P29  0.29 3  -2.14 0  -2.31 0 
P31  0.15 0  -2.28 0  -2.29 0 
P32  -0.62 11  -0.78 11  -3.16 11 
P35  0.13 0  -2.31 0  -2.43 0 
P36  -0.09 0  -2.52 0  -2.93 0 
P37  0.30 1  -2.36 1  -2.55 1 
P38  0.70 7  -2.59 7  -2.60 7 
P40 0.33  3 
** -4.04 0 
** -4.35 0 
P42 0.53  4 
** -3.7  0 
* -3.69  0 
P43  0.97 8  -1.83 8  -1.84 8 
P44  -0.19  0  -1.42 11  -3.23 11 
P45 0.61  6 -2.28  11 -2.25  6 
P46  0.59 11  -2.51 11  -2.83 11 
Source:  Own calculations; EViews 5.1. 
Notes: H0: Series has a unit root; column 6, 4, and 2 show the t-values for the alternatives 
of a trend and a constant, just a constant and none respectively; columns 3, 5, and 7 
give the lag lenght n; 
* Denotes rejection of the H0 at the 5 % level; 
** Denotes 
rejection at the 1 % level. 
4.2 Cointegration  analysis 
This section analyzes whether the I(1) integrated time series show a linear long 
run equilibrium. The results of the JOHANSEN cointegration test for all possible 
bivariate pairs of provinces are presented in Figure  3. The upper triangle 
represents the trace statistic for the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector 
versus the alternative hypothesis of one or more cointegrating vectors. The 
lower triangle holds the results of the H0 of one cointegrating vector versus the Enno-Burghard Weitzel, Ahmet Bayaner  408 
H1 of two or more cointegrating vectors. Black boxes indicate cointegration 
between two provinces and white boxes show no integration. As a first result, 
the trace statistic shows that 58 percent of all possible combinations of regional 
prices have a statistically significant linear long run relationship (upper triangle). 
If cointegration is revealed, there is most likely a single cointegrating vector. As 
can be seen from the lower triangle in Figure 3, the null hypothesis of one rather 
than two cointegrating vectors cannot be rejected in all but 15 cases. There are 
significant regional discrepancies, with some provinces cointegrated with the 
majority of all other provinces, e.g. provinces 2, 3, 23, and 38, whereas there are 
other provinces that are hardly cointegrated at all, e.g. provinces 7, 15, and 44. 
Figure 3:  Johansen cointegration results 
 
 
Source:  Own calculations, EViews 5.1 
Notes:   H0 rejected;   H0 not rejected; upper triangle H0: no cointegration; H1: one or 
more cointegrating vectors; lower triangle H0: one cointegrating vector; H1: two or 
more cointegrating vectors. 
4.3  Estimation of the asymmetric ECM 
Having established cointegration, the next step is to estimate the asymmetric 
ECM as laid out in Section 3. Since an autoregressive distributed lag model 
ADL(1,1) resembles the data-generating process reasonably well, K and L in 
equation (1) are both set to zero, giving the following equation to be estimated: Spatial price transmission on the Turkish wheat market – An initial application  409
 
with i ≠  j and i, j  = 1, …, N, the number of provinces included in the analysis. 
The estimation is only carried out for those pairs that are cointegrated, according 
to the Johansen test. A Wald coefficient test is applied for the estimated 




j,t. Figure  4 shows the 




j,t, where Δy is given on the ordinate and 
Δx on the abscissae. Black boxes label the rejections, whereas grey boxes show 
that the H0 cannot be rejected. This is true for 94  percent of all bivariate 
regressions. Thus, symmetry is the rule for contemporaneous price adjustment. 
Although only a small percentage in terms of total pairs shows asymmetry, 12 out 
of 28 provinces transmit prices asymmetrically. Since these provinces are spread 
nearly all across Turkey, from Izmir in the west to Diyarbakir in the east, no 
regional pattern can be established. 
Figure 4:  Results of Wald test for contemporaneous symmetry 
 
 
Source:  Own calculations; EViews 5.1 











A similar pattern is revealed for the lagged adjustment to the error correction 
term. Here, as depicted in Figure  5, the null hypothesis of symmetric price 
transmission can be rejected in 10  percent of all possible combinations. 
(2)Enno-Burghard Weitzel, Ahmet Bayaner  410
Consequentially, the number of provinces that transmit prices asymmetrically 
increases to 22. There are only five provinces, namely Antalya, Burdur, Hatay, 
Kars and Malatya, that show no asymmetry whatsoever. 
Figure 5:  Results of Wald test for error correction symmetry 
 
 
Source:  Own calculations; EViews 5.1. 






j,t ≠  Φ
 -
j,t.. 
The results in terms of the coefficients’ magnitude are exemplified for one 
specific province. Konya is chosen since this province is cointegrated with 22 other 
provinces and is also the most important producer, as well as consumer
1, of 
wheat among the Turkish provinces. Figure  6 shows the coefficients of 
contemporaneous price adjustment for the case that the price in Konya is 
exogenous, as well as for the endogenous case. Both series are given in relation 
to the distance of the other province to Konya
2. If contemporaneous price 
adjustment is significant (in 15 out of 22 cases), then it is incomplete since the 
coefficients are smaller than one. They are all positive; thus, a shock in the 
exogenous province is adjusted in the endogenous one in the same direction. 
Figure 7 contains the coefficients for the error correction, of which all 22 are 
significant at the one percent level. As theory requires, they are all negative, i.e., 
errors of previous periods are indeed corrected to the long run equilibrium. 
                                                 
1  Consumption refers to human consumption, animal food and wheat processing capacity. 
2  Distance is measured as the road mileage between the two provinces’ capitals. Spatial price transmission on the Turkish wheat market – An initial application  411
Figure 6:  Coefficients for contemporaneous price adjustment 
 
 
Source:  Own calculations; EViews 5.1. 
Notes:   Price in Konya is exogenous, + Price in Konya is endogenous. The given 
coefficients are significant at the 5 % level at least. 
As for the contemporaneous adjustment, the error correction occurs 
incompletely, i.e., since the coefficients are smaller than one (in absolute values) 
the correction will take significantly longer than one period to be completed. In 
contrast to the contemporaneous adjustment, the coefficients for the endogenous 
error correction are larger (in absolute values) than the exogenous ones. This 
points to the identification problem that might be due to missing strict 
exogeneity, no common factor, that is pushing the system, or the application of 
an OLS-method. 
Figure 7:  Coefficients for error correction 
 
Source:  Own calculations, EViews 5.1. 
Notes:   Price in Konya is exogenous, + Price in Konya is endogenous. The given 
coefficients are significant at the 1 % level. Enno-Burghard Weitzel, Ahmet Bayaner  412
5 DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK 
The cointegration analysis showed significant differences in the degree of 
cointegration among the provinces. Why are some provinces like Adyaman, 
Afyon, or Kayseri cointegrated with virtually all other provinces, whereas 
Antalya, Burdur, and Malatya are hardly cointegrated with any other province? 
Having established the pattern of cointegration, an interpretation based on 
economic criteria needs to be developed. One promising factor is distance and 
the implicit transportation costs. Applying the asymmetric ECM revealed 
adjustment processes that were symmetric in more than 90 percent of the cases. 
Thus, it must be scrutinized whether or not the symmetric ECM is a more 
appropriate model specification. Although the analysis of the coefficients’ 
magnitude is limited by the identification problem, an interesting task is to 
investigate the types of market integration that prevail. Turkey’s trading position 
changed during the observation period, going from being an importer to an 
exporter, and vice versa. Thus, the implicit assumption of constant parameters 
over time should be investigated, applying a model that allows for regime shifts, 
for example a Markov-Switching model. The aforementioned transportation costs 
and the obviously prevailing symmetry lead the way to the alternative application 
of a threshold cointegration model, suggested by HANSEN and SEO (2002). This 
model allows for a neutral band (of transaction costs) in which no price 
adjustment takes place. 
6 CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzed the Turkish wheat market for spatial price transmission 
between 28 of 81 provinces. Fifty-eight percent of all possible combinations of 
provinces are cointegrated, and no apparent regional pattern of this cointegration 
could be established. The application of the asymmetric error correction model 
revealed that 94 [90] of the contemporaneous [lagged] adjustment occurs sym- 
metrically. The asymmetric cases are spread all over Turkey, with no spatial 
structure. For the example province of Konya, the magnitudes of the adjustment 
coefficients reveal that there exists significant contemporaneous price adjust- 
ment (in 15 out of 22 cases) regardless of Konya being modeled exogenously or 
endogenously. Nevertheless, the coefficients are not greater than 0.4, implying 
incomplete contemporaneous adjustment. The error correction (lagged 
adjustment) is significant for all 22 provinces that Konya is cointegrated with. 
The absolute magnitude of the coefficients is smaller than 0.5 at maximum. 
Thus, it takes significantly longer than one period until the error is corrected.  
Further research in this area should focus on the effects of distance in terms of 
transport and transaction costs. Furthermore, the role of changing economic 
environments and their effects on the assumptions of constant parameters should 
be thoroughly investigated. Spatial price transmission on the Turkish wheat market – An initial application  413
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FARM TO RETAIL PRICE TRANSMISSION ON THE PORK MARKET:  









The study of marketing margins and price transmission on various commodity 
markets has been a popular research topic of the past decades (see MEYER and  
VON  CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 2004, for a recent survey). With a few exceptions, 
however, these studies have focused on developed economies. Until now there 
are no comparative studies on marketing margins and price transmission 
between a developed and a transition country, which focus on the same period 
and market. In this paper, therefore, we examine the above phenomena on two 
markets: Hungary and Germany. We apply the Johansen (maximum likelihood) 
and Gregory-Hansen (with recursively estimated breakpoints) cointegration 
procedures. Price transmission modeling suggests that, despite the inherent 
differences between the two countries, the pricing dynamics are surprisingly 
similar. Prices on both markets are cointegrated, and exogeneity tests reveal 
long-run producer to retail causality. Homogeneity is rejected, suggesting a non-
competitive mark-up pricing strategy. Price transmission is symmetric in the 
long run. 
Keywords: Price transmission, marketing margin, pricing, structural breaks, 
German pork market, Hungarian pork market. 
 
                                                 
*      Junior Research Fellow, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences,   
  Budapest, Hungary. Email: bakucs@econ.core.hu. 
**     Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Science, 
  Budapest, Hungary. Email: ferto@econ.core.hu. 
***    Research Associate, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern  
  Europe (IAMO), Halle (Saale), Germany. Email: hockmann@iamo.de. 
**** Ph.D. Student, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern   
   Europe (IAMO), Halle (Saale), Germany. Email: perekhozhuk@landw.uni.halle.de. Farm to retail price transmission on the pork market   415
1 INTRODUCTION 
Measuring the spread in vertical price relationships and analyzing the nature of 
price transmission along the supply chain from the producer to consumer have 
both evolved as widely used methods to gain insight into the functioning of, and 
degree of competition in, food markets. Asymmetric price transmission has been 
studied by numerous authors using different econometric methods, from the 
classical WOLFFRAM, 1971, and HOUCK, 1977, specification to cointegration 
(VON  CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 1998) and threshold autoregressive models (e.g. 
GOODWIN  and  HARPER, 2000). None of these studies (except BOJNEC, 2002, 
BAKUCS and FERTŐ, 2005), however, focus on a transition economy. Because of 
the inherited pre-1989 distorted markets, low developed price-discovery 
mechanisms and often ad-hoc policy interventions, transitional economies could 
be expected to have generally larger marketing margins and more pronounced 
price transmission asymmetries.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate and compare the dynamics of the 
marketing margin on the Hungarian and German pork meat markets. The paper 
is organized as follows. Section  2 reviews some of the theoretical literature 
concerning marketing margins and price transmission, while section 3 describes 
the empirical procedures we apply. Our data and results are reported and 
discussed in section  4, with a summary and some conclusions presented in 
section 5. 
2 MARKETING MARGIN AND PRICE TRANSMISSION  
2.1 Theoretical  background 
The marketing margin is the difference between the retail and the producer or 
farm gate price. It represents marketing costs such as transport, storage, 
processing, wholesaling, retailing, advertising, etc.:  
M FP RP + =                               (1) 
M, the marketing margin, is composed of an absolute amount and a percentage 
or mark-up of the retail price: 
bRP a M + = , where a ≥ 0 and 0  ≤b<  1.                  (2) 
With the use of logarithmic data, the long-run elasticity between the prices is 
readily available from the marketing margin model. If prices are determined at 
producer level, we use the mark-up model: 
FP RP FP ε α + = 1 ,                          ( 3 )  
where  εFP  is the price transmission elasticity from the producer price (FP) 
towards the consumer price (RP). If εFP = 1, we have perfect transmission, and Lajos Zoltán Bakucs, Imre Fertő, Heinrich Hockmann, Oleksandr Perekhozhuk  416
thus the mark-up will be (e
α1 - 1). 0 < εFP < 1 implies that the transmission 
between the two prices is not perfect.  
If however, prices are determined at the consumer level, then the use of the 
mark-down model is appropriate: 
RP FP RP ε α + = 2 ,                  ( 4 )  
where εRP is the elasticity of transmission between the consumer price (RP) and 
the producer price (FP). As before, there is perfect transmission, if εRP = 1, and 
the mark-down equals (1 - e
 α2). Imperfect transmission results if εRP > 1.  
A common perception is that responses to price increases differ from responses 
to price decreases. More precisely, retailers tend to pass price increases to 
consumers more rapidly, whereas it takes longer for consumer prices to adjust to 
producer prices if the latter decrease. There are several major explanations for 
the existence of price asymmetries. First, asymmetrical price transmission 
occurs when firms can take advantage of quickly changing prices. This is 
explained by the theory of the search costs (MILLER and HAYENGA, 2001). They 
occur in locally imperfect markets, where retailers can exercise their local 
market power. Although customers would have a finite number of choices, they 
might face difficulties in quickly gathering information about the pricing of the 
competing stores because of the search costs. Thus firms can quickly raise the 
retail price as the producer price rises, and reduce retail prices much more 
slowly when upstream prices drop. Second comes the problem of perishable 
goods (WARD, 1982), that makes retailers hesitate in raising prices as producer 
prices rise. Wholesalers and retailers in possession of perishable goods may 
resist the temptation to increase prices because they risk a lower demand and 
ultimately being left with the spoiled product. Third, the adjustment costs or menu 
costs (GOODWIN and HOLT, 1999) may underlie asymmetric price adjustments. 
Menu costs involve all costs arising from re-pricing and the adoption of a new 
pricing strategy. As with perishable goods, menu costs also militate against 
retailers changing prices. Finally, the exercise of oligopoly power can favor 
asymmetric price transmission. It appears in markets with highly inelastic 
demand and concentrated supply; many food chains have such market 
organization characteristics. It also needs to be mentioned that such collusive 
behavior is rather difficult to maintain in the long run, because of the incentive 
for one firm to cheat the others (MILLER and HAYENGA, 2001, pp. 554).  
2.2 Empirical  evidence 
There are a great number of empirical studies dealing with marketing margin 
and asymmetry problems in livestock markets. VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL (1998) 
finds asymmetrical price transmission on the German pork market. DAWSON and 
TIFFIN (2000) identify a long-run price relationship between UK lamb farm and 
retail prices, and study the seasonal and structural break properties of the series, 
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prices; thus lamb prices are set in the retail market. Threshold Autoregressive 
Models were developed by GOODWIN and HOLT (1999), GOODWIN and HARPER 
(2000) and BEN-KAABIA, GIL  and  BOSHNJAKU (2002) studying the US beef 
sector, US pork sector and Spanish lamb sector, respectively. GOODWIN and 
HOLT (1999) find that farm markets do adjust to wholesale market shocks, 
whereas the effect of retail market shocks are largely confined to retail markets. 
GOODWIN and HARPER (2000) in their pork market study find a unidirectional 
price information flow from farm to wholesale and retail levels. Farm markets 
adjust to wholesale market shocks, but retail level shocks are not passed on to 
wholesale or farm levels. BEN-KAABIA, GIL and BOSHNJAKU (2002) establish a 
symmetric price transmission, concluding a long-run perfect price transmission, 
where any supply or demand shocks are fully transmitted through the system. 
They also observe that an increased horizontal concentration allows retailers to 
exercise market power. 
BOJNEC (2002) finds that both the Slovenian farm-gate beef and pork markets 
are weakly exogenous in the long run, with a mark-up long-run price strategy for 
beef and a competitive price strategy for the pork meat market. BAKUCS and 
FERTŐ (2005) use VECM to study the price transmission on the Hungarian pork 
meat market, and found competitive pricing and no evidence of price 
transmission asymmetries. Most empirical results emphasize the presence of 
feedback between the different market levels, and support the imperfect price 
transmission between farm and retail markets in all meat categories studied. In 
short, most studies find asymmetrical price transmission in livestock markets, 
and they also establish a mostly unidirectional price information flow from farm 
to wholesale and finally retail levels.  
3 EMPIRICAL PROCEDURE  
Most macroeconomic time series are not stationary over time, i.e. they contain 
unit roots. That is, their mean and variance are not constant over time. Utilizing 
the standard classical estimation methods (OLS) and statistical inference can 
result in biased estimates and/or spurious regressions.  
Even though many individual time series contain stochastic trends (i.e. they are 
not stationary at levels), many of them tend to move together in the long run, 
suggesting the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship. Two or more non-
stationary variables are cointegrated if one or more linear combinations exist of 
the variables that are stationary. This implies that the stochastic trends of the 
variables are linked over time, moving towards the same long-term equilibrium.  
3.1  Testing for unit roots 
Consider the first order autoregressive process, AR(1): 
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The process is considered stationary if ⎥ ρ⎥ < 1, thus testing for stationarity is 
equivalent with testing for unit roots (ρ = 1). (5) is rewritten to obtain: 
t t t e x x + = Δ −1 δ Δyt = δyt-1 + et, where δ = 1 - ρ             ( 6 )  
and thus the test becomes:  
H0: δ = 0 against the alternative H1: δ < 0. 
There are a large number of unit root tests in the literature (see MADDALA and 
KIM, 1998) for a comprehensive review), and due to their sensibility to the choice 
of the lag length and deterministic form it is a common practice to apply several 
tests. With structural breaks in the time series, the unit root tests often lead to the 
misleading conclusion of the presence of a unit root, when in fact the series are 
stationary with a break. There are, however, unit root tests that can handle the 
problem. Depending on specification, the PERRON (1997) test considers three 
models: With a break in the intercept, with a break in the trend, and with a break 
in both the intercept and trend. The test endogenously searches for the 
breakpoints. That is achieved by computing the t-statistics for all breakpoints, 
then choosing the breakpoint selected by the smallest t-statistic, that being the 
least favorable one for the null hypothesis of a unit root.  
3.2 Cointegration  analysis 
The two most widely used cointegration tests are the Engle-Granger two-step 
method (ENGLE and  GRANGER, 1987) and Johansen’s multivariate approach 
(JOHANSEN, 1988). Let’s consider a simple relationship in the form of (7), used 
by several cointegration tests: 
t t t y y η π + = Δ −1 ,                  ( 7 )  
where yt is an (n x 1) vector of non-stationary variables, π is an (n x n) matrix, 
and  ηt  is a vector of possibly serially correlated normally distributed 
disturbances. The Johansen procedure is based on estimating π and its rank. It as 
the advantage that it allows for the existence of more than one cointegrating 
relationship (vector) and the speed of adjustment towards the long-term 
equilibrium is easily computed. The procedure is a Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
approach in a multivariate autoregressive framework with enough lags 
introduced to have a well-behaved disturbance term. 
The Engle and Granger two step method uses an OLS regression to estimate the 
long-run relationship (8): 
t t t e y y + + = 2 2 1 1 μ μ y1 t ,              (8) 
where yit are non-stationary variables, μ are coefficients to be estimated, and et 
are disturbances. 
The residuals from (8) are then tested for unit roots. The null hypothesis of unit 
roots is equivalent with the no cointegration hypothesis. If, however, the null Farm to retail price transmission on the pork market   419
hypothesis is rejected, the variables are considered to be cointegrated. If 
however, unlike (8), the true data-generating process contains various regime 
shifts, then the Engle and Granger test is likely not to reject the no-cointegration 
null hypothesis.  
GREGORY and HANSEN (1996) introduce a methodology to test for the null 
hypothesis of no-cointegration against the alternative of cointegration with 
structural breaks. 3 models are considered under the alternative. Model 2 with a 
change in the intercept: 
t t t t e y y + + + =
Τ
2 2 1 1 α ϕ μ μ τ  , t = 1,…,n.                (9) 
Model 3 is similar to model 2, only it contains a time trend: 
t t t t e y t y + + + + =
Τ
2 2 1 1 α β ϕ μ μ τ  ,  t = 1,…,n.             (10) 





t t e y y y + + + + = τ τ ϕ α α ϕ μ μ 2 2 2 1 2 1 1    t = 1,…,n.           (11) 
Because, usually, the time of the break is not known a priori, models (9)-(11) are 
estimated recursively allowing T to vary between the middle 70 % of the sample: 
n T n 85 . 0 15 . 0 ≤ ≤        
For each possible breakpoint, the ADF statistics corresponding to the residuals 
of models (9)-(11) are computed, then the smallest value is chosen as the test 
statistic (being the most favorable for the rejection of the null). Critical values 
are non-standard, and are tabulated in GREGORY and HANSEN, 1996.  
3.3 Asymmetrical  error  correction representation 
With the development of cointegration techniques, attempts were made to test 
asymmetry in a cointegration framework. VON  CRAMON-TAUBADEL (1998), 
demonstrated that the earlier specifications are fundamentally inconsistent with 
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t-1 are the segmented error correction terms resulting from the 
long-run (cointegration) relationship: 





− − + = 1 1 1 t t t ECT ECT ECT .                 (14) 
Using a VECM representation as in (12), both the short-run and the long-run 
symmetry hypothesis can be tested, using standard tests. Valid inference Lajos Zoltán Bakucs, Imre Fertő, Heinrich Hockmann, Oleksandr Perekhozhuk  420
requires one price to be weakly exogenous in both the long and short run with 
respect to the parameters in (12). Following BOSWIJK and URBAIN 1997, we test 
for the short-run exogeneity by estimating the marginal model (15), then 
perform a variable addition test of the fitted residuals ν
^
t from (15) into the 
structural model, (12): 
t t t t RP L FP L FP ν ψ ψ ψ + Δ + Δ + = Δ − − 1 2 1 1 0 ) ( ) ( .          ( 1 5 )  
Long-run exogeneity is tested by the significance of the error correction terms in 
the equations (12), and (15). 
4 DATA AND RESULTS  
Our dataset consists of 160 monthly
1
†† (January 1992 - April 2005) farm-gate and 
consumer prices for Hungary, and 108 monthly (January 1996-December 2004) 
farm-gate and consumer prices for Germany. Both Hungarian and German farm-
gate prices (FPPH and FPPG) are represented by the monthly producer purchase 
price of live pigs for slaughter. The Hungarian consumer price (RPPH) is 
defined as the average retail price of various meat cuts, while the German 
consumer price is represented by the retail price of chops. Hungarian data was 
deflated to January 1992 prices, using the monthly Hungarian Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). All data was transformed in logarithms, because, when analyzing 
cointegrating relationships between variables, it is common to use logarithms. 
Otherwise, with trending data, the relative error might decline over time and this 
is inappropriate (DAWSON and TIFFIN, 2000). The evolution of real farm and 
retail level prices is presented in Figures 1 and 2.  
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1  With monthly data, seasonal effects might be present. Graphical analyses suggest that all 
four time series exhibit seasonality. Therefore, following common practice, throughout this 
paper, monthly centered seasonal dummies were included in the VARs and regressions. 
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4.1   Stationarity and integration tests – German data 
First, we test unit roots in the logarithms of retail and farm gate prices and also 
their first differences using ADF (DICKEY and FULLER, 1979, 1981), DF-GLS 
(ELLIOTT, ROTHENBERG and STOCK, 1996), and Perron tests
2
‡‡
 in the presence of 
structural breaks (PERRON, 1997). As expected, results (not presented here, but 
available upon request) depend on the choice of lag length and deterministic 
assumptions. All tests, however, reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the 
first differences, therefore we conclude that all three series are integrated of 
order one.  
JOHANSEN (1988) cointegration test results (Table 1) found 1 cointegrating vector 
between the German retail and producer prices. 
Table 1:  Cointegration analysis of German prices 
Number of CI vectors  Trace statistic 
(1 % critical values in brackets) 
r = 0  29.16 
(24.64) 
r ≤ 1  9.51 
(12.58) 
Note:   11 centered seasonal dummies included. 
The resulting cointegration vector (t-statistics in brackets) is: 
RPPG  =  1.594  +  0.423  FPPG           (16) 
             (-31.11)  (-6.33) 
                                                 
2  RATS code, and EVIEWS software was used to test the order of integration. 
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4.2  Stationarity and integration tests – Hungarian data 
As in the German case, unit root test results (not presented here, but available 
upon request) are ambiguous. After careful balancing, however, we conclude 
that both price series are non-stationary.  
Unlike in the German case, both the Engle-Granger two step, and the Johansen 
ML procedures accept the no-cointegration null hypothesis. Therefore next we 
apply the Gregory-Hansen procedure
 3,
§§to test for cointegration in the presence of 
structural breaks. Models 2 to 4 (equations 9 to 11) were subsequently estimated, 
starting with model 4 (models 2 and 3 are nested within 4). The null hypothesis of 
no-cointegration was rejected in favor of the alternative of cointegration with a 
structural break in the intercept (model 2)
4
***. The recursively estimated ADF statistics 
for the different breakpoints are presented in figure 3. The min ADF statistic is – 
5.864, – significant at 1 % – corresponding to a break occurring in April 1996.  
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The resulting cointegrating relationship (t - statistics in brackets) is: 
RPPH = 2.000E1 +1.922E2  +  0.802FPPH         (17) 










1 April t if
April t if
E , and 









2 April t if
April t if
E  
                                                 
3  The Gregory-Hansen cointegration tests in the presence of structural breaks were carried 
using a Gauss code. 
4  Results were substantiated using the JOHANSEN (2000) maximum likelihood cointegration 
procedure in the presence of structural breaks. Malcolm code, in RATS programming 
language is available to test cointegration with up to two structural breaks. 
§§ The GREGORY-HANSEN cointegration tests in the presence of structural breaks were carried using a GAUSS code. 
*** Results were substantiated using the JOHANSEN 2000 maximum likelihood cointegration procedure in the presence of structural breaks.  MALCOLM code, in RATS programming language is available to test cointegration with up to two structural breaks. Farm to retail price transmission on the pork market   423
To ensure that the prices are indeed cointegrated, the residuals of (17) are tested for 
unit roots using the DF-GLS procedure. The test rejects the unit root null at 1 %.  
4.3  Price spread and price transmission analysis – German data  
Long-run exogeneity tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of weakly exogenous 
producer prices (1.779~ χ
2, p = 0.18). It follows that the long-run causality on 
the German pork meat market runs from the producer towards the consumer level. 
To test the competitive transmission null hypothesis, we impose the βRPPG = βFPPG 
restriction on (16). The test statistic is χ
2 ~ 4.639 (p = 0.09), rejecting the null 
hypothesis of competitive pricing. Imposing the weak exogeneity restrictions 
results in the long-run equation represented by (18) and depicted in Figure 4: 
RPPG  =  1.552  +  0.543FPPG           (18) 
Figure 4:  Cointegrating relationship on the German pork meat market 
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With the use of logarithms, the long-run elasticity between the prices is readily 
available. Thus the German pork producer and retail prices are cointegrated with 
an imperfect transmission of εFPPG = 0.543.  
The residuals of (18) and are now saved and segmented into negative and 
positive phases. The first differences of the farm prices are also split into 
negative and positive sections as follows: ΔFPPGMt, ΔFPPGPt. The transformed 
equation (12) was first estimated with 4 lags, and then reduced to more 
parsimonious models. Before proceeding to the price transmission analysis, the 
direction of the causality must be determined. The marginal models (15), not 
shown here, were also estimated, and the fitted residuals ν
^
t saved. The variable 
addition test results of the saved ν
^
t residuals into model (12), and its symmetric 
counterpart, are presented at the bottom of Table 2. Surprisingly, the test statistics 
show that the marginal model residuals are significant in the structural equation. As 
discussed in section 3.3, to test the long run causality the significance of the error 
correction terms (ECTt-1, ECTMt-1, ECTPt-1) in the marginal equation 15 is tested. 
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that, although the long run causality runs from the producer to the retail prices, on 
the short-run, German retail prices control farm prices. 
Table 2 presents the regression estimates of the asymmetrical and symmetrical 
representations, short and long-run symmetry, and some diagnostic tests. There 
are no traces of serial autocorrelation of order 1, 4, and 12. The Ljung-Box Q 
statistic doesn’t reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation amongst the 
first 36 residuals. The residuals however are non-normal, which implies that the 
test results must be interpreted with care, although asymptotic results do hold for 
a wider class of distributions (VON  CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 1998). Some of the 
coefficient estimates are not significant; the coefficients of adjustment are around 
50 %. The error correction terms (ECTt-1, ECTMt-1 and ECTPt-1) have the right 
(negative) sign, and ECTMt-1 causes a slightly greater change in the retail price 
than ECTPt-1. ECTPt-1 is not significant at conventional levels; an F-test concludes 
that the long-run symmetry null hypotheses cannot be rejected, suggesting long-run 
price transmission symmetry. The short-run symmetry hypothesis is then tested. At 
1  % probability, the nulls of symmetry cannot be rejected in this case either. 
Table 2:  Symmetric and asymmetric VECM models (dependent variable 
ΔRPPG) 
Independent variable  Symmetric representation 
(standard errors in brackets) 
Asymmetric representation 
(standard errors in brackets) 
ΔFPPGt  0.043
* (0.017)  – 
ΔFPPGt-1 0.075
** (0.019)  – 
ΔFPPGMt-2  – 0.089
** (0.033) 
ΔFPPGPt  – 0.171
** (0.029) 
ΔRPPGt-1  0.078 (0.08)  - 0.023 (0.075) 
ECTt-1  - 0.117
** (0.02)  – 
ECTMt-1  – -  0.160
** (0.04) 
ECTPt-1  – -  0.059
 (0.042) 
Constant  0.0006 (0.001)  - 0.003 (0.002) 
Adjusted R
2 0.49 0.56 
Autocorrelation LM(1)  0.002  0.035 
Autocorrelation LM(4)  0.11  1.212 
Autocorrelation LM(12)  0.559  0.737 
Autocorrelation 
(Ljung – Box Q statistic)  Q(36) = 36.038  Q(36) = 47.087 
Normality (Jarque–Bera)  76.68
**†  61.03
**† 
Variable addition test (νt, 
marginal model residuals)  0.426 [~F(1.99)]  9.131
** [~F(1.97)] 
Long-run symmetry  –  2.321 [~F(1.98)] 
Short-run symmetry –  2.919  [~F(1.98)] 
Notes: 
* Significant at 5 %,
 ** significant at 1 %.
 
   †  Non-normality – implies that the test results must be interpreted with care, although 
asymptotic results do hold for a wider class of distributions (VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 
1998). Farm to retail price transmission on the pork market   425
4.4  Price spread and price transmission analysis – Hungarian data 
Long-run exogeneity tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of weakly exogenous 
producer prices (0.459~χ
2, p = 0.38). It follows that the long-run causality on the 
Hungarian pork meat market runs from the producer towards the consumer 
level. Homogeneity restrictions, i.e. βRPPH = βFPPH on (17) are rejected (12.43~ 
χ
2, p = 0.00). The significance of the break point is also tested by variable 
exclusion tests; however, the null hypothesis that the intercepts in the 2 sub-
periods are equal is rejected (12.32~ χ
2, p = 0.00). Re-estimating the model by 
imposing the exogeneity restrictions can improve its statistical properties. 
Equation (19) and Figure  4 represent the re-estimated long-run relationship 
between the producer and retail prices on the Hungarian pork meat market: 
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Figure 4:  Cointegrating relationship with a structural break on the 
Hungarian pork meat market 
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With the use of logarithms, the long-run elasticity between the prices is readily 
available. Thus the Hungarian beef producer and retail prices are cointegrated 
with an imperfect transmission of εFPPH = 0.807. Equation 19 and Figure 4 show 
that, after the structural break in April 1996, the margin on the Hungarian pork 
market was squeezed.  
As with the German data, we split the error correction terms (the residuals of 
equation 19) as well as the first differences of the Hungarian farm prices into 
positive and negative phases, then estimate equation 12. Coefficient estimates as 
well as some diagnostic tests are presented in Table 3. The variable addition test Lajos Zoltán Bakucs, Imre Fertő, Heinrich Hockmann, Oleksandr Perekhozhuk  426
(bottom of Table 3) of the residuals from a marginal equation shows that the ν
^
t 
residuals are not significant in the structural equation. Therefore the short-run 
causality on the Hungarian pork meat market runs from the producer towards the 
consumer prices. The models appear to be well specified, there are no traces of 
serial autocorrelation, and the coefficients of determination are quite high. Both 
ECTMt-1 and ECTPt-1 are highly significant, and of the right sign, ECTMt-1 being 
slightly bigger (in absolute values) than ECTPt-1. A formal test, however, cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of the two correction terms being equal, suggesting 
that long-run price transmission is symmetric. The short-run symmetry null 
hypothesis is rejected, an increase in farm prices induces a bigger increase in 
retail prices (on short-run) than a decrease in farm prices.  
Table 3:    Symmetric and asymmetric VECM models (dependent variable 
ΔRPPH) 
Independent variable  Symmetric representation 
(standard errors in brackets) 
Asymmetric representation
(standard errors in brackets)
ΔFPPHt  0.519
** (0.03)  – 
ΔFPPHt-1 0.156
** (0.054)  – 
ΔFPPHMt  – 0.175
** (0.039) 
ΔFPPHMt-1 –  0.216
** (0.054) 
ΔFPPHPt  – 0.831
** (0.036) 
ΔFPPHPt-2 –  -  0.171
** (0.06) 
ΔRPPHt-1 0.105  (0.064)  0.227
**  (0.038) 
ΔRPPHt-2 –  0.102
*  (0.052) 
ECTt-1  - 0.277 
** (0.056)  – 
ECTMt-1  – -  0.203 
** (0.067) 
ECTPt-1  – -  0.198
* (0.093) 
Constant  - 0.0303 (0.001)  - 0.006
* (0.002) 
Adjusted R
2 0.79  0.89 
Autocorrelation LM(1)  1.254  0.03 
Autocorrelation LM(4)  0.783  0.483 
Autocorrelation LM(12)  0.565  0.721 
Autocorrelation 
(Ljung – Box Q statistic)  Q(36) = 23.496  Q(36) = 35.187 
Normality (Jarque–Bera)  84.71
**†  26.85
**† 
Variable addition test (νt,,  
marginal model residuals)  0.082 [~F(1.151)]  0.093 [~F(1.147)] 
Long-run symmetry  –  0.001 [~F(1.148)] 
Short-run symmetry  –  7.943
** [~F(1.148)] 
Notes:
 *  Significant at 5 %,
 ** significant at 1 %.
 
   †  Non-normality – implies that the test results must be interpreted with care, although 
asymptotic results do hold for a wider class of distributions (VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 
1998). Farm to retail price transmission on the pork market   427
5 CONCLUSIONS 
With many empirical studies of livestock markets in developed countries, we 
have simultaneously examined how retail price is formed and how price 
transmission works in the livestock markets of a developed and a transition 
economy. We analyzed the long-run relationship between two retail prices and 
the farm-gate price for pork meat in Germany and Hungary. Vertical price 
transmission was analyzed in the cointegration framework, using a relatively 
new cointegration technique that also allows cointegration in the presence of 
structural breaks. Results indicate that the retail and farm gate prices on both 
markets move together in the long run: That is, they are cointegrated, with a 
structural break occurring on the Hungarian market in April 1996. The exogeneity 
tests found that farm prices were weakly exogenous in both the long abd short 
term, and established a unidirectional long-run Granger causality from producer 
to retail prices. Prices are set on the farm level market and transmitted up 
through the wholesale and processing level to the retailers. Our long-run 
causality findings are in line with most empirical studies carried out on livestock 
markets (VON  CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 1998; BOJNEC, 2002; ABDULAI, 2002; 
BEN-KAABIA et al., 2002, to name just a few). Short-run causality, however, is 
different in Germany from Hungary. German retailers and processors might be 
able to exercise their market power on the short-run, and impose prices upon 
farmers. The marketing analysis found that both countries possess a non-
competitive market structure, where processors and retailers charge a mark-up 
of the retail price plus a constant absolute margin that might suggest the exercise 
of market power. The existence of a mark-up pricing strategy concur with 
BOJNEC  (2002), who studied the Slovenian pork and beef meat market, and 
found competitive pork but non-competitive beef marketing margin formation 
processes.  
We carried out both short and long-run asymmetry tests and, contrary to popular 
belief, we found that the null of symmetrical price transmission cannot be 
rejected in the long run. This result contradicts the findings of the studies set in 
developed markets that usually establish asymmetrical price transmission on 
livestock markets, and a farm to wholesale to retail price information flow. 
Short-run price transmission in Hungary proved to be asymmetric, and retailers 
tend quickly to pass on increasing short-run producer price movements. Finally, 
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Table 4:    Comparing marketing margin and price transmission results 
Economic Phenomena  Germany  Hungary 
Cointegration Yes  No 
Cointegration with a 
structural break  No Yes 
Mark-up pricing  Yes  Yes 
Competitive pricing  No  No 
Long-run causality  Producer to retail  Producer to retail 
Short-run causality  Retail to producer Producer  to  retail 
Long-run price 
transmission  Symmetric Symmetric 
Short-run price 
transmission  Symmetric Asymmetric 
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The paper outlines the theoretical framework for analyzing the market structure 
in vertically-related markets. The VECM (Vector error correction model) is 
employed to analyze the relations between the agricultural (farm) price and the 
wholesale price in the vertical sector for pigs, broilers and wheat (Bohemian 
flour). The results suggest that the processing stage for pigs, and probably for 
broilers, may exercise oligopsonistic power. The markets are pushed into an 
equilibrium state, whereby it takes approximately 12 months to reach an equilib-
rium relationship after unitary innovation (shock). The price transmissions do 
not seem to change significantly post-EU enlargement. Moreover, the results 
imply that Czech farmers’ degree of competitiveness is reduced. Agricultural 
policy may diminish the negative effects of the asymmetric relations in price 
transmissions in the short-run. However, in the long run these effects may 
deteriorate.  
Keywords: Price transmission, equilibrium relationship, market power, 
oligopsony. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Growing concern about the nature of the agri-food chain in the Czech Republic 
has arisen from changes in the Czech agrarian sector, which changed from 
supply-driven to demand-driven during the 1990s. This conversion brought 
about changes in relations among vertical markets that have had an important 
impact, especially on farmers and agricultural enterprises. To be successful, 
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farmers and agricultural enterprises have had to accommodate their behavior 
(decisions) with respect to the market. Even agricultural policy has taken into 
account the conditions on the retail market. However, it seems not to take into 
consideration the nature of transmission in vertical markets or the exploitation of 
market power in a given commodity vertical chain.  
The question is whether market power is abused with respect to upstream 
suppliers and/or downstream consumers in the Czech agri-food chain. Whereas 
agricultural producers are represented by numerous farmers and enterprises, the 
processing industry is concentrated and the retail market is significantly 
influenced by multiple large, national retail chains. 
It is well known that in the presence of oligopoly, prices may adjust differentially 
to changes in costs due to the curvature of the demand function. The concept of 
oligopoly is very well illustrated in the industrial organization literature. On the 
other hand, its related concept of oligopsony, i.e., competition among few buyers, 
is described very briefly, if ever, in the theoretical literature. ROGERS R. T. and 
SEXTON R. J. (1994) introduce two reasons why industrial organization economists 
pay little attention to the buyer’s market power: (i) they do not think it is very 
important, and (ii) they do not believe it presents any unique modeling issues 
relative to the seller’s market power.  
Oligopsony may not be important on the industrial markets but it can have a 
very significant impact on the agricultural market or on the agri-food chain. This 
significance arises from the characteristics and specifics of agricultural production 
and agricultural and food markets. Thus, modeling oligopsony can supply unique 
results about the nature of relations in agri-food chains that help to understand, 
among other issues, how the markets are pushed into equilibrium states, what is 
the position of single elements in the chain, what is the competitiveness of 
farmers, what is the effect of agricultural policy and how is this effect in the 
chain distributed?  
Changes in the agri-food chain and the unmet need for precise analysis of the 
agrarian sector have resulted in a lack of theoretical, methodological and 
empirical information about vertical markets in the Czech Republic that could 
be employed in policy analysis and exploited by policy-makers. This paper will 
contribute to the analysis of agri-food chain in the Czech Republic in at least 
two ways: Methodologically and empirically. Strictly speaking, the paper 
attempts, by employing the below-outlined theoretical framework and 
econometric methodology, to answer questions concerning equilibrium in the 
chain, market power in the chain, changes in price transmission after EU 
enlargement, the competitiveness of farmers or agricultural enterprises, and the 
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2 MATERIAL AND METHODS 
The paper’s objective is to quantify and analyze relations in selected price 
transmissions based on the outlined theoretical framework and by employing 
VAR modeling and co-integration analysis.  
The paper follows a hypothesis that assumes simultaneous relations in price 
transmission with an excess of demand power over supply power. It is supposed 
that the chain is demand-driven, which can be characterized as oligopsonistic. 
That the price of agricultural producers is influenced by economic relations on 
the processing market and the price of food producers is the result of 
international food companies having a large role on the consumer market. The 
space for price movement or price adjustment depends on the target profit (or 
margin) of the demand side of the chain.  
Price transmission is analyzed in the following agri-food chains: 
(i)  Vertical sector for pigs – This consists of the agricultural market for 
pigs, the processing market for processed pig products and the retail 
market for processed pig products. 
(ii)  Vertical sector for broilers – This consists of the agricultural market 
for broilers, the processing market for processed broilers and the 
retail market for processed broilers. 
(iii)  Vertical sector for wheat (Bohemian flour) – This consists of the 
agricultural market for wheat, the processing market for Bohemian 
flour and the retail market for Bohemian flour.  
The analysis aims to address the following points: 
(i)  The determination of long-run relationships between the agricultural 
and processing market in the agri-food chain and the speed of estab-
lishing an equilibrium relationship; 
(ii)  The power and the manner of reactions to innovations (shocks) in 
vertical markets; 
(iii)  The characterization of the market structure and the position of 
farmers and agricultural enterprises in the agri-food chain;  
(iv)  The identification of changes in price transmissions after EU enlar-
gement and, 
(v)  The discussion of the competitiveness of Czech farmers and agricul-
tural enterprises and of the effects or efficiency of agricultural policy. 
To make the analysis possible, the theoretical framework must first be defined 
and then the econometric methodology with respect to the above-stated points 
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2.1 Theoretical  framework 
The theoretical framework is defined to enable analysis of the market 
structure in the agri-food chain. The idea of the theoretical framework follows 
LLOYD et al. (2004). 
The characteristics of producers on the agricultural and processing markets can 
be defined by including the necessary assumptions as follows. 
Agricultural market 
The agricultural market consists of n producers (farmers or agricultural 
enterprises) that supply the quantity of agricultural product QA depending on the 
price level PA. This can be expressed in the form of inverse supply function (1). 
PA = f (QA| x1, ..., xn)      ( 1 )  
The characteristics of the supply side on the agricultural market can be supposed 
to be close to the competitive market. Thus, the first order condition for profit 
maximization of all agricultural producers is equal to: 
MR = PA = MC . 
Assuming the competitive market structure on the supply side of the agricultural 
market implies not taking into account the substitution matrix (i.e., the Hessian 
matrix of second-order partials of the profit function) of prices of agricultural 
products supplied by different agricultural producers in the profit maximization 
of i
th processing firm.  
Processing market 
The demand function for the processed product can be expressed in the form of 
an inverse demand function (2). 
PP = f(QP)       ( 2 )  
The profit function of i
th processing firm, which determines output supply and 
input demand of i
th processing firm, can be expressed as follows: 






Pi = , k is the input-output coefficient and Ci are other costs. 
Assuming that other costs Ci do not depend on the QPi, i.e., are constant for each 
level of production in the production space R, then the profit function depends 
only on the input price from the agricultural market (i.e., on the price of the 
agricultural raw material) and on the output price, i.e., the price on the 
processing market. Consequently, the profit function can be defined as the 
maximum value function: 
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For better orientation below, it is useful to express relation (6) in elasticity notation  











+ ⋅ = + ⋅ ,     (7) 
where χi is the conjectural elasticity of firm i in the processing market, ePP is the 
price elasticity of demand for the processing market of given product, δi is the 
conjectural elasticity of firm i in the agricultural market and ePA is the price 
elasticity of an agricultural product’s supply.  
Expressing (7) for the whole market, i.e., summing all firms on the market by 
using firms’ market shares as weights, results in (8). 









+ ⋅ = + ⋅     (8) 
In relation (8), χ and δ are states for industry level market parameters.  
Assuming the following situations or values of χ and δ, respectively: 
(i)  χ = δ = 0: if both χ and δ are equal to zero then the market structure 
is competitive, i.e., there is no market power, and the above-stated 
relation (8) simplifies to (9). 
PP = kPA  ,        ( 9 )  
 where  kPA is the industry level of marginal cost.  
(ii)  χ > 0 and δ = 0: if χ is higher than zero and δ is equal to zero, then 
there is oligopoly power and no oligopsony power on the market. In 
this situation, the first order condition for profit maximization can 
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(iii)  χ = 0 and δ > 0: if χ is equal to zero and δ is higher than zero, there 
is oligopsony power and no oligopoly power on the market. Then, 
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(iv)  χ > 0 and δ > 0: if both parameters are higher than zero, both 
oligopoly and oligopsony power can be found on the market. The 
first order condition for profit maximization is in the form of (8).  
Assuming that demand shifts on the processing market play a major role in 
changes in the price transmission of the agri-food chain and cost shifts are not 
significant, then according to LLOYD  et al., (2004) the market structure is 
competitive if and only if the price transmission elasticity is equal to 1. Oligopoly 
power is exercised if the price transmission elasticity is higher than 1 and oligop-
sony power is present if the price transmission elasticity is less than 1. There 
could also be the possibility of both oligopoly and oligopsony power. In such a 
case, price elasticity is higher than one but lower than the elasticity of oligopoly 
power only. The precise numbers of the price transmission elasticises for 
determining the type of market power depend on the height of parameters in the 
relation (8). In this paper, the calculation of price transmission elasticises for a 
given market structure is not done. The above-stated information is sufficient for 
determining if market power (oligopsony power) is exercised or not, and this is 
sufficient for the purposes of the following analysis.  
2.2 Econometric  methodology 
To establish the theoretical framework of the empirical analysis, it is possible to 
employ econometric methodology. With respect to the aims and the hypothesis 
of the paper, addressing the theoretical framework with the observed data can be 
done by using VAR modeling and co-integration analysis. The following brief 
description of both concepts presents their most important features, which are 
central to the aims and hypothesis of the paper.  
The VAR modeling follows the idea that all variables in the model are stochastic 
and simultaneously dependent. That is, the model structure contains just 
endogenous variables, of which the lags are equal. The VAR(p) model is 
possible to write in the form of (12) (CHAREMZA et al., 2003), whilst it assumes 
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η             ( 1 2 )  
where Xt is g x 1 vector of stochastic stationary variables, p denotes the length 
of lags and u1, …, ut are nid (0,Σ).
 2 
The economic series are usually integrated of the order d. To get stationary 
series, the series must be differentiated d times. The differentiation used in the 
VAR modeling to obtain stationary time series, however, omits any information 
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about the long run adjustments that the data may contain. The VAR model 
contains information about the short run relationship among variables, whereas 
information about the long run is not provided. This feature of VAR modeling 
can be regarded as a specification mistake when the long run relationship among 
variables exists. In other words, if the long run relationship exists, the model 
should contain it. Thus, the concept of co-integration should be employed. 
The co-integration analysis is powerful because it facilitates describing the 
existence of an equilibrium, or stationary (long run) relationship among two or 
more time-series, each of which is individually non-stationary. The modeling 
non-stationary time series may result in spurious regression. Thus, it can be said 
that the regressions involving levels of time series of non-stationary variables 
make sense only if these variables are co-integrated (BANERJEE et al., 2003). 
The linkage of co-integration analysis with VAR modeling results in VECM 
(Vector Error Correction Model). In this case, the relation (12) contains error 
correction mechanism, i.e., the general form of VECM can be expressed in (13). 
Vector Error-correction mechanisms combine the advantages of modeling both 
levels and differences. Thus, in the VECM, the dynamics of both short run 
(changes) and long run (levels) adjustment processes are modeled simultaneously. 
t t s t
p
s
s t t u D X C X X + + Δ + Π + = Δ −
=
− ∑ ψ η
1
1   ,       (13) 
where CS = 0 for s > p, Xt is g x 1 vector of stochastic non-stationary (integrated 
of order 1) variables and u1, …,ut are nid (0,Σ) and Dt is a vector of non-
stochastic variables. The hypothesis of co-integration is formulated as a reduced 
rank of the Π-matrix, which contains two coefficients, α and β. The coefficients 
α and β are g x r matrices of full rank. The hypothesis implies that the process 
ΔXt is stationary, Xt is non-stationary, but β’Xt is stationary. Thus, it can be said 
that the relations β´Xt are stationary relations among non-stationary variables 
(HANSEN et al., 2002). The essential problem is the determination of r, that is, 
identifying the number of co-integrating vectors, and the estimation of the co-
integrating matrix β. The procedure employed in this paper to determine r and 
estimate the co-integrating matrix β is that of Johansen. 
The paper contains two estimated models for each agri-food chain. The first one 
contains variables for the agricultural (farm) price (denoted by APt) and the 
wholesale (processing) price (denoted by PPt) of a given product. The second 
one consists of margins, i.e., the margin of wholesale prices with respect to 
agricultural prices (denoted by marginPAt) and the margin of retail prices with 
respect to wholesale prices (denoted by marginRPt).  
From the above-mentioned information and with regard to the aims of the paper, 
it is obvious that the VECM facilitates identifying the existence of the long run 
relationship between markets in the agri-food chain and the speed of establishing 
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Moreover, the VECM enables analyzing the power and the manner of reactions 
on innovations (shocks) in vertical markets (i.e., the analysis of dynamics in the 
vertical sector) and the way of establishing the equilibrium relationship. This is 
analyzed by the impulse-response analysis, i.e., application of the orthogonal 
process of fitted VECM. In other words, the impulse response function represents 
the behavior of the modeled series in response to innovations (shocks) and is 
thus exploited in the dynamic policy simulation.  
The characterization of the market structure and the position of farmers and 
agricultural plants in the agri-food chain is done based on the fitted models and 
the above-outlined theoretical framework. That is, the first model may provide 
the estimation of the price transmission elasticity for the given vertical markets, 
and the theoretical framework contains information about the values of the price 
transmission elasticity for different market structures. The second model serves to 
analyze relations in the whole price transmission, i.e., the whole agri-food chain.  
Identifying changes in price transmission after EU enlargement is done by 
incorporating a dummy variable into the fitted models, which captures changes 
in the price transmission after the EU enlargement.  
Finally, the results are discussed considering the competitiveness of Czech farmers 
and agricultural enterprises and the effects or efficiency of agricultural policy.  
The RATS software version 6 and the package CATS in RATS are used to fit 
and test the models. 
2.3 Data 
The data set is gathered from the Czech Statistical Office and covers the period 
January 1995 to December 2005.  
The following prices are used: 
(i)  Vertical sector for pigs: The agricultural (farm) price of pork in 
Czech Crowns per kilogram, the wholesale price of processed pig 
products in Czech Crowns per kilogram (the wholesale price is the 
weighted average of wholesale prices of processed pig products; the 
weights stem from the slaughter yield) and the retail price of 
processed pig products. (the retail price is the weighted average of retail 
prices of the processed pig products; the weights are as stated above).  
(ii)  Vertical sector for broilers: The agricultural (farm) price of broilers 
in Czech Crowns per kilogram, the wholesale price of broilers in 
Czech Crowns per kilogram and the retail price of broilers in Czech 
Crowns per kilogram. 
(iii)  Vertical sector for wheat (Bohemian flour): The agricultural (farm) price 
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flour in Czech Crowns per ton and the retail price of Bohemian flour 
in Czech Crowns per ton.  
The prices are not deflated. All variables are logarithmically transformed. 
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Firstly, the price transmission of pigs is analyzed. The analysis starts with the 
unit root tests to determine the order of integration in modeling the employed 
variables. According to the results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, 
both endogenous variables, i.e., the logarithm of the agricultural price of pigs 
(logAP) and logarithm of the wholesale price of processed pig products (logPP), 
are integrated of order 1 (i.e., I(1)).  
As stated in the econometric methodology, the analysis of the integrated series is 
made by linking the concept of VAR modeling with co-integration analysis, i.e., 
the VECM may be employed. The VECM consists of two endogenous variables 
(i.e., logAP, logPP), constant in the co-integration space and a dummy variable 
(dum1). The dummy variable contains number 0 for the period January 1995-
May 2004 and the rest is assigned the number 1. The VECM model has 4 lags in 
the VAR space, with the length of lag being chosen based on AIC (Akaike’s 
Information Criterion), SIC (Schwarz Information Criterion) and with respective 
auto-correlation residuals structure. 
The L-max test and the Trace test suggest that the model contains one co-
integrating vector at the 10  % significance level. That is, the results of the 
estimation inform about the existence of equilibrium relationship. The VECM has 
one co-integrating vector, thus the model contains unique information about the 
long run relationship between variables and can be used to characterize market 
structure. 
To obtain the demanded co-integrating vector, it is necessary to normalize the 
eigenvectors by the coefficient of logAP. The resulting co-integrating vector 
(1,000; -0,823; 0,066) for logAP, logPP and the constant represents the 
equilibrium relationship between agricultural and wholesale prices. The co-
integrating vector is significant in the equation for logAP at the 5 % significance 
level. In the second equation, this is not the case. Consequently, logPP may be 
an exogenous variable with respect to logAP.   
Assuming that there are no strong knock-on and feedback effects, which could 
make interpreting the coefficients difficult (see LLOYD et al., 2004), then the 
coefficients of the equilibrium relationship, i.e., the co-integrating vector, represent, 
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In this case, the "pass-back" price transmission elasticity is equal to  0.823. 
Elasticity is smaller than 1, which implies, according to the theoretical 
framework, that the processing stage may exercise oligopsonistic power. 
The impulse-response analysis of the VECM for pigs shows the system’s 
reaction to innovations (shocks). Thus, it illustrates the dynamic of the system 
and informs about the speed and the way of establishing equilibrium. Graphs in 
Figure  1 demonstrate responses of the system to the unitary orthogonal 
innovation (shock) in logAP (left graph) and in logPP (right graph). A series’ 
response is normalized by dividing by its innovation variance. 
Figure 1:  Impulse-response analysis of VECM for pigs 
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The left-hand graph shows responses of logAP (black line) and logPP (dashed 
line) to the unitary innovation in the agricultural price (logAP). The responses of 
both series, which firstly rise and then fall, are significantly positive. After 
approximately one year, the series seems to reach equilibrium.  Lukáš Čechura  440
The right-hand graph presents responses to the innovation in the wholesale price 
(logPP), which is positive for all periods. The responses of the agricultural price 
are negative in the first month after the shock and then positive. Equilibrium is 
again reached after 12 months.  
The responses and the final state after the innovation differ depending on the 
type of the innovation. The nature of the differences, together with the path of 
responses after the given innovation, supports the above-stated characterization 
of the type of market structure. 
The second model consists of marginPA (marginPA = logPP – logAP) and 
marginRP (marginRP = log_retail_price – logPP). The model is estimated in the 
form of the VAR model due to the stationarity of variables marginPA and 
marginRP. The VAR model has 2 lags (according to AIC and SIC), constant and 
a dummy variable (dum2). The dummy variable contains zero between 1995 and 
2004 and one for year 2005, in which there seems to be a significant change in 
the spread of margins.  
Even if the F-test suggests that both maginRP in the equation for marginPA and 
marginPA in the equation for marginRP are not significant regressors at the 5 % 
level, the impulse-response analysis is shown because it presents interesting results.  
The left-hand picture in Figure 2 demonstrates responses to the innovation in the 
marginPA (black line). The second picture illustrates responses to the innovation 
in the marginRP (dashed line). 
The path of responses in both pictures may imply, considering the above–stated ar-
guments, that the processing industry plays a major role in the agri-food chain for pigs. 
Figure 2:  Impulse-response analysis of VAR model for pigs 
 
 
marginPA  marginRP 
Plot of responses to marginPA 















Plot of responses to marginRP 










The dummy variables (dum1 and dum2) are significant in both models. Dum1 is 
significant in the first equation of VECM, while Dum2 is significant in both 
equations of the VAR model.  
Dum1 in the VECM expresses the increase in agricultural prices after EU 
enlargement. Dum2 captures a slow decrease in marginPA and an increase in 
marginRP after the EU enlargement. However, the period is too short to draw 
conclusions about the changes in the price transmission of pigs.  
Secondly, the agri-food chain of broilers is analyzed. The series of prices, i.e., 
the agricultural price of broilers and the wholesale price of broilers, are 
integrated of order one according to the ADF test. Thus, the VECM is estimated 
to contain prices as endogenous variables constant in the co-integration space 
and to have 4 lags in the VAR space.  
The fitted model has one co-integrating vector according to the L-max test and 
the Trace test. That is, the model offers unique information about the long run 
relationship, and one may conclude that the equilibrium relationship between 
prices exists.  
Re-normalization of the eigenvectors by the coefficient of the agricultural price 
results in the following co-integrating vector: (1,000; -0,747; -0,317). The co-
integrating vector is significant in both equations of the VECM at a 5  % 
significance level. That is, the relationship between variables seems to be 
simultaneous.  
Assuming again that there are no significant strong knock-on and feedback 
effects, then the "pass-back" price transmission elasticity is equal to 0.747. The 
"pass-back" elasticity suggests that the processing stage may exercise 
oligopsony power only.  Lukáš Čechura  442
Graphs in Figure  3 show responses of the series to the unitary orthogonal 
innovation in logAP (left graph) and in logPP (right graph). The response of a 
series is normalized by dividing it by its innovation variance.  
Figure 3:  Impulse-response analysis of VECM for broilers 
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The left-hand graph shows responses of the series logAP (black line) and logPP 
(dashed line) to the innovation in logAP, which are positive in all steps. The 
reaction of the agricultural price is higher than that of the wholesale price, and 
the series may reach equilibrium within 1 year.  
The right-hand graph presents the series’ responses to innovation in logPP. The 
responses of both series are positive again in all periods. The responses of logPP 
are higher than the responses of logAP in the first 3 steps. However, from the 4
th 
step the responses of logAP exceed the responses of logPP. The system may 
reach equilibrium within 20 months.  
The results of the impulse-response analysis contradict the above-stated 
conclusion about market power and should be analyzed more closely.  The nature of selected price transmissions in the agri-food chain  443
Figure 4 contains the impulse-response analysis of the VAR model for broilers. 
The VAR(3) model consists of margin PA, margin RP, constant and dum1. The 
F-test suggests that marginPA and maginRP are significant regressors in both 
equations at the 5 % significance level. 
The left-hand graph shows the series’ responses to the innovation in marginPA, 
and the right-hand graph presents responses of the series to the innovation in 
marginRP. The results of the impulse-response analysis imply that the retail 
stage may play a dominant role in the agri-food chain of broilers. 
Figure 4:  Impulse-response analysis of VAR model for broilers 
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The dummy variable is not significant in the VECM but is significant in the 
VAR model. However, their values do not suggest that there has been any 
significant change in the price transmission of broilers after EU-enlargement.  
Finally, the vertical sector of wheat (Bohemian flour) is analyzed. According to 
the ADF test, the variables, i.e., the agricultural price of wheat and the wholesale 
price of Bohemian flour, are integrated of order one. The analysis of integrated 
series I(1) starts with the estimation of the VECM considering the possible Lukáš Čechura  444
existence of a long run relationship between variables. The VECM consists of 
two endogenous variables (agricultural price of wheat and wholesale price of 
Bohemian flour) and constant in the co-integration space. The length of lags in 
the VAR space, in this case 3 lags, was chosen according to the information 
criterions (AIC and SIC). 
The L-max test and the Trace test of the fitted VECM suggest that the model has 
one co-integrating vector at the 10 % significance level. That is, the series are 
co-integrated and the equilibrium relationship between them may exist. 
The eigenvectors are normalized by the wholesale price of Bohemian flour due 
to the significance of the parameter α in the second equation of the VECM. The 
resulting co-integrating vector has the form of (-0,829; 1,000; -2,020) and is not 
significant in the first equation. This may imply that the agricultural price of 
wheat may be exogenous with respect to the wholesale price of Bohemian flour. 
However, exogeneity tests do not confirm this hypothesis. 
Assuming that the co-integrating vector is also relevant for the first equation and 
that there are no significant strong knock-on and feedback effects, then the 
"pass-back" price transmission elasticity is equal to 1,206 (i.e., 1/0.829). In this 
case, the "pass-back" elasticity suggests that the processing stage may exercise 
the oligopoly power only or both oligopoly and oligopsony power. However, 
considering that the co-integrating vector is not significant in the first equation, 
the identification of market structure is not clear.  
Figure 5:  Impulse-response analysis of VECM for wheat (Bohemian flour) 
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Figure 5 presents the results of the impulse-response analysis of the VECM for 
wheat (Bohemian flour).  
The left-hand graph shows the responses of series logAP (black line) and logPP 
(dashed line) to the innovation in logAP. The right-hand graph contains the 
series’ responses to the innovation in logPP. 
All series’ responses to innovations are positive. The responses of logPP exceed, 
in both graphs, the responses of logAP. This is again a case which may be in 
contradiction to what has been stated above about the market structure. 
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The impulse-response analysis of the VAR model for wheat (Bohemian flour) is 
presented in Figure 6. In this case, the VAR(8) model consists of margin PA, 
margin RP, constant and dum1. F-test suggests that the variables are significant 
regressors in both equations at the 10 % level. 
The left-hand graph shows series’ responses to the innovation in marginPA and 
the right-hand graph presents responses of the series to the innovation in 
marginRP. The results of the impulse-response analysis imply that the retail stage 
may again play a dominant role in the agri-food chain for wheat (Bohemian flour). 
The dummy variable is not significant in both models, which may imply that there 
has not been any significant change in wheat’s price transmission (Bohemian 
flour) after EU-enlargement. 
The obtained results can be discussed with respect to the Czech farmers’ 
competitiveness and effects (efficiency) of agricultural policy. 
The results suggest that the processing stage may exercise market power. 
Strictly speaking, the processing market for pig products may have oligopsony 
power, and the processing market for broilers also seems to exercise oligopsony 
power. However, the results in this vertical sector are not unambiguous and the 
vertical markets of wheat (Bohemian flour) may be non-competitive as well. In 
light of these results, it seems that the Czech farmers’ degree of competitiveness 
is reduced due to the possible market power abuse at the processing and/or retail 
stage. Asymmetric relations, which result in asymmetric price transmission in 
the vertical sector, may have several effects on farmers.  
The short-run effects may produce a skewed distribution for the agricultural 
(farmer’s) price. That is, the short-run price dynamic can be nonlinear (see 
CHAVAS et al., 2004). The prices may respond differently to positive and 
negative innovations (shocks) and/or to small and large innovations (shocks). 
Some of these responses can be found in the above-presented impulse-response The nature of selected price transmissions in the agri-food chain  447
analysis, however, the precise description of distribution demands deeper 
analysis. The implications of asymmetric price transmission, considering the 
farmer’s competitiveness in the short run, may be seen in higher price volatility 
and consequently, in higher degree of risk for the agricultural sector. The higher 
degree of risk may result in the reduction of output (see risk-adjusted value of 
marginal product) ceteris paribus. However, this consequence can be abolished 
by effects of agricultural policy.  
The long run effects can be evaluated based on the estimated co-integrating 
vectors. Assuming that the processing stage exercises oligopsony power, i.e., the 
case of the vertical sectors of pigs and broilers (possibly also wheat), then the 
long-lasting positive change in the wholesale price by 1 % results in the increase 
in the agricultural price by less than 1 % (i.e., by 0.823 % in the case of pigs and 
by 0.747 % in case of broilers). That is, the processing/farm price margin is 
going up. The negative change in the wholesale price has the opposite effect. 
However, taking into account that the analysis is based on nominal prices, then 
it can be assumed that the long-lasting change in the wholesale price is positive. 
Considering the role of agricultural policy and assuming a long-run increase in 
prices (at least nominal), it can be concluded that the financial "aid" for farmers 
is distributed within the agri-food chain. Thus, the long-run effects (efficiency) 
of agricultural policy may be deteriorated with respect to Czech farmers.  
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The paper outlines a theoretical framework for the analysis of the market 
structure in vertically-related markets. The linkage of co-integration analysis 
with VAR modeling is used to fit the theoretical model. Results of the analysis 
suggest the following: The equilibrium relationship in all investigated vertical 
markets exists; the processing stage may exercise oligopsony power in the 
processing stage for pigs and broilers; the market structure of the vertical 
markets for wheat is not precisely determined; the impulse-response analyses 
show that the price dynamic takes approximately 12 months to reach 
equilibrium. Moreover, the price transmissions do not seem to significantly 
change their nature after EU enlargement.  
The results imply that the Czech farmers’ degree of competitiveness has been 
reduced. Agricultural policy may diminish the negative effects of the 
asymmetric relations in price transmissions in the short run. However, in the 
long run, the effects of agricultural policy may deteriorate, assuming oligopsony 
power in the processing stage. 
Finally, the analysis suggests that the hypothesis of the paper cannot be rejected. 
The analysis of the nature of price transmission in vertical markets is not 
comprehensive in this paper. However, the paper contributes to the analysis of Lukáš Čechura  448
price transmission in the Czech Republic both methodologically and empirically, 
and opens further topics for future research.  
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The economic transformation in countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well 
as Asia has resulted in a diverse picture of change in agricultural labor use. 
Annual migration within this sector ranges between an emigration of about nearly 
8 percent of the agricultural labor force, to an immigration into agriculture of 
about 10  percent on average. This paper considers the determinants of this 
occupational labor flow and separates the migration rate in an annual and a time-
invariant part. The most important determinants of the annual migration rate are 
the ratio of sectoral income per worker and the relative magnitude of agricultural 
labor. The time-invariant part of the migration is very closely related to initial 
conditions and the method of land privatization. 
Keywords: Intersectoral migration, intersectoral income differential, institutions, 
transition economies. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Economies in transition have undergone a tremendous change since the start of 
economic reforms. In most of them, agriculture was collectivized and 
intersectoral movement of labor more or less restricted before the break-up of 
the economic planning system. Economic reforms implied decollectivization, 
privatization of land and assets, adjustment of relative prices and liberalization 
of labor markets. However, the speed and degree of implementation varied 
widely between the different countries. ROZELLE and SWINNEN (2004) compare 
the agricultural reform process in several transition countries. A striking result is 
the significant divergence in agricultural labor productivity and agricultural 
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labor use over the reform period. Whereas Central European and East Asian 
countries experienced an increase of labor productivity after reforms, the drop is 
highest for Transcaucasian and Central Asian countries. Adjustment of the labor 
force to new economic conditions seems to take different paths and to proceed at 
different speeds. The continuous decline of the proportion of the workforce 
employed in agriculture which, it is hypothesized, occurs in parallel with 
economic development, cannot be observed in all transition countries (see 
sources cited in MUNDLAK, 1978). In Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, and Tajikistan it has even increased by more than 
50 %. This paper refers to this inflow of labor as immigration. Other countries 
experienced a steep drop in agricultural employment which far exceeds the 
development in non-transition countries (see Figure 1). This outflow of labor is 
termed rural migration or emigration. The objective of this paper is to provide a 
more detailed analysis of one aspect of this adjustment process: Determinants of 
occupational migration from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors. More 
specifically, the determinants which drive intersectoral migration in transition 
countries are analyzed econometrically, focusing the impact of different 
privatization methods and other institutional indicators. Finally, this paper looks 
at whether migration converges to a common rate in the whole sample or in 
more homogeneous sub-samples. 

















































































































Source:  Own calculations based on WORLD BANK (2005), ILO (2006), and national statistics. 
Notes:    Percentage change between 1990 and 2003, except China (1978-2003), Croatia, 
Macedonia, and Serbia (1996-2003), Slovenia (1993-2003) and Tajikistan (1991-2003). Labor mobility in transition countries and the impact of institutions  453
Previous literature on the transition process in agriculture focused mainly on 
privatization methods (e.g., CSAKI  and LERMAN, 1997; LERMAN, CSAKI  and 
FEDER, 2004; SWINNEN, 1998), the development of productivity (see among 
others MACOURS  and SWINNEN, 2000; LERMAN  et al., 2003; ROZELLE  and 
SWINNEN, 2004; MATHIJS  and  SWINNEN, 2001) or evolving farm structures 
(LERMAN, CSAKI and FEDER, 2004). Aspects of agricultural labor form a smaller 
block of literature, mainly concentrating on either participation in emerging off-
farm activities and particularly in Chinese rural areas: CHAPLIN, DAVIDOVA and 
GORTON (2004); BUCHENRIEDER, KNÜPFER  and  HEIDHUES (2002); GLAUBEN, 
HERZFELD  and WANG (2005a); GLAUBEN, HERZFELD  and  WANG (2005b);   
DE BRAUW et al. (2002); ZHANG, DE BRAUW and ROZELLE (2004).
1 BROOKS and 
TAO (2003) analyze the determinants of the share of non-agricultural 
employment for Chinese provinces using a fixed effects model. Results show 
that non-agricultural real GDP and the nominal wage index are the most 
important explanatory variables.  
Turning to the change in agriculture’s share of total labor, SWINNEN, DRIES and 
MACOURS (2005) separate the literature discussing the adjustment of the 
agricultural labor force into two categories, with the first focusing on the 
reduction in surplus labor after the removal of subsidies, central planning and 
mobility restrictions. By contrast, the second category highlights the buffer role 
played by agriculture, e.g., in form of subsistence farms, in periods of high 
unemployment and economic uncertainty. The theoretical model provided by 
SWINNEN, DRIES  and  MACOURS (2005) shows the importance of institutional 
reforms for the change in agricultural labor. An effective privatization of 
corporate farms as well as the break-up of state enterprises and collective farms 
into private family farms will reduce the total numbers employed in agriculture, 
but this is partly offset by increased labor efficiency. Decreasing relative 
agricultural prices and increasing wages in non-agricultural sectors also lead to a 
reduction in agricultural labor.  
Two approaches can be found within the empirical literature. DRIES  and 
SWINNEN (2002) focus on the development of the proportion of the workforce 
employed in agriculture in Polish macro-regions between 1990 and 1997. A 
similar study for seven countries of Central and Eastern Europe for the period 
1989-1998 is undertaken by SWINNEN, DRIES  and  MACOURS (2005). Both 
studies use the annual percentage change in labor employed in agriculture since 
the start of economic reforms as dependent variable. Statistically significant 
explanatory variables are the change in privately used land, the change in the 
proportion of agricultural land operated by individual farms, and the terms of 
trade. A slightly different focus informs the work by BUTZER, MUNDLAK and 
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LARSON (2003) as well as BUTZER, LARSON and MUNDLAK (2002). Both papers 
rely on the approach developed by LARSON and MUNDLAK (1997) and 
MUNDLAK (1978). The migration rate between agriculture and non-agricultural 
sectors for South-east Asian countries and Venezuela is explained using a 
principal components approach. The main determinants of intersectoral 
migration are the income ratio between sectors, the growth of non-agricultural 
employment, and unutilized capacity in non-agriculture. 
This paper follows the approach by MUNDLAK and co-authors. The rate of 
occupational migration between agriculture and non-agricultural sectors is cal-
culated for 29 transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Asia 
for up to 26 years. Several macroeconomic and institutional variables are used to 
explain this migration rate in a panel framework. The following section explains 
the methodology and describes the database. Section three presents the results of 
the econometric analysis and the paper finishes with some concluding comments. 
2 METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
Starting from early models of migration like Todaro’s seminal work (TODARO, 
1969; HARRIS and TODARO, 1970), migration is understood as a mechanism to 
equalise marginal earnings in agriculture and non-agricultural sectors. 
Institutions which limit intersectoral mobility may restrict this equalisation.
2 
Due to data limitations most of the empirical literature uses average sectoral 
income per worker instead of marginal income. Wages are thought to be less 
informative due to other additional income components and uncertainty 
regarding the probability of finding employment in the preferred sector. The use 
of sectoral income may suffer from price differences between agriculture and 
non-agricultural sectors. But this effect should diminish over time since almost 
all transition countries liberalized prices relatively fast.
3 
Using the framework developed in LARSON and  MUNDLAK (1997) and 
MUNDLAK (1978) the intersectoral migration rate and resulting income ratios 
between sectors are calculated for a panel of transition countries. Assuming that 
the growth rate of agricultural labor (nA) would equal the growth rate of total 
labor (n), differences between both rates could be attributed to migration. Thus 
the migration rate from agriculture is calculated as the difference between 
growth rates of total labor and agricultural labor (Equation 1).  
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und HUGO (1993) as well as TAYLOR und MARTIN (2001). 
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According to the above-mentioned literature, one should expect migration to 
increase with the income ratio between non-agricultural sectors and agriculture 
and the relative magnitude of agricultural labor, which constitutes the source of 
supply (HARRIS and TODARO, 1970, ZAREMBKA, 1970). The income ratio between 
non-agricultural sectors and agriculture is calculated as the ratio of sectoral GDP 
per worker. Assuming perfect intersectoral mobility, this ratio should approach a 
value of one. By contrast, higher values point to mobility-restricting institutions.  
Annual sectoral labor and GDP data are taken from WORLD BANK (2005), 
ILO (2006), UNITED NATIONS (2006) and are supplemented by information from 
national statistical yearbooks. This study analyses 29 transition countries from 
Europe and Asia.
4 The data covers up to 26 years with most of the countries 
starting in 1990.
5  
The econometric analysis proceeds in two steps.
6 First, the migration rate is 
explained using a fixed effects model (Equation  2). Relying on theoretical 
models of migration the lagged income differential IRit-1 should explain a large 
part of the migration rate. The labor ratio (LRit-1) between agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors accounts for a potentially larger migration rate if the 
agricultural sector is relatively large. A change in relative prices might affect 
productivity in agriculture and, therefore, act as a migration determinant. The 
variable Terms of Trade (TOTit-1) should control for this relationship. These 
three variables form a basic specification. Finally, a set of additional explanatory 
variables is included in matrix Xit  to control for the robustness of the basic 
specification. First, the lagged unemployment ratio (Unempt-1) is included to 
take into account the probability of finding jobs outside of agriculture. Second, 
the annual average of the EBRD transition indices (EBRD) should check for the 
impact of economic liberalization on intersectoral mobility. The vectors β1-4 
contain the coefficients to be estimated.  
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The estimated fixed effects ( ˆi υ ) are, as a second step, explained by institutional 
variables and initial conditions using a cross-country approach (Equation 3). The 
matrix Yi contains variables to control for initial conditions, like GDP per capita 
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5  Data for China covers the whole sample (1978-2003); the observation of Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, and Romania starts in 1980; and Poland follows in 1981. Most of the remaining 
countries enter the sample in 1990. 
6  The fixed effects model does not allow the inclusion of time invariant variables, like initial 
conditions, as exogenous variables. They would lead to perfect multicollinearity with the 
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in 1990, agriculture’s share of GDP in 1990, and dummies for the land 
privatization procedure. A second subset of variables controls for institutional 
quality, approximated by a corruption index, literacy of adult population and the 
proportion of paved roads.  
  ˆii i cY u υ γ′ = ++  (3) 
The explanatory variables in equation 2 capture the annual part of the migration 
rate mit; and the fixed effects  ˆi υ  might be regarded as the time-invariant part of 
the intersectoral migration. Therefore, this two-step procedure implies a 
decomposition of the annual migration rate. 
3 RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1 Descriptive  analysis 
Table  1 shows the average migration rate per annum as a percentage of the 
agricultural labor force and the average income ratio for all countries over the 
sample period. The average migration rate varies between an emigration of up to 
8 percent of the agricultural labor force (Estonia) and an immigration of up to 
10 percent  (Georgia).
7 The ranking is highly correlated with the change in 
agriculture’s share of total labor (see Figure 1). A comparison of these estimates 
with decade averages for the 80s by LARSON and MUNDLAK (1997) shows a 
relatively high migration in Estonia, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, and 
Belarus. A first look at the calculated income ratios shows an interesting picture 
and the variable varies between 0.8 and 4.7. Whereas the CIS countries exhibit 
income ratios near one in 1990 and 1991, the variance increases significantly 
over the sample period. Non-CIS countries show a higher variation of income 
ratios at the beginning of the sample period. These results are comparable with 
estimates by LARSON and MUNDLAK (1997) for Asia, Latin America and the 
group of other countries. Only African countries show higher income 
differentials between non-agricultural sectors and agriculture. 
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Table 1:  Migration rate and income ratio 
No. of years with 





ratio  Emigration Immigration
Albania  1992-2003  0.010 4.351 4  7 
Armenia 1990-2003  -0.088  1.156  0  13 
Azerbaijan 1999-2003  0.014  1.388  3  1 
Belarus 1988-2003  0.032  0.862  15  1 
Bulgaria 1980-2003  -0.003  1.020  13  10 
China 1978-2003  0.020  4.000  22  3 
Croatia 1996-2003  0.017  2.405 5  2 
Czech Republic  1980-2003  0.040 0.776  18  1 
Estonia 1989-2003  0.079  1.010  13  1 
Georgia 1990-2003  -0.102  2.540  5  8 
Hungary 1990-2003  0.067  1.149  12 2 
Kazakhstan 1990-2003  -0.054  0.944  5  7 
Kyrgyzstan 1986-2003  -0.030  0.961  7  11 
Latvia 1990-2003  0.008  0.843  7  6 
Lithuania 1982-2003  0.005  2.644  11  10 
Macedonia 1996-2003  -0.045  2.441  2  5 
Moldova 1990-2003  -0.027  2.014  4 9 
Mongolia 1990-2003  -0.021  4.181  4  9 
Poland 1980-2003  0.021  3.997  18  5 
Romania 1978-2003  -0.006  2.176  13  11 
Russia 1990-2003  0.019  0.799 7  6 
Serbia and 
Montenegro  1996-2003 -0.004  0.886  3  4 
Slovak Republic  1990-2003  0.051  1.680  9  4 
Slovenia 1993-2003  0.015  2.665  6 3 
Tajikistan 1991-2003  -0.038  4.119  1 11 
Turkmenistan  1990-2003  -0.012 3.284 3  9 
Ukraine 1987-2003  0.000  1.314  6  9 
Uzbekistan 1990-2003  0.005  1.319  8  4 
Vietnam 1993-2003  0.018  4.698  10  3 
Source:  Own calculations based on WORLD BANK (2005); ILO (2006); UNITED NATIONS 
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A closer look reveals that the average migration rate masks significant temporal 
differences between and within countries, as Figure 2 shows. The average migration 
of 4 percent in the Czech Republic is highly influenced by the development after 
1990, where up to 20 percent of the agricultural labor force left the sector in 
only one year. The period prior to that (1981-1988) is characterized by a 
migration rate close to zero. By contrast, Romanian data indicate a flow from 
non-agricultural occupations to agriculture after 1989, accounting for up to 
10 percent of agricultural employment. Different privatization procedures and 
subsequent restructuring are acknowledged as one of the main reasons behind 
this (ROZELLE and SWINNEN, 2004). Poland, as a third example, experienced not 
such a significant shift in the migration rate. An emigration of more than 
5 percent of the sector’s labor force occurred only in the years 1994 to 1999. 
Finally, China shows a large decrease in agriculture’s share of total employment 
since 1978, whereas the annual migration rate is mostly positive but 
comparatively low (2 % of the agricultural labor force). Occupational migration 
might be broken down into two parts. First, the actual change of occupation by 
workers which fits the situation in the Czech Republic and Romania in 1990-93. 
The second part is related to the decision of those new entrants into the labor 
force who shun the agricultural sector. This is more likely to describe the 
development in Poland and China.  




























































































Source:  Own calculations based on WORLD  BANK (2005), ILO (2006) and national 
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3.2  Results of the econometric analysis 
Starting from a basic model which covers all countries, different specifications 
of equation 2 are estimated and the results reported in Table 2. The fixed effects 
approach is favored in all specifications compared to a cross-section analysis. 
The country-specific fixed effects explain almost half of the dependent variable’s 
variation. Unfortunately, all specifications suffer from a high correlation between 
the exogenous variables and the unobserved fixed effects, which is mainly 
driven by the relationship between the income ratio and the fixed effects.
8 
Column  1 shows the basic specification over the whole sample period. An 
increasing income ratio (IR) has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
the migration rate. Countries with a larger pool of agricultural labor (LR) 
experience a higher sectoral migration. Increasing relative agricultural prices 
(ToT) lower the annual migration significantly. Restricting the sample to the 
post-1989 period (Column 2), results in a smaller impact of the income ratio on 
the migration rate. On the other hand, the impact of the labor ratio and terms of 
trade increases, although the differences are not statistically significant except 
for the labor ratio. Including additional explanatory variables results in a smaller 
sample as most of them are not available for all countries and over the whole 
sample period. The unemployment rate (Unemp) and the progress in economic 
reforms (EBRD), captured by the EBRD transition index, has no significant 
influence on the dependent variable. Unfortunately, it reduces the statistical 
significance of the variables IR and the ToT. It also increases the contribution of 
the unobserved fixed effects. Controlling for additional exogenous conditions 
like infrastructure (Telephone), agricultural support (PSE), foreign direct 
investments (FDI) or inflation does not alter the results much. These additional 
specifications are presented in the Appendix.  
As stated above, the fixed effects explain a large part of the migration rate and 
they are highly correlated with the average migration rate. The second step of 
the econometric exercise consists of explaining these fixed effects with 
indicators of initial conditions, privatization procedure and institutional quality. 
Results are presented in Table  3. The estimated fixed effects from the basic 
model [1] in Table 2 which covers all countries enter the following cross-country 
estimation as dependent variable. Unfortunately, some of the explanatory 
variables are highly correlated, which may increase coefficients’ standard errors. 
Different specifications are therefore estimated.  
                                                 
8  Using the fixed effects estimator has the advantage that the correlation between the fixed 
effects and the explanatory variables does not affect the estimator’s consistency and leads 
to unbiased coefficients (BALTAGI, 2005). Thomas Herzfeld, Thomas Glauben  460
Table 2:  Determinants of annual migration rate 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 



















































Unempt-1  – –  0.0001 
(0.08)  – 
EBRD  – – –  -0.0024 
(-0.18) 
R
2  0.0950 0.1222 0.1034  0.1279 
ρ  0.4372 0.5523 0.5155  0.5929 





N/Countries  395/29 348/29 294/28  304/27 
Notes:  The heteroscedasticity consistent estimator (WHITE, 1980) has been used to 
estimate the asymptotic covariance matrix. Coefficients significant at the 1 %, 5 %, 
and 10 % level of significance are indicated with 
***, 
**, and 
*, respectively. The 
displayed R2 measures only the contribution of the explanatory variables without 
the fixed effects. The ρ indicates the share of the explained variation due to the 
fixed effects. 
Column 1 presents the results of the first specification which controls for initial 
conditions and the kind of land privatization. Countries which have chosen 
distribution in kind (Distribution) procedures exhibit a significantly lower 
migration than countries which implemented a distribution of shares, the 
reference category. By contrast, the restitution of land (Restitution) is 
significantly correlated with a higher migration compared to the reference. 
Referring back to the literature mentioned in the introduction these results 
support both categories. Countries which opted for distribution experienced 
immigration into agriculture, highlighting the subsistence aspect. On the other 
hand, restitution of agricultural land seems to have accelerated restructuring 
within the sector, including a faster emigration from agriculture.  Labor mobility in transition countries and the impact of institutions  461
Table 3:  Determinants of country fixed effects 
  [1] [2] [3] 































Log(GDP90)  0.0093 
(0.71) 
– – 









Land  – 0.0299 
(0.88) 
– 




2   0.6427  0.5954  0.6591 
N  29 28 28 
Notes:  The heteroscedasticity consistent estimator (WHITE, 1980) has been used to 
estimate the asymptotic covariance matrix. Coefficients significant at the 1 %, 5 %, 
and 10 % level of significance are indicated with 
***, 
**, and
 *, respectively. 
Initial conditions seem to have only a limited impact. The GDP per capita in 
1990 (GDP90) is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Countries 
where agriculture had a higher share of national GDP in 1990 (AGSHARE90) 
seem to have a lower migration. A second specification [2] accounts for the 
impact of institutional indicators like education, corruption, arable land per 
capita and infrastructure quality on the fixed effects. The unobserved country 
specific part of the migration rate is positively correlated with the educational 
level (Literacy) and institutional quality (Corruption).
9 The third Column  [3] 
presents the results of a stepwise regression procedure and includes only 
variables with a significance level below 0.2. Again, countries which privatized 
land via distribution in kind and where agriculture was more significant in 1990 
                                                 
9  The corruption index is compiled by TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL and measures the 
perceived level of corruption within a country. It is scaled from 0 to 10 with higher values 
indicating a lower level of corruption. The variable in the estimation is the average of the 
annual values over the period 1995-2005. Thomas Herzfeld, Thomas Glauben  462
experience a significantly lower migration. By contrast, countries which 
implemented restitution show a higher intersectoral migration.  
The final question raised in the introduction relates to the development of 
differences between countries regarding migration and income ratio over time. 
Trade liberalization, like the agreements between the so-called Višegrad states, 
and the process of EU accession is expected to lead to integration of prices of 
tradable goods (ČIHAK and HOLUB, 2001). But the effect on non-tradable goods 
like labor is less clear. Referring to the literature on economic growth, σ-type 
convergence is observed if the variance of the migration rate and the income 
ratio decrease over time, meaning that migration and income ratio approach 
common levels within country groups. Two sub-samples are formed: First, those 
CEE countries which joined the European Union in 2004; and second, members 
of the CIS (former Soviet Union without the Baltic States and Georgia). Both 
sub-regions may be regarded to share some common characteristics. Whereas 
most European transition countries privatized agricultural land in the form of 
restitution to former owners, almost all CIS countries distributed land in kind or 
in shares (ROZELLE and SWINNEN, 2004). Some of the new EU-member states 
formed a trading union over the 90s, and all shared preferential trade access to 
the EU. However, no signs of convergence could be observed. Whereas the 
variance of the annual migration is very low before 1990, it shows no trend after 
the beginning of the economic reforms. Regarding the income ratio, variances 
even increase from 1990 to 2003 for the two subgroups as well as for the whole 
sample. The calculated variances are plotted for the whole sample and the two 
sub-samples in Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix. 
4 CONCLUSION 
Transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as Asia have chosen 
different ways to transform their agricultural sectors from a planned to a market 
economy. The adjustment of the agricultural labor force partly reflects these 
different approaches with increasing labor use in some countries and sharply 
declining employment in agriculture in others. Country specific fixed effects 
explain almost half of the variation of annual migration rates in the econometric 
analysis. In addition, migration is positively correlated with the income ratio 
between non-agricultural sectors and agriculture; the labor ratio between both 
sectors and the development of relative prices. As the income ratio is still 
increasing in Armenia, China, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania and 
Tajikistan, an increasing migration from agriculture to other sectors is to be 
expected in the future. The privatization procedure and agriculture’s share of 
GDP in 1990 are the most important determinants of the country specific part of 
the migration rate captured by the fixed effects in the first step of the analysis. 
Finally, the variance of the migration rate and the income ratio do not indicate 
any convergence even within more homogeneous sub-samples.  Labor mobility in transition countries and the impact of institutions  463
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APPENDIX 
Table A1:  Determinants of annual migration rate, additional specifications 
  [1] [2] [3]  [4] 





















































Telephone  8.23E-06 
(0.14) 
    
PSE   0.0001 
(0.43) 
  
FDI     -0.0012 
(-1.18) 
 
Log(Inflation)       -0.0036 
(-1.40) 
R
2   0.0932  0.1252  0.1023  0.1086 
ρ  0.4335 0.6808  0.4349  0.4345 





N/Countries 388/29  162/13 374/29 357/29 
Notes:  The heteroscedasticity consistent estimator (WHITE, 1980) has been used to 
estimate the asymptotic covariance matrix. Coefficients significant at the 1 %, 5 %, 
and 10 % level of significance are indicated with 
***, 
**, and 
*, respectively. The ρ 
indicates the share of the explained variation due to the fixed effects. 
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CHOOSING TO MIGRATE OR MIGRATING TO CHOOSE:  
MIGRATION AND LABOR CHOICE IN ALBANIA 
 
CARLO AZZARRI, GERO CARLETTO, BENJAMIN DAVIS, ALBERTO ZEZZA
* 
ABSTRACT 
Very little systematic analysis exists of the income generating strategies of 
Albanian households within the emerging market economy, and how this relates 
to income dynamics, people’s mobility and poverty. Our results show that 
agricultural, migration and human capital assets have a differential impact 
across livelihood choices, and that this impact varies by gender and age. Two 
areas of policy concern derive from this analysis. First, migration is clearly 
crucial for the economic future of Albania, both in terms of financing economic 
development, serving as an informal safety net, and in reducing excess labor 
supply and poverty. The suggestion of a potential disincentive effect on labor 
effort and participation is however worrying, as it would have implications in 
terms of missed opportunities for development. Second, agriculture appears to 
be more of a survival strategy than part of a poverty exit strategy. 
Keywords: Migration, agriculture, labor, Albania. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A decade and a half into the socio-economic and political transition to an open, 
market-oriented democracy, Albania has changed dramatically. The economy 
has grown at an average annual rate of about 6  percent since 1993, and its 
structure has gradually changed as state owned agriculture and manufacturing, 
the pillars of the socialist economy, have given way to services and construction. 
GDP per capita in constant Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars has doubled 
to US$ 4330 in just over 10 years (WDI, 2005). 
                                                 
*  Azzarri, Davis and Zezza are Consultant and Economists, respectively, with the Agricultural 
and Development Economics Division of the FAO and Carletto is Economist with the 
Development Economics Research Group of the World Bank. Corresponding author is 
Carlo Azzarri. Email: carlo.azzarri@fao.org.  Carlo Azzarri, Gero Carletto, Benjamin Davis, Alberto Zezza  468
This growth was both stimulated and accompanied by profound changes in the 
economic structure and social fabric of the country. Despite this progress, 
approximately 25 percent of Albanians, and 30 percent of rural Albanians, live in 
poverty (WORLD BANK, 2003). Albania also remains predominantly a rural country, 
with 58 percent of the population still residing in rural areas (INSTAT, 2002).  
Persistent poverty, poor access to basic services, dismal infrastructure, high 
levels of unemployment, and the large income differential with its EU neighbors 
fuel a steady flow of international migration, which has become the single most 
important political, social and economic phenomenon in post-communist 
Albania. Private transfers are estimated to have reached US$ 1 billion annually 
in 2004, constituting 14 percent of GDP. Remittances thus serve as the most 
important source of foreign exchange, over 1.7 times larger then the value of 
exports (IMF, 2005).
1  
Notwithstanding its policy relevance, the impact of the migration phenomenon 
on the livelihood strategies of the families that stay in Albania is an issue that 
has received relatively little attention.
2 We take advantage of the 2002 Albania 
Living Standards Measurement Study (ALSMS) survey
3 to identify the principal 
income strategies of Albanian households and investigate the role of migration, 
and access to migration networks, in different livelihood strategies and 
individual labor activity choice. In addition to migration, we also focus on the 
role of agricultural and livestock activities given their still predominant role in 
the economic strategies of the poor. 
We begin by focusing on the role of agriculture and migration in household 
economic strategies, based on an analysis of income shares. We then posit how 
international migration, human capital and agricultural assets may affect labor 
market participation including activity choice, and use multivariate analysis to 
identify the determinants of participation in different labor activities. 
2 THE STRUCTURE OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN ALBANIA 
In this section, using data from the 2002 ALSMS, we look at the structure of 
household income and participation in labor activities to document the principal 
economic activities utilized by Albanian households. As can be seen in Table 1, 
while only 29 percent of total household income comes from on-farm activities, 
                                                 
1  This is likely to be underestimated, since it does not account for the money not remitted from 
abroad but brought back by Albanians returning home, or not sent through the official 
banking system. 
2  Exceptions include MCCARTHY et al. (2006), who focuses on agricultural production decisions 
and GERMENJI and SWINNEN (2004) who use an earlier data set. 
3  The 2002 ALSMS was carried out by the Albania Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) with the 
technical assistance of the World Bank. The survey, conducted on a sample of 3599 households 
and based on a two-stage cluster design, is nationally representative. Choosing to migrate or migrating to choose  469
62  percent of all households, urban and rural, had some on-farm income. 
Approximately 50 percent of income among rural households derives from agri-
culture, and over 90 percent of all rural households, reaching virtually 100 percent 
in the Mountain region, are involved in some form of on-farm activity.  
Agricultural income and activities are more important for poor households than 
for wealthier ones (Figures 1 and 2). On average, 38 percent of income among 
households in the bottom consumption quintile derives from on-farm activities, 
while agriculture accounts for only 19 percent of income in the top quintile. 
Similarly, it is indicative that 3 out of 4 households in the poorest quintile carried 
out on-farm activities. Surprisingly, and although the percentage is significantly 
lower, more than half of the top 20 percent of wealthiest households also had 
agricultural activities. 
Table 1:  Sources of income and participation rates, by regions 
  Sources of income, percentages  Participation in economic activities, shares   
In 











All 3,599  0.29  0.31  0.10  0.10  0.20 0.62 0.45  0.15  0.28 0.57 0.25 
REGION  (unw)               
Tirana 600  0.01  0.58  0.12  0.07  0.23 0.09 0.70  0.15  0.16 0.54 0.18 
Coast 
Urban 
480 0.06 0.45 0.14 0.12 0.23 0.36 0.62  0.20  0.35 0.53 0.20 
Coast 
Rural 
520 0.49 0.20 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.91 0.31  0.10  0.30 0.49 0.21 
Central 
Urban 
479 0.04 0.39 0.16 0.10 0.31 0.16 0.58  0.23  0.32 0.64 0.19 
Central 
Rural 
520 0.48 0.18 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.98 0.30  0.13  0.31 0.57 0.29 
Mountain 
Urban 
400 0.04 0.51 0.10 0.06 0.29 0.21 0.64  0.13  0.12 0.55 0.25 
Mountain 
Rural 
600 0.56 0.16 0.02 0.06 0.20 0.99 0.28  0.03  0.15 0.74 0.50 
Source:  Own calculations, ALSMS, 2002. 
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Figure 2:  Share of households receiving income from source, top and 
bottom quintiles 









Source: ALSMS,  2002. 
However, very few households depend on agricultural income only. 
Approximately 1 in 2 households in the bottom quintile also had some off farm 
income. Particularly prominent among the poor were public transfers; 63 percent 
received some kind of public transfer (primarily pensions and ndihma 
ekonomike
4), comprising 22 percent of total income, while only 38 percent had 
off-farm wage income, and 25 percent remittances. 
Private transfers are also relatively widespread. More than a quarter (28 percent) 
of all households reported receiving remittances in 2002, comprising 10 percent 
of total income
5, the bulk of these households residing in the Coastal and Central 
regions. This does not include income brought back from current temporary 
migration, which is considered part of wage income. The share of households 
receiving remittances increases somewhat across quintiles, ranging from 
25 percent in the first quintile to 34 percent in the fifth. Greater heterogeneity is 
found among regions, with over 30 percent of the households in the Coastal and 
Central regions receiving remittances, compared to around 12-16 percent in the 
Mountain region and Tirana.  
                                                 
4  It is a cash assistance program, known as Economic Assistance, which is the largest component 
of public social assistance programmes in Albania. 
5  Given the relatively high level of migration assets in Albania, these figures may seem to 
underestimate the incidence of remittances among families with international migrants. Choosing to migrate or migrating to choose  471
Table 2:  Access to international migration assets, by quintiles and regions 
 Permanent  Temporary 
In 
percentages   
Obs. 
(unw.)  Greece  Italy &
beyond  Greece 
Italy & 
beyond 
All    3,599 13  20  13  5 
Quintiles  1  720 9  11 16  4 
  2  720 11  16  17  4 
  3  720 13  19  13  4 
  4  720 15  26  10  6 
  5  719 19  27  9  7 
Regions  Tirana  600 6  23  5  3 
  Coast urban  480 10  25  8  7 
  Coast rural  520 17  25  13  7 
  Central urban  479 15  20  10  6 
  Central rural  520 17  17  20  3 
  Mountain urban  400 6  14 11  5 
  Mountain rural  600  12 8 19 6 
Source:  Own calculations, ALSMS, 2002. 
A high share of private transfers comes from remittances from abroad. These 
figures are thought to be underestimated, and the real magnitude of this 
phenomenon is probably much higher than what both official foreign exchange 
statistics as well as survey figures suggest. Access to migration assets is very 
important, and varies by income level and region.
6  Households in the upper 
quintile have two to three times the number of former household members 
(permanent migrants) living in Greece (9 to 20 percent) and Italy and further a 
field (11 to 27 percent) compared to households in the bottom quintile, as seen 
in Table 2. 
The opposite is true for temporary migrants to Greece. Twice as many 
households in the first quintile had at least one current household member with 
experience in migrating to Greece (17 to 9 percent). Instead, both permanent and 
temporary migrants to Italy and beyond show increasing percentages as higher 
the quintile is, witnessing higher migration returns in farther countries. In terms 
of regions, permanent migrants to Greece are found in the Central region and the 
rural Coast, while permanent migrants to Italy are found predominantly among 
households in Tirana, the Coastal and urban Central regions. Temporary 
migrants to Greece are located principally in the Central and Mountain rural 
                                                 
6  We characterize two types of migration assets: Temporary (adults who spent at least one 
month outside the household during the last 12 months) and permanent (all children of the 
women in a household who are still alive but are not living in the household). Elsewhere 
we have discussed the importance of these networks for the decision to migrate 
(CARLETTO et al., 2005). Carlo Azzarri, Gero Carletto, Benjamin Davis, Alberto Zezza  472
areas, while temporary migrants to Italy and further a field are evenly 
distributed. 
3 FOCUS ON KEY ASSETS: EDUCATION, LAND, AND MIGRATION 
The objective of this section is to analyze the individual labor activity decision, 
focusing in particular on the role of assets across different options. Our interest 
lies on which factors pull individuals off the farm, or conversely encourage 
intensification of farm activity. We focus on the three key assets available to 
rural Albanian households: Agricultural land, human capital (i.e. education) and 
migration networks.  
Migration – In the framework proposed by the New Economics of Labor 
Migration (NELM) (STARK, 1991) migration is viewed as a mechanism the 
household can use to diversify economic activities in the face of risk and obtain 
liquidity and capital in the presence of credit and insurance market failures. In 
this vein, there are a number of potential avenues through which migration may 
have an impact on labor participation and occupational choice. 
First, access to migration assets can be expected to ease the constraints in access 
to capital and lead to more investment and more labor being allocated to self-
employment activities, including agriculture. Similarly, migration could cover 
other transaction costs or help hedge against risks which limit participation in 
wage or other riskier activities. The evidence on the effect of migration on 
productive investment is mixed, with some studies finding a positive impact of 
migration on investment in the place of origin and others finding no significant 
impact on productive investment
7. 
It is difficult to predict the net effect of migration on household productive 
activities.
8 The migration of some household members may affect the time 
endowment of the household, leading for instance to a reallocation of family 
labor towards specific activities, such as working on the family farm. On the 
other hand, the extra-income earned by the migrant members, may also induce 
other members of the household to work less, as the marginal value of the 
additional income diminishes and they may decide to substitute work for leisure. 
Evidence of this is provided for instance by AZAM  and GUBERT  (2004) for 
Western Mali. Also, seasonal or potential migrants may reduce their participation 
in the labor force while at home (or display a preference for casual as opposed to 
                                                 
7  Studies finding evidence of a positive effect include LUCAS  (1987) in South Africa, 
WOODRUFF and ZENTENO  (2001) in Mexico, BLACK et al. (2003) in Ghana and 
KONSEIGA (2004) in Burkina Faso. Studies finding no measurable impact are MINES and 
DE JANVRY (1982), and TAYLOR et al. (1996) in Mexico, and DE BRAUW and ROZELLE 
(2003) in China. 
8  See discussion in LUCAS (2006) and MCKENZIE (2005). Choosing to migrate or migrating to choose  473
long term jobs) as they are waiting for their first or next migration experience. 
Anecdotal suggest this may be the case in Albania (CARLETTO et al., 2004). 
Education – The effects of education on labor market participation and 
occupational choice are in principle more straightforward to predict. Regarding 
labor market participation the evidence is univocal in pointing to educational 
attainment (and human capital in general) as perhaps the single major determinant 
of labor market participation. PENCAVEL  (1986) and KILLINGSWORTH  and 
HECKMAN (1986) provide a review of labor supply studies for men and women 
respectively and give ample evidence of this proposition.  
When it comes to occupational choice, the bulk of the evidence unsurprisingly 
points to more education being associated to white collar as opposed to blue 
collar jobs, and to off farm as opposed to on-farm jobs (e.g. CHRISTIADI and 
CUSHING, 2006; SOOPRAMANIEN and JOHNES, 2001). A study by TIEFENTHALER 
(1994) on the rural Philippines, however, argues that in less developed regions, 
and particularly for informal sector jobs, these effects may be much less 
significant. 
Land – Ownership of land assets is, on the contrary, expected to lead to more 
on-farm labor participation (as for instance in MATHSE and YOUNG (2004) for 
Zimbabwe). At a certain level of farm size, land ownership could also be 
associated with more off farm activity, due to a technology effect (as e.g. in 
MWABU and EVANSON (1997) for Kenya). The latter effect is however unlikely in 
Albania, given the uniformly small land sizes resulting from land privatization.  
4 MODELLING LABOR PARTICIPATION AND ACTIVITY CHOICE 
In order to test these hypotheses, we first model participation in the labor force 
and then, for employed working-age individuals, we predict their choice of 
occupation. Over the past 30 years, an increasing body of literature has been 
focusing on estimating behavioral models in labor economics. MOFFITT (1999) 
provides a good review of the econometric practices in this field. 
In line with this literature, we use a probit model to investigate the probability of 
having performed any work in the twelve months prior to the survey. The model 
is specified as follows: 
Wi = α + β1X + β2Z + β3HC + β4LA + β5A + β6RD +β7H +  
+ β8SA + β9M + β10LM + β11G +  ε              (1) 
where:  
•  Wi is the labor participation binary dependent variable, equal to 1 if the 
individual has performed any work in the 12 month prior to the survey, 
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•  X, Z, HC, and LA are vectors of individual-level demographic 
characteristics, household-level demographic characteristics, human 
capital assets, and land assets, respectively; 
•  A is a vector of household non-agriculture endowments. It includes a 
non-agricultural household asset index Following MORRIS et al. (2000), 
and a dummy for whether the household has a fixed phone or not; 
•  RD refers to relative deprivation, that is, a household’s wealth position 
relative to other households in a given geographical area – here, the 
village –, calculated following STARK and TAYLOR (1989). 
•  H refers to the headcount poverty index at the district level (INSTAT, 
2004); 
•  M refers to migration assets, which include a dummy for previous 
temporary individual migration to Greece and Italy by the individual 
making the choice, a dummy for previous temporary migration to Greece 
and Italy by another member of the household, and the number of 
permanent migrants to Greece and Italy;  
•  LM refers to local labor market conditions. These include the structure of 
employment by sector (services, construction and industry, with 
agriculture as the default) at the village level and unemployment rates at 
the district level, all taken from the 2001 Census; 
•  G refers to location variables for the three major regions (Coast, Central 
and Mountain), further disaggregated by urban/rural, with Tirana as 
reference category;  
•  And ε is the error term. 
We estimate the model separately for men and women in our sample, as Wald 
tests have shown that parameters statistically differ by gender.  
Our second equation aims at investigating workers’ occupational choice. Since 
BOSKIN’S (1974) seminal paper, conditional or multinomial logit (MNL) models 
have been standard practice for this type of analysis. A recent application to a 
transition economy is VERME (2004). 
The occupational choice model estimated is specified as follows: 
ε β β β β
β β β β β β β α
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + + + =
G LM M SA
H RD A LA HC Z X Li
11 01 9 8
7 6 5 4 3 2 1          (2) 
where:  
•  Li is the employment choice dependent variable, which assumes 1 if she 
is a wage worker and 2 if self-employed, working on farm being the 
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•  All other notations are as in Equation (1), with the only addition of age 
interaction terms in vectors LA and M. 
We introduce some age interaction terms in the model in order to gauge how the 
impact of migration and agricultural assets vary with age. In all regressions we 
account for autocorrelation among observations in the same household by 
correcting the calculation of the standard errors
9.  
5 REGRESSION RESULTS 
5.1  Labor market participation: Probit model 
The results of our model for the labor participation probit are reported in Table 3. 
The coefficients on the demographic and family characteristics return the 
expected results. Having more children under six years of age is associated with 
lower labor market participation for women but not for men. Conversely, being 
married makes men – but not women – more likely to participate. 
It is interesting to note how the squared term on the education variable is 
negative for men (as expected) but positive for women, suggesting that further 
years of schooling have an increasingly positive effect on female labor 
participation. Agricultural land displays the expected positive effect on labor 
participation for both sexes, and in both cases with diminishing marginal 
"returns", as shown by the negative sign on the quadratic term. Interestingly, 
also relative deprivation has a positive effect. The more relatively deprived a 
household, the more likely that its female members will engage in some 
productive activity. 
The effects of local labor market conditions at the district level are also 
interesting. As expected, higher district level unemployment rates are associated 
with lower participation rates for both sexes. Higher unemployment means more 
surplus labor and, therefore, it is more likely that individuals in these areas will 
be more likely to have a higher reservation wage than what they can expect to 
earn in the market
10.  
                                                 
9  The Hausman test could not reject the null hypothesis that the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) assumption holds; that is, that the odds of outcomes in the model do not 
depend on other available choices. 
10 We are modelling labour participation as a choice. However, we cannot fully account for 
bottlenecks on the demand side, and for the fact that some of the individuals in our sample 
can be truly rationed on the labour market, and hence involuntarily unemployed. A similar 
caveat applies to the possible mismatch between supply and demand when it comes to 
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Table 3:  Selected regression results. Clustered probit on labor market 
participation 
  Male Female 
 
Coef. Rob. Coef.  Rob. z 
Individual         
Age  0.20  13.86  0.15  13.60 
Age squared  0.00  -13.29  0.00  -11.57 
Years of education  0.13  4.53  0.02  0.94 
Years of education squared  0.00  -2.42  0.00  3.03 
Dummy: Married  0.68  6.72  0.08 1.19 
Household      
# of children <6 yrs  -0.05  -1.00  -0.07  -1.97 
Household  size  0.01  0.13 -0.01 -0.13 
Household size squared  0.00  -0.66  0.00  -0.83 
Age of household head  -0.01  -0.59  0.00  -0.14 
Age of household head squared  0.00  0.48  0.00  0.33 
Dummy: Female headed hh  -0.43  -2.29  0.30  2.92 
Dummy: Widow/er headed hh  0.35  1.88  -0.15 -1.30 
Hh: Non-agriculture asset score index  -0.07  -2.50  0.03  1.65 
Hh: Dummy, hh has a fixed phone line  0.10  1.42  0.13  2.31 
Hh: Size (ha.) of agr land owned   0.63  4.29  0.67  5.80 
Hh: Size (ha.) of agr land owned squared  -0.14  -2.97  -0.16  -4.31 
Household: Relative deprivation -0.03  -0.48  0.23  5.46 
Area      
Community: Share of jobs in industry (excluded agr.)  -1.10  -1.99  -1.32  -2.95 
Community: Share of jobs in constructions (excluded agr.)  0.56  0.83  -1.51  -2.96 
Community: Share of jobs in services (excluded agr.)  -0.87  -2.69  -1.86  -6.98 
District: Unemployment rate  -0.03  -6.15  -0.01  -3.50 
District: Headcount ratio  0.01  1.92  0.02  4.57 
External  mig      
Individual temp mig to Greece 1997-2001  -0.54  -5.37  0.00 -0.03 
Individual temp mig to Italy and other countries 97-01  -0.79  -5.86  -0.23 -0.96 
Other members temp mig to Greece  1997-2001  -0.08 -0.77 -0.08 -1.20 
Other members temp mig to Italy and other countries 97-01  -0.18  -1.07  -0.20  -2.00 
Hh: Permanent migration. Number of children in Greece  0.05  1.27  0.03  0.93 
Hh: Permanent migration. Number of children in Italy and other -0.06  -1.53  -0.10  -3.10 
Region      
Dummy: Costal urban region  0.11  1.03  0.02  0.23 
Dummy: Costal rural region  -0.04  -0.19  -0.79  -4.13 
Dummy: Central urban region  0.23  2.16  0.29  3.20 
Dummy: Central rural region          0.34          1.45  -0.57  -2.93 
Dummy: Mountain urban region  -0.55  -3.90  -0.59  -5.16 
Dummy: Mountain rural region  -0.08  -0.36  -0.78  -3.99 
Constant  -2.90  -5.27  -2.38  -5.38 
N. observations  4,477    4,995   
Log pseudo-likelihood  -1,499    -2,576   
Chi2 1,001    1,048   
Pseudo-R2 0.34    0.21   
McFadden's Adj R2  0.33    0.20   
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2  0.50    0.38   Choosing to migrate or migrating to choose  477
The composition of labor demand also has an impact, with lower labor 
participation in communes with lower share of non-agricultural jobs. This may 
reflect the buffer role agricultural employment can play and the large 
phenomenon of underemployment, a well known fact of Albanian agriculture. 
Labor force participation is also higher in poorer districts. 
The effects of the migration variables are extremely interesting. In the case of 
previous individual temporary migration, we observe a substantial negative 
effect on labor participation for men. This is consistent with the wait-for-the-
next-migration effect we hypothesized earlier. Elsewhere has been shown that 
previous migration experience is a very important determinant of temporary 
international migration from Albania (CARLETTO et al., 2005), supporting the 
view of a cyclical/seasonal process. It is therefore more than plausible that many 
temporary migrants are either waiting for the next episode of seasonal migration, 
or are planning a more permanent migration, therefore not working while in 
Albania. This effect does not seem to hold for women. 
On the contrary, previous temporary migration to Italy by other household 
members as well as permanent migration to Italy are associated with a 
disincentive effect on female labor participation. This may be explained by a 
number of reasons outlined earlier: An income effect which reduces the 
marginal value for women of entering the labor market, or a general reallocation 
of time and tasks at the household level as the time endowment of the household 
is altered by migration. The fact that only migration to Italy appears significant 
may suggest the presence of an income effect via migrant remittances, as 
migrants to Italy tend to remit significantly larger amounts. 
5.2  Occupational choice: Multinomial logit (MNL) model 
The results of the occupational choice model are reported in Table  4. Labor 
activity choice depends on a mix of individual, household and community level 
characteristics. In our sample, women are much less likely than men to participate 
in any labor activity. Among activities, women are least likely to participate in 
self employment activities, followed by wage employment, then on-farm labor. 
That is, of all labor activities, women are most likely to be found working on the 
family farm. 
Among working adults, having more children under six years of age is 
associated with men having a higher likelihood of working in agriculture as 
opposed to wage work, whereas the opposite is true for women. Marital status 
also matters, but again in quite opposite ways for the two sexes: Married men 
are more likely to be salaried workers than farmers, whereas married working 
women tend to "get stuck" on farm and are less likely to be engaged in wage 
employment. Working on-farm for women may be considered more compatible 
with rearing children.  
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Table 4:  Selected regression results. Clustered multinomial logit 




  Wage  Self-empl.  Wage  Self-empl. 
 
Coef. Rob.z Coef. Rob.z Coef. Rob.z Coef. Rob.z 
Individual       
Age  0.26 5.36 0.42 6.75 0.17  2.97  0.29  2.59
Age squared  0.00 -5.29 -0.01 -6.88 0.00  -2.58  0.00  -2.66
Years of education  -0.12 -1.33 0.01 0.06 -0.35  -4.16  -0.18 -1.32
Years of education squared  0.01 2.66 0.00 0.29 0.03  6.25  0.02  2.53
Dummy: Married  0.57 1.84 0.08 0.23 -0.87  -2.85  -0.35 -0.88
Household     
# of children <6 yrs  -0.26 -2.63 -0.07 -0.54 0.09 0.57 0.01 0.02
Household size  0.03 0.22 0.12 0.63 0.19 0.91 0.11 0.41
Household size squared  0.01 0.75 0.00 0.27 -0.01 -0.75  0.01  0.75
Age of household head  -0.04 -1.06 0.00 0.05 0.08 1.48 0.09 1.29
Age of household head squared  0.00 0.70 0.00 -0.31 0.00 -1.26  0.00 -1.40
Dummy: Female headed hh  0.89 1.54 0.56 0.88 0.99  2.28  0.76 1.35
Dummy: Widow/er headed hh  -0.39 -0.73 -0.39 -0.68 -1.09  -2.05  -0.03 -0.05
Hh: Non-agriculture asset score index  -0.03 -0.49 0.34 4.18 0.07 0.80 0.35  2.91
Hh: Dummy, hh has a fixed phone line  0.02 0.05 0.35 0.85 0.63  1.72  0.83 2.04
Hh: Size (ha.) of agr land owned   -1.53 -3.69 -1.08 -1.83 -3.48  -5.80  -0.89 -1.36
Hh: Size (ha.) of agr land owned squared  0.35 4.07 0.26 2.94 0.41  3.36  0.37 3.58
Hh: Size (ha.) of agr land owned*age  -0.01 -0.79 0.00 -0.38 0.03  2.78  -0.01 -0.88
Household: relative deprivation  -3.09 -10.88 -3.71 -10.63 -1.92  -7.48  -2.86  -6.72
Area     
Community: Share of jobs in industry (excluded agriculture)  14.78 5.33 13.43 4.54 5.14  2.30  3.55 1.26
Community: Share of jobs in constructions (excluded agriculture)  5.37 2.29 4.26 1.66 -0.53 -0.23  3.21  0.94
Community: Share of jobs in services (excluded agriculture)  8.12 7.57 8.61 7.14 6.07  5.84  4.72  3.16
District: Unemployment rate  0.01 0.79 -0.02 -1.19 0.03  2.35  -0.01 -0.29
District: Headcount ratio  0.02 1.42 0.02 1.04 -0.04  -2.47  -0.07  -2.94
External mig     
Individual temp mig in 1997-2001  0.75 0.73 1.86 1.76 3.60  2.22  4.23  2.38
Individual temp mig in 1997-2001*age  -0.04 -1.36 -0.07 -2.21 -0.09  -2.83  -0.09  -2.28
Other members temp mig to Greece 1997-2001  -0.07 -0.21 0.38 0.98 0.45 1.58  -0.27  -0.70
Other members temp mig to Italy and other countries 1997-2001  0.20 0.48 0.26 0.53 -0.14 -0.33 -0.28 -0.54
Hh: Permanent migration. Number of children in Greece  0.04 0.11 0.59 1.19 -0.05 -0.14 -0.29 -0.48
Hh: Permanent migration. Number of children in Greece*age  0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.91 0.00 0.43 0.01 0.53
Hh: Permanent migration. Number of children in Italy/other  0.35 1.13 -0.04 -0.08 -0.30 -0.76 -2.08  -2.66
Hh: Permanent migration. Number of children in Italy/other*age  0.00 -0.61 0.01 0.55 0.01 1.51 0.04  2.58
Region     
Dummy: Costal urban region  1.66 1.62 2.34 2.26 -0.47 -0.39  0.77  0.62
Dummy: Costal rural region  0.97 1.02 1.30 1.27 -1.86 -1.48 -1.31 -0.89
Dummy: Central urban region  1.54 1.18 2.51 1.90 0.26 0.21 1.05 0.80
Dummy: Central rural region  0.49 0.52 1.21 1.18 -2.29 -1.83 -1.32 -0.90
Dummy: Mountain urban region  -1.08 -0.98 -0.89 -0.79 -0.96 -0.76 -0.45 -0.33
Dummy: Mountain rural region  -0.16 -0.17 0.02 0.02 -2.49  -1.97  -1.84 -1.28
Constant  -5.51 -3.46 -12.19 -5.35 -4.13  -2.13  -8.02  -2.73
N. observations  3,557 3,204   
Log pseudo-likelihood  -1,790 -935   
Chi2  606 771   
Pseudo-R2  0.48 0.66   
McFadden's Adj R2  0.46 0.63   Choosing to migrate or migrating to choose  479
The impact of assets varies across labor activities. Human capital assets are 
proxied through individual level of education. As expected, for women 
education has a strong and increasingly positive impact on the probability of 
being in wage employment as opposed to farming. This reinforces the positive 
and increasing effect observed in the participation model. The negative 
relationship between education and on-farm activity for men kicks in at levels of 
education higher than primary.  
Agricultural assets – measured by the size of agricultural landholding – is 
associated, as expected, with a higher probability of participation in on-farm 
labor activities, though this decreases with land size. Some evidence of a reverse 
effect is found for land and age in the female model: For a given amount of land, 
the older the individual the lower the relative odds she will work in wage 
activities. Non-agricultural assets, on the other hand, increase the probability of 
being self-employed compared to working on-farm.  
The composition of labor demand at the community level also affects labor 
participation. A higher share of non agricultural employment in the community – 
services, industry and construction – is associated with a lower probability of 
participating in on-farm activities. The district unemployment rate, significant 
and negative in the participation model, does not seem to have a large impact on 
occupational choice. However, it does increase the likelihood of having women 
employed as wage earners.  
Migration assets, which appear to be largely substitutes, not complements, for 
labor activities, also affect occupational choice. For both men and women, 
individual temporary migration leads towards more self-employment, 
particularly for younger individuals, and for women, this previous migration 
experience leads to a higher likelihood of working in wage labor as well. In both 
cases, the relative odds for female participation given previous migration 
experience are significantly greater then for male participation. This differential 
effect may not be due only to the individual history of migration per se, but to 
some unobservable characteristic of the household or individual which is linked to 
both migration and labor force participation. In the model of female occupational 
choice, however, we also find evidence that permanent migration to Italy reduces 
the relative probability of being self-employed, and that this effect increases 
with age.  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Farming is still key to the livelihoods of many Albanian households which remain 
heavily dependent on low-productivity agriculture. An important share of 
household income – as well as home-produced food consumption – comes from 
the small farm sector. A majority of Albania’s economically active population 
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in the national economy over time. Very few farmer households – less than a 
third – market production, implying that for the majority of farming households 
cash income derives from public and private transfers, or from diversified 
income strategies. 
Migration is used as a mechanism to diversify economic activities in the face of 
risk and obtain liquidity and capital in the presence of credit and insurance 
market failures. While we are unable to detangle the direction of causality 
between migration and poverty, access to migration assets appear to play a 
particularly important role for households with lower levels of human capital. 
While low levels of assets limit successful livelihood strategies, the multivariate 
analysis shows that access to household and individual level assets condition 
individual labor participation and labor activity choices. We find that 
agricultural, migration and human capital assets have a differential impact 
across livelihood choices, and that this impact varies by gender and age. We also 
find some migration assets to reduce the relative odds of choosing any labor 
activity. For men the disincentive to labor participation is due to returned 
migrants likely to be in Albania planning a future migration episode; for women 
it is linked to an income effect – via remittances – and/or a reallocation of time 
and occupations at the household level. 
Migration assets also appear to have an impact on occupational choice. For both 
males and females (and more so for the younger ones), previous individual 
migration experiences make people more likely to work off-farm, particularly as 
self-employed. This is consistent with the story of return of temporary migrants 
being able to start up their own business thanks to the saving accumulated when 
working abroad. However, labor choice is not the same as investment, and thus 
further research is warranted to shed light on this issue.  
Two areas of policy concern derive from this analysis of household and 
individual economic strategies in Albania. First, migration is clearly crucial for 
the economic future of Albania, both in terms of financing economic 
development, serving as an informal safety net, and in reducing excess labor 
supply and poverty. The suggestion of a potential disincentive effect on labor 
effort and participation is however worrying, as it would have implications in 
terms of missed opportunities for development. More research is needed to shed 
light on this issue.  
Second, agriculture appears to be more of a survival strategy than part of a 
poverty exit strategy. Agricultural activities are too atomized, and largely 
subsistence oriented, with the possible exception of the more fertile coastal 
plains where a greater commercial orientation emerges. Education may play a 
role in encouraging diversification out of agriculture, and in Albania this means 
promoting a relatively higher level of education, beyond the high school level.  Choosing to migrate or migrating to choose  481
One implication is that agriculture and migration are not necessarily substitutes. 
They may be complements, if engaging in some kinds of business at home 
requires dealing with risk or liquidity constraints in a way that migration can 
cater for. As the economy grows and modernizes, it is easy to forecast a 
substantial reduction in the share of agricultural employment in the future. It is 
also likely that the patterns and roles of migration will keep evolving as the push 
and pull factors driving migration change – wage differentials with neighbouring 
economies; employment opportunities at home. A better understanding of what 
this means for household livelihood strategies is crucial for designing policies 
that are more effective in stimulating growth and reducing poverty and social 
exclusion. 
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ABSTRACT 
Developing rural non-farm employment opportunities is widely recognized as 
being important for economic growth and rural employment, and as a 
sustainable livelihood strategy for rural populations. However, this issue, as yet, 
has not been analyzed properly in the Ukrainian context. This paper combines 
two complementary data sets on rural households and their members from the 
State Statistic Committee of Ukraine 2004 household survey to present a profile 
of rural non-farm employment in Ukraine. Also, we empirically investigate the 
factors enhancing or impeding access to non-farm rural employment and income 
diversification for Ukraine’s rural population, as well as its (nonagricultural 
sector) importance for the agricultural sector’s growth. The evidence suggests 
that, despite substantial heterogeneity of the nonagricultural sector, gender, 
education, access to infrastructure and land are important factors influencing 
access to rural non-farm employment, as well as rural non-farm incomes. 
Keywords:  Non-farm employment, Ukraine, economic growth, income 
diversification. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Rural non-farm employment (RNFE) development is widely recognized to be a 
pillar of rural development policy and, from a long-term perspective, a critical 
factor for providing rural employment and income. 
Rural development policy is a complex issue, but is basically about two things: 
Delivering public services in rural areas, in particular physical and social 
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infrastructure, and supporting economic development in rural areas (KUHN and 
DEMYANENKO, 2004). In the latter context, non-farm employment, in addition to 
agriculture, offers an important source of rural employment and opportunity to 
raise rural incomes, and hence living standards in rural Ukraine. 
RNFE as defined in this paper includes all economic activities associated with 
work, either waged or self-employed, located in rural areas, except agriculture, 
hunting, and fishing (LANJOUW and LANJOUW, 1997). These might be derived 
from agriculture and natural resource use via upstream or downstream linkages. 
Other activities are similar to those in urban areas, in particular manufacturing, 
services and commerce. 
Why is RNFE worth particular attention? In general, according to BERDEGUE et al.  
(2000), RNFE might serve as a partial solution to three major problems in rural 
areas.  
First, RNFE can contribute to a sustainable livelihood strategy for the rural 
population. This means that the existence of assets (human or capital) in rural 
households related to RNFE strengthens their livelihood position. This is 
important for rural areas, but especially for agriculture, since one of the most 
challenging adjustments facing agriculture in Ukraine today is the need to 
reduce hidden unemployment and movement to more manageable and efficient 
capital/labor ratios. RNFE is desperately needed to provide alternatives to 
agricultural employment in rural areas and to "draw" excess labor out of farming. 
Second, modern and efficient agriculture is intensive in terms of inputs, services 
and commercial linkages. If Ukrainian agriculture is to be transformed and 
competitive, it will require improved linkages with input supply systems, 
agricultural processing chains, and systems for distributing fresh and processed 
products. Modern agriculture requires cooperation with the agro-industry in 
order to successfully meet the demanding quality and safety norms and 
standards of international markets. It also requires access to management, 
administrative and advisory services. All of these involve RNFE, in both the 
secondary (processing, agro-industry, etc.) and the tertiary sectors (technical, 
commercial and transportation services).  
Third, RNFE can contribute to the "urbanization" of Ukrainian rural areas, 
which have traditionally been associated with underdevelopment and 
backwardness. A major share of the young rural generation strives to migrate to 
urban areas in pursuit of a "better life" in the form of better facilities, social and 
physical infrastructure, etc. RNFE opportunities might offer options for labor or 
professional development which are more attractive than agricultural work to 
some. Rural spaces exhibiting an increase in RNFE have changed the 
characteristics of the rural environment. Non-agricultural trade, transportation 
systems, and a wide range of services oriented to production, consumption and 
recreational needs significantly strengthen ties between towns and their 
hinterlands. Ultimately, this offers rural inhabitants not only better economic Oleg Nivyevskiy, Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel  486 
opportunities, but also narrows the quality gap between urban and rural lives 
(BERDEGUE et al., 2000). 
This paper consists of four parts. The first part explains the RFNE situation and 
policies abroad. Then, using Ukrainian household survey data, we provide a 
profile of RNFE in Ukraine and an empirical analysis of the access of rural 
household members in Ukraine to RNFE opportunities. Finally, suggestions for 
promoting RNFE in Ukraine conclude the paper. 
2 LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT RNFE ABROAD 
BRIGHT et al., (2000) review the voluminous literature on RNFE in both developing 
and developed countries and make the following generalizations: Rural 
households in developing countries typically receive 30-35 % of their total rural 
income from off-farm sources; numerous studies demonstrate that there is a 
positive correlation of RNFE activities with: i) higher income levels of rural 
families; ii) higher potential for diversification of income sources; iii) higher 
productivity in agricultural activities.  
Other studies on RNFE have shown a positive correlation between a higher 
diversification of non-farm activities, income and: i) educational level; ii) 
quality and access to infrastructure or services; iii) quality, objectives and 
organization of services; iv) opportunities created through local, regional and 
national government policies; v) access to credit and financial services. Studies 
on RNFE in developing countries suggest the following policies for sector 
promotion: Increase asset holdings of the rural community (in terms of 
education and infrastructure); remove land market constraints and improve 
access to credit for non-farm activities (BRIGHT et al., 2000).  
Experience with RNFE in developed countries is also relevant to Ukraine. Rural 
employment growth in the EU is driven by both endogenous and exogenous 
factors. Endogenous factors include local impulses and local resources, while 
exogenous factors externally determine the transplantation of employment 
into the region. EU policy experience shows that a multi-sectoral, bottom-up 
approach must be taken regarding rural employment promotion, rather than 
concentrating on just one sector, be it agriculture, agro-food or tourism   
(VON MEYER et al., 2000). Other policy lessons from the EU are that infrastructure 
should be improved to make rural areas attractive to business and for living. 
Governments should try to improve the general conditions in rural areas and not 
target particular enterprises. Resources should be directed not to regions with 
potential for growth due to their location, comparative advantage, or other reasons, 
but to those which suffer from poor physical infrastructure, a poorly-trained labor 
force or lack of processing and marketing facilities (BRIGHT et al., 2000). 
BERDEGUE et al. (2000) draw very similar conclusions from their review of 
RNFE literature for Latin America: i) RNFE is strongly concentrated in areas Rural non-farm employment in Ukraine  487
characterized by dynamic and prosperous agriculture; poor or depressed 
agricultural areas have access to RNFE as well, but however, in absolute terms; 
ii) poor households depend to a higher degree on RNFE, but the level of this 
type of income is very low in absolute terms, while households with higher 
agricultural incomes tend to have higher levels of non-farm incomes; iii) the 
conventional view is that households with greater levels of access to land have 
less access to RNFE; iv) educational level is a powerful determining factor in 
access to RNFE; v) RNFE arises as a consequence of prior investment in 
infrastructure (roads, electrification, etc.); vi) gender has a significant influence 
in determining access to RNFE (BERDEGUE et al., 2000).  
3 NON-FARM EMPLOYMENT IN RURAL UKRAINE 
3.1  The profile of non-farm employment in rural Ukraine 
In 2004 almost one-third (15.5 m) of Ukraine’s population (total 47.4 m) lived 
in rural areas. While agricultural production constitutes the backbone of the rural 
population, the non-farm sector and income are increasingly significant as well. 
As Table 1 indicates, a significant share of the rural population is employed in 
agriculture (about 10 %), but approximately the same share is employed in non-
farm sectors (education, healthcare, mining industry, etc.). On the other hand, 
approximately 71  % of the rural population is non-employed. This number 
includes those seeking work but who are unable to find it (unemployed), 
pensioners, pupils, students, etc. However, one should take into account the 
specifics of rural life in Ukraine. Most rural households, including those 
involved in non-farm sectors, tend to spend a considerable amount of time on 
subsistence or subsidiary farming as well. For example, rural households 
produce about two-thirds of Ukraine’s total raw milk production. Moreover, 
according to official statistics, households produce about 60  % of the gross 
agricultural produce of Ukraine. 
The RNFE profile is approximately the same across all regions. The most 
important sectors, in terms of rural employment, are the food processing industry, 
wholesale and retail trade, transport, and education. The relative importance of 
employment in agriculture largely reflects the degree of regional agriculture 
specialization. For example, in the leading southern and eastern regions, higher 
percentages of the rural population are employed in agriculture than in other regions. 
The fact that almost the whole Ukrainian rural population formally or informally 
works in agriculture represents an important challenge for rural development 
policy. Ukrainian agriculture has been in a process of restructuring over the last 
15 years. Based on its natural endowments (climate, soils, geographical location) 
and given an adequate agriculture policy, Ukrainian agriculture can be expected to 
gradually restructure towards an internationally-competitive and efficient sector. 
However, technical progress will release labor from agriculture, as illustrated in Oleg Nivyevskiy, Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel  488
Table 2, which documents the steady and ongoing decline in the number and share 
of agricultural employment in counties such as Germany, France, and the USA.  
Table 1:  Sectoral profile of Ukrainian rural employment, primary 
occupation, 2004, % 
  Branch of activity  Ukraine  West
1 North Center South East
Agriculture 9.27  4.76  11.09  9.92  13.58  10.48
Fishery 0.11  0.09  *  0.03 0.16  0.23 
Mining industry  0.50  0.38  0.25  0.40  *  1.82 
Processing industry  2.12  2.63  2.46  2.07  0.83  2.05 
Electricity, gas, and 
water supply  0.61 0.71  0.86  0.58  0.42  0.89 
Construction 1.55  1.68  1.28  0.99  2.56  1.29 
Wholesale and 
retail  1.95 1.74  2.43  1.65  1.56  2.65 
Hotels 0.25  0.39  *  0.33 0.29  0.18 
Transport and 
communication  1.60 1.11  2.64  1.84  1.67  1.52 
Finance 0.13  0.12  0.15  0.04  0.25  0.15 
Real Estate  0.04  0.05  *  0.10 0.03  0.07 
State government  2.07  2.56  1.91  2.53  1.71  1.79 
Education 3.83  4.05  3.59  3.35  4.29  3.22 
Healthcare 2.05  1.96  3.17  2.08  1.85  1.73 
Public services  0.45  0.55  0.29  0.37  0.86  0.13 
Employed 
Servants 0.01  0.03  * * *  * 
Non-employed (pensioners, 
pupils, students, unemployed, 
children, etc.) 
73.43 77.07  69.85  73.71  69.94  71.76
Source:  Own calculation based on household survey conducted by the Derzhkomstat in 2004. 
Notes:  
1 West: Transkarpathian, Lviv, Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Rivne, Khmelnitsky,  
    Chernivtsi oblasts; North: Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Chernigiv, Sumy oblasts; Center:   
  Vinnytsya, Cherkasy, Poltava, Kirovograd oblasts; East: Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk,  
    Zaporizhzhya, Donetsk, Lugansk oblasts; South: Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson   
  oblasts and Crimea Autonomy. 
  
* – No records. 
Increasing rural unemployment, unless new jobs are created, implies significant 
social and economic problems for the government: Increased rural-urban 
migration creates more stress on urban areas, increased rural poverty, reduced 
local tax bases, etc. RNFE opportunities can reduce these personal and public 
costs (JOHNSON, 2005).  
Entrepreneurship is the basis for much economic development, and in most 
countries, farmers and other rural residents have been among the most 
entrepreneurial segments. It is widely agreed that entrepreneurship is essential to 
the development of the Ukrainian economy, and particularly in rural areas 
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Table 2:  Farm employment in selected OECD countries and Ukraine 
   1960 1970 1980 1990  2000  2010
*
Australia  Farm employment, m persons  1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9  0.9  0.8
  % of total economic employment 27.8 18.6 14.2 11.1  9.0  7.6
Canada  Farm employment, m persons  2.5 1.8 1.8 1.0  0.8  0.6
  % of total economic employment 38.0 20.6 14.5 6.9  4.7  3.4
France  Farm employment, m persons  10.1 6.9 4.4 3.1  2.0  1.3
  % of total economic employment 51.1 32.0 18.7 12.6  7.4  4.6
Germany  Farm employment, m persons  10.9 6.8 5.4 3.2  2.1  1.3
  % of total economic employment 31.1 19.1 14.5 7.9  5.1  3.3
New Zealand Farm employment, m persons  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3  0.3  0.3
  % of total economic employment 38.6 29.7 25.8 21.0  17.6  15.3
Ukraine  Farm employment, m persons  –  –  –    7.9  5.3
  % of total economic employment –  –  –    31.2  21.4
USA  Farm employment, m persons  13.1 9.6 8.5 7.7  6.3  5.2
  % of total economic employment 17.3 10.7 7.6 5.9  4.3  3.2
Source:  Faostat, State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine. 
Note:  
* Projections. 
If we look at the profile of employment in Ukrainian rural areas, we notice that 
entrepreneurs and self-employed persons constitute only a small fraction of the 
total rural population, with almost negligible differences across the regions (see 
Table 3). The Ukrainian rural self-employed population is primarily engaged in 
agriculture, construction, processing and wholesale and retail activities (Table 4). 
Nevertheless, hired workers constitute the bulk of the employed rural population. 
Table 3:  Profile of Ukrainian rural employment by type, 2004, % 
Type of Employment  Ukraine West
1 North Center  South East 
Hired persons  26.44   22.78   30.14   25.99   30.02   28.19  
Entrepreneurs (with hired 
persons)  0.16   0.14  
*  0.41 0.09    0.03 
Self-employed (w/o hired 
persons)  2.35   4.37   0.54  1.31   2.12   1.13  
Subsistence and subsidiary 




unemployed, children etc.) 
70.96   72.64   70.82   72.24   67.65   70.66  
Source:  Own calculation based on household survey conducted by the Derzhkomstat in 2004. 
Notes: 
1 West: Transkarpathian, Lviv, Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Rivne, Khmelnitsky,  
  Chernivtsi  oblasts;  North:  Zhytomyr,  Kyiv, Chernigiv, Sumy oblasts; Center:   
  Vinnytsya, Cherkasy, Poltava, Kirovograd oblasts; East: Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk,  
    Zaporizhzhya, Donetsk, Lugansk oblasts; South: Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson   
  oblasts and Crimea Autonomy. 
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As Table 5 shows, almost half of the total public expenditures earmarked for 
agriculture and rural development in Ukraine in 2006 are enterprise-targeted, or 
directly aimed at production. Such expenditures, as EU experience has shown, 
might increase agricultural output, but not agricultural competitiveness. Rural 
development measures (social and physical infrastructure, gasification, etc.) 
receive only about 15  % of planned spending. Moreover, these expenditures 
were largely neglected over the last several years, receiving only a tiny fraction 
of the total agricultural budget (KUHN and DEMYANENKO, 2004). It would be 
more efficient to reallocate budget funds toward Green box measures (according 
to WTO classification
1), and within the Green box towards rural development 
measures, thus making agriculture more competitive and rural areas more 
attractive for the private sector. (DEMYANENKO and GALUSHKO, 2004).  
Table 4:  Sectoral profile of Ukrainian rural self-employment, 2004, % 
  Branch of activity  Ukraine West
1 North Center South East 
Agriculture 0.62  0.61  0.04  0.35  1.26  0.81 
Fishery 0.01 
* * 0.06 
** * 
Mining industry  0.01 
* *  *  0.09 
* 
Processing industry  0.18  0.47 
*  0.03 
* * 
Construction 0.89  2.34 
*  0.35 0.16  0.04 
Whole- and retail 
sale  0.59 0.88 0.50  0.41 0.59  0.21 
Hotels 0.01 
* *  * 0.06 
* 
Transport and 
communication  0.07 0.15 
*  0.04 
*  0.04 
Real estate  0.02  0.07 
*  0.08 
* * 
Education 0.008  0.02 
* * *  * 
Healthcare 0.01  0.02 
* * *  * 
Public services  0.08  0.19 




Servants 0.006  0.01 
* * *  * 
Others 97.49  95.21  99.45  98.53  97.81  98.90 
Source:  Own calculation based on household survey conducted by the Derzhkomstat in 2004. 
Notes: 
1 West: Transkarpathian, Lviv, Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Rivne, Khmelnitsky,  
    Chernivtsi oblasts; North: Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Chernigiv, Sumy oblasts; Center:   
  Vinnytsya, Cherkasy, Poltava, Kirovograd oblasts; East: Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk,  
    Zaporizhzhya, Donetsk, Lugansk oblasts; South: Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson   
  oblasts and Crimea Autonomy. 
  
* No records. 
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Table 5:  Public expenditures on agriculture and rural development, 2006 
State support measures  b UAH  % 
Amber box measures  4.6  45.8 
Green box measures:  5.4  54.3 
Administrative expenditures  0.7 6.9 
Inspection services, pest and disease control  0.2 2.0 
Rural development  1.5 14.9 
Selection  0.2 2.4 
R&D, education  1.4 13.7 
Land reform and environmental protection  0.6 6.2 
Source:  Draft Law "On State Budget 2006", second reading. 
3.2  The determinants of Ukrainian RNFE  
To cast light on the determinants of access to RNFE in Ukraine, an econometric 
analysis is carried out using over 9,000 rural households and their members 
from the State Statistic Committee 2003 household survey. Since no similar 
analysis on Ukraine is as yet available, we mainly rely on RNFE studies from 
abroad in determining factors that might influence the probability of RNFE 
access. The dependent variable is a qualitative (dummy) variable that takes the 
value of one if a member of the household is primarily employed in the rural 
non-farm sector, and zero otherwise
2. As Section 2 has shown, a broad set of 
demographic characteristics of the household and its members might influence 
access to RNFE. Level of education, gender, and age play a significant role 
(BERDEGUE et al., 2000; BRIGHT et al., 2000; FERREIRA and LANJOUW, 2001; 
GORDON and CRAIG, 2001). Specifically, level of education is expected to have a 
positive effect on RNFE access. Women are expected to have less access to 
RNFE. The impact of age is often found to be nonlinear, increasing the 
probability of RNFE up to some point and decreasing it thereafter (FERREIRA and 
LANJOUW, 2001). Locational factors also proved to determine access to RNFE 
(ISGUT, 2004). Since our data does include information on the distance of 
households from small towns or cities, we can only consider a very broad 
geographical factor (e.g. Eastern or Western regions of Ukraine) as an explanatory 
variable. Such a practice is common (e.g. FERREIRA and LANJOUW, 2001) and the 
information on the profile of RNFE in Ukraine presented in Section 3.1 also 
leads us to this decision. Availability of land might also have an impact. As 
BERDEGUE et al. (2000) mention, "the conventional view is that households with 
greater levels of access to land have less access to RNFE". Also, this might be 
highly relevant for Ukraine since the bulk of rural households tends to spend a 
considerable amount of time on subsistence or subsidiary farming as well (see 
Section 3.1). It is also conventional to consider household size and number of 
                                                 
2  Note that we considered only employed rural population.
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children as explanatory variables (e.g. FERREIRA  and LANJOUW, 2001; 
BUCHENRIEDER, 2003). 
The marginal effects or elasticity indicate the strength of the correlation between 
the probability of RNFE and a respective explanatory variable
3, holding all other 
explanatory variables at their means. 
The results in Table 6 illustrate that Ukrainian men, as expected, are more likely 
to be engaged in the non-farm sector than women, controlling for all other 
variables. Being a man increases the probability of RNFE by almost 19  %, 
implying that more attention should be paid to rural women in order to facilitate 
their access to RNFE. Interestingly, the probability of RNFE declines with age, 
down to a turning point of around 45 years (at 2.0 % per each additional year) 
and then increases. This result is opposite to what, for example, FERREIRA and 
LANJOUW (2001) find. This implies a lack of (need for) programs, such as micro- 
financing, that would especially support young rural inhabitants. As expected, 
the more land that a household owns, the lower the probability of RNFE, but up 
to 45.45 ha per household member (at .06 % per each additional .01 ha), and 
afterwards it increases. Probably removing some land market constraints in 
Ukraine (e.g. a moratorium on the sale and purchase of agricultural land) would 
allow a greater consolidation of land (more than 45  ha per member), thus 
increasing access to RNFE. Controlling for other characteristics, the probability of 
RNFE does not appear to be associated with household size, while the number 
of children in the household negatively influences RNFE probability (i.e., every 
additional child decreases the probability of RNFE by approximately 6.2 %). 
Geographical location seems to influence the probability of non-farm 
participation, in particular living in the Western region increases the probability 
of RNFE by 31.5 % and only by 9.8 % in the northern region. This might be 
explained by western oblasts traditionally being less agriculturally-specialized 
than, for example, eastern or southern oblasts. The influence of education levels 
on the probability of non-farm labor participation has some peculiarities. 
Graduation from high and secondary school has a negative impact (decreases the 
probability of RNFE by 14 % and 38 %, respectively), whereas higher education 
has a positive impact (increases probability by 11 %). This result may be related 
to the fact that graduation from high and secondary school does not bestow a 
qualification, whereas graduation from higher education establishments provides 
such a qualification, making the individual more flexible on the labor market. 
However, technical (secondary) education (which also provides a qualification) 
does not have a significant influence on RNFE, controlling for all other 
variables. 
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Table 6:  Probit estimates of RNFE 
Variable  dF/dx 
(elasticity)  Coefficients p-value 
Male
*  .1898666 .5144023 0.000
Age
***  -.0200476  -.0543145 0.057 
Age squared
***  .0002235 .0006054  0.090 
Higher education
*  .1139984 .3856681  0.008 
High school education
*  -.1423096 -.3905377  0.000 
Primary education  .2511969 .9079051  0.104 
Secondary education
* -.3816893 -.9966030  0.000 
Technical (secondary) school  .0489094 .1338975  0.145 
Number of children in household
*  -.0619971 -.1679677  0.004 
Household size  .0039011 .0105693  0.788 
Land owned per capita
*  -.0006891 -.0018671  0.000 
Land owned per capita squared
*  7.58E-08 2.05E-07  0.000 
North Region
**  .0985969 1.124556  0.047 
South Region  .0664452 1.029380  0.167 
West Region
*  .3152760 1.781260  0.000 
East Region   .0789343 1.065700  0.107 
Number of observations  1332  Prob > chi2  0.0000 
Log likelihood  -699.8044 Pseudo  R2  0.2056 
LR chi2(16)  362.28    
Source:  Authors’ estimates based on household survey conducted by the Derzhkomstat in 2003. 
Notes: 
*, **, *** Statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively.  
4 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICIES TO PROMOTE 
RFNE IN UKRAINE 
Promoting RNFE is very difficult and not the responsibility of one ministry or 
one organization (e.g. any state or private organization responsible for a 
particular activity, be it road building, gasification, construction) but rather of 
the whole government, and requires coordination among different organizations 
and ministries. This task is likely to be easier at the local level, in the context of 
decentralization, than at the national level. Since the rural non-farm sector is 
heterogeneous, blanket policy recommendations are inappropriate. Bearing all 
this in mind and based on worldwide experience, however, some conclusions 
can be made. Below we present such conclusions for RNFE development in 
Ukraine. 
The role of policies targeted at rural areas is widely recognized as providing 
incentives that stimulate RNFE participation, as well as households’ capacity to 
respond to such incentives. For example, micro-financing can improve access to 
financial resources for the rural population: These might include micro-loans for 
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strategies. Currently in Ukraine, micro-loans are mostly neglected, since state 
loan program funds are targeted towards agriculture (i.e., the partial interest rate 
compensation program). Hence, if the credit policy is widened to include the non-
farm sector, it is particularly likely to benefit local non-farm self-employment 
initiatives. Secure ownership and usage rights of natural resources, particularly 
land, would provide the capacity to respond to incentives granted by micro-
financing opportunities. Hence, allowing land sale and purchase in Ukraine 
would make it possible to use land titles as collateral and improve natural 
resource allocation, thereby increasing RNFE opportunities.  
If state support to agriculture were located in the wider context of rural 
development, shifting it from so-called coupled support (or, according to WTO 
classification, Amber box measures) towards de-coupled support (Green box 
measures), would lead to more efficient public fund allocation, thus making 
agriculture more competitive and rural areas more attractive for the private 
sector. The competitiveness of the agricultural sector cannot be increased 
without the development of the industrial, commercial and service sectors that 
characterize modern agriculture. Technology promotion policies, human 
capacity building, increasing the attractiveness of rural areas to the private sector 
(roads, electrification, telecommunication, etc.) are not neutral in this regard. 
Voluminous empirical evidence shows a positive effect of education and 
infrastructure on RNFE opportunities.  
Ukraine has no public institution responsible for RNFE. The ministries of 
industrial policy, health, and education are clearly urban-oriented, whereas the 
ministry of agriculture rarely looks beyond agricultural production. If such a 
public institution were established, the design and implementation of rural 
development (including RNFE) policy would be much more effective. The EU’s 
experience in this regard might be helpful. 
Empirical evidence proves gender to be an important factor that determines 
RNFE access. In Ukraine, women generally have less access to RNFE. Thus, 
RNFE policies that support rural women must pay greater attention to 
facilitating their access to RNFE.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 7:  Variable definitions and summary statistics 
Variable Definition  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min Max. 
Male  1 if female, 2 if male  1.47 0.49  1 2 
Age  Age of a household member, in 
years 
39.70 10.17  17 72 
Age squared  Age of a household member 
squared, in years 
1678.60 819.47 289 5184 
Higher 
education 
1 if a member has a higher  
education, 0 otherwise 
0.14 0.35  0 1 
High school 
education 
1 if a member has a high school 
education, 0 otherwise 
0.55 0.49  0 1 
Primary 
education 
1 if a member has a primary  
education, 0 otherwise 
0.005 0.07 0  1 
Secondary 
education 
1 if a member has a secondary  
education, 0 otherwise 




1 if a member has a technical  
(secondary) education, 0 
otherwise 




Number of children in 
household 
1.02 0.96  0 8 
Household size  Number of household members  3.81 1.42  1  10 
Land owned per 
capita 
Quantity of land owned by  
household per household 
member, in 0.01 ha 
115.38 406.67 0  9008 
Land owned per 
capita squared 
Squared quantity of land owned 
by household per member 
1.78e+05  3.15e+06 0 8.1e+07
Northern region  1 if household located in north  
region, 0 otherwise 
0.15 0.36    
Southern region  1 if household located in south  
region, 0 otherwise 
0.19 0.39    
Western region  1 if household located in west  
region, 0 otherwise 
0.35 0.48    
Eastern region  1 if household located in east  
region, 0 otherwise 
0.18 0.38    
Source:  Authors’ estimates based on household survey conducted by the Derzhkomstat in 2003.  Agriculture in the Face of Changing Markets, Institutions and Policies: Challenges and Strategies 
JARMILA CURTISS, ALFONS BALMANN, KIRSTI DAUTZENBERG, KATHRIN HAPPE (eds., 2006) 
Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Central and Eastern Europe, Vol. 33, Halle (Saale), IAMO, pp. 497-510. 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR FARM HOUSEHOLD 





In a post-productivist era, some farms may find it easier than others to devise 
new initiatives and enterprises for income generation. Many monoactive farm 
households may wish to continue as they have done in the past. This study 
investigated a variety of livelihood strategies of pluriactive farm households in 
both Finland and the UK. Some households were more entrepreneurial than 
others; the age and personality of members influenced livelihood decisions. 
Household activities remained restricted by access to assets and the 
opportunities these provided. Benefits and disadvantages of farm pluriactivity 
are discussed. Finnish farms have long been pluriactive, so a comparison 
provides useful information to help farm families choose more sustainable 
livelihoods, and should therefore be considered by those providing training and 
advice to farm households.  
Keywords:   EU rural development policy, pluriactive livelihood strategies, 
entrepreneurial skills, capital assets, Finland, UK. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This study looked at recent trends in farming in both the UK and Finland, 
focusing on strategies employed by farm households and how these households 
might cope with Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform. While it was 
previously common in the UK for some farm incomes to be earned solely from 
agriculture, a post-productivist era where direct payments are reduced may 
encourage farm households to increasingly consider the opportunities (and the 
challenges to be overcome) of pluriactivity (defined later). A comparison is 
made with Finland, where additional farm income sources have long been an 
economic necessity. 
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A variety of methodologies were used in a case study approach. Focused 
interviews enabled direct contact with household members, to gain accurate, 
first-hand data (MERTON et al., 1990). A Sustainable Livelihood Framework 
ensured an integrated approach in constructing interview questions (DFID, 2006), 
seasonal calendars established year-round workloads arising from pluriactivity, 
and SWOT analysis on interview data helped formulate the results (PASTEUR, 
2001).Ten interviews were undertaken, split evenly between Finnish and UK 
farm households. Methodologies provided information on pluriactive livelihood 
strategies adopted on UK and Finnish farms, and the influences behind them.  
2 THE UK AND FINLAND AS CASE STUDY LOCATIONS 
A brief look at recent trends in farming in the UK and Finland establishes the 
context of this study. Though Finland’s history of farm pluriactivity is longer, it 
has been common in both countries and is likely to increase further in the future.  
2.1  Farming in the UK 
The UK has for many years experienced the loss of farmers from the industry. 
Cheaply imported food, the decrease in food exports, increased mechanisation 
and high inflation in food retail prices compared to the price received by the 
farmer has taken its toll. Added to this were the crises of BSE and Foot and 
Mouth Disease, reducing the export of produce and lowering farm incomes.  
Prime Minister TONY  BLAIR (2000) suggested that farm households might 
continue to farm with support from non-agricultural income activities. This idea 
is now also supported by the European Union (EU) agricultural reforms and 
DEFRA (2005) explain how households will need to be flexible, entrepreneurial 
and work closely with their markets, suppliers and customers. This may involve 
specialising or diversifying, be agricultural or non-agricultural, on or off-farm. 
However, whilst protecting households to some extent from risks associated 
with a limited income source, a challenge exists for households to devise ways 
of exploiting their capital assets (explained later) in order to develop on and/or 
off-farm income generating opportunities (MANNION, 2001; DFID, 2006). 
2.2  Farming in Finland  
Finland’s membership of the EU in 1995 gave rise to significant changes which 
put into context the status of Finnish farming and its possible future direction. On 
joining the EU, price supports decreased, Finnish producer prices immediately 
fell by 40-50  % (causing concern for future farm household livelihoods) and 
direct income payments became more common (MTT ECONOMIC  RESEARCH, 
2005). This price fall plus the ageing population of Finnish farming families, 
resulted in a huge drop in the total number of farms, but at the same time some 
increase in average farm size (Finnish farms were relatively small). From 1995 a 
change also occurred in farm types and structure. The number of dairy farms fell 
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the number of farms growing crops increased. The increase in farm size and 
change in farm types attempted to make Finnish farming more economically 
viable. Finland’s northerly geographic position restricts both growing season 
and crop varieties, increases costs, and influences it’s history of combining on-
farm agricultural work with additional income generating activities. Such 
families may increasingly work off-farm, with agriculture as a secondary 
activity, particularly if growing crops (MTT ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2005). 
3 RESEARCH INTO THE FARM HOUSEHOLD 
This study focused on the household, not only the farmer, to accurately collect 
data regarding livelihood activities. DESERAN (1984) supports this: "Farms are 
rarely operated by farmers alone but usually involve the labour of other family 
members".  Decisions regarding use of common resources are the shared 
responsibility of the whole family (TRUST, 1985). The farm household is defined 
as those contributing in however small a way towards its livelihood.  
3.1  Perceptions of farm income activities 
Part-time farming with other income-generating activities has increasingly been 
adopted to alter otherwise low farm household incomes. HILL (2000) believes 
farming households compare well with non-farming when additional earnings 
are accounted for, but acknowledges that type and location of farms and 
farmer’s age and education can constrain agricultural and non-agricultural 
opportunities.  
3.2  Farm household livelihood strategies 
This study utilises EIKELAND’S (1999) terms to distinguish between "industrial 
pluriactive" (self-employed in two or more enterprises) and "wage-earning 
pluriactive" (involved in both self-employment and wage earning). Pluriactivity 
denotes the multiple occupations undertaken by farm households (however 
significantly they contribute towards total family income). In addition to on-
farm agricultural production, this could include either on-farm non-agricultural, 
and/or off-farm agricultural or non-agricultural work. Though not the only 
industry in which households seek additional income, the extent of farm 
pluriactivity has increased in proportion to the decline in agricultural income, 
and was being undertaken by over 60 % of family farms in the EU (SOFER, 2001). 
This is likely to increase further due to CAP reform. 
BROX (1984) and BROX et al. (1966) explain how some researchers believe that 
industrial pluriactivity would cease if sufficiently well paid wage-earning 
opportunities existed in rural areas. KINSELLA et al. (2000) suggest that farm 
households may choose pluriactivity either for a viable income or a temporary 
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Should improved education and household members’ personalities not be 
considered in addition to the above? This is addressed in the idea of the 
entrepreneurial farmer. CARTER (1998) and STANWORTH et al. (1976) suggest 
that pluriactive farmers (or portfolio owners) would not prefer to be wage-
earners, but are differentiated by their relative youth, greater experience and 
training. They choose to specialise rather than keep to traditional mixed farming. 
Pluriactive farmers are said to take more risks in pursuing business success, to 
seek larger profits through expansion and to continually seek new markets and 
opportunities. 
Particular strategies chosen depend upon access to capital assets (human, financial, 
natural, social and physical) (MANNION et al., 2001; DFID, 2006) (see Figure 1). 
They relate to skills, knowledge, land, labour, landscape or social networks 
available, and vary in importance depending upon economic or political changes. 
A farm household may establish an enterprise, utilising special skills or education 
(human capital assets). The utilisation of assets to provide products or services for 
which the public are prepared to pay can determine farm livelihood success.  
Figure 1 illustrates the holistic approach taken to ensure that each household’s 
individual farm context, access to assets, and influence from livelihood related 
policies was accounted for, thus establishing the decision-making process. This 
framework therefore identifies support required by pluriactive farm households. 
Such support is later expressed in terms of recommendations for policy change. 
The framework should be read in an integrated manner, using the feedback loops.  
Figure 1:  Sustainable livelihoods framework  
 
Source: DFID,  2006. 
Income from non-agricultural sources has long been a common phenomenon on 
Finnish farms (PELTOLA, 1999), existing to a greater extent than in the UK. The 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES’ statistical report (2002) showed that, 24 % of Finnish 
male farmers had secondary gainful employment in 1997, as opposed to 9 % of 
UK male farmers. In some households, the distribution of labour could mean 
one person concentrating his/her time mainly on-farm, while their spouse may Opportunities and challenges for farm household livelihood strategies  501
work off-farm in a non-agricultural job. PELTOLA (2000) believes that 
pluriactivity on Finnish farms will increase further in the future. 
Whereas rural development funds could previously be used only for agri-
environment schemes, forestry and early retirement, they now cover producer 
participation in quality assurance and certification schemes, processing and 
marketing of agricultural products, diversification of agricultural activities, and 
training (EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 2003). More emphasis is placed on 
production of goods and services on-farm, plus off-farm enterprises. Both farm 
households and rural communities could potentially benefit (KINSELLA et al., 2000). 
4 POLICY SUPPORT FOR PLURIACTIVE FARMING LIVELIHOODS 
The future of agriculture in a post-productivist era will inevitably incorporate 
increasingly diverse livelihood strategies. In order to ease the transition, agri-
cultural policy needs to recognise each household as having different skills, 
interests and motivations for the chosen activity. 
DEFRA (2005) suggest that UK farmers participate in cooperatives or 
partnership ventures, add value or diversify into non-agricultural activities. 
However, policy-makers may be challenged in providing adequate training for 
previously full-time farming households. These "contented monoactives" 
(SHUCKSMITH et al., 2002) may lack the knowledge and skills to ensure a 
profitable livelihood. Time will reveal whether EU Rural Development funds 
can address this. Much finance currently focuses on farm-centric measures such 
as investments in existing agricultural holdings and land improvement 
(EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2003). Only grants for diversification of agricultural 
activities and for tourism and crafts might enable the establishment of new 
enterprises. An evaluation of existing rural development measures undertaken 
by the European Commission (EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 2004) revealed the 
benefits to be gained to depend upon individual farms. For example, whilst 
provision of training is regarded as having wide relevance, assistance with 
processing and marketing is not considered effective for primary producers or 
for use in restructuring. Likewise, farm investment measures are only suitable 
for modernising less competitive farms, and not for those already highly 
productive. However, the proposed policy reform concerning 2007-2013 
discusses the intention to make such support measures more effective. 
It is hoped that future EU policy reforms may enable Finland to use more 
nationally chosen options, which better suit Finnish farming conditions, and 
alongside the development of innovative technology, increase production 
efficiency (yield levels are currently lower in Finland than some EU countries), 
whilst reducing environmental damage (MTT ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2005). In 
addition, the desired future would be for small farmers to invest in organic 
production, and the potential exists to further develop rural tourism. In general, Claire Newton  502
keeping the countryside populated and increasing farm profitability are important 
challenges. 
5 PLURIACTIVE HOUSEHOLD STRATEGIES IN FINLAND AND THE UK 
The ten farm households interviewed (FIN1-5 and UK1-5)
1 were chosen for 
having additional non-agricultural incomes, either as wage-earners or in industrial 
pluriactivity, and a variety of factors determined their choice (EIKELAND, 1999). 
Theoretical sampling (GEIGER, 1990; MCCRACKEN, 1988) ensured that both 
geographical location and livelihood activities varied between households. 
Seasonal calendars were used to establish the year-round workload of each farm 
household (on and off-farm, as well as agricultural and non-agricultural), 
identifying both opportunities and challenges associated with pluriactivity. 
Farm households were found to have been influenced by their capital assets, 
replicating the findings of MANNION et al. (2001). The focused interview plus 
SL Framework highlighted UK1’s access to physical assets, in terms of 
accommodation and dining space, and the human capital of knowledge and 
interest. These assets facilitated the establishment of a bed and breakfast (B&B) 
enterprise as a form of industrial pluriactivity. 
Since HILL (2000) suggested that livelihood opportunities were constrained by 
education (presumably a lack of it), a good education should therefore enhance 
employment prospects. This proved especially important when considering 
FIN4’s intention to work full-time in agriculture until its financial non-viability 
became apparent and choosing to utilise a university education to combine farming 
with research.  
The focused interview, SL Framework and seasonal calendar highlighted FIN5’s 
utilisation of a college education in occasional mathematics teaching, the short 
hours complementing on-farm duties. Such flexibility would have been 
impossible with many other off-farm jobs. 
Not all farm households undertook non-agricultural activities solely for extra 
income, supporting observations by PELTOLA (1999), evidence for which was 
found in two interviews. FIN5 had established a variety of non-agricultural 
activities, both on and off-farm. Despite the household enjoying the additional 
income, the primary reason behind their livelihood choice was fun. Similarly, 
UK1’s B&B was initially a hobby, but was expanded to supplement their falling 
agricultural wage.  
                                                 
1  FIN1-5 and UK1-5 refer to the five Finnish and five UK farm households that were 
interviewed as part of this study. Each of the ten households was issued with letters 
abbreviating their country of location plus a number in order to be easily identifiable within 
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The suggestion made by HILL (2000), CARTER (1998) and STANWORTH et al. (1976) 
that the age of the farm household members influences the extent and type of 
pluriactivity was replicated several times. The husband in FIN5 was relatively 
young and could be considered to be entrepreneurial, judging by his energy and 
ideas for exploiting opportunities. These included producing and selling wine, 
running a restaurant, rearing organic pigs and selling ham direct to the public. 
Conversely, UK5 was nearing retirement and though the wife appeared unhappy 
with her job, she had no time or energy to improve it. She was literally waiting 
to sell the business.  
Another factor believed by HILL (2000) to influence access to non-agricultural 
opportunities is the geographical location of the farm. Though UK1 were 
restricted by the natural capital of their hill farm in utilising their land (the 
physical environment was suitable only for sheep, and local planning laws 
allowed no development), they benefited from the landscape’s popularity with 
tourists when choosing their B&B.  
UK5 had deliberately purchased a farm in the vicinity of a large residential 
population, maximising sales opportunities. UK4, however, had been less 
fortunate, in witnessing the closure of shops which sold the farm’s products. 
UK4 had subsequently relied on farmers’ markets, limiting their sales capacity 
and increasing their income vulnerability.  
The local community research opinion (BROX, 1984; BROX et al., 1966) is that 
industrial pluriactive households would prefer to be wage-earners. All the 
interviews disproved this, however. UK3, as an entrepreneur, was concentrating 
on developing industrial pluriactivity to increase product lines and profits, while 
FIN5 clearly enjoyed establishing their businesses, and had in fact considered 
discontinuing off-farm activities and concentrating solely on on-farm work. 
Although KINSELLA et al. (2000) have suggested that farm households’ choices 
are pluriactive either to ensure a viable income or as a stage in the transition to 
leaving farming altogether, none of the households wished to leave farming, 
thereby reinforcing pluriactivity as generating a viable income. Only FIN5 
briefly considered swapping pig farming for other activities, until realising that 
the customers for their wine-making business and restaurant enjoyed the novelty 
of visiting a working farm. KINSELLA et al. (2000) don’t account for pluriactivity 
being undertaken for non-financial reasons, but several households supported 
this in stating that income was not always the priority.  
In summary, the methodologies adopted here revealed that access to capital 
assets significantly influenced the farms’ pluriactive strategies. It was evident, 
too, that whilst valuable, increased income was not always the sole reason for 
non-agricultural activities. Claire Newton  504
6 INFLUENCES ON PLURIACTIVE DECISION-MAKING 
Present and future influences upon farm household pluriactivity were examined. 
The interview showed FIN5 to be driven more by the challenge of business than 
by the farm subsidy payments they might have earned from restricting 
themselves to a particular line of production. Similar findings were recorded in 
interviews with UK2 and UK3, who were concerned less with EU policies and 
more with business expansion and marketing. They knew more money could be 
made from organic vegetables and dairy products than from the mixed arable 
farm they had inherited from their father. UK2’s research had proved there was 
a market for vegetables and that "customers want organic". This suggests that if 
these three households had not inherited their farms, they would have been 
managing an enterprise anyway. Perhaps they were primarily business people as 
opposed to farmers seeking an agricultural lifestyle, as observed in the work of 
CARTER (1998) and STANWORTH et al. (1976).  
Many interviewees wished to earn more and obtain a larger share of their total 
income from agriculture. FIN1, FIN2 and UK1 were concerned at the existing 
decline in income from agricultural production. Such concern was not expressed 
by all those interviewed, however. Some households had found new ways to 
improve their finances. FIN3, for example, had been influenced by EU 
agricultural policy to buy additional milk quotas, had increased their dairy herd 
and had doubled their average milk yield by changing both feeding and breeding 
practices. 
Having discussed the influences behind previous decisions, it is important to 
understand the potential future influences on farm household livelihood 
activities. FIN1’s plan was to transfer from dairy farming to crop production, 
freeing manpower and time for a more financially rewarding livelihood. Crucially, 
crop farming could continue alongside off-farm research. 
FIN4 believed that the agricultural reforms leading towards the certification of 
food production (EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 2003) could encourage quality 
Finnish food. Food certification may provide the benefits that FIN3 believed 
forestry certification did, in terms of quality assurance, subsequent demand 
(especially from overseas) and increased selling prices. Certification may help 
support household incomes, reducing the likelihood of abandoned farms, as 
suggested by KINSELLA et al. (2000).  
There were a variety of reasons for households choosing pluriactivity. Some 
used their entrepreneurial ability to remove restrictions they had encountered 
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7 THE IMPACT OF PLURIACTIVE STRATEGIES ON FARM HOUSEHOLDS 
Both positive and negative outcomes of pluriactivity and the extent of 
sustainability on the farm household were revealed through use of interviews, 
seasonal calendars and a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats) analysis framework (PASTEUR, 2001). 
One obvious benefit for pluriactive farm households was the increased income 
beyond that earned solely from agricultural production, although increased 
income was not always the initial objective. UK1, for instance, had come to 
realise the benefits of a pluriactive livelihood that KINSELLA et al. (2000) refer 
to, in enabling the family to continue farming the land and living in "a beautiful 
location".  
Apart from the additional income, the interview with FIN2 revealed the 
improved social life and increased social capital obtainable from combining on-
farm agriculture and off-farm teaching. They believed this enabled them to 
"stand back" and better understand each other’s livelihood problems.  
The interview with FIN5 reflected the ability of pluriactivity to provide 
opportunities for managing various enterprises. Working in their restaurant 
enabled the parents to be with their children, though they admitted the need for 
yet more time together. Their diverse livelihood activities caused an uneven 
year-round spread which was sometimes problematic for their cash flow, and the 
seasonal calendar revealed the winter as a quiet time regarding work, as in other 
cases as well. 
FIN4 explained that the distance between the farm and the research job resulted 
in long journeys, but the flexible working hours, the ability to undertake 
research on-farm via a computer, and the way that cereal farming and 
agricultural research complimented each other were positive features. 
It became apparent that pluriactivity increased farm incomes, providing greater 
security and enabling families to stay on the farm and work it. For 
entrepreneurs, pluriactivity is an opportunity to experiment with a variety of 
businesses. Sustainability was reduced, however, if the spread of time and 
money was uneven throughout the year.  
8 FARM PLURIACTIVITY IN THE UK AND FINLAND COMPARED 
The interview data showed that both UK and Finnish farm households were 
capable of securing additional livelihood activities, either on or off-farm. Use of 
the SL Framework replicated MANNION et al. (2001) and DFID’s (2006) theory 
that the activities chosen by households depend partly on capital assets, and that 
of HILL (2000), that activities also depend on age and geographical location. 
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Whereas Finnish farms have long obtained incomes from non-agricultural 
sources (PELTOLA, 2000), this has been less common in the UK. Regarding the 
extent of pluriactivity, archival data show that 63 % of men in the UK earned 
their income solely from agriculture in 1997, compared to only 45 % of men in 
Finland (EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2002). These figures are partly the result of 
Finland’s climate, which shortens the growing season and restricts the crop mix, 
and Finnish farm size, being typically smaller, and therefore less demanding on 
time and labour.  
Many more farmers in Finland than in the UK own forest, the management of 
which provides additional non-agricultural income sources. It is remotely 
possible that Finnish farm households are more likely to include a female 
member who is obtaining her income from an off-farm profession, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of a farm being pluriactive. This is because Finnish 
rural women may be better educated than women in some other countries. The 
wife in FIN2, for example, earned her non-agricultural income from teaching. 
The wife in FIN5 partly earned her income from post office work. Although 
these two were the only examples among the Finnish households, a larger study 
may have identified others. 
The findings revealed the way in which livelihood activities either 
complemented one another or were in conflict. Both FIN1 and FIN3, for 
example, talked of dairy farming being a constraint in terms of the time a farmer 
needs to spend on-farm, whereas this was not perceived as a problem with UK3. 
This may have been due to UK3 having concentrated on developing the on-farm 
processing and retail element in dairy farming and having therefore increased 
their income through value-adding. It is important to remember, too, that the 
costs of dairy farming in the UK may be lower, due to the milder winters and 
longer summers. If Finnish farms shift from dairy (or livestock, in general) to 
crop farming, time will be freed up for the increase in off-farm work which 
MTT ECONOMIC RESEARCH (2005) predict. 
To summarise, it is clear that both UK and Finnish farm households are capable 
of non-agricultural livelihood activities. The way in which they complement 
each other or conflict is partly influenced by factors that include climate. 
9 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES 
Recommendations for changes can be made in order to increase the benefits for 
pluriactive farm households. The likelihood of pluriactive farms being less 
vulnerable to changes in agriculture than monoactive farms has been discussed. 
The changing nature of agriculture and the increase in families leaving the 
industry may result in rural population decline, in turn reducing trade for rural 
businesses and the demand for local services. This problem may be worse in 
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Despite EU rural development policy funding focussing heavily on farm-centric 
measures rather than the establishment of new enterprises, for example, a policy 
emphasis on rural development could help by encouraging and supporting 
producer participation in quality assurance and certification schemes. 
In view of the need for alternative incomes, the National Farmers Union (NFU) 
(2002) consider that farmers would benefit from value-adding, the production of 
commodity products, new product development (including non-food) and 
service provision. However, for farmers to take advantage of this, it is suggested 
that they require new skills. Farm households need to be appropriately trained 
for new opportunities, and EU rural development grants might help. The SL 
Framework is a reminder of ways in which policy change can affect other 
livelihood aspects, either negatively or positively. Any support must enable 
farmers to benefit from changing market forces and consumer demands.  
Social capital might increase if farmers utilise EU rural development funding. 
UK2 had received Objective 5b funding from MAFF (now DEFRA) to establish 
an organic vegetable cooperative. UK2 considered the cooperative to enable 
both risks and rewards to be shared amongst the local agricultural community. 
FIN3 also benefited from working in cooperation with neighbouring farms in 
sharing machinery and in terms of pooled ideas and resources, relating to the 
observations of FALK et al. (2000). 
A requirement exists for some farm households to develop additional income-
generating ideas. The provision of training and finance would maximise 
opportunity up-take through increased social capital. 
10  CONCLUSIONS 
This study explored the opportunities, challenges and sustainability of the 
livelihood strategies of pluriactive farm households. Interviews revealed many 
reasons for farm households choosing pluriactivity, including the need for 
additional non-agricultural incomes and increasing emphasis on rural development 
initiatives. Some farms had not initially established non-agricultural activities 
for economic reasons, however. 
While geographical location, type of farm, the age and educational 
background of the household members (HILL, 2000) and access to capital 
assets (MANNION et al., 2001) varied between these farms, attempts were made 
to maximise the livelihood opportunities available. 
It became apparent that EU policies did influence to some extent the livelihoods 
chosen. Farmers spoke of changing productivity in endeavouring to profit from a 
change in policy. Also, the decrease in agricultural incomes in recent years and 
the move away from production based subsidies increases the need for non-
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policy. Some were entrepreneurs who would have been managing another 
business if it had not been a farm. This entrepreneurial attitude may be useful in 
a future where policy may have less influence on farms. 
For those farm families looking for alternative income sources, the majority of 
EU Rural Development grants focus on farm-centric measures, including 
investments in agricultural holdings and support for young farmers, as opposed 
to assisting with the establishment of farm pluriactivity. 
One disadvantage experienced by pluriactive households is the uneven spread of 
both time and money throughout the year. Some parents considered that they 
were not spending enough time with their children during the busy times. 
Winters were quiet for many, and an ideal time for non-agricultural activities. 
All the farms appeared satisfied with their industrial pluriactive livelihoods; 
none intended to leave farming. Differences were found between the UK and 
Finland, partly as a result of how climate influences farm types and time spent 
on farming. 
Finnish farm households have a longer history of pluriactivity and rural 
development projects than those in the UK. A look at Finnish farm households’ 
management of time and types of work undertaken is therefore useful 
information to UK farmers in preparation for the reduction in direct payments. A 
pluriactive livelihood might reduce the risks associated with changes in policy. 
The success of future farm pluriactivity, for both Finland and the UK, depends 
on the support that farmers receive to enable them to reduce their constraints and 
maximise their opportunities (PELTOLA, 2000; NFU, 2002).  
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TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT IN REMOTE 







The overall objective of the international project TERA (6
th Framework Program) 
is to identify and analyze the territorial factors that influence the development of 
enterprises in remote rural areas of Europe. Emphasis is placed on rural-urban 
linkages as this represents the key issue for the future development of rural 
areas. The objective of the initial part of the project is to specify and identify the 
project’s study areas and to complete a descriptive and comparative analysis of 
the areas. The areas specified in this work are rural, remote and containing or 
adjacent to an urban center. The comparative analysis based on the reports from 
6 individual partners, presents the socio-economic development contexts of the 
study areas and identifies their similarities and differences in terms of socio-
economic and territorial characteristics. The results lead to a recommendation of 
the "best" strategy for further development. 
Keywords: Remote rural area, rural-urban linkages, rural development,  
comparative analysis, TERA. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Traditional rural policies were mostly geared towards agriculture, with a strong 
emphasis on direct subsidies delivered top-down. It is important to note the 
distortions that these policies have created is due to the fact that they are poorly 
integrated with the objectives of other sectors such as small business 
development and basic infrastructure implementation. Nowadays rural policy in 
the European Union should deal with rural development as a whole: The 
agricultural component fits into a more synergistic and wider picture. There is 
an emphasis on cross-sector coordination and the definition of real customized 
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local strategies. Agriculture must be a component within these strategies, but it 
must not be addressed outside the other issues. As the use of subsidies declines, 
there is an increasing need for regions to identify their competitive advantages. 
Some regions are leaders in different manufacturing activities. Others base their 
development on attracting new activities, marketing local products and services, 
or attracting new residents with an exceptional natural environment. Other 
communities can look to advantages in terms of their rapid links to major urban 
areas. Some are investing in regional educational institutions (JOHNSTON, 2005). 
The changing economic situation and rapid urbanization both point to an urgent 
need to integrate approaches of rural and urban development. Government 
policy needs to take account of the spatial pattern of economic activity. The sense 
of local and regional issues will help to provide a more detailed understanding of 
how the processes of global growth interact with local conditions and play out 
across a country; where and how they vary and what central government policy 
can do about it. The understanding of what aspects of the growth process can be 
influenced by policy represents an issue of high importance. Identifying regional 
and local economies and understanding how they operate can help determine the 
most economically-rational, and politically/administratively feasible level at 
which to intervene to achieve a particular purpose. Too often local government 
boundaries determine the geography of a policy when these may have little to do 
with the extent of economic linkages. On the contrary, thinking and acting 
instead, for instance, in terms of a "functional economic region" gives policies 
economic strength, and indicates when – and which – multiple actors in both the 
public and private sector to involve (HOBSON and PHILLIPSON, 2005). 
TERA project (6
th Framework Program; participants: Italy, Finland, Greece, 
Scotland, Czech Republic, Latvia) aims to contribute to EU efforts to increase 
the value added of development policies and to provide a new policy framework 
able to enhance the positive effects of policy delivery and to promote cohesion 
and sustainable spatial development in a larger EU. 
The overall objective of TERA is to identify and analyze the territorial factors 
that influence the development of enterprises in remote rural areas of Europe. 
TERA will lead to increased understanding of how factors can be integrated, in 
order to contribute to the remote rural areas competitiveness and the overall 
quality of life. The emphasis is placed on the rural-urban linkages which 
represent the key issue for the future development of rural areas. 
In this paper we describe the initial part of the project. The objective of this part 
is to specify and identify project study areas (by means of a factor analysis, 
cluster analysis or an expert assessment), to complete a descriptive analysis of 
the areas and finally to complete a comparative analysis and suggestions for a 
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2 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY APPROACH 
The specification of criteria for the selection of the study areas is compatible 
with the objectives of TERA. The main objectives of the project are, in short:  
(a) Identifying and analyzing territorial economic factors which influence the 
creation, development and survival of enterprises in peripheral rural areas of 
Europe and measuring the nature and degree of the influence of these factors. 
(b) Assessing the extent to which current and recent EU development policies 
and national and regional development Programs and projects take account 
of these factors, especially in the context of parallel support policies such as 
CAP direct payments and national social welfare support systems. 
(c) Specifying new policy directions which take account of territorial factors 
and promote the development of remote rural areas in a more targeted and 
effective manner. 
The methodological approach of this paper follows the TERA work-package 
sub-tasks and comprises a few steps. 
The first step involves the criteria for the identification and the selection of rural 
and remote study areas containing or adjacent to an urban center.  
This step is followed by a comprehensive analysis of the socio-economic and 
developmental context of the study area. The procedure identifies in detail the 
social, economic, environmental and territorial characteristics of the study areas. 
This task has been pursued by each partner separately. 
The comprehensive analysis leads to a comparative analysis of the socio-economic 
development context of the study areas that attempts to identify similarities and 
differences amongst them in terms of socio-economic characteristics, physical 
endowments and territorial characteristics.  
The methodology process comprises three concurring steps: 
1.  Identification and selection of a remote rural area and an adjacent urban center; 
2.  A comprehensive analysis of a selected remote rural area; 
3.  A comparative analysis of selected remote rural areas. 
3 IDENTIFICATION AND SELECTION OF REMOTE RURAL AREAS 
3.1  Typology of rural areas 
Rural areas make up 90 percent of the area of the enlarged EU and are home to 
half of the EU´s population, according to the OECD definition (BOEL, 2005). 
Geography, history, culture and economic factors have combined to impart a 
remarkable range of diversity to European regions. Certain regions are generally 
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"Rural" often reflects no more than the density of population. But this is only 
one component. The notion of rurality should also take account of the dynamics 
of the agricultural population seen from the point of view of employment, 
conservation of the countryside and other socio-economic criteria. The variety of 
agricultural activities and the differences in the level of economic development 
between regions lead us to conclude that there are many elements that define the 
"rural" character (BARTHELEMY and VIDAL, 1999).  
One of the "rural" definitions follows the OECD distinction. The term "rural" is 
conceptualized as "a territorial or spatial concept, not restricted to any particular 
land use, degree of economic health or economic concept. It has distinguished 
three types of rural areas on the basis of their place in economic geography" 
(BARTHELEMY and VIDAL, 1999). The OECD makes clear that the distinction 
between types of rural territories is "primarily a function of geographic and 
economic remoteness from urban centers" (BARTHELEMY and VIDAL, 1999). The 
three types are: 
•  Economically-integrated rural areas, which are growing both 
economically and demographically, often located near an urban center, 
with incomes generally above the rural average. Although farmers make 
up only a small part of the work force, farm incomes are typically higher 
than the national average; 
•  Intermediate rural areas, which are relatively spatially remote, but their 
good infrastructure provides easy access to urban centers. These are 
areas traditionally dependent on agriculture and related activities, 
particularly in terms of jobs, although they are increasingly diversified 
into other sectors such as manufacturing and services; 
•  Remote rural areas are usually sparsely populated and often located in 
peripheral regions far removed from urban centers. They are 
characterized by low population density, an aging population, minimal 
infrastructure and services, low skill and income and weak integration 
with the rest of the economy
1. 
3.2  Identifying remote rural areas 
In the framework of the TERA project the aim is to identify the so-called remote 
rural areas to address more effectively the problems of rural development in the 
EU. Following this idea, the EU territory can be in principle structured into: 
•  Non-rural areas (NON-RA); 
•  Non-remote rural areas (NON-RRA); 
•  Remote rural areas (RRA). 
                                                 
1  OECD (1994): Creating rural indicators, Paris. Territorial aspects of enterprise development in remote rural areas of Europe  517
From a rural policy-making point of view, the differentiation between NON-
RRA and RRA are interpreted similar to the differentiation between NON-LFA 
and LFA in the framework of the CAP. However, we take into consideration the 
real status of the RRA and their preparation for future development
2.  
Identifying and selecting remote rural areas lead to policy issues linked not only 
with agriculture, but with more complete regional development. One of the most 
serious policy-making questions is, what further attention should be given to 
those areas and which policy principles should be followed in the future. 
Referring to DATAR (the French agency for territorial development: Délégation 
à l’Aménagement du Territoire et à l’Action Régionale), the main policy-making 
principles can be summarized in: 1) Redistribution, 2) Refunding or repairing,  
3) Protection, 4) Compensation and 5) Creation.  
The first principle can be redistribution of the current stock of wealth, job places 
and capital in a remote rural area to ensure a better or more harmonious 
distribution of these factors. This principle refers more to a situation where the 
government and top-down "planning" play a strong role. 
The second principle can be refunding targeted towards construction/reconstruction 
of the territorial structure, to smooth differences and imbalances caused mainly 
by any natural negative conditions of the remote rural area. Therefore, the goal 
is to provide remedies to these weaknesses in the name of common justice. 
The third principle can be protection, which is focused mainly on environmental 
or cultural aspects, i.e., in the sense taking care of the landscape, nature and 
culture. The creation of nature or landscape protected areas, or national and 
regional parks, expresses the sensitivity of policy towards these issues. 
The fourth principle compensation can be applied when regional planning is far 
from being an exact science and no models are able to reach the optimal 
distribution of means and resources. Developmental actions are actually activated 
in privileged areas or localities, such as places with a high concentration of regional 
factors. 
The fifth principle creation is related to the belief that some mechanisms, local 
conditions and places can trigger growth and developmental processes. A region 
is thought of as a neutral space where planning actions can trigger exogenous 
dynamics from which endogenous processes can follow to ensure spontaneous 
and long-term development of the given area. 
3.3  Study area requirements 
TERA study areas are rural, LFA and remote with some dispersion of economic 
activity, and are adjacent to or containing an urban center. 
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To identify RRA, we rely mainly on official statistical data, which is linked with 
NUTS levels. The question is which of the NUTS 1-5 levels is the most suitable 
for the objectives of the TERA project. The selection of the NUTS level is 
country specific, but we follow three main criteria for this task: 
•  Sufficient homogeneity of a NUTS level; 
•  Sufficient data availability for a NUTS level; 
•  Sufficient size (acreage, population) for policy-making considerations. 
NUTS levels differ considerably among EU countries. In this way, each TERA 
partner chose (as a study area) the NUTS level that was most meaningful for the 
purpose of the project and also reflected country-specific conditions. 
In practice, this means that each TERA partner selected the most suitable levels 
among NUTS 3, NUTS 4 and NUTS 5. 
3.4 Rural-urban  linkages 
Following the TERA objectives, identifying crucial territorial factors for the 
development of economic activity in remote rural areas of Europe is necessary. 
The existence of adjacent urban centers impacts on the economic interactions 
between remote rural areas and the urban centers.  
The classic ideal view of rural-urban linkages is one of symbiosis. In a distinct 
geographical area: 
•  Towns function as service centers for their rural hinterlands, offering 
outlets for rural products, public and commercial services, and 
employment opportunities. 
•  Rural areas provide raw and processed materials, labor and demand for 
non-agricultural goods and services. 
In economic terms, three types of rural-urban linkages are usually distinguished: 
Consumption linkages (demand for final products), production linkages 
(backward or forward supply of inputs for businesses), and financial linkages 
(e.g. rents extracted by urban landlords, remittances by migrants, rural savings 
channeled through urban institutions) (DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT, 2002). 
A major theme in rural-urban linkages is the flow of migrants from the countryside 
to towns. Regional rural-urban migration often concentrates in small and inter-
mediate urban centers where there are employment opportunities. It seems that 
many rural residents prefer to commute rather than migrate. Investments in 
transport facilities that respond to the needs of low-income groups would be 
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The external influence of adjacent urban centers can be seen in an indicator of 
un/employment (e.g. job creation, job destruction, employment opportunities) 
and population distribution in rural areas.  
Urban centers play an important role in the provision of basic services for much 
of the urban population and most of the rural population. These urban centers 
are also particularly important in providing rural populations with access to 
government services and the rule of law (SATTERTHWAITE and TACOLI, 2003). 
To consolidate the definition of the TERA study area with meeting the TERA 
objectives, the following definition is applied:  
Remote rural areas are sparsely populated and often located in peripheral 
regions. They are characterized by low population density, an aging population, 
minimal infrastructure and services, low skill and income and a weak economy. 
Also these areas contain or are adjacent to an urban center. 
3.5  Indicators for identifying remote rural areas 
Reflecting both regional differences in economic structures and natural 
conditions, the role of indicators is to communicate an easily understood picture 
of the main trends by a selected number of key statistics.  
The identification of RRA is based on the set of indicators and their analytical/ 
statistical evaluation. Considering the time limits, the data for all the applied 
indicators are readily available (there was no time for research activities to "fill 
gaps" in the data). This means that the implementation of indicators is based, as 
far as possible, on existing statistics.  
To some extent, the suggested typology follows a typology developed by the 
POLITECNICO DI MILANO (1999). 
In principle, each country – subject to data availability and its individual situation – 
apply the following categories of indicators: 
A. Natural/general characteristics. 
B. Demography. 
C. Settlements. 
D. Economy and social characteristics. 
E.  Infrastructure and history. 
There are a few alternative ways of using the indicators listed above to select the 
study areas. 
•  The simplest way: To expertly select a cluster of RRA, and directly 
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•  A simple way: To expertly select the most important indicators, define 
threshold values for the selected indicators and derive a cluster of RRA 
complying with threshold values. 
•  A more sophisticated way: To apply selected indicators on a cluster 
analysis methodology to identify a cluster of the most RRA. 
•  The most sophisticated way: To apply a factor analysis methodology for 
selected indicators. 
3.6  Selection of the Czech study area 
This section details the methodology of selecting a remote rural area in the Czech 
Republic. The development of settlements in Central Europe and mainly in the 
Czech lowlands has a very deep historical history. This development has resulted 
in a high number of relatively small/very small settlements in the Czech Republic 
less than ten kilometers from each other, which is one of the RRA criteria.  
Individual indicators describing RRA defined at level NUTS 4 show different 
absolute values within specific districts. If we compare the order of the districts 
based on the value of each indicator, we find that the order of the districts mutually 
varies and doesn’t allow RRA to be chosen precisely and unambiguously. 
Therefore, to determinate RRA in the most objective manner, the evaluators 
decided to use a statistical method of factor analysis which allows a multi-
criteria valuation method to be used to select and identify a common context of a 
chosen number of indicators in selected problem spheres (criteria), and then to 
statistically verify them and classify them according to the score.  
From the overall total of 22 chosen indicators, 17 indicators were identified after 
the first calculations, where 93.6  % of the spread is explained by only 
9 indicators (Table 1).  
Table 1:  Overview of indicators 
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Only 6.5 % of the unexplained criteria were not explained by these. This result 
can be considered as very favorable and evidential. For a more specific solution, 
the first outcome was adjusted in accordance with the (impact) of each indicator 
through assigning a coefficient in a range of + 3 to – 3. Predominantly urban 
areas were excluded from the matrix after the calculations, as they are not the 
subject of this project and the final order of NUTS 4 was set in line with the 
RRA criteria. 
The successive re-assessment of each criterion based on a subjective evaluation 
of its meaning within RRA was terminated when the final order of NUTS 4 did 
not react to the sensitive changes of the scales. After evaluation of the time 
trends for the economic and social development in the last 15 years, the Bruntál 
district was chosen as a problematic RRA on the level of NUTS  4 for the 
purpose of the TERA project. This district is part of the NUTS  3 North 
Moravian district. The reason for the final choice is that both NUTS  3 and 
NUTS  4, which are cross-border areas with Poland, have been historically 
affected three times: 
•  The first time there was an extensive displacement of Germans after the 
2
nd world war, which mainly affected agriculture. The abandoned 
agricultural land was then managed by large-scale methods as state 
farms. Forcibly displaced inhabitants were replaced by people from 
inland, without any historical, ownership or expert continuity.  
•  The second serious breakpoint was the abnormal acceleration of heavy 
industry, mines, iron works and steel mills and large-scale agriculture, 
which contributed to the overall devastation of land and unbalanced the 
socio-economic development of the area.  
•  The third tragedy for the area was the collapse of heavy industry and the 
socialist agricultural businesses in 1990, with all the negative attendant 
phenomenon such as unemployment, negative migration, overall 
decrease of inhabitants, unfavorable structure of settlement, low quality 
of services and so on.  
The impact of these changes in marginal NUTS 4 of the North Moravian district 
and Bruntál district has been confirmed.  
4 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The paper focuses on the socio-economic situation and developments in the 
study’s remote rural areas (Table  2) and their potential for the future. It is 
presented as a comparative analysis of the areas and attempts to identify 
similarities and differences among them. The document is based on reports from 6 
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Table 2:  Study remote rural areas and their urban centers 
Country Study  area  Urban  center(s) 
Greece  Municipality of Archanes  Municipality of Heraklio 
Finland  North Karelia   Joensuu 
Scotland East  Highland  Inverness 
Italy  Po Plain Area  Ferrara, Ravenna 
Czech Republic  Bruntál  Ostrava 
Latvia  Latgale  Rezekne and Daugavpils 
 
The main socio-economic aspects of the study areas analyzed and compared are 
as follows: 
(a) Location and physical characteristics 
(b) Demography and human resources 
(c) Settlements, housing 
(d) Infrastructure – Road network and transport facilities 
(e) Socio-economic situation 
4.1  Location and physical characteristics  
Following the suggested methodology, the study areas are examined with two 
methods: (1) assessment of the most important indicators (Greece, Scotland, and 
Finland); (2) factor and/or cluster analysis (Czech Republic, Latvia, Italy). 
The selected study areas represent NUTS 3, NUTS 4 or NUTS 5 level. National 
NUTS  levels were used according to national conditions, including data 
availability. The Scottish unit LAU (Local Administrative Units) is comparable 
with NUTS 3, and the Italian unit SLL (Sistemi Locali di Lavoro) are identified 
as the NUTS 4 level. The Latvian clusters can be territorially identified as areas 
at the NUTS 3 level. 
Compared with neighboring areas and with national situations, all the selected 
study areas are marginal and represent remote rural areas linked with 
incorporated or adjacent urban areas (centers).  
4.2  Demography and human resources  
All study areas, except the Greek area, are sparsely populated with low population 
density, which is significantly lower than the population density of the given 
country. We can distinguish two levels of population density in the study areas. 
The first group contains areas with the density lower than 25  persons per  km
2 
(Finland, Latvia and Scotland). The second group contains areas with a 
significantly higher density (Czech Republic, Italy and Greece). 
The population in all the study areas, except the Finnish and Latvian area, is 
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distribution is characterized by a higher share of people over 65 and a lower 
share of people under 15. 
The effect of migration is different among the study areas. A positive balance 
can be seen in the Greek and Scottish areas, with inward movement of people 
from other parts of the country. A negative balance predominates in the Finnish, 
Czech and Latvian areas. 
The level of education as a reflection of the quality of human resources has 
shown improvement during recent years (the share of population with a higher 
education is growing), but the level is usually lower than the national average. 
This improvement is partially caused by immigration of people with higher 
education. 
4.3  Settlements, housing  
Each study area includes one or two urban centers, but the share of the rural 
population represents a significant (much higher than the national average) 
portion of the total population. This fact determines the rural character of the 
study areas. 
The majority of people in the study areas lives in family houses. There is a 
tendency towards reducing the number of household members and of the size of 
houses. 
The share of properties used as second residences or holiday homes is generally 
quite high. As a rule, the study areas have significant recreational potential, 
which could create good opportunities for future development in the areas.  
4.4  Infrastructure - Road networks and transport facilities 
All the areas studied can be relatively easily reached by road, railway or air. 
Transport facilities (bus and railway stations, airports) seem to be adequate. 
Among the study areas, the Czech, Finnish and Latvian areas can be considered 
as more isolated remote areas from this point of view. 
4.5  Socio-economic situation  
From the social and economic point of view, all the selected regions show 
similar characteristics (compared with national averages): 
•  Significantly lower GDP per capita; 
•  Much higher level of unemployment; 
•  Higher importance of the primary sector (agriculture and in some 
countries also forestry) in the structure of the local economy; 
•  Importance of the public sector in the economy; 
•  Growing share of tourism and other related services in the structure of 
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5 FINAL RESULTS 
The summary comparison of the study areas from the TERA objectives point of 
view is presented in Table 3. 
Table 3:  Comparison of the study areas 
Indicator Unit  CR  FIN  GRE  ITA  LAT  SCO 
Population density
* %  51  63  174  64  15.3    24 
Growth of population  
(last 10 years)  % 0.7  -3.0  6.3  -5.0  7.3  5.8 
Share of 0-14 age population  %  18.1  18.0  15.6  9  16.1  18.3 
Share of population over 65  %  11.1  25.0  19.4  24  23.6  15.9 
GDP per capita  eur  7,200  16,500 7,241 n.a.  1,230  19,050
GDP per capita
* %  82  75  74  n.a.  35  80 
Share of small businesses  %  57  95  100  n.a.  100  57 
Unemployment %  11.4  14.5  5.2  6-7  15.5  3.8 
Share of employed in  
primary sectors  % 6.6  8.0  38.2  14-35  47.0  12.5 
Share of employed in industry and 
construction  % 42.0  28.0  8.1  21-22  28.1  16.9 
Share of employed in other sectors 
(services)  % 51.4  64.0  53.7  34-50  24.9  71.6 
Average farm size  ha  110  29.2  2.6  15  15.6  40 
Share of recreational houses in  
their total number  % 15.4  29.7  12.0  24  n.a.  4.2 
Source:  Individual studies of the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Scotland. 
Notes:  n.a. = Not available. 
* % of the national average. 
Data and indications were used for elementary characterization and 
classification of the study areas. Two points of view (criteria) were applied for 
these purposes: The level of "remoteness" and the "best" strategy for future 
development (still reflecting only regional differences inside a given country, 
which means not considering regional differences at the EU-25 level). 
Considering most of the indicators in Table 3, distances from capitals and links 
with local urban centers, we can roughly recognize: 
•  Areas with a higher level of "remoteness" – Finland, Czech Republic. 
•  Areas with a middle level of "remoteness" – Latvia, Scotland. 
•  Areas with a lower level of "remoteness" – Greece, Italy. 
The concentration of typical features of all the studied areas can be used for 
identifying the "best" strategy for their future: 
•  Czech Republic: Economically underdeveloped area with a high 
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(also influenced by the existence of very large – non-family – farms and 
a relatively low share of the active population employed in the tertiary 
sectors). The "best" strategy for the future could be the utilization of a 
combination of refunding and creation principles. 
•  Finland: Nice landscape and a higher environmental endowment seem to 
be a good basis for further developing the recreational potential of the 
area, combined with continuation in the existing industries. A threat for 
the future is the relatively problematic age structure of the population. A 
balance of protection and compensation principles could be the "best" 
strategy for the future development of the area, also to reduce the 
present high level of unemployment. 
•  Greece: The area is predominantly (even extremely) targeted on primary 
agriculture, with a lower economic level compared with the national 
average. There is potential for the tertiary sector, particularly in tourism 
linked with the nearby historical sites. Considering the high importance 
of primary agriculture, another key issue is the development of 
processing capacities meeting higher standards of quality and/or origin. 
The "best" strategy could be the utilization of the creation principle, 
possibly in combination with the redistribution principle (e.g. higher 
supports from EU structural funds). 
•  Italy: Economically undeveloped area with a high share of its acreage in 
protected areas, but with promising links to two cultural and historical 
urban centers. However, applying the redistribution principle to 
conserve the environment as a public good seems to be the "best" 
strategy for the future.  
•  Latvia: Economically a very poor area compared to national averages, 
with a very high level of unemployment and an enormously high share 
of the population employed in agriculture. The development of other 
sectors, including the tertiary sector, is a "must" for the future, to 
gradually eliminate the bad socio-economic situation, including the 
worst age structure among the studied regions. The principles of 
refunding  combined with creation could be a solution for change to 
occur in the future. 
•  Scotland: The area seems to be the most economically developed among 
the study areas, with (surprisingly) higher employment in agriculture, 
much exceeding the EU and national levels. On the other hand, there is a 
large potential of combining the present activities with the development 
of tourism (the area also shows the highest employment in the tertiary 
sector among the studied areas). The leading creation principle could be 
the "best" solution for the future of the area.  Zuzana Bednarikova, Tomas Doucha, Zdenek Travnicek  526
6 CONCLUSION 
The overall objective of the international project TERA (6
th Framework 
Program; participants: Italy, Finland, Greece, Scotland, Czech Republic, Latvia) 
is to identify and analyze the territorial factors that influence the development of 
enterprises in remote rural areas of Europe. 
The objective of the initial portion of the project is to specify and identify 
projects study areas (by means of factor analysis, cluster analysis or expert 
assessment), to complete a descriptive analysis of the areas and finally, to 
complete a comparative analysis and offer suggestions for future development.  
The comparative analysis is based on reports from 6 individual partners. The 
main socio-economic aspects of the study areas analyzed and compared are: 
Location and physical characteristics, demography and human resources, settle-
ments and housing, infrastructure, the socio-economic situation. 
The areas specified in this work are rural, remote, sparsely populated and 
containing or adjacent to an urban center. Overall, the population is aging. The 
effect of migration is different among the study areas. The level of education has 
shown an improvement. The study areas have significant recreational potential 
and can be relatively easily reached by car, train or air. All the selected regions 
show similar socio-economic characteristics (compared with the national 
average): Lower GDP per capita, high level of unemployment, high importance 
of the primary and tertiary sector, structure of enterprises based mainly on small 
businesses. 
Data from the partners were used for an elementary characterization and 
classification of the study areas. Two points of view (criteria) were applied for 
these purposes: The level of "remoteness" (higher, middle, lower) and the "best" 
strategy for a future development (principles of redistribution, refunding, 
protection, compensation, creation). The results show that all levels of remoteness 
are equally represented among the areas, and the principle of creation, combined 
with refunding or redistribution, seems to be the most suitable strategy. This 
means that the study areas have significant potential which could create good 
opportunities for further development. 
An ongoing aim is to design the structure of the CGE and NEG models which 
will be constructed for the TERA study areas. The CGE modeling frameworks 
should be able to account not only for (rather traditional) issues such as 
remoteness, distance, transport costs, factor mobility, etc., but also for 
externalities (such as quality of life) and dependence on natural resources. Also, 
the NEG macroeconomic models will explore the effects of intersectoral labor 
reallocations on employment/unemployment in remote rural areas. 
Furthermore, these models should have a multisectoral nature and be able to 
assess the effects of policy changes on the development of enterprises in these 
remote rural areas and on the development of these areas as a whole. Territorial aspects of enterprise development in remote rural areas of Europe  527
To illustrate in practice how a number of key elements (remoteness and 
distance, factor mobility, externalities and agriculture, determining and 
disaggregation level) for the project might be captured using the CGE model, an 
example of Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) will be introduced. SAM 
explicitly accounts for a range of rural-linkages between activities, factors of 
production and households (PHIMISTER and ROBERTS, 2006).  
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The paper discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the LEADER approach as 
an instrument for rural development policy in post-socialist rural areas. In 
development theory and in the view of the European Commission, this approach 
appears rather promising. The economic success of promoted projects, evaluated 
by classical cost-benefit-analysis, and regional efficiency is analyzed for two 
case studies in Eastern Germany. These two regions participate in a national 
program – Active Regions – which follows a strong LEADER approach. The 
results show that the efficiency criteria of EU-policy are reached, in general, 
with a very wide scope between projects. The overall regional process meets EU 
criteria as well. The discussion of results shows that it is not possible to define 
general success factors by also considering other empirical findings. Regionally-
specific conditions – hard factors like infrastructure and income level and weak 
factors like social conditions and local actors – have a large influence. 
Therefore, the planned introduction of the LEADER program in less-favored 
rural areas in post-socialist countries as an obligatory instrument of rural 
development requires special attention. 
Keywords: Rural development, LEADER-approach, Efficiency analysis 
Eastern Germany. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU) has changed 
rapidly in the past fifteen years. Rural development policy is one key element of the 
CAP, now in the 2
nd pillar. From 2007-2013 rural development policy will be 
organized in one single fund and under one Council regulation (COUNCIL, 2005). 
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And will be obligatory to all EU member states, including the new member states 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Besides traditional instruments of promotion like 
support of investment, capacity building and training, the so-called LEADER-
approach will be obligatory. The LEADER-approach as a methodological axis is a 
territorial and bottom-up approach. For successful introduction, specific conditions 
are necessary and there is little experience with it in the new member states 
(however, as a former socialist society, East Germany has already participated in 
LEADER-programs for several years). Conditions in rural areas are partly 
comparable to that in other new member states. Rural areas in Central and Eastern 
European countries face several problems. In socialist times, no special emphasis 
was given to them. During transformation, the declining importance of the 
agricultural and food sector could not be coped with by economic growth in 
other sectors. Therefore, the economic gap between rural and urban areas has 
widened in the last ten years (BAUM and WEINGARTEN, 2005). Pillar I support of 
the CAP favors economically competitive regions. It does not contribute to 
economic and social cohesion (DAX et al., 2005). Traditional instruments of 
pillar  II are evaluated inconsistently as well concerning cohesion goals. The 
experience of adopting EU rural policy in the pre-accession period (SAPARD 
program) is not too promising. Therefore, it is useful to define necessary 
conditions and determine those instruments that meet the conditions in less 
favored rural areas. 
The theory of regional development is not able to completely explain the observed 
differences in regional economic development or to determine all factors that are 
relevant for fostering economic growth (BAUM and WEINGARTEN 2005). Rural 
development policy has to rely on empirical findings and best practice examples. 
In EU discussion, territorial approaches that are not confined to mono-sectored 
promotion are especially assumed to be promising, although comparative 
evaluation has generally not taken place.  
In Germany a national program – Active Regions – Shaping Rural Futures – was 
introduced in 2002, and follows the LEADER approach with some important 
differences, especially in application. The author had the opportunity to work in 
one of the model regions and participate in the evaluation of another. This paper 
will analyze the adoption and results of this program in some regions of Eastern 
Germany. The analysis will be based on two case studies of the national 
program and will be compared with other evaluation results and with the 
LEADER program. The economic evaluation relies on cost-benefit-analysis. 
The results and their possible relevance to other Central and Eastern European 
rural areas will be discussed at the end of the paper.  Theodor Fock  530
2 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
2.1  The promotion program "Active Regions" 
The German Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection 
initiated the national program Active Regions – Shaping Rural Futures 
("Regionen Aktiv") in 2001. In a nationwide competition, eighteen model 
regions were selected out of 206 regions that applied. The selected model 
regions were to develop new paths in promoting activities in the field of regional 
rural development, environmentally-friendly activities and consumer interests. 
Sustainability and a social policy approach were to be adopted. The national 
government gave special funds to the model regions, on top of normal funding, 
averaging €  3  million for the period 2002-2005. Compared to the LEADER 
program, the federal ministry introduced some new elements. Besides the 
declared goals, the implementation of the program is especially innovative; so-
called regional development partnerships were established consisting of 
professional regional management, regional actors organized in an association 
and a public body administrating the public budgets. The selection and decision 
process of what kind, which amount and which actor to be promoted was given 
completely to the regions, thus strengthening their sense of responsibility 
(BMELV, 2002). Non-state actors were to have a majority in the decision-making 
process to guarantee a genuine bottom-up approach. The Federal Ministry gave 
no guidelines for the kind of support to be implemented, thus, projects from all 
sectors of rural life were possible. In the end, all kinds of actions could be 
chosen, except for those limited by European regulation. Compared with the 
local groups in the LEADER approach, under this program regional competence 
is stronger.  
2.2  The model regions and the data source 
Two model regions situated in northeast Germany were analyzed in detail, the 
Lübeck Bay region (Region Lübecker Bucht) and the Mecklenburg Lake District 
(Region Mecklenburgische Seenplatte). The two regions differ in their starting 
conditions; the Lübeck Bay region is influenced by the city of Lübeck, which 
has approximately 250,000 inhabitants in the center of the region. Parts of it 
belong to the former East, while parts belong to the former West Germany. The 
region may be characterized as typically rural but with strong links to an urban 
center. Table 1 shows some basic data of both regions. The Mecklenburg Lake 
District lies completely in East Germany, the distance to urban centers exceeds 
140 km (to Berlin) and the largest town in the region, Neubrandenburg, has only 
67,000  inhabitants. The region is characterized by the Federal Office for 
Building and Regional Planning as a rural area with strong development 
problems (BBR, 2000). In both regions, tourism is a major factor only in some 
areas: At the shore of the Baltic Sea in the Lübeck Bay area and around Lake New policy approaches for rural development  531
Müritz, the second largest German lake in the Mecklenburg Lake District, but in 
other parts rural tourism is developing slowly. 
Table 1:  Basic data of the two model regions 
2002/2003 
  Lübeck Bay Area  Mecklenburg Lake 
District 
Area [km²]  1,936  5,810 
Inhabitants [1.000]  425  317 
Populations density [persons per km²]  219  55 
Municipalities (number)  101  249 
Tourism (number of overnight stays [mio.])  3.2  2.3 
Rate of unemployment [p.c.]  17  25 
Source:   BMELV, 2002. 
The regional development concepts of both regions reflect their different 
situations, potentials and problems. In both concepts, fostering regional products 
and marketing and rural tourism are important parts. In the Lübeck Bay area, 
aspects of environmental and consumer protection are main considerations of 
the regional goals, and thus integrate special needs of the urban population. On 
the other hand, in the Mecklenburg Lake district, the focus lies on fostering 
regional economic development through strengthening value-adding processes, 
which reflects the region’s severe economic and social situation and its high 
rates of unemployment, outward migration and economic stagnation.  
2.3  Method of economic evaluation 
To evaluate the economic effects of this kind of project funding, cost-benefit 
analysis is appropriate. The projects have long-term cost and especially benefit 
effects, such that the duration of the contribution margin or profit calculation 
would be too short. For a more econometric analysis (data envelope analysis), 
necessary data are missing. But the limitations of cost-benefit-analysis have to 
be considered. Not all effects can be monetarized, the interest rate for 
discounting future benefits is disputable and future benefits, especially over 
periods of more than ten years, are only estimations. The economic effects are 
calculated from a regional project-based point of view. More tourism in the one 
promoted region could lead to less tourism in other regions, so that from a 
broader view, the effects would lead to a zero-balance, although they are 
assessed as a benefit in this calculation. The strictly regional perspective seems 
justifiable, as the objective of the programs is the promotion of regional 
economic development. Thus, only the promoted and realized projects and their 
costs and benefits are integrated in the calculations. Alternatives with a 
potentially higher interest rate are not considered, so an optimum is not 
determined.  Theodor Fock  532
The calculation itself follows a standard routine, with problems occurring 
especially in data collection and evaluation. Quantification of inputs (public and 
private budgets) is possible without data problems, whereas outputs, which in 
many cases will occur in the future, are insecure, and precise data may be 
missing or cannot be quantified by project actors. The efficiency of project 
promotion is calculated by the internal interest rate for different periods, and 
according to EU-standards in project funding, a minimum interest rate of 5 % 
should be reached to classify a project’s funding as successful. For the Lübeck 
Bay area, 50 projects in total and 19 detailed analysis projects formed the basis 
in from 2002 to August, 2005. For the Mecklenburg Lake District, there were 
40 projects in total and 15 detailed analysis projects from 2002 to November 2005. 
The duration of single projects differs, with some running for just months, and 
some more than two years; thus, the total public budget ranges between € 5,000 
and € 400,000. In both cases, regional management was promoted completely by 
public budget and acted mostly as project management without direct measurable 
benefits. The overall benefits, including benefits of those projects without detailed 
evaluation, were assigned regional management (FOCK et al., 2005; NOLEPPA, 2006). 
Therefore, comparative efficiency is measured by the value of the internal 
interest rate with the discussed methodological limitations, and the value of 5 % 
is interpreted as a minimum criteria for efficiency. 
3 RESULTS 
Calculating economic efficiency leads to efficiency results of single projects, 
overall regional efficiency and, partly, to cross-program comparisons. With 
calculations on a single project basis, it is possible to find success factors 
depending on the project field/objective (i.e., direct marketing, rural tourism, 
product development, environmental protection, etc.), the kind of project funding 
(i.e., investments, employment, public relation and marketing) and the project 
actors (farmers, other profit or non-profit institutions, public or private). The 
Active Regions program offers a wide range of options because the limitations 
of funding were very wide. Cross-program evaluation is only partly possible, 
except with a special interest in future program design due to differing program 
objectives and different methods of evaluation. 
As expected, the results of calculating the economic efficiency on a project basis 
exhibit a large range. Some projects have a high positive rate of interest, 
between 20 % and 100 %, in a period of only five years, whereas other projects 
need up to fifteen years to reach the break-even point or do not reach a positive 
return on disbursed project funds at all. The differing results are partly due to the 
respective projects’ field and objective. Projects with aim to promote education, 
consumer protection or environmentally-friendly activities are not mainly 
undertaken for economic profitability, and consequently, a positive net return is 
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performance, not the project’s objective, lead to differing success. The 
efficiency analysis shows that innovation is a main success factor. The funding 
of well-known standard activities such as direct marketing on farms, or tourism 
in combination with horse-riding led to positive but low internal interest rates; 
profit-making effects could be observed in these projects. However, projects 
with a high degree of innovation, for instance the developing vegetarian ice 
cream or creating new tourist routes with an emphasis on cultural activities 
("Kultur- und Literaturreisen") were the projects with the most outstanding 
economic results. But innovative projects are naturally much more risky, and 
public funds function as venture capital in these cases.  
For an evaluation of regional profitability, e.g. economic efficiency summarizing 
the effects of all projects and significant differences in the character of project 
funding, i.e., in fields like rural tourism or direct marketing, is of interest. Table 2 
shows the results for regional profitability. In both cases, positive interest rates 
are reached in the long-term perspective. Considering only five years, the costs 
of project funding and maintenance (public and private) surpass the benefits. It 
must be considered that for both regions, some economically very successful 
projects largely contribute to positive economic returns (FOCK  et al., 2005; 
NOLEPPA, 2006). In general, the investment of public funds is justified in both 
cases if the EU criterion of 5 % is taken, especially if non-monetarizable effects 
that contribute to public welfare, such as improvements in consumer protection, 
education or gender aspects can be quantified. Three further indicators lead to 
the generally positive evaluation of the two case studies: The minimum private 
co-financing rate of 25 %, which was set by the government and reached in both 
cases (27.5 % and 31.3 %). Secondly, the ratio of investment, which is high, at 
150 % of public funds, compared to other promotion programs, and the cost-
ratio per sustainable job opportunity of approximately € 100,000, which is rather 
low. 
Table 2:  Results of the cost-benefit-analysis on a regional basis 
  Internal interest rates in p.c. 
In 
Characteristics  5 years  10 years  15 years  20 years 
Mecklenburg Lake District  n.a.  0.8  6.3  8.4 
Lübeck Bay Area         (a) 









Source:  Own calculations in FOCK et al., 2005; NOLEPPA 2006. 
Notes:  a: Official data; b: Adjusted data. 
The measurement of intervention success in regional development policy is 
complicated due to methodological and empirical problems (TOEPEL, 2000). 
Differentiating the success by project character is therefore, in this study, only 
possible intuitively, by constructing "clusters" and comparing relative economic 
profitability and other success factors. In the Mecklenburg Bay District, projects Theodor Fock  534
in product development and partly in marketing activities and promoting selling 
points of regional products, are successful above average. In the Lübeck Bay 
Area, the above-average projects are found in regional marketing activities and 
rural tourism, partly combined with cultural activities. The differences reflect 
the specific regional conditions. The urban-influenced Lübeck Bay area offers 
better opportunities for recreation and sales volume of regional products. In 
contrast, in the Mecklenburg Lake District, the favorable farm structure enables 
the development of new regional products. For regional marketing, a special 
infrastructure, with central selling points is useful because of the low population 
density. It is remarkable that non-government actors were, in both regions, able 
to define projects with high development potential out of the high number of 
theoretically-possible projects. 
A third aspect is cross-program evaluation to determine general success factors 
for future program design. For the current LEADER-programs, results of economic 
evaluation are, in general, not available. The mid-term evaluation concentrated 
on aspects like program development, application of the bottom-up approach and 
network building according to EU-regulations (SCHWARZ et al., 2003). At this 
stage, the comparison of programs must concentrate on these aspects. Differences 
in the program implementation of LEADER and Active Regions are rather 
obvious and indicate higher economic efficiency in the national model project. 
The duration of implementation was shorter compared to LEADER, which could 
only start after two years of program specification and notification by EU-
administration. It is obvious that the motivation of non-government actors is 
harmed by the long delay before implementation. The structure of local action 
groups and regional partnerships in the "Active Regions" program differs with 
the emphasis on public bodies in LEADER and private actors in "Active 
Regions". This is reflected by the character of selected projects and the 
promoted activities. Under the LEADER-program, projects with a non-profit 
character dominate and grants are given mainly to non-profit organizations or 
municipalities (FOCK et al., 2005). Concerning objectives like promoting value-
adding processes and regional employment, the adaptation of LEADER appears 
less successful in the analyzed cases. 
4 DISCUSSION 
Empirical findings may contribute to the further development of instruments for 
regional development. Case study results are needed for improving policy 
design, especially as the "general theory of rural development" is still missing. 
Transferring experiences one-by-one from one region to another is not possible 
due to specific regional circumstances. Therefore, the results of the two 
analyzed regions in Eastern Germany can only serve as a basis for further 
analysis in other regions. Rural areas in Eastern Germany are influenced, as are 
others in Central and Eastern Europe, by specific post-socialist factors. Due to New policy approaches for rural development  535
the German reunification process, integration into the European Union took 
place much faster and deficits in rural infrastructure were largely reduced. The 
starting situation for adopting rural development instruments following the 
LEADER-approach is only partly comparable to the situation in other Central 
and Eastern European regions. 
The experience with endogenous rural development in one Polish region 
illustrates the problems and ambitious preconditions for implementation 
(GRAMZOW, 2005). Deficits in access to capital markets, physical infrastructure, 
the low income-level and the unfavorable farm and business structure are major 
obstacles. Positive experience with endogenous development is important. 
Another important bottleneck is that innovative and cooperative regional actors 
in administration and non-government associations are engaged in endogenous 
regional development. The experience in Poland corresponds to results of the 
mid-term evaluation of "Active-Regions" (KNICKEL et al., 2004), where similar 
success factors were defined. For many other regions, comparable conditions are 
given which will complicate the successful adaptation of measures following the 
LEADER-approach. 
Especially in less-favored areas, high co-financing rates cause additional problems 
(GRAJEWSKI and SCHRADER, 2004). One reason for the quick implementation of 
the national "Active Regions" program and its higher attractiveness for local 
actors compared to LEADER is assumed to be its lean structure. Co-financing 
through different public bodies was not necessary. The possibility of 
influencing, directly or indirectly, the selection of projects is thus dropped. It is 
easier to establish an actual decision-making body at a regional level that is 
trusted by the local population. Under the model character of Active Regions, 
decision-making competencies are delegated to the regions with almost 
complete independence, whereas under the current LEADER programs, the 
supervising role of central administration continues.  
With the high participation of profit-oriented actors, the character of promoted 
projects seems to be shifting in that direction as well. Projects with an innovative 
character are those with a special economic capacity. In decision-making bodies 
with a strong private and profit-oriented share, it is more likely that this kind of 
project will be chosen, which is in contrast to the dominance of public 
administration representatives, who are more risk-averse.  
Objectives such as fostering regional income and regional employment can be 
supported directly, whereas infrastructure and non-profit projects can only be 
achieved indirectly. At least for the two analyzed model regions, the decision-
making process shows satisfying results. Nevertheless, without a strong civil 
society, it will be difficult to realize the possible surplus of endogenous 
development strategies like "Active Regions" and the LEADER-approach. 
Transferring these instruments to rural areas in the new member states requires Theodor Fock  536
careful measurement, especially for less-favored areas with structural problems 
and weak societies. 
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